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

John Darby,
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A

SURVEY

OF THE

TURKISH EMPIRE.

IN WHICH ARE CONSIDERED,

I.

ITS GOVERNMENT,

FINANCES, MILITARY AND NAVAL FORCE,

Religion, Hiſtory, Arts, Sciences, Manners, Commerce, *and* Population.

II.

THE STATE OF THE PROVINCES,

Including the ancient Government of the CRIM TATARS,

The Subjection of the GREEKS,

THEIR EFFORTS TOWARD EMANCIPATION,

And the Intereſt of other Nations,

Particularly of GREAT BRITAIN, in their Succeſs.

III.

THE CAUSES OF THE DECLINE OF TURKEY,

And thoſe which tend to the PROLONGATION of its EXISTENCE,

With a Developement of the Political Syſtem of the late

EMPRESS OF RUSSIA.

IV.

THE BRITISH COMMERCE WITH TURKEY,

The Neceſſity of aboliſhing the LEVANT COMPANY,

And the Danger of our QUARANTINE REGULATIONS.

WITH MANY OTHER IMPORTANT PARTICULARS.

By W. ETON, Eſq;

MANY YEARS RESIDENT IN TURKEY AND IN RUSSIA.

LONDON:

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PREFACE.

I Do not offer to the Public a complete Treatiſe; I have indeed materials, out of which I could have formed a much larger work; but theſe outlines will, I hope, repreſent in its true character the object to which I more immediately wiſh to fix the attention of my readers.

As I reaſon only from facts, I truſt the impartial Reader will draw the ſame concluſions; and as I ſpeak of countries in which I have been long reſident, and of events, to many of which I was witneſs, I hope my teſtimony may have ſome weight. To ſhow that I have had opportunities of being acquainted with the matters of which I treat, I will only obſerve, that in Turkey I have been a conſul; that I have had indirect concerns in trade; and that, as a traveller, I have viſited moſt parts of that empire; that in Ruſſia I was, for ſeveral years, in the confidence of the

3-23-46

late Prince Potemkin, and in a ſituation to know more of the ſecrets of the cabinet than moſt foreigners; and that for five years I did the buſineſs of ſecretary to his Majeſty's miſſion at St. Peterſburgh: at the ſame time I am convinced that I expoſe myſelf to the cenſure of not being better informed, and, on the other hand, of incurring, though I am conſcious of not meriting, the blame of betraying a confidence put in me; ſo far, however, from this being the caſe, I rather apprehend that the delicacy of my ſituation, with reſpect to the two countries, and particularly to my own, may have operated too reſtrictively on my pen.

Many writers and travellers have ſeen things in a different light; and I am ſenſible that I may be accuſed of treating the Turks too ſeverely, and particularly by thoſe who admire Lady Wortley Montagu's elegant deſcriptions, and ſimilar productions of a warm imagination *. I draw concluſions from facts recorded

* The beſt authors who have written on this ſubject are, *Buſbec*, *Leunclav*, *Montecuculli*, *Marſigli*, and *Ricaut*; they ſhow what the Turks were in their days. As to *Cantemir*, though he had found an aſylum in the very heart of the

recorded in their own hiſtory. Indeed there cannot be a more horrible picture than that which they have, themſelves, delineated. The ſentiments expreſſed by the ſultans and muftis, which will be found in the abridgement of their hiſtory, in their own words, are ſo repugnant to juſtice, to humanity, to every principle of virtue, and to thoſe laws which all civilized nations have reſpected, that nothing can be ſaid worſe of them. The effects produced by this monſtrous government in the provinces are ſhocking to behold. We ſeek in vain for a population, ſufficient to compoſe thoſe numerous kingdoms and ſtates, which flouriſhed when the Turks uſurped their dominion; we find the country literally a deſert; we find vaſt cities reduced to beggarly villages, and of many hundreds no traces remain.

The government of the Turks has undergone conſiderable revolutions, which

the Ruſſian empire, he wrote as if he ſtill had been at Conſtantinople. Other more modern authors are, *Boſcoviſch*, *Buſinello*, *Guys*, *Le Bret*, *Sir James Porter*, *Riedeſel with Dohm's notes*, *Ludeke*, *Stœvers*, *Ferrieres*, and *Volney*, and their picture of the Turks is not more favourable than mine. There are others, who have compoſed in their cloſets excellent hiſtories, &c. of this people.

it will be neceſſary to inveſtigate. The empire, in its flouriſhing ſtate, was one vaſt camp. The firſt ſultans dated, and their feeble ſucceſſors ſtill date, their decrees from the imperial ſtirrup. The iron ſceptre, imbrued in blood, could only be wielded by warlike ſovereigns, the idol and the terror of the ſoldiery, whoſe diſcipline alone was their politics, and whoſe rapine alone their reſources.

Achmet III. father of the late Abdul-hamid, firſt ſet the example of an effeminate reign; and by not going out himſelf at the head of his janizaries, he became ſo much the object of their contempt that they dethroned him.

Machmud, his nephew, terrified at the fate of his predeceſſor, and finding himſelf unable to govern, determined to deſtroy the whole body of janizaries. The army, dreaded by the ſultan, found in him an enemy more powerful than all the hoſts of Chriſtendom; and he, without their co-operation, unable to wield his ſceptre, found an enemy in the other ſlaves he called in to aſſiſt him, ſtill more deſtructive of his own power. The preſent reigning ſultan, Selim, has fallen on a more gentle

tle method of aboliſhing the *janizaries*, but he ſtill has the *ulema* to contend with.

The abſtract of their hiſtory is moſtly from Ricault, whoſe antiquated, though faithful relation, I have often quoted in his own language. I have only cited a few facts to prove the truth of my general aſſertions; to enumerate only all the inſtances of unprovoked aggreſſion, breach of oaths, treaties, and capitulations, maſſacres, and acts of cruelty and oppreſſion, to be found in the bloody pages of their hiſtory, would alone make a large volume.

The firſt part of theſe papers has been written ſome time; that which is political, about two years ago, on my return to my native country; but it was not then deſigned for the preſs. It may be objected, that there are matters in it which ought not to be made public, as it contains information which may benefit our enemies; I anſwer, that they being in poſſeſſion of the information which the late government of France had procured, there is nothing eſſential in this book which will be new to them; nor had even that government, at any time, ſo many ſpies,

or ſuch exact intelligence as the Directory now have.

With reſpect to the Greeks, there will be found much matter wholly new to the Public, but not to the Directory; for no one was better informed of the ſtate of Greece than citizen (heretofore chevalier de) Truguet, lately miniſter of the marine department. He was for a long time employed in the Archipelago, under the direction of Mr. de Choiſſeul Gouffier, and was ſent to Egypt to negotiate with the Beys for leave to trade to India through that country, and to counteract the Ruſſian intrigues with them.

I have endeavoured to prove, that the intereſts of Great Britain and Ruſſia are inſeparable and reciprocal. This, indeed, has been generally granted; but when the aggrandizement of that empire at the expence of the Turks has been the ſubject of diſcuſſion, that caſe has generally been conſidered as an exception; on what grounds I ſhall examine, and, I hope, plainly prove that the expulſion of the Turks from Europe, and the re-eſtabliſhment of the Greek empire, is more the advantage

of

of Britain than even of Ruſſia itſelf; that ſo far from being an uſurpation, it is an act of juſtice; and that, according to the laws of nations, the Turks have not, by length of poſſeſſion, acquired a right to the dominion of the countries they conquered. The importance of the alliance of Ruſſia appears every day more ſtrongly, and I riſk now, much leſs than I did a few years ago, when I maintained, that the ſalvation of Europe depended on engaging that power as a principal in the war. The views of the French with regard to Greece now too plainly appear, and the Emperor of Ruſſia is in danger of being attacked in the Black Sea by a French fleet.

If it be ſaid that we ought, as much as may depend on us, to prevent the increaſe of naval power in every other nation, without denying the propoſition, I affirm, that it is not applicable to the preſent caſe: Ruſſia never can be formidable in the Baltic; nature has forbid it. In the Black Sea ſhe may, and ſhe will, in ſpite of all we can do to prevent it. The queſtion then is, ſince we cannot prevent it, which is the mode of its exiſtence which will be

be leaſt hurtful to us? That the Greeks will emancipate themſelves from the yoke of Turkey is equally certain. If this event take place by the aſſiſtance of the French, we ſhall *certainly* have an *enemy* in Greece; if through Ruſſia, and with our concurrence, a friend. There is, indeed, a poſſibility, but not the leaſt probability, that we may ſometime or other quarrel with them, but not for a length of time, as there will exiſt a mutual intereſt in friendſhip. Why make a vain attempt, which will certainly create us enemies, when at leaſt we ſtand a fair chance of procuring friends?

What I have ſaid of Auſtria at that time, I leave as I wrote; I ſee no reaſon to think I was then wrong.

The conſiſtency of the conduct of his Majeſty's miniſters, in firſt oppoſing the expulſion of the Turks from Europe, and afterwards making a war with Ruſſia a *caſus fœderis*, in the treaty of alliance with the Empreſs, in 1795, is fully proved by the different circumſtances of the times. They have evinced, that they uniformly purſued the intereſts of their country, and did not obſtinately adhere to a ſyſtem, when

it no longer accorded with them. Let their antagoniſts prove, that they themſelves did not ſacrifice the honour, as well as the intereſts of this country, in oppoſing, in an unprecedented manner, the meaſures adopted by its government; that they themſelves are not the cauſe of thoſe calamities which they attribute to miſconduct in miniſters.

I have added a few miſcellaneous papers without order or digeſtion. They will ſhow, in part, how far the Empreſs's vaſt views of aggrandizement extended—they went to the entire conqueſt of all European Turkey, a part of which was to be given to the Houſe of Auſtria; the re-eſtabliſhment of the Greek empire, and placing her grandſon Conſtantine on the throne of Conſtantinople; of making Egypt an independent ſtate; of giving to Poland a Ruſſian for a ſovereign, and ultimately incorporating it into her own empire; of making a conqueſt of Japan and a part of China, and eſtabliſhing a naval power in thoſe ſeas.

I have thought it neceſſary to ſay ſomething of the character of the late Empreſs. Anecdotes of that Princeſs appear daily in all languages. There are doubtleſs

doubtleſs many truths in ſome of them, but they are generally ſo defectively related, and with circumſtances which ſo totally miſcharacteriſe the action, that few of them will ſerve as materials for the accurate Biographer. Thoſe who wiſh to know her real character, and the character of the moſt conſiderable perſons of her court, would do well to wait a little longer. As to the hiſtory of her reign, there are many circumſtances which cannot yet be diſcloſed. Theſe anecdotes have the appearance of having been learnt in Ruſſia, but not committed to writing, and the memory of the authors, ſurcharged with abundance of materials, has confounded them; they appear like mutilated ſtatues reſtored by unſkilful artiſts; we find the trunk of a Hercules or a Jupiter with the head of an Apollo and the feet of a Satyr.

It is a difficult thing, at all times, to diſcover truth, amidſt the miſrepreſentations of courts, of miniſters, of commanders. Should any one write, for inſtance, the hiſtory of the laſt war between Ruſſia and Turkey, he would take for his guide, in relating the firſt event, the ſiege of Ochakof, the accounts

counts publiſhed by the court of Peterſburgh, and the reports of the commanders. There he would find a brilliant victory gained by Prince Naſſau over the Turkiſh fleet in the Liman; but if he could get the report made by Paul Jones to the Admiralty of Cherſon, ſigned by all the commanders of the fleet, he would find that no engagement took place (except a diſtant cannonade); that the Turkiſh ſhips ran aground by their ignorance and bad manœuvres; and that Naſſau with his *flotilla*, inſtead of taking poſſeſſion of them, ſet them on fire. This journal, which I have read, and taken an extract from, was forbidden by Prince Potemkin to be ſent to Peterſburgh, and the whole campaign, as it ſtands on record, is nearly a romance. The fortreſs might have been taken the 1ſt of July with more eaſe than the 6th of December, and the commander in chief knew it. I was at the opening of the trenches, and at the ſtorming of the place, and therefore can ſpeak of facts to which I was an eye-witneſs.

If, after all, I am miſtaken, and have loſt my way in the wilderneſs of politics, I have not erred intentionally; I have

have been guided by no motive but the intereſt of my country: and here I muſt make a digreſſion, which, I hope, will be pardoned.

A man who has been twenty years abſent from his native country may, I hope, be permitted to expreſs his aſtoniſhment at the changes he finds on his return. Changes which ſeem not to ſtrike ſo forcibly thoſe who ſaw the face of things every day.

When I left England, no man would have dared to ſtand up to arraign his country, and publicly plead the cauſe of France, and its enmity then was friendſhip compared with its enmity now; he would have been deemed a traitor, and the people would have treated him as ſuch.

I hear miniſters accuſed of plunging the nation into a ruinous war, and perſevering in it; I look to facts, and facts prove the contrary.

They are accuſed of not humiliating their country before the enemy, and procuring ſuch a peace as muſt ſoon make England a province of France. I hope they are guilty.

I hear it publicly aſſerted, that the conſtitution is changed; that liberty is annihilated;

annihilated; that we are under a military government. I look to facts, and find a Hardy, a Thelwall, &c. &c. &c. cannot be puniſhed. I ſee acquitted, at Haverford, men who were accuſed by five witneſſes of high treaſon, becauſe on their trial the witneſſes cannot be *perſuaded* to ſpeak out; and becauſe their firſt poſitive, clear, and unequivocal depoſition before a magiſtrate cannot be admitted. Where is the military government? The circumſtance of an invaſion would have juſtified it. How did they proceed in France, where liberty, equality, and fraternity are eſtabliſhed? they puniſhed *en maſſe*. At Toulon, all thoſe *ſuſpected* of having favoured the Engliſh were collected and fired on; at Lyons and other places, the ſame. Where were the juries? the counſel for the priſoners? where was the book of laws? where was the judge, who durſt not interpret them one ſyllable beyond the letter? How would they have proceeded here? Not only the two men in queſtion, but the whole town of Fiſguard, would have been driven to the place where the French landed by invitation, and tried and executed by a regiment of ſoldiers, all *en maſſe*, or in a lump.

lump. They would have proceeded in the ſame manner with a Thelwall and his applauding audience. How did they proceed with their oppoſition? not an oppoſition to overturn the government it had ſworn to maintain, but an oppoſition to ſtop the progreſs of deſpotic power. The members of it were all ſeized, and ſent without trial to ſome place, nobody knows where, into exile, perhaps to the bottom of the ocean.

In what page of hiſtory, ancient or modern, is ſuch moderation to be found as in this inſulted government? I ſee here, *proved by facts*, men ſubject only to the law, and that law more powerful than men. I find no ſuch liberty anywhere elſe, neither in practice at this day, nor in the records of hiſtory.

Nor are my ears leſs ſhocked to hear a foreign dialect ſpoken by a part of the people of Britain. Our demagogues have tranſlated the French words *liberté, egalité, fraternité, philantropie, philoſophie*, by the Engliſh words, liberty, equality, fraternity, philanthropy, philoſophy, and becauſe there is much reſemblance in the ſounds, they would perſuade the people that there is alſo a reſemblance in the ideas.

Facts

Facts teach us, that *liberté* ſignifies the moſt horrible tyranny, ſilencing all law, and violating all property; that *egalité* ſignifies, murdering ſovereigns and the higher claſſes, and putting over the people men the moſt low, ignorant, and wicked, inveſted with power to inſult, enſlave, and drive them in flocks to be ſlaughtered, and placing them at a greater diſtance than there exiſted before between them and their ſuperiors by birth and education. *Fraternité*, in France, ſignifies being a Frenchman; applied to other nations, it ſignifies, forcing on them a government, plundering their property, and taking their wives and daughters. *Philantropie*, is profeſſing a general love to all mankind, and practiſing cruelty to every individual. *Philoſophie*, (which was the mother of all the French virtues,) ſignifies the commiſſion of every crime without remorſe; the extinction of every ſentiment religious and moral, of every generous and ſocial feeling; the diſſolution of every tie of kindred and affection; the annihilation of every quality which ornaments and diſtinguiſhes the gentleman, the ſcholar, and the man of taſte; the baniſhment of chaſtity, mo-

deſty, ſenſibility, and decorum from the female ſex.

Every nation has thought it neceſſary, in times of public danger, to puniſh crimes, when the common law was inſufficient, by a tribunal erected for that purpoſe; in Athens, this tribunal was compoſed of the people aſſembled; in Rome, by judges appointed in conſequence of a decree of the people. Have not the good people of Britain a right to look to their repreſentatives for protection againſt thoſe who *openly* and *ſecretly* attack their government, and who *eſtabliſh ſchools to diſſeminate ſedition* in the minds of their children, and yet defend the revolutionary tribunals in France, and the military deſpotiſm of the Directory, on the ground of public danger? In all offences againſt the nation, might not, (I aſk, for I am not learned in the law) conſiſtently with our ſacred conſtitution, the repreſentatives of the nation try and decide, rather than a jury of private perſons? Such offences are not of a private nature between man and man: or might not that body which repreſents the party injured, the nation, be the accuſer, and the Houſe of Lords the tribunal? If this

manner of proceeding be unprecedented, the neceſſity of occurring to it is alſo unprecedented.

I feel it incumbent on me to apologize to the Public for the repetitions, foreign idioms, and other inaccuracies and defects, which may be found in this work, in conſequence of its having been too haſtily prepared for the preſs.

ERRATA.

Page 66. line 4, *for* volontiers, *read* volunteers.
— 128. laſt line note, *for* melice, *read* unilitia.
— 156. line 22, *for* of, *read* off.
— 343, — 1, } *for* Fenal, *read* Fenar.
— 344, — 15, }

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mitted great cruelties, and was depoſed. Oſman I. unſucceſsful againſt Poland. Attempted to cut off all the corps of janizaries. Revolt. Depoſed and put to death. Muſtafa I. re-enthroned. Great diſorders and rebellions. Again dethroned. Amurat I. Diſorders ſtill continued. The ſultan a drunkard, and the paſhas governed. Exerciſes great ſeverities on taking the government into his own hands. Diſregards the laws of nations. Went to the Perſian war in perſon, and became ſober. Deſtroyed Tauris by fire and and ſword. Relapſes into debauchery. Dreadful cruelty towards his ſubjects. Murdered his brother. Marched againſt Perſia, and re-eſtabliſhed good diſcipline. Obliged Venice to pay 250,000 ſechins to avoid a war. Relapſed into his former debaucheries, and died in conſequence of them. His character. Ibrahim. Gave himſelf up to pleaſure. The vizir, who governed, attacked Aſoph. He made peace with Germany, and broke it ſoon after. The divan reſolved to take Candia. The ſultan took the mufti's daughter by force. Depoſed and ſtrangled. Mahomed IV. His minority occaſioned great diſorders. The ſeraglio plundered. Order reſtored by Kiuperli. The ſultan took the government into his own hands. Paſha of Aleppo rebelled. Violated the peace with Germany. Murdered his German priſoners. The Tatars carried off 100,000 Poles. Candia taken after unheard of cruelties. Invaded Poland, and killed or carried off 300,000 inhabitants. Killed nearly 100,000 men at Human. The Ottoman power now at its heighth, after which it gradually declined. Vienna was ſaved by Sobieſki. Mahomed was depoſed. Achmet II. and Muſtafa II. had no better ſucceſs. Tranſilvania ceded to the emperor of Germany at the peace of Carlowitz. Muſtafa was depoſed. Achmet III. obtained advantages over the Ruſſians at Pruth; but was unſucceſsful in his other wars, and concluded a diſgraceful peace at Paſſarowitz. Being alſo unſucceſsful againſt the Perſians he was depoſed. Mahomed V. Changes of internal ſyſtem took

took place. Oſman III. The kiſlar-aga gained greater power than the vizir. Muſtafa III. increaſed the revenue of the vizir, and ſince they have been removed leſs frequently. He ordered the Tatars to invade Ruſſia. His ill ſucceſs obliged him to make a diſhonourable peace. Abdulhamid not more ſucceſsful. Probability that another war will terminate in their expulſion from Europe.

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A SURVEY OF THE TURKISH EMPIRE.

INTRODUCTION.

IT is the aim of the following ſheets to delineate the moral and political ſtate of a great empire, leſs accurately known to us than its contiguity and relative importance demand. The ſtudy of human nature, under the various influences of peculiar ſituation, laws, and cuſtoms, can in no caſe be unintereſting either to the politician, the moraliſt, or the philoſopher. If we conſider mankind merely as acted upon by ſcience, as elevated to unuſual ſplendor by the energies of intellect, or depreſt to a brutal degradation by groſs ignorance, it muſt render our ſpeculations more accurate, our judgment more diſtinct, to try the ſtandard of theory by the teſt of experience, and to view the effect produced on a

large community by the degree of knowledge which they poſſeſs. If from ſcience we turn to morals, and would contemplate the efficacy of religious doctrines, of legal inſtitutions, or of popular opinions, theſe cannot be fairly tried but by referring to their effect on the nation at large in which they exiſt. Should it again be our deſire to eſtimate juſtly the political advantages of external and internal adminiſtration, theſe are beſt tried by an appeal to facts: deſpotiſm or licentiouſneſs appearing in their true colours give the ſureſt, becauſe the moſt rational means, of appreciating the advantages of good government.

No one can doubt that theſe ends will be greatly promoted by a review of the ſtate of Turkey, which muſt preſent a picture no leſs intereſting, from the magnitude of its objects, than from the peculiarity of their features. It may indeed be objected, that this ſubject has been treated by many writers, apparently well qualified to deliver faithful and complete information; but it is not improbable that the teſtimony of an eye-witneſs, furniſhed with a multitude of particular facts, would even in that caſe be a deſirable addition to the maſs of evidence which is before the public. The truth, however, is, that the multitude of

of teſtimonies, or the accuracy of information, is by no means ſuch as to render further accounts unneceſſary: in many very intereſting points the principal authors do not agree; ſome are ſwayed by perſonal or national intereſt, and ſome miſled by ſuperficial obſervation or unfounded caprice. We have proofs that even a long reſidence in that country, and in a capacity which would appear the beſt calculated to afford information, that of a public miniſter, is not ſufficient. The numerous errors Sir James Porter has fallen into demonſtrate this. As to merchants, their occupations ſeldom leave them leiſure or curioſity to be informed of matters foreign to commerce, and diſtant from their places of abode. From travellers who run through a country leſs is to be expected. "*Till a man* "*is capable of converſing with eaſe among the* "*natives of a country, he can never be able to* "*form an adequate idea of their policy and* "*manners.*"

It is obvious, that a conſiderable portion of time and ſtudy is requiſite to obtain a full acquaintance with the moral and political ſtate of a nation: he who would obſerve it with accuracy ſhould have reſided a long time in the country; he ſhould have poſſeſſed opportunities of penetrating

into the councils of the government, as well as of noticing the manners and genius of the people; he ſhould have ſeen them in war and in peace, have noted their military ſkill and their commercial ſyſtem; finally and above all it is neceſſary that he ſhould have an accurate knowledge of their language, ſo as to cut off one great and almoſt univerſal ſource of error in accounts of foreign countries, ariſing from the miſapprehenſion of the relator himſelf.

In order to form a juſt ſtandard for trying the comparative accuracy of different accounts, it will be neceſſary to know thoſe prejudices which are moſt likely, in ſpite of integrity, to inſinuate themſelves into an author's work from motives of private or of public intereſt. With this view it will not be unacceptable to notice a few particulars relative to two or three preceding works of the beſt reputation, which have treated of the Turkiſh empire in general: (of earlier authors it is needleſs to ſpeak.) I know of no book from which more may be learnt of the true character of that people, and ſtate of knowledge among them, than from *M. De Tott.* He ſpoke their language perfectly, he enjoyed their confidence, and lived more intimately with them than any Chriſtian

Chriſtian has lately done. It does not appear that he has wilfully miſrepreſented any one circumſtance. I never ſaw him, but what I have heard of him is much in his favour. His book diſobliged the French court, which did not wiſh to ſee them expoſed. He has ſpoken, perhaps, too much of himſelf, and made the moſt of what he did for the Turks, though the facts are indiſputable. Had he ſaid leſs of himſelf, we ſhould have loſt thoſe little ſtories he tells, which give more inſight into the true character of the people he was concerned with than volumes of diſſertations.

The egotiſm of modern travellers in relating incidents and adventures which might happen in any country, and which convey no information peculiar to that they are travelling in, is truly diſguſting; they are at beſt ſubjects for novels. The work of Baron De Tott is indiſputably the beſt and moſt accurate account hitherto given of the general ſyſtem, as well as the peculiar features of Turkiſh manners, and though it has been cenſured as a calumny, it is in fact a very moderate picture of real events.

To this teſtimony of De Tott is oppoſed that of M. Peyſſonel, a man undoubtedly learned and ſcientific, whoſe reſi-

dence in the empire and knowledge of its language render him deſerving of great attention, though his opportunities of acquiring information were by no means equal to thoſe of De Tott. Of M. Peyſſonel two things are to be remarked, the ſuffrage which he gives in favour of Tott, and the prejudices which were likely to affect his own teſtimony. In ſpeaking of the Baron, he readily admits "*his profound know-*
"*ledge of the government, laws, manners, cuſ-*
"*toms and character of the Turks, derived*
"*from a long reſidence in the country, a cloſe*
"*attention to the language, and from being em-*
"*ployed in affairs of the greateſt importance.*"
What he profeſſes is only to point out, "*pul-*
"*chro in opere nævos,*" ſome imperfections in a valuable work. After this ſuffrage in favour of Tott, we need only refer to him for a picture of Turkey, faithful enough to be relied on, and yet ſufficiently forcible to excite our diſguſt at ſuch monſters in human ſhape. The ſame M. Peyſſonel quotes, as writers of greater accuracy, Du Pan and Monteſquieu, who, he acknowledges, wrote in their cloſets accounts of a people whom they had never ſeen.

In page 88 of M. Peyſſonel's letter we ſee the true reaſon of his defence of the

Turks: "*It is* (ſays he) *to endeavour to juſ-*
"*tify a nation which has always been the ally*
"*of our own; with whom we carry on a com-*
"*merce that is ſtill the object of envy and the*
"*vexation of our rivals.*"

Mouragia (now Chevalier d'Oraſſon) is perfectly equal to the extenſive work he has undertaken, which will contain more knowledge of Turkey than any book which was ever written; but he will not touch the ſubject of their decline and approaching fall: his object is to repreſent them in the moſt advantageous light, and he will not prove what they are, but what they poſſibly might have been: he is an Armenian, and Turkiſh is his mother tongue: he was once literally a ſans culotte: his promiſing genius, when a boy, procured him the patronage of a rich Armenian merchant; intrigue, talents, and the protection of the French directory, raiſed him to the poſt of Swediſh miniſter at Conſtantinople.

Other authors have only lightly touched on thoſe matters which are the ſubject of this book, and which it is my intention to inveſtigate more fully.

CHAPTER I.

On the Turkiſh Government.

TO point out thoſe relations which a country bears to its neighbours, or to the general intereſts of ſociety, is perhaps no very difficult taſk: the features are ſtriking, the moral and phyſical differences are eaſily diſcernible, and the ſtandard of general politics is, perhaps, accurate enough to determine, with ſufficient nicety, the reſult of ſuch an analyſis; but if we carry our inveſtigation into thoſe more minute cauſes which affect the proſperity or decline of a nation from internal circumſtances, we ſhall find the queſtion more deep and intricate, the deciſion more vague and doubtful. Without ſuch data, however, it is impoſſible to build up a moral or political ſpeculation of any magnitude or importance; it is impoſſible to reaſon with accuracy on the great intereſts of nations, or to form grand and comprehenſive plans embracing the general advantage of ſociety. Nor is it leſs true, that internal cauſes are always the

the moſt immediate motors in national elevation or decay: as, on the one hand, no feeble ſtate was ever elevated to extraordinary eminence by the mere aid of alliances, however powerful; ſo, on the other, ſcarcely any great nation ever periſhed by means of external violence, unleſs it had ſomething within itſelf vicious and unſound. I ſhall, therefore, in a future chapter, take a view of the Turkiſh Empire from without, as it ſtands related both to the general ſyſtem of Europe, and to the ſeveral European powers; and in the mean while I will proceed to diſcuſs its internal ſituation.

From the nature of man, from the extent of his faculties and the variety of his powers, it is evident that he is at the ſame time operated upon by cauſes the moſt heterogeneous and diſſimilar. With the progreſs of ſociety new powers and new faculties are daily called forth; they continually modify each other, and produce that action and re-action which conſtitutes the complexity of the vaſt ſocial machine. To abſtract and generalize theſe various motions, to reduce them to their primary and elemental principles, is the buſineſs of ſcience; but it unfortunately happens but too often, that the philoſopher, who may with much care and obſervation have made this analyſis, will build upon it ſpeculations the moſt

moſt unſound and irrational. The error into which theſe dealers in ſyſtem frequently fall (an error which has very unjuſtly thrown a general odium upon all the ſyſtematic labours of ſcience) is to conceive that the diviſions which they have themſelves eſtabliſhed in theory are ſtrongly marked in fact, or, in other words, that the different habits and cuſtoms of mankind are leſs intimately interwoven than experience daily proves them to be. When, therefore, we trace the diſtinct ſources from which the peculiar character and circumſtances of the Turkiſh nation have originated, we muſt be careful at the ſame time to remember, that the events which have flowed from thoſe ſources have been ſo mixed and compounded together, and act at the preſent day with ſuch an aggregate force, as to produce a far greater effect by combination than by their ſeparate power. So much is neceſſary to be obſerved before we begin to delineate the peculiar features of Turkiſh policy: we now proceed to the taſk of diſcrimination.

The modern European, accuſtomed for the moſt part to conſider all the ſubjects of one empire as alike entitled to the protecting care of government, alike inveſted with the political rights of citizens, can with difficulty accommodate his feelings to a ſtate of manners

ners reſulting from the diviſion of the political body into conquerors and conquered, oppreſſors and oppreſſed. This is, however, the diſtinction moſt broadly marked in the Turkiſh Empire; a diſtinction ſupported by every kind of prejudice which can influence ſocial manners, and confirmed by the inveterate habits of ages. To the celebrated governments of antiquity this exaltation of one part of the community upon the degradation of the other was by no means unknown; we ſee it inſtanced in the *Helots* of Sparta, and in the inſtitutions of many of thoſe nations who moſt loudly vaunted of their fancied liberty: happily for modern ages it has generally, in Europe, given place to political equality; but Turkey is the refuge of fanatical ignorance, the choſen ſeat where ſhe has unfurled her bloody banner, and where, though torpid with age, ſhe ſtill graſps her iron ſceptre. That happy union, and equality of right to the protection of laws, which tempers the variety of individual intereſts by the general utility, is the only baſis of ſocial happineſs. How far the dereliction of theſe principles in the Turkiſh government weakens the power of the community, whilſt it perpetuates the miſery of the individual, will appear from a comparative view of the different ſects in that country, and from a ſurvey

vey of the ſtate of its provinces. The *Turks*, properly ſo called, are the followers of Mahomet, deſcended from the Tatarian conquerors of theſe beautiful countries, who being now the actual maſters of the empire, and the only perſons who ſeem to have a real intereſt in its exiſtence, their ſituation, moral and phyſical, firſt demands our notice. The great outline of their character, as diſtinguiſhed from the other inhabitants of this extenſive empire, is the ſuperiority which they claim on the grounds of conqueſt and religion. To apply to a nation, barbarous as the Turks, any rule of rational policy drawn from the law of nations, would, perhaps, be deemed abſurd; but the enlightened obſerver muſt ever remark, that the fancied right of conqueſt is nothing but the right of the ſword, which is never legitimate but when ſanctioned by juſtice. In the hiſtory of the world there have been frequent inſtances of mighty nations, who, after conquering their opponents by force of arms, have received from their captives the ſofter yoke of ſcience. It was thus that, in the words of Horace:

> "Græcia capta ferum victorem cepit, et artes
> "Intulit agreſti Latio."

Nor have there been wanting examples of the introduction of arts by the conqueror himſelf,

himſelf, who has thus made amends, by the bleſſings of civilization, for the havock which he had cauſed by the ſword. The Turks, however, like barbarians, invaded Greece, and ſwept before them the mighty monuments of ancient ſcience; and, like barbarians, they hold their captives, to the preſent day, under the benumbing yoke of ignorance and ſlavery. Inſtead of promoting the mutual advantage of both nations, by an intercourſe of knowledge and benevolence, they uſe the privilege of conqueſt only to the extinction of the common powers of intellect. A politic conqueror, in augmenting the happineſs of his new ſubject, increaſes his own power; a barbarian invader weakens his own reſources by the continued oppreſſion of his captives. Abderahman (or Almanzor) who, in the middle of the eighth century, founded a kingdom in Spain of the provinces which had been ſubject to the kalifs, promoted intermarriages between Chriſtians and Mahomedans. The Arabs, who had been as great enemies to the ſciences as the Turks, now cultivated them with great ſucceſs, and had acquired a conſiderable portion of knowledge and politeneſs, while the reſt of Europe was degraded by ignorance and barbariſm. But the haughty Turk is not merely exalted above his ſubject Greek as a conqueror;

queror; he conſiders himſelf ſtill more highly elevated as the favorite of heaven, and the greater part of his ferocity as a tyrant is owing to the arrogant and barbarous dictates of his religion. It is in vain that the panegyriſts of Turkey would aſſure us of the ſpirit of toleration, which, according to them, the diſciple of the ſanguinary Mahomet cheriſhes in his boſom. Every feature of the Turkiſh character, every circumſtance of their public and private cuſtoms, contradicts the aſſertion. Mankind are not at the preſent day to learn, that the human character is formed by its education, and that a great and important branch of that education conſiſts of political inſtitutions. Were there any doubt of the truth of this principle, the ſtrong exemplification of it afforded by Turkey would obviate every objection. There it is, more than in any other country, that the dogmas of the legiſlator and the prieſt are continually preſented to the mind of youth as well as of age; that they occur in every rank and condition of life, and act with a force the more powerful, as they are united in one and the ſame code. Such are the obſervations which ariſe on the firſt view of the Turkiſh character: in proceeding to particularize its individual features, we have to contemplate the various cauſes, moral and phyſical, which have an influence,

influence, either immediate or remote, upon it; always remembering, that they are to be viewed, not merely as ſimple powers, but as acting with that mutual and reciprocal force which ſo greatly augments their aggregate effect. The local and material objects which contribute to the riſe and fall, the importance or weakneſs of nations, are, *climate*, *ſituation*, *productions*, and *population*; but theſe are in part or altogether ſubject to the energies of mind, and mind takes its peculiar bent from *religious* and *political inſtitutions*, from *hiſtorical events*, from *arts* and *ſciences*, and from thoſe general *manners* which are the reſult of all the other cauſes combined.

In the following ſketch I ſhall endeavour to develope, firſt, the *moral* cauſes, and from their action it will not be difficult to account, in the ſecond place, for the *natural* phænomena obſervable in the preſent ſtate of Turkey.

The religion of the Turks is, perhaps, the predominating principle, which, above all others, ſtamps the character of their minds; but as its power in this reſpect is chiefly owing to its political authority, and as it is not my intention to enter into a metaphyſical inveſtigation of a ſyſtem whoſe abſurdity is obvious to all enlightened Europeans, I ſhall conſider this part of the ſubject as dependant on

on the political inſtitutions, which will therefore firſt demand attention.

Political inſtitution is a ſpring always in action, a motor univerſally preſent, forming the character of the individual, and guiding the operations of the community. Would we then caſt our eyes over the moral map of Turkey; would we juſtly eſtimate the internal powers of that nation, either as an enemy or ally, our notions muſt be regulated by the degree of purity or error obſervable in its political œconomy.

Much has been ſaid in aſſertion and denial of the *deſpotiſm* of the Turkiſh government; and arguments the moſt abſtruſe and far-fetched have been employed, rather to confound the meaning of terms, than to eſtabliſh the authenticity of facts. But if by deſpotiſm be meant a power originating in force, and upheld by the ſame means to which it owed its eſtabliſhment; a power ſcorning the juriſdiction of reaſon, and forbidding the temerity of inveſtigation; a power calculated to cruſh the growing energies of mind, and annihilating the faculties of man, in order to inſure his dependence, the government of Turkey may be moſt faithfully characterized by that name. All permanent power, extended over a large community, muſt have ſomething more than the mere force of arms

to rely on; or rather that very force muſt depend, in the ultimate reſort, on popular opinion. It is a vain objection, therefore, that the deſpotiſm of the ſultan cannot extend beyond the ſuperſtition of the people: that very ſuperſtition ſerves it as a baſis, and the more firmly rooted are their religious prejudices, the more terrible is the deſpotiſm which ſprings from them.

Equally vain and fruitleſs are the conteſts concerning the particular character of this deſpotiſm. It has been called a *military* government, from the nature of its origin, and the means moſt frequently employed in its adminiſtration; and it has obtained the denomination of a *theocracy*, becauſe its fundamental code is the Koran. Each of theſe ſtatements contains ſomething that is erroneous. A military government ſuppoſes the dictates of an arbitrary chief, requiring implicit obedience in every inferior, and preſcribing a certain and inevitable puniſhment for neglect or tranſgreſſion; it excludes all formality and delay, and it is enforced by military power. In theocracies, the will of the leader has not (or at leaſt pretends not to have) the direction of the ſtate: himſelf an inſtrument in the hands of a ſuperior being, he communicates to the people, at various times and as occaſion requires, the commands

mands of the Divinity. The Turkiſh government bears evident traces of both theſe ſyſtems; derived from the character of its founder; but there are ſome points of difference which prove it to be, *ſui generis*, an heteroclite monſter among the various ſpecies of deſpotiſm. In the Mahometan ſyſtem of policy we may trace three æras. The *firſt*, which was of that kind uſually denominated a theocracy, continued during the life-time of the prophet himſelf, who, like Moſes and Joſhua among the Jews, appeared in the double character of a military chief and an inſpired legiſlator. The *ſecond* was the government of the Saracen kalifs, his immediate ſucceſſors: they bore indeed the double ſceptre of temporal and ſpiritual power; but as they pretended to no perſonal communications with the Almighty, all the ſanctity of their character conſiſted in being the deſcendants of the prophet, and the guardians and expoſitors of his law. The preſent Turkiſh conſtitution forms the *third* gradation: like the preceding, it has an inviolable code in the ſacred volume of its religion; like them alſo its reliance is on the power of the ſword, and the modes of its adminiſtration are military; but it has a great eſſential difference in the ſeparation of the temporal and ſpiritual authorities. This *diviſion of power* origi-

nated in the political error of the Ottoman princes, who, eager only for military glory, and perhaps wiſhing to caſt a ſpecious veil over their uſurpation, when they finally ſuppreſſed the kalifat, did not aſſume to themſelves all its functions, but reſigned into the hands of the theological lawyers the ſpiritual ſupremacy. No deſpotiſm was ever more profoundly politic than that, which, wielding at once the temporal and ſpiritual ſword, converted fanaticiſm itſelf into an inſtrument of ſovereignty, and united in one perſon the voice and the arm of the Divinity. But it muſt be remembered, that when the power of the kalifs began to decline, other princes, beſides thoſe of the race of Othman, aſſumed an independent ſovereignty; and it is probable that moſt of them, with a ſhow of moderation, which they thought politic, inveſted the prieſts with the adminiſtration of all their ſpiritual affairs. Such was the origin of the authority given to the *ulema*, or body of lawyers, and their chief, the *mufti*, or high prieſt, to whom is entruſted the expoſition of the Mohammedan law in all its branches. Theſe men poſſeſſing, like the prieſts under the Jewiſh theocracy, the oracles both of law and religion, not only unite in themſelves the power of two great corporations, thoſe of the

law

law and of the church, but alſo ſhare with the ſovereign the direct exerciſe of the legiſlative, executive, and judicial powers. Previous to the Ottoman æra, there were indeed muftis; but their power was only of a judicial, not of a political nature, exactly reſembling that of the muftis, who are now appointed in the ſeveral provinces, and whoſe office is ſomewhat ſimilar to that of kadi or judge; for it muſt not be forgotten, that the judicial and ſacerdotal characters are in Turkey the ſame. The chief engine of this hierarchy is the *fetva* of the mufti, a ſort of manifeſto, which, like the bulls of the Roman pontiff, originating in eccleſiaſtical power, has been applied to the moſt important political purpoſes.

The kalifs, with a view of enſuring the prompt obedience of their ſubjects, were accuſtomed to give to the principal acts of their government the ſanction of religion, by affixing to their decrees (ſuch as thoſe of war and peace) the ſacred ſeal, which aſſured to the true believers, acting under it, the honour of ſupporting their faith, if triumphant, or the palm of martyrdom in caſe of death. The Othman princes, in order to obtain a ſimilar end, were obliged to require the aid of the prieſthood, which they had eſtabliſhed. They applied, therefore, to the mufti, who,

by the advice of the heads of the ulema, publiſhed the ſacred ordinance called *fetva*, which declares the act of government, to which it is affixed, conſonant to the Koran, and obligatory on all true believers. The power which the prieſthood thus acquired was at firſt inconſiderable; it reſembled the enregiſtering of edicts by the French parliaments, which was a meaſure rather judicial than legiſlative; but they doubtleſs perceived in it the ſeeds of future greatneſs and authority. So long as the ſceptre was ſwayed by warlike princes, the mufti was eaſily made to ſpeak as the ſultan directed, and the power of the ulema, under their warlike monarchs, was ſcarcely perceived. It does not appear that they attempted any reſiſtance to the will of the ſovereign before the reign of Amurath IV. That prince, one of the moſt ferocious that ever ſate on the Ottoman throne, irritated at the oppoſition of a mufti, cauſed him to be thrown into a huge mortar, and pounded to death. He conceived this kind of puniſhment in order to obviate, by a cruel irony, the privilege which the ulema enjoyed, that no member of their body could have his blood ſhed as a puniſhment. This example ſufficiently proves how little the men of the law were, at that time, able to

oppoſe a ſovereign whoſe deſpotiſm was ſupported by the ſcimitar.

But upon the decline of the military ſpirit of the ſultans, that, which was only a political ſpring in the hands of the ſovereign, has become a fundamental law of the empire, creating and confirming a power, which, if not in actual oppoſition, is always in balance againſt him. The utility of ſuch a balance of power in the more enlightened governments has been ſtrenuouſly ſupported on the grounds of a liberal policy; but, whatever we may think of ſuch arguments, they cannot apply to the ſtate of Turkey, where the balance is only a balance of intrigue and artifice, whilſt there is, in both parties, a perfect accordance of deſpotiſm, a mutual defect both of the means and inclination to benefit the community. On the part of the ſultan, it may be obſerved, that he would, long ſince, have become the mere creature and tool of the mufti, but for the power which he has reſerved to himſelf, of nominating and depoſing the holder of that dignity. This it is which gives him a counterpoiſe againſt the mufti, by creating for him, among the ulema, as many partiſans as there are candidates aſpiring to the pontificate. The ulema, on the other hand, are, in their collective capacity, jealous of preſerving the influence

which they have thus obtained in the government; and that religion, which ſerved the firſt ſultans as a mean of adminiſtration, has become a ſource of terror and ſubjection to their feeble ſucceſſors. The fetva is now ſo indiſpenſable a preliminary to any political act, that the ſultan, who ſhould dare to omit it, would be declared an infidel by a fetva iſſued by the mufti *motu proprio*; and ſuch a proceeding would be ſufficient to excite againſt him both the populace and ſoldiery, and to precipitate him at once from his throne. So far is this jealouſy carried by the ulema, that they oppoſe, with all their power, the ſultan's departure from the capital, leſt, at a diſtance from their manœuvres, he ſhould be able to conciliate the army to his intereſts, and aſſert his independence. The late ſultan Muſtafa, anxious to be at the head of his army, was prevented from taking the field only by the fear of a revolt, which the men of the law could eaſily have excited in his abſence.

Another apparent check on the authority of the ſultan, is formed by the *great council*, conſiſting of the great military officers, the heads of the ulema, and the principal miniſters of the empire. No important act of government can be undertaken without a previous diſcuſſion in this aſſembly, at which the

the grand ſeignior, or his chief vizir, preſides; but every queſtion is decided by a plurality of votes. It is unneceſſary to expatiate on this body, as forming a diſtinct political power, becauſe, from the nature of its members, it muſt be ſwayed either by the party of the ſultan, or by that of the prieſthood, and it, therefore, ſerves rather to determine the relative power of thoſe two diſtinct bodies.

That much political knowledge cannot be expected from the miniſters of ſtate, is evident from the manner in which they attain their ſituations. Riſing from the meaneſt ſtations, they advance progreſſively to the higheſt poſts; not by means of ſuperior genius or knowledge, but by petty intrigue, and by flattering thoſe on whom they depend. The vizir *Yuſef*, who commanded in 1790 againſt the emperor, was raiſed by Gazi Haſſan from a ſtate of the mereſt indigence. He ſold ſoap, in a baſket on his head, in the ſtreets, before he became the ſervant of Haſſan, who, after employing him in that menial office, made him ſucceſſively clerk in the treaſury of the arſenal, his own agent at the porte, (kapi kahia) paſha of the Morea, and, laſtly, grand vizir.

There is, indeed, a regular eſtabliſhment for educating youth for the ſervice of the ſultan in a ſchool at Pera, called *Galata Serai:*

Serai: when they come thither, they are placed in different claſſes, according to their abilities and the line to which they are deſtined. But this inſtitution has ſo far degenerated, that few but the ſons of perſons belonging to the ſeraglio are ſent thither, where their education is of ſmall importance, as any one, whether he has paſſed through this college or not, may attain any office in the ſeraglio by means of intrigue and bribery. It may be worth while here to notice a ſingular error, which is generally entertained in Europe relative to the term *ſeraglio*, which is ſuppoſed to mean the apartments of the women: it literally means *palace*, and is, therefore, applied by way of eminence to the vaſt range of buildings inhabited by the grand ſeignior and all the officers and dependents of his court. Here is tranſacted all the buſineſs of government; the council itſelf is called the *divan*, and the place of public audience the *porte*, or the gate. Of the officers of the ſeraglio the *vizir* is chief (as being the prime miniſter of the ſovereign); this is alſo a term given to him by way of eminence, as it ſignifies a counſellor in general; every paſha of three tails (that is of the firſt claſs) is a vizir: the paſha or vizir who reſides at the porte, or with the ſultan, is called the grand vizir, or vizir azem. Beſide the vizir, all the

the other great public officers of the empire, reſident at Conſtantinople, inhabit the ſeraglio, or, at leaſt, have their offices there; all the miniſters, paſhas, &c. without exception, belong to it, and their poſſeſſions revert at their death to the ſultan, their maſter and their heir, of whom they are ſtiled the *ſlaves* (kul, or kool) ſo that their deſcendants have no advantage over thoſe of the meaneſt mechanics, except what they may caſually derive from the notice of the ſovereign, or from having been introduced by their parents into the ſchool of the ſeraglio.

From the preceding obſervations it appears, that the legiſlative and executive powers are, in the higher acts of policy, divided among different bodies: the executive acts of an inferior order are ſuch as regard *financial* and *military* operations, or matters of general *police*. The two former of theſe branches, though of ſmall import in the individual acts, are, each in its aggregate, of ſufficient importance to claim a ſeparate conſideration; to each of them, therefore, I ſhall devote a future chapter, and for the preſent paſs on to a curſory view of the internal police. However diſtinct the *principle* of the Turkiſh government, as it at preſent exiſts, may appear, its forms of adminiſtration, and all its internal police, are purely military.

military. This is ſo thoroughly the caſe, that the grand ſeignior is ſtill ſuppoſed to reign, as formerly, in the midſt of his camp; he even dates his public acts from his *imperial ſtirrup*, and ſimilar inſtances are diſcoverable in all his other formalities. The government of diſtant provinces is committed to *paſhas*; their dignity is military, and the whole deſpotic power of the ſultan is delegated to them. A ſlight view of the hiſtory of the janizaries will ſhow of what kind is the dependence placed on them, as well in the maintenance of the police as in the exerciſe of war. The force of arms firſt ſubjugated the countries which form their empire; the force of arms alone could retain them in ſubmiſſion; and it is owing to the decline of the military ſpirit of the Turks, that the members of ſo vaſt a body are, at the preſent day, ſo feeble and diſunited.—To wield the iron ſceptre with effect required a warlike ſovereign ſtained with blood, the ſcourge of his people, and alone the idol and the terror of an obedient ſoldiery.

Such were a long while the characters of the ſultans, and of the janizaries, the faithful miniſters of their deſpotiſm. From the moment that the latter beheld their chief no longer animated with a brave and warlike ſpirit, the machine of government was thrown into

into diſorder; the moving power was no longer the ſpring which ſhould have directed, and the re-action of the exterior parts toward the centre was totally deſtroyed. The janizaries, then, ſeized themſelves that power which a weak and cowardly ſultan could not wield; they depoſed their monarch, and placed upon the throne one in whoſe valour and abilities they had greater confidence; but a more refined policy on the part of the deſpot annihilated the power of theſe pretorian bands, by a ſyſtem of corruption and enervation. The moſt eminent of their leaders were taken off, either by ſecret fraud or open accuſation, and their places ſupplied by the meaneſt and moſt devoted creatures of the court. In the meanwhile the corps itſelf was baſtardized and rendered contemptible by the introduction of a herd of the vileſt of the people; men occupied in the loweſt employments, and even ſtained with the moſt infamous crimes, who would have been formerly expelled from the ſervice with the greateſt indignation. The ſultans have, indeed, ſucceeded in extinguiſhing every ſpark of that fire which they dreaded; they have annihilated all traces of a military ſpirit; but they have, at the ſame time, paralyzed their own hands, and left themſelves without

without the powers neceſſary for the ſupport of a deſpotic government. Many of the paſhas, having little to fear from the vengeance of the grand ſeignior, proceed to the moſt violent abuſes of their authority, and not unfrequently appear in open rebellion. The defection ſpreads from province to province, and little remains, in this vaſt empire, but the ſhadow of an union without real ſtability, and of an obedience which mocks the graſp of ſuperiority. In the regular adminiſtration of government, however, the ſultan is poſſeſſed of the moſt arbitrary power over the lives of his ſubjects, and executes criminal juſtice, either by himſelf or his vizirs, without proceſs or formality.

In regard to property his power is more limited: over that of all his officers he has the fulleſt right; he is their lawful heir; but in regard to that of his other ſubjects he is reſtricted by the laws to greater moderation. It is, nevertheleſs, eaſy to avoid ſuch reſtrictions; and we ſhall, in fact, ſee that the inſecurity of property in Turkey is one very powerful cauſe of the ignorance and vices of its inhabitants. The ſultan delegates his power in this reſpect to the vizirs and paſhas in the provinces, and, in a leſs degree, to governors and officers of different ranks and denominations.

nominations. Pretexts and ſuppoſed crimes are always to be found to deſtroy or to ruin a ſubject. This part of the government is therefore truly deſpotic; and when the prince or his repreſentatives are tyrants, it is deſpotiſm in a form the moſt cruel and inſulting to the rights of mankind.

Having examined the legiſlative and executive branches of government, it remains to ſpeak of the *judicial*. This branch is founded, like the others, on religion; but a diviſion ſuited to the barbarous nature of its origin ſeems to obtain in it. The offences againſt the ſtate, or ſuch as affect the public peace, are wholly under the juriſdiction of the ſovereign, and ſeem to be excluded from the judicial forms; whilſt the diſpenſation of juſtice by formal proceſs ſeems to be intended only for offences and diſputes of a more private nature.

The excellence or defect of a judicial ſyſtem depends upon the *code* of law; upon the *commentaries* or precedents which are received as poſſeſſing authority; upon the *perſons* appointed to adminiſter juſtice, and upon their *mode* of deciſion. The fundamental law, civil and political, is the *koran*, whoſe reſpect is owing to its divine origin: from this is extracted a civil code, called the *multka*, to which are added certain commentaries called the

the *durer* and *halebi*; and beſides theſe there are various collections of *fetvas*, or ſentences, of the moſt celebrated muftis, all of which together form, it muſt be confeſſed, a collection of legal knowledge more than ſufficient for the inſtruction of the judges. But as theſe judges are not bound by any preceding decrees, and have the application of the law in their own breaſts, the more intricate it is rendered by the different compilations and commentaries, the more arbitrary is the power intruſted to them. Were the tribunals pure, and the mode of trial equitable, this laxity of interpretation would doubtleſs be an advantage to the cauſe of juſtice; but the contrary is ſo notorious in Turkey, that the iniquitous deciſions of the judges are proverbial, and often furniſh the ſubjects of their burleſque comedies. Peyſſonel complains of the unfairneſs of Baron de Tott in citing different inſtances of Turkiſh injuſtice, and obſerves, that ſimilar examples may be found in the hiſtory of every country; but it is not neceſſary in Turkey to recur to paſt ages, or to ſingle out particular examples; it is the prominent feature in the character of their tribunals, and every day's experience confirms the cenſure of Tott, by repeated inſtances of corruption.

The dexterity of the Turkiſh kadis, or judges,

judges, to decide in favour of thoſe who have paid them, is often very ingenious; many pleaſant ſtories are told of them, and it is generally a ſubject for a kind of comedians, who act in coffee houſes or in private houſes, but without dreſs or ſcenery, one of them performing the part of a kadi, and two others the plaintiff and defendant.

An Arab who had hired out his camel to a man to travel to Damaſcus, complained to a kadi, on the road, that he had overloaded his camel; the other bribed the kadi. "What has he loaded it with?" aſks the kadi—the Arab anſwers, "*with cahué (coffee) and mahué*," *i. e. coffee et cetera* (changing the firſt letter into *m* makes a kind of gibberiſh word, which ſignifies *et cetera*) "*ſugar and mugar, pots and mots, ſacks and macks*," *&c.* going through every article the camel was loaded with; "*he has loaded it twice as much as he ought*;" "then," ſays the kadi, "let him load the cahué and leave the mahué, the ſugar and leave the mugar, the pots and leave the mots, the ſacks and leave the macks," and ſo on to the end of all the articles enumerated, and as the poor Arab had told every article, and only added et cetera, according to the Arab cuſtom, without there being any &c. he took up the ſame loading he had before.

A chriſtian ſubject of the Turks was carried before a judge at Aleppo, accuſed by a Sherif of having one evening in the bazar, or market place, knocked off his green turban, for which he would have been put to death—the judge was himſelf a Sherif (they have in moſt places the privilege of a judge of their own race.) The Chriſtian ſent ſecretly, bribed him, and informed him of the truth, which was, that the Sherif's turban was of ſo dark a green that he took it for a dark blue, a colour which a chriſtian friend of his wore, and for whom he had taken him in the dark of the evening, and had knocked off his turban in a joke. The accuſed was brought before the judge, and the plaintiff came into the judge's hall with a great number of other Sherifs. The judge addreſſed them; "*Do you come here in ſuch numbers to aſk juſtice, or to take it yourſelves; go out all but thoſe who are witneſſes, and you chriſtian,*" ſaid he, addreſſing himſelf to the accuſer (who had been privately pointed out to him) "*go you out, I ſuppoſe you are a witneſs for the accuſed; you ſhall be called when you are wanted.*" The man exclaimed, that he was not only a Mahomedan, but a Sherif, and the accuſer himſelf! "What," ſays the judge, "you a Sherif and wear a turban of a colour that I myſelf in the day time took for

for that of an infidel; how could the poor infidel in the dark diſtinguiſh it. You ought to wear the holy *graſs* green of the prophet, and not be aſhamed of it. He acquitted the Chriſtian, and ordered the plaintiff to be baſtinadoed for not wearing a proper green turban. It would, without this turn, have been difficult to have appeaſed the violence of the Sherifs aſſembled; but he was well paid for it, and for money they will run any riſks.

If the Turkiſh judges diſplay great ingenuity in diſtorting the rules of equity, it muſt be owned that they ſometimes ſhow equal ſkill in the advancement of juſtice. When the famous Kuperly was grand-vizir, an old woman brought to an Armenian money-changer a caſket, containing jewels of great apparent value, ſaid they belonged to a ſultana, and borrowed money on them, depoſiting the caſket after ſhe had ſealed it. The money was to be paid again in a certain time. The woman not appearing a long while after the time was expired, he opened the caſket, in the preſence of ſeveral reſpectable perſons, when the jewels were diſcovered to be falſe. The Armenian went to the vizir and related the ſtory. The ſultana had not ſent any jewels to be pawned. He ordered him to remove from his ſhop, in a private manner, every thing valuable, and

on ſuch a night to ſet it on fire; that he would be near with proper people to prevent it ſpreading; that then he ſhould conſtantly ſit before his ſhop, and lament to all who paſſed his having loſt a caſket of jewels of immenſe value in the fire. In a few days the old woman appeared, and demanded to releaſe her jewels. She was carried to the vizir, who ſhowed her her caſket, and told her ſhe ſhould be immediately put to death by the moſt terrible torments, if ſhe did not confeſs the whole. She diſcovered her accomplices; they were put to death, and the Armenian got back his money, deducting the vizir's ſhare. This fact is known at Conſtantinople.

The panegyriſts of Turkiſh juriſprudence adduce in its favour the cuſtom which is called *burning the mat*, by which any individual, whether Mahometan, Jew, or Chriſtian, may appeal to the juſtice of the grand ſeignior from the oppreſſion or injuſtice of his officers. The petitioner, on theſe occaſions, appears in the ſtreet, near the moſque to which the ſultan is going, and has on his head a bit of burning mat, at the ſame time bearing aloft his petition, which is lifted up to the officer, whoſe buſineſs it is to receive and put it into a bag. The extreme of violence often produces a remedy no leſs violent

in its nature; it is thus with the burning of the mat, which is never practiſed but on great occaſions, when a complaint is lodged, in a deſperate manner, againſt a vizir, or other great perſon, and the ſultan is thereby cautioned to take the ſuppliant under his protection. Such petitioners have, generally, a party of malcontents to ſupport them; and they adopt this mode to warn the ſultan of the danger of not receiving their complaints, which, indeed, without ſome ſuch precaution, ſeldom meet with any attention.

It appears from the preceding conſiderations, that the evils ariſing from the mode of government afford little hope of reform. Such an attempt would in vain be undertaken, even by a ſovereign of the greateſt abilities and moſt patriotic inclinations. Were a ſultan, equal in military talents to Amurat the fourth, to ſit on the Ottoman throne, it might be poſſible to rekindle that martial genius in his forces, which has been ſo long extinguiſhed, and to reduce to ſubmiſſion thoſe rebellious paſhas, who have been ſo long independent. This indeed would be an herculean labour; but even this would be rendered ineffectual by the prevalence of the ulema. A powerful prieſthood, in oppoſition to the ſovereign, muſt, in ſuch a country as Turkey, thwart all his views, and render in-

effectual his moſt ſtrenuous exertions. To introduce an unity into the government, this ambitious body ſhould be wholly extirpated; but ſuch a ſtep as this ſcarcely any ſultan who has ſat on the throne, would have dared to have taken; how much leſs is it to be expected from the daſtardly and enervated ſovereigns who now ſpring from the ſeraglio.

Much ſtreſs has been laid by ſome authors on the limitation of the ſultan's power by law, with reſpect to property of individuals, to prove that his government is not wholly deſpotic. The fact, however, is ſimply, that with regard to ſome kind of property, as houſes which are poſſeſſed by inheritance, the ſovereigns have ſometimes thought it dangerous to violate the common law openly, by depriving the owner of their property by force; in ſuch caſes, when the object has been deſirable, we have ſeen them take a ſhorter way, by putting the owner to death; and againſt this exerciſe of power no one objects; and ſometimes they have ſubmitted to the law to make their reign popular. This oppoſition to the will of the ſultan, as has been obſerved, is not to be underſtood of the officers of the porte, for with theſe no ceremony is obſerved. The paſhas in the provinces are, however, leſs delicate than the ſultan in the capital,

CHAPTER II.

On the Turkiſh Finances.

THERE is no matter of internal policy which affords a wider ſcope for the diſplay of abilities than finance; it is to a ſkilful application of its powers in this reſpect, that the riſe and the continuance of a great empire is chiefly to be attributed; and from a failure here may be deduced moſt of the evils which bring on its decay and downfal. It would be a narrow view of this ſubject, which ſhould regard only the debtor and creditor ſide of the account, the poſitive or the relative magnitude of the impoſts; it is not ſo much the *ſum* raiſed or expended, as the *mode* of its levy and application, which is to be regarded as the teſt of political ability. The following ſketch will, therefore, embrace a view of the different public treaſures, together with obſervations on the mode of raiſing them, on their application, and on their preſent ſituation.

The Turkiſh ſyſtem of finance may be divided into two great branches, the public treaſury or *miri*, and the ſultan's treaſury

or *haſni*, each of which has its peculiar ſources of revenue, and its particular appropriation of expenditure.

There are, indeed, other treaſures of conſiderable magnitude, which deſerve the attention of the politician, though not properly included in the ſyſtem of finance: theſe are the treaſures of the *ulema* and thoſe of the *moſques*, ſums taken from the active and efficient capital of the nation, and either wholly unemployed, or appropriated to uſes which cannot be ſuppoſed to have a very direct relation to the neceſſities of the ſtate.

The public treaſure or exchequer of the ſtate firſt demands our attention, as that in which are to be expected the moſt methodical regularity, the greateſt fairneſs in the impoſition, and judgment in the application of the taxes. The revenues of this treaſure are of two kinds, the fixed and the caſual, the former of which may be divided into the *karach* or tribute paid by Chriſtians, and the farms of the empire in general; the latter conſiſt of certain articles, which will be mentioned in the ſubjoined detail.

The expenditure embraces a variety of objects, *viz.* the expences of the army and navy, in war as well as peace; the pay of all officers, civil and military; the erecting and repairing of fortifications, of public edifices, high-

high-roads, bridges, &c. together with a great part of the expences of the ſultan's houſehold, and ſeveral other extraordinary diſburſements.

The following detail will compriſe the ordinary revenue and expenditure of the public treaſury of the Ottoman empire, from the moſt authentic documents, together with a view of its debts and credits in the year 1776, at the concluſion of a ruinous war with *Ruſſia*.

ANNUAL REVENUE of the MIRI.

This comprehends the different tributes, taxes, and cuſtoms, called the karach, mukata, bedeli-nouzoul, avaragí-hané, gebeluyan, gebeluyan-embak, gebi-humayun, havaſi-humayun, eukaf-humayun, piſkés-zaiſé, meokuf, tarap-hanei, anciré, haremein haſincſi, ſherifein haſinési, &c.

1. FIXED REVENUE.

The firſt branch is the *karach*, a capitation tax, or annual redemption of the lives of all thoſe males above 15 years of age, who do not profeſs the Mahometan religion.—It is farmed in the different diſtricts as follows:

EUROPEAN CITIES and PASHALIKS.	Purſes Rumi of 500 dollars or piaſtres.	Piaſtres.
Conſtantinople and its environs - This karach was augmented to this ſum in the year 1776, by the addition of 360 purſes (or 180,000 piaſtres) of which augmentation only 100 went to the public treaſury.	2,916	
Adrianople and its environs -	1,750	
Sophia - - - - -	320	
Tattar-bazargik - - -	250	

	Purſes Rumi.	Piaſtres.
Philippopolis	280	
Salonico	530	
Uſkiup	260	
Kioſdentil	226	
Terhale	450	
Yenitſher Kinar	270	
Avlonia	350	
Ohry	250	
Delviné	170	
Elbiſſan	160	
Bania	450	
Kiſria	250	
Ozi (now in the poſſeſſion of Ruſſia; called Oczakow by the Poles)	90	
Siliſtria	170	
Varna	170	
Babadahg	100	
Paravadi	160	
Karinabad	180	
Egribozak	190	
Ruſchuk	220	
Shumna	170	
Hezargarad	90	
Niceboli	390	
Harmen	260	
Viddin	300	
Iſlemie	150	
Uſunge abad Haſkioy	176	
Gallipoli	240	
Orſe	70	
Yenebanti	210	
Negroponte	500	
Iſdiu	96	
Belgrade	180	
Niſſa	196	
Alaſſonia	170	
Tif	45	
Kiordos	70	
Athens (Seitin, or land of olives)	90	
Yeniké	220	
Napoli di Romania	225	

	Purſes Rumi.	Piaſtres.
Hatevmis - - - -	120	
Calamata - - - -	130	
Enghily Kafry - - -	170	
Livadia - - - -	70	
Tancara - - - -	90	
Donigé - - - -	80	
Aleſſandria - - - -	290	
Boſnia with its dependencies - (Bender and Hotin are not included)	1,495	
Morea and its five juriſdictions -	3,560	
	20,015	
PROVINCES and CITIES of ANATOLIA.		
Hadé vendighiar Sangiaki - -	280	
The province of Kiatahie - -	480	
Gimis dizné of Eſkiſhehir - -	120	
Sultan Ony - -	130	
Kara Hiſſar - -	160	
The province of Angora - -	190	
The juriſdiction of Tuſſia -	180	
of Boli - -	90	
of Kiſlin -	75	
of Viran Shehir -	75	
of Hiſſar ony -	120	
of Akſhe-ſhehir	110	
of Cara-ſu -	55	
of Ghiul Bazar -	80	
The government of Caſtemony -	190	
The juriſdiction of Sinop - -	150	
of Tyr - -	50	
of Sultatnony -	70	
of Ghiuſel Hiſſar	90	
of Allaſhehir -	80	
of Metmen -	90	
The government of Menteſhe -	150	
of Smyrna -	320	
The juriſdiction of Akſhe Shehir	120	
of Sahri-hiſſar -	125	
The iſland Kuſeh-adaſi - -	150	
The juriſdiction of Ghiul-hiſſar -	160	

	Purſes Rumi.	Piaſtres.
The juriſdiction of Hamid -	300	
of Yalli-keſſri -	80	
of Sandughi -	50	
The government of Breigha -	160	
of Caraſſi -	40	
of Teké -	27	
of Glayé -	210	
of Iſenghemid -	450	
of Ala - -	110	
of Sivas -	490	
of Tokat -	260	
of Nikdé -	120	
of Yeniſherry -	210	
of Yenni-il -	90	
of Amaſia -	180	
of Bozauk -	70	
of Zurem -	150	
of Diyunik -	120	
of Dzanik -	800	
of Arabkir -	320	
The province of Caramania -	200	
of Ahſhery - -	210	
of Kaiſarie - -	120	
of Akſerai - -	120	
of Adana - -	200	
of Silis - -	110	
of Iz-il - -	300	
of Ekin - -	90	
Tripoly in Syria - - -	120	
Damaſcus (or Sham Sherif) -	400	
Aleppo (Haleb) - - -	600	
Kelis - - - - -	120	
Agras - - - - -	70	
Meras - - - -	200	
Anitab - - - - -	240	
The government of Malatia -	120	
of Rica - -	200	
of Ahmed -	110	
The government of Hiſni Manſur -	80	
of Diarbekir -	300	
of Muſſil -	300	
of Etzerun -	450	

	Purſes Rumi.	Piaſtres.
The government of Trebiſond -	300	
of Gelder -	200	
of Van - -	110	
of Karis - -	150	
Bagdat, Baſſora, Merdin, and environs - - - -	500	
The iſland of Tenedos - -	45	
of Meteline - -	180	
Shio (or Scio) -	380	
Stanchio - -	150	
Candia - -	560	
Kubrus (or Cyprus)	850	
Tino - -	45	
The iſlands dependent on the capitan paſha - - - -	180	
Cairo (or Meſſir) - - -	1,350	
Several other revenues, of which is a ſeparate account - -	1,455	
Total for the Karach for Romelia and Anatolia - - -	39,077	
	or	19,538,500

The SECOND BRANCH of the FIXED REVENUE comprizes the following general TAXES or FARMS of the Empire.

Mukata, (farms regiſtered in the Baſh-muhaſſebé, &c.) - -	4,791
The Ogialik of Bulgaria pays -	520
The Agalik of the Turkomani -	450
The body of Chingani (Gypſies or Bohemians) - - -	2,690
Gebeluyan lokaf humayun render -	280
Emlaki humayun - - D° -	350
Gebeluyan of the Timar and Ziamet, poſſeſſed by aged or infirm perſons - - -	470
Bedeli Nuzul of the Timar and Ziamet of Romalia and Anatolia	3,580
Avarigi Hané *(per centage of immoveables)* - - -	2,959

	Purſes Rumi.	Piaſtres.
Of tobacco, the mines of ſilver, &c. contributions of the adminiſtrators - - -	2,300	
Mukata, mizan on ſilk, maſtic, oil, &c. of the country of Bruſa -	790	
Duty paid by the dealers in ſheep	780	
Salt pits or mines of Haſſar -	1,200	
Fiſh, woods, &c. of Metelino and its ports; tax on weight at Conſtantinople - - -	2,800	
Paid for the ſultan's kitchen, by certain cities, towns, and villages - - -	1,300	
By the company of butchers -	600	
The cuſtom houſe of Conſtantinople - -	1,872	
*The duty on tobacco - -	1,287	
* N. B. This duty is aſſigned in the following manner; 855 purſes to the proprietors of the Mulikané. 232 to the mufti. 200 to the imperial mint. 1,287		
Rent of the houſes belonging to the arſenal - - -	1,280	
Duty on tobacco of Arabia and of Id - - - - -	700	
Of which is aſſigned 400 to the proprietors above mentioned 300 to the imperial mint.		
Revenues of the farms belonging to Mecca and Medina - -	2,800	
Divers ſmall farms deſtined for charity - - - - -	2,995	
Annual Fixed Revenue - -	75,871	
	or	37,935,500
Carried forward - -	75,871	
	or	37,935,500

	Purſes Rumi.	Piaſtres.
Brought forward - -	75,871	37,935,500
II. UNFIXED REVENUE.		
From the Muagili and Mukata -	5,772	
Duty on tobacco - - -	3,065	
Caſual confiſcations and inheritances - - -	1,327	
Farms of Cairo - - -	1,650	
On tobacco by a new regulation -	400	
The Zaëſé paid by the vizir and other miniſters for their offices -	1,800	
Beſides what is paid on the creating of a vizir on making any other miniſter. - - -		
	89,885	
	or	44,942,500

Total of the Revenue of the Empire or public treaſury, called the *Miri*, 44,942,500 piaſtres, or about £. 4,494,250. ſterling. Since this calculation was made, the exchange is ſtill more againſt Turkey, or, more properly ſpeaking, this money has been much debaſed.

The Revenues of Walachia and Moldavia are not included. They were to pay nothing during the three firſt years after the peace with Ruſſia was concluded.

ANNUAL EXPENDITURE of the MIRI.

	Purſes Divani.	Piaſtres.
Pay of the city guards or militia of Conſtantinople	22,700	
Pay of the boſtangis and of the people belonging to the ſultan's kitchen	700	
Pay of the agas and officers of the ſultan's palace	1,700	
To the harem of the old palace	1,800	
To the ſultan's eunuchs	800	
To the aga of the ſeraglio of Galata	501	
Expences of the kitchen (purſes rumi)	1,800	
To the chief of the butchers	600	
Expences of the imperial ſtables	600	
Arbitrary aſſignments	1,250	
A donation to Mecca and Medina	9,000	
Pay of the ſailors of the fleet	2,700	
Proviſion for the fleet	800	
Expences of the admiralty	1,800	
Penſions of the ſultanas and of the depoſed khans of the Crim	1,372	
Pay of the garriſon of Viddin	1,250	
Pay of all the other fortreſſes of the Ottoman empire	18,000	
Pay of thoſe of Boſnia	1,970	
For maintaining recruits	472	
Expences of the leſſer department called Kuchúk Kalem	1,200	
Pay of thoſe who guard the Danube	3,521	
Expences in maintaining the poſts	1,700	
Total of the Expenditures of the Empire, paid by the public treaſury or miri	76,236	or 36,968,133

Equal to about £. 3,696,813 ſterling.

Revenue	£. 4,494,250 ſterling.
Expenditure	3,696,813
Surplus	£. 797,437 ſterling.

An

An ACCOUNT of the DEBTS and CREDITS of the MIRI, in 1776, *after the concluſion of the* RUSSIAN WAR.

	Purſes Divani.	Piaſtres.
The Miri owed,		
To the treaſury of Mecca and Medina		1,350,000
To the Haſnè		45,550,000
To the arſenal		6,500,000
To the Miri was owing,		53,400,000
From the tobacco cuſtoms	3,786,000	
From ſeveral branches of the Revenue	6,000,000	
A balance on the Yearly Payments to the treaſury	7,280,480	
		17,066,480
Balance, being the debt of the Miri, or about £. 3,628,350 ſterling		36,333,510

The *haſné*, or private treaſure of the ſultan, next claims our notice: in amount, indeed, it is vaſtly ſuperior to the miri, but it contributes little to the exigencies of the ſtate, except in times of war, or other great emergency, and even then it is generally made a creditor of the public treaſury to the amount of its contribution.

The ordinary expenditure of this treaſury is chiefly confined to the ſeraglio; it is, how-

ever, very conſiderable, though greatly diminiſhed ſince the reform introduced by ſultan Muſtafa the third.

Its extraordinary expences have ſometimes been very conſiderable, large ſums being occaſionally paid to ſecure the fidelity of the janizaries in times of popular commotion, or on the acceſſion of a new ſultan to the throne amidſt the ſtruggle of contending factions; it has alſo, in ſome inſtances, contributed larger ſums toward the proſecution of a war, than thoſe for which it has been made creditor by the miri.

The receipts may be divided (as thoſe of the miri) into fixed and caſual; the former, however, are very inconſiderable in compariſon with the latter.

The fixed revenues of the haſné conſiſted of the following tributes:

From Cairo	600,000 piaſtres.
Wallachia	230,000
Moldavia	260,000
Raguſa	20,000
	1,110,000 piaſtres, or £. 111,000 ſterling.

Theſe, however, have either ceaſed entirely, or are little to be relied on. The Raguſan tribute, which is the only one paid regularly, conſiſts of 12,000 ſequins, or £. 6,000 ſterling

ſterling every three years. Thoſe of Moldavia and Wallachia are annihilated when there is a war with Ruſſia; and Cairo is ſo little ſubject to the porte, that inſtead of receiving a regular contribution from thence, large ſums are frequently ſent thither to corrupt the begs, and to enſure their obedience to the porte, by fomenting quarrels amongſt them.

The caſual revenues of the haſné, are

1ſt. The revenues of the mines, which have lately much diminiſhed.

2d. The ſale (for they are really ſold) of all places and poſts, which are alſo diminiſhed, as they do not bring in ſo much as they did, owing to the wretchedneſs of the provinces. The paſhalik of Cairo uſed to coſt £. 75,000 ſterling; that of a cadi in a great city 2 to £. 5000, and more.

3d. A duty of 10 per cent on all inheritances.

4th. The inheritances of the officers of the ſeraglio, and the porte (or empire,) the ſultan being their heir, to the total excluſion of their children or relations. The ulema ſolely are exempted from this law.

5th. The confiſcations of all officers diſgraced or put to death.

6th. The property of thoſe who die without heirs, inherited by the law of eſcheat.

7th. Penalties.

8th. Preſents from great officers and foreign courts.

Nothing can be more uncertain than a gueſs (for a calculation is impoſſible) of the amount

of each of theſe branches of the private treaſury; many of them are in themſelves highly fluctuating, and others are ſubject to immenſe embezzlements. That they greatly ſurpaſs the revenues of the miri cannot be doubted, ſince it is the principal occupation of every paſha to ſuck out the very vitals of his province; and theſe men have no ſooner amaſſed a great property, than they are cut off by the ſultan to enrich his treaſury.

Every ſultan leaves what is called his treaſure in the vaults of the ſeraglio, and every ſultan thinks it a duty to leave as conſiderable a ſum as he can—they attach even a vanity to it.

The perſonal hereditary wealth of the individuals of the ulema forms, in the aggregate, a very conſiderable fund, which, in the ordinary operations of government, cannot be applied to any uſes of the ſtate. The ulema, as we have ſeen, is the only body of men who hold offices in the Turkiſh empire, whoſe property is hereditary in their families; it may therefore be naturally ſuppoſed that they will become objects of the ſultan's avaricious jealouſy: ſuch, however, is their power, that any invaſion of their treaſure would be attended with the greateſt danger. The mere exiſtence of ſuch a treaſure is, however, a ſubject of great importance, both as affecting

affecting the ordinary and extraordinary circumſtances of the ſtate.

In the former, it ſerves to ſupport a body of men inveſted with formidable power, in oppoſition to the ſultan; but as theſe ſame men have little connection of intereſt with the people at large, their wealth ſeems to be taken from the general ſtock only to nouriſh an additional body of tyrants. In the event of any great convulſion, it cannot be doubted that even this treaſure would be ſacrificed to the preſervation of the ſtate; but it ſeems probable that this meaſure would not be adopted without ſome ſtruggle on the part of the ulema, who will ſcarcely be willing to make ſuch a ſacrifice until it is, perhaps, too late.

The treaſures in the moſques are very conſiderable: they ariſe from the revenues appropriated to them at their foundation, and by ſubſequent bequeſts; and as the ſuperſtition of the rich muſſulmans frequently leads them to ſuch acts of oſtentatious charity, the aggregate of theſe ſums throughout the whole empire muſt be immenſe. The whole of this property, being under the ſeal of religion, cannot be broken in upon with impunity. The ordinary revenues are, or ought to be, expended in the ſupport of the moſque, and in works of piety and charity; but there are be-

ſides, in ſome of their vaults, treaſures which would be very conſiderable, were it not for conſtant malverſation on the part of the guardians. The whole of theſe treaſures, though ſtrictly forbidden by law to be applied to any other uſes than thoſe of religion, may be reſorted to when the ſeat of empire itſelf is in imminent danger, an event in which the intereſts of the Mahometan religion are ſuppoſed to be involved.

Such are the ſources, and, as nearly as it can be calculated, the amount of the Turkiſh revenue and expenditure. The mode of its collection, and the probable conſequences of its preſent ſituation, afford room for obſervations of the higheſt importance, which, indeed, are ſufficiently obvious to the enlightened European, but which the ignorant Turk would with difficulty comprehend or arrogantly deride.

The want of clear and accurate views on the ſubject of finance gives the court that rapacity, which ſpreads to all the ſubordinate officers, and tends to the impoveriſhment of the people without augmenting (but on the contrary diminiſhing) the reſources of the government. It has become a fixed ſource of revenue to ſet to public ſale offices of every denomination; nor is it only to the treaſury that theſe fees, ſometimes to a very high amount,

amount, are paid: in the intrigues of the ſeraglio, by which the diſpoſal of all places is regulated, every thing is done by means of bribes; and if this is attended, as we have ſeen, with the worſt conſequences in the diſtribution of juſtice, it is no leſs pernicious in the department of finance.

Hence it is, that the paſhas ſent into the diſtant provinces exert to the utmoſt their power of extortion; but are always outdone by the officers immediately below them, who, in turn, leave room for the ingenuity of their ſubordinate agents; and the circle is only completed by the power of the deſpot, who, from time to time, ſqueezes into his own coffers the ſponge, with which this herd of plunderers had abſorbed the property of the people.

As the Mahomedans themſelves pay no perſonal tax or capitation, and in general contribute very little to the revenues of the ſtate, the paſhas are obliged to find other methods of exacting money from them; but the Chriſtians always ſuffer moſt.

The mildneſs of the Turkiſh government is argued from their permitting foreigners to pay lower duties than their own ſubjects; this circumſtance is, however, only a proof of their ignorance in matters of commerce; for ſurely a wiſe and politic ſovereign would, by

all means, cheriſh the commercial ſpirit in his own ſubjects rather than in ſtrangers. The duty paid by foreigners is 3 per cent. whilſt that paid by the natives varies in different places from 5 to 7 and 10 per cent. The loweſt is a duty of 5 per cent. paid at Conſtantinople and Smyrna, on ſome articles of foreign produce; but in moſt parts of the empire the legal duty on merchandize in general is 10 per cent. Peyſſonel, who corrects Tott on this ſubject, is himſelf ſo far from being accurate, that (contrary to his aſſertion) the common duty is called *aſheria*, or the tenth (from the Arabic *aſhir.*) But the legal impoſts are but a ſmall part of what the merchant pays: foreigners indeed are, in all countries, more liable to impoſition than the natives; but that even the latter are ſubjected to heavy impoſitions is certain, from the inſtances cited by Tott, which are by no means uncommon.

From the total ſeparation of the public treaſury and that of the ſultan, it reſults, that whilſt the former is in the moſt impoveriſhed ſtate, and unable to pay for the moſt neceſſary expences of the empire, the latter abounds with money, which is laviſhed on the moſt frivolous objects. However the ſplendor of the ſovereign may be ſuppoſed to be connected with the glory of the ſtate, the

neceſſities

neceſſities of the latter have ſurely a paramount claim; but in Turkey it is conſidered of more importance to provide diamonds for the ſultan's harem, than to conduct the moſt uſeful operations, military or commercial. If the preſent ſtate of the Turkiſh finances ſeems incompatible with the permanence or proſperity of the ſtate, the future proſpect is ſtill leſs promiſing.

The debt of the miri, in 1776, cannot be conſidered as very enormous, if we take into the account how great had been the exertion, and how ruinous the expence, of the preceding war. The fleet, which had ſuffered ſo greatly from the diſaſter at Tcheſmé, was alſo re-eſtabliſhed on a more formidable footing than it had been previouſly to that event, and the treaſury ſeemed to have effected all its moſt burdenſome operations. Nevertheleſs the expenditure has ſince increaſed, and it is not probable that the miri can diſcharge its debts without a donation from the treaſury of the ſultan, a meaſure which does not enter into the policy of the ſeraglio. Here then we are to conſider the probable conſequences of a deficiency in its treaſury, to a government which knows nothing of the financial proviſions of modern politics, and, conſequently, will be totally unprepared for ſuch a conjuncture.

The

The revenues of the empire are diminiſhing, and as the extortions of the paſhas increaſe, and the means of ſatisfying them decreaſe in a degree alarming to the porte, oppreſſive even to the Mahomedans, and ſhockingly diſtreſsful to the poor Chriſtian ſubjects, ſome great criſis cannot be very far off, when the ſultan muſt (notwithſtanding every reaſon he may have to the contrary) open the treaſures of the ſeraglio, and, laſt of all, have recourſe to the ſacred depoſits of the moſques, and the riches of the ulema. What diſorder, confuſion, and alarm, this will occaſion, what revolutionary events it may produce in the provinces, from the diſtreſs and conſequent weakneſs of the porte, may be eaſily foreſeen; univerſal anarchy muſt prevail, and every paſha will aſpire at being an independent ſovereign.

That there would be reſources in the empire no one can doubt; but to employ them would require another ſyſtem of government —a ſyſtem incompatible with the policy, the habits, and perhaps the fundamental laws of the Turkiſh government.

The revenues have lately been conſiderably augmented by improvements in the adminiſtration of the different branches, and particularly the farms.

The debaſement of the current coin has ſometimes

ſometimes been reſorted to by ſovereigns as a meaſure of finance. In this point of view the following obſervations on the Turkiſh money may not be unacceptable;

The alloy in the GOLD COIN is ſilver (not copper.)

The zurmachbub of Conſtantinople, a gold coin of Machmut, Oſman, and Muſtafa, weighs 13 karats, and is { 22 ½ carats fine / 1 ½ alloy ſilver. } The mitcal, or 24 carats of pure gold, is worth 6 ½ dollars. Theſe pieces go for 3 ½ dollars.

The zurmahbubs of Abdulhamid and Selim are 19 carats fine, and go for 3 ½ dollars.

Thoſe of Cairo weigh 13 karats, and go in Turkey for 3 ½ dollars; they are from 17, 18, to 19 carats fine.

The fundukli of Machmut and Muſtafa weigh 17 ½ carats, are 23 carats fine, and go for 5 dollars.

SILVER COIN.

1 pound of ſilver equals 100 drachms.

In the piaſtres there are but 40 drachms pure in the pound.

Thoſe of Abdulhamit 34 drachms—they cheat 2 carats at the mint, which the money is leſs than the ſtandard.

That of ſultan Selim, the preſent reigning ſovereign, is ſtill worſe.

CHAPTER III.

Of the Turkiſh Military Force.

THE ſtate of the Turkiſh military forms a very intereſting branch of enquiry, ſince it is that by which their empire has riſen, and upon which it ſeems to depend. In developing the weakneſs of this diſorganized maſs, I ſhall firſt recur to the cauſes which formerly gave it power, and which, having ceaſed to operate, leave it, at the preſent day, only the ſemblance of its ancient greatneſs. From this ſurvey we ſhall turn to a delineation of its preſent ſtate, and after giving a detail of the land forces, ſhall conſider their preſent military character, their tactics, and laws of warfare; from the united conſideration of which will be ſeen, what eſtimation the Turkiſh armies juſtly deſerve. The naval force will merit a ſeparate attention; and here we ſhall notice thoſe attempts at its amelioration, from which, if effectual improvement could be at all hoped in Turkey, it might have been, with ſome probability, expected. Laſtly, I ſhall notice the ſtate of the Turkiſh fortifications, particularly of thoſe which are, or are ſuppoſed to be, of the laſt importance to the defence of the empire.

It

It is undeniable that the power of the Turks was once formidable to their neighbour not by their numbers only, but by their military and civil inſtitutions, far ſurpaſſing thoſe of their opponents, who were never united in a rational ſyſtem; governed often by courtiers, prieſts, or women; poſſeſſing no rational ſyſtem of finance, no great reſources in caſes of exigency, no ſyſtem of war even comparable to the Turks, a feudal government, internal diſſentions, no wiſe or ſolid alliances amongſt each other; and yet they all trembled at the name of the Turks, who, with a confidence procured by their conſtant ſucceſſes, held the Chriſtians no leſs in contempt as warriors than they did on account of their religion. Proud and vain-glorious, conqueſt was to them a paſſion, a gratification, and even a mean of ſalvation, a ſure way of immediately attaining a delicious paradiſe. Hence their zeal for the extenſion of their empire, or rather a wild enthuſiaſm, even beyond the pure patriotiſm of the heroes of antiquity; hence their profound reſpect for the military profeſſion, and their glory even in being obedient and ſubmiſſive to diſcipline.

The Ottoman empire was governed by great men from Othman I. to Mahomed IV.

The

The exceptions, if any, were always ſo ſhort, that the military genius of the people did not decline, but was like a fire ſmothered, and always broke out in the next reign with redoubled fury. To ſultan Amurath I. is owing the riſe of a permanent military among the Turks; he it was, who, after extending the ſphere of his conqueſts from the Helleſpont to the Danube, formed the more politic project of preſerving his empire by a body of militia, accuſtomed to diſcipline and attached by peculiar privileges to the ſervice.

For this purpoſe he took every *fifth child of the Chriſtians* in his power, above fifteen years old, and committed them to the care of huſbandmen for two or three years, to be inured to hard labour, and inſtructed in the Mahometan religion. They were then taught the uſe of arms, and to accuſtom them to ſlaughter they were made to practiſe the uſe of their ſabres on their priſoners or criminals. When every movement of compaſſion was worn out, they were inrolled in the body of *yeniſheri* (new troops) or janizaries, and formed the flower of the Turkiſh army. The inſtitution of the janizaries gave at that time a deciſive ſuperiority to the Turkiſh arms, as they preſented a ſyſtem of diſcipline, and a permanency of organization, till then

then unknown in Europe. Theſe haughty and celebrated legions were long the terror of ſurrounding nations, and continued to be looked upon as formidable until the middle of the ſeventeenth century. At that time the Turkiſh power ceaſed to aggrandize itſelf; it made a pauſe in its conqueſts, a pauſe prophetic of that downfal toward which it has ſince ſo rapidly verged, and which ſeems now to threaten a ſpeedy approach. The ſteps which led to this degradation are eaſily diſcernible. The diſcipline of this ferocious ſoldiery could only be upheld by ſovereigns equally ferocious: no ſooner did the ſultans quit the fatigues of the camp for the debaucheries of the harem, than the janizaries, diſdaining their command, broke out into ſedition, and dethroned the monarch who appeared unworthy of empire. It was the policy of ſultan Mahmud, who dreaded their military and turbulent ſpirit, to debaſe this corps; he therefore permitted the loweſt and moſt infamous of the people to enrol themſelves as janizaries; hence their number has been greatly ſwelled, but their character has been more than proportionally degraded, and many of them are notoriouſly ſtigmatiſed for cowardice, theft, and the vileſt crimes, whilſt others, enervated by a city life, and the practice of the loweſt trades, have nothing

nothing military. but the name of janizary. In the abſtracts of their hiſtory will be ſeen the attempts that were made to cut them off entirely.

Peyſſonel makes a pompous enumeration of the diſtinctions which take place in the army, and of the military canons of ſultan Soliman, which determine its regulation and diſcipline.

That there are ſuch diſtinctions follows from the very nature of an army, as the *ſag kol* and *ſol kol* (right wing and left wing) the *ortas*, *buluks*, and *ſeymens* (different names for corps) as alſo the titles of the officers, as *janizar aga*, *ſeymen baſhi*, *koul kiaiaſſi*, &c.; but theſe forms prove nothing with regard to the minutiæ of tactics. It is the general characteriſtic of the Turkiſh government to be loaded with forms and regulations, which are of no effectual ſervice; thus the canons of ſultan Soliman indeed exiſt, but no one ſtudies them, and to attempt enforcing them would be abſurd.

I ſhall therefore proceed to ſtate the following

CALCULATION of the TURKISH ARMY,

As far as its utmoſt extenſion at preſent admits, from the concording teſtimony of ſeveral

veral perſons who had the moſt intimate acquaintance with it, from an application of many years, and with means of acquiring the beſt information.

INFANTRY.

	Men.
1. Janizaries - - - -	113,400
2. Topgees, artillery men; according to the ancient inſtitutions there ſhould be 18,000, but there never exiſted more than -	15,000
3. Gumbaragees, bombardiers - -	2,000
4. Boſtangees, guards of the gardens; they now guard the palace - - -	12,000
5. Mehtergees, who erect the tents and place the camp - - - -	6,000
6. Meſſirlis, ſent from Egypt—infantry and cavalry	3,000
7. Soldiers, from Walachia and Moldavia - -	6,000
8. Leventis, marines; few in peace, in war at moſt - - - -	50,000
Infantry -	207,400

CAVALRY.

	Men.
1. Spahis—paid regulated - - -	10,000
2. Serragis, for the ſervice of the infantry and their baggage, enrolled by the paſhas in the provinces. They are a corps de reſerve in great neceſſities - - -	6,000
3. Zaims and timariots, feudal troops - -	132,000
4. Gebegis, armourers, who guard the powder, arms, and magazines, occaſionally ſerve as a corps de reſerve of cavalry; they ſhould be, according to the canons of the empire, 30,000, they now are ſcarcely - -	13,000
Carried over -	161,000

CAVALRY.

	Men.
Brought forward -	161,000
5. Miklagis, who attend on the ſpahis - -	6,000
6. Segbans, who guard the baggage of the cavalry - - - -	4,000
7. Volontiers, with their horſes, never more than	10,000
Cavalry - -	181,000
Infantry - -	207,400
Total -	388,400

From theſe ſhould be deducted,

1. The leventis, who belong to the fleet, and can only be employed near the coaſt where the fleet is -	50,000	
2. For the garriſon of Conſtantinople, though ſo many in time of war, are not always kept there - -	20,000	
3. Garriſons of the fortreſſes and frontiers in Europe and Aſia - -	100,000	
4. The boſtangees, when the grand ſeignior does not go into the field	12,000	
		182,000
Troops to take the field -		206,400
The miklagis, and ſuch as ſerve the vizir, the beglerbegs, and paſhas, never go into the battle, and only increaſe the number; theſe may be computed nearly at -		20,000
Total -		186,400

The remainder of effective men will therefore amount only to 186,400 men.

As

As it will ſoon appear how little the Turkiſh arms are ſtrengthened by diſcipline, the conſideration of numbers becomes doubly important, and indeed it is upon them that the porte at preſent entirely relies. Yet even here its power evidently fails to an alarming degree: it has often found it difficult to aſſemble 100,000 men; and in 1774, with its utmoſt efforts, it could only bring into the field 142,000.

Theſe numbers too are greatly leſſened by deſertion. In 1773, the porte ſent 60,000 janizaries toward Trebiſond, to be embarked for the Crimea, where not 10,000 arrived, the reſt having diſperſed themſelves on their route. Beſides theſe regular troops, the Turks were formerly aſſiſted by numerous hordes of Tatars, whoſe mode of warfare exceeded even their own in barbarity: this ſupply is now cut off by their ceſſion of the Tatar provinces to the empreſs, ſo that they will not in future be able to cope with Ruſſia even in the number of their troops.

The laſt reliance of the porte is upon the volunteers; but a few obſervations will ſuffice to ſhew how little confidence can be placed in ſuch forces.

Formerly, when the whole nation was in ſome manner inflamed with the warlike genius of the janizaries, when the people were

inflated by ſucceſs, and every one knew more or leſs the uſe of arms, theſe were often found uſeful and valiant troops; but at preſent they conſiſt chiefly of an undiſciplined rabble, inſtigated either by a momentary raſhneſs or a deſire of plunder. Some go, becauſe they are aſhamed to ſtay at home, on account of the ridicule of their neighbours; others, to ſecure the privileges and pecuniary advantage which they derive from being attached to a chamber (or company) of janizaries; another part of theſe volunteers are robbers, and the outcaſt of the Turks, who go to plunder on their march, as well going as coming, under the ſanction of their military profeſſion.

The mollahs and mouhazim cry from the minarets of the moſques, in time of war, that all good muſelmans muſt go to fight againſt the infidels, with a long enumeration of the obligations on all true believers to take the field.

Hence, a young man is often ſeized with a fit of enthuſiaſm, (I have perſonally known many ſuch in Aſia) he takes a pair of richly furniſhed piſtols (if he can afford it, for in the richneſs of their armour is their pride) a ſabre covered with ſilver, and a carabine, and mounts his horſe to conquer the infidels, and make them become muſulmans, and to bring back

back with him young girls for his harem. If he does not repent and turn back before he ſees the camp, nor when arrived at the army, he ſoon learns from others the danger there is, and the difficulty of vanquiſhing the infidels; and when he has been a witneſs of it, and ſeen that there are only hard blows to be gotten, he generally ſets ſpurs to his horſe, and rides off. Thus by whole troops, in every war, theſe volunteers return, plundering the poor peaſants, and often murdering them, particularly if they are Chriſtians, to be able to ſwear, when they return home, how many infidels they have killed. The Aſiatic foot ſoldiers deſert in the ſame manner, and by thouſands, though they are moſt of them janizaries.

There is, it is true, a conſiderable difference in the ſoldiery: the Turks of Europe are the beſt ſoldiers; but far above all, thoſe of Boſnia, Albania, Croatia, and towards the emperor's frontier; they are a very robuſt and warlike people, accuſtomed from their infancy to arms, and are almoſt continually fighting with one another, or againſt the porte, or plundering on the roads. The emperor had to do with a much worſe enemy than the Ruſſians; and beſides, they had to defend their families and homes, and conſe-

quently had an intereſt in the war, which the Aſiatic troops have not.

Many authors have contended, that it is poſſible to inſpire the Turks anew with their ancient military ſpirit, and to elevate their forces to their former ſuperiority, by inſtructing them in European tactics. The attempts which have ſo frequently been made by French officers to this purpoſe, without the leaſt ſucceſs, are convincing proofs againſt ſuch a ſuppoſition. The celebrated Bonneval, whoſe adventures were matter of much notoriety in the beginning of this century, laboured at this undertaking, as did the Baron de Tott ſince his time; yet, notwithſtanding the ability and perſeverance of the latter, all his pains were rendered fruitleſs by the unconquerable bigotry of the Turks themſelves. An attempt is now making on a better principle; not by endeavouring to diſcipline the old ſoldiery, but by raiſing a new corps, of which notice ſhall hereafter be taken. If theſe inſtances were not ſufficient to ſhow the impracticability of ſuch an attempt, a very ſlight view of the real ſtate of their force would ſuffice to ſet it in the cleareſt point of view.

Their force lies in their attack, but for that they muſt be prepared; taken unawares

the ſmalleſt number puts them to flight. The Ruſſians always conquer when they attack them, and therefore avoid being attacked, which is generally very eaſy. At preſent the attack of the Turks (terrible indeed as it appears to thoſe who ſee it the firſt time) is no longer new to the Ruſſians; they know how to receive it, and therefore do not dread it. Had the emperor followed the Ruſſian ſyſtem, he would have been equally ſucceſsful, in the beginning of the laſt war, as he was when he changed his plan of operation.

Beſides that the Turks refuſe all melioration, they are ſeditious and mutinous; their armies are incumbered with immenſe baggage, and their camp has all the conveniencies of a town, ſhops, &c. for ſuch was their ancient cuſtom when they wandered with their hordes. When their ſudden fury is abated, which is at the leaſt obſtinate reſiſtance, they are ſeized with a panic, and have no rallying as formerly. In proportion as the march of the army, advancing in the field, was ſlow, ſo is it rapid in its retreat. They leave their baggage, abandon every thing to the enemy, and do not even nail up their cannon. The cavalry (which is the only part of their army that deſerves the name of troops) is as much afraid of their own foot as of the enemy; for in a deſeat

they fire at them to get their horſes to eſcape quicker. In ſhort, it is a mob aſſembled rather than an army levied. None of thoſe numerous details of a well-organized body, neceſſary to give quickneſs, ſtrength, and regularity to its actions, to avoid confuſion, to repair damages, to apply every part to ſome uſe; nothing, as with us, the reſult of reaſoning and combination; no ſyſtematic attack, defence, or retreat; no accident foreſeen, or provided for.

To theſe reaſons might be added the opinion of Gazi Haſſan, the celebrated captain-paſha (of whom I ſhall have occaſion to ſay much hereafter) who, after repeated endeavours to improve the army, found all his attempts ineffectual. He ſaw it was impoſſible to diſcipline the Turkiſh army, and gave up all hopes of it, but propoſed a new order of battle.

He would have divided an army of 100,000 men into ten different corps, which were to attack ſeparately, and ſo arranged that the retreat of the repulſed corps ſhould not overwhelm and put in diſorder thoſe which had not attacked. He affirmed, that though the artillery of an European army would make great ſlaughter, yet no army could withſtand ten Turkiſh attacks, which are furious, but ſhort if they do not ſucceed, and the attack

of

of 10,000 is as dangerous as of 100,000 in one body, for the firſt repulſed, the reſt, on whom they fall back, immediately take to flight. But any one who knows the Turks would ſee the impoſſibility of leading on the other corps after a defeat of the firſt, as the ſpirit of their army now is. The old janizaries are no more; beſides, the Chriſtian army, encouraged by ſucceſs, would have time to recover from any diſorder. Haſſan himſelf was as brave as a lion, but he could not inſpire into the troops his own ſpirit; he tried nineteen years, and had all the time unlimited power. If he therefore performed nothing in a reign, where he virtually was ſovereign, what is to be expected now or hereafter? Centuries may paſs away before another ſuch man ariſes with ſuch means.

The Turkiſh weapons require ſome notice. The artillery which they have, and which is chiefly braſs, comprehends many fine pieces of cannon; but notwithſtanding the reiterated inſtruction of ſo many French engineers, they are profoundly ignorant of its management *. Their

* In ſpeaking of their artillery I ought not to omit mentioning an Engliſhman in the ſervice of the porte; his name is Campbell, and he is related to a great Scotch family. When very young, he came to Conſtantinople (the cauſe of his quitting Scotland is ſaid to be a duel) and, without making himſelf known to any European, he went to

Their muſket-barrels are much eſteemed; but they are too heavy; nor do they poſſeſs any quality ſuperior to common iron barrels, which have been much hammered, and are of very ſoft Swediſh iron. They are thus made: round a rod of iron they twiſt ſoft old iron wire, and forge it; then they bore out the rod, part of which often remains, according as the wire was thick or thin, and the bore large or ſmall.

The art of tempering their ſabres is now loſt, and all the blades of great value are ancient; however, their ſabre is ſuperior to any of ours in its form and lightneſs. It is a great error in all the cavalry in Europe to have heavy ſabres; I have often heard old

to the porte and turned Turk. He advanced by ſlow degrees till he became general of the bombardiers (the place which Bonneval had) and then only he became acquainted with his countrymen, and other Europeans. He was many years at the head of the foundery of ordnance; and though at home he knew nothing of the art of caſting cannon, he ſoon far ſurpaſſed Mr. de Tott, over whom he had great advantages, as he is a Mahomedan. He is a good claſſical ſcholar, and ſpeaks the modern languages with correctneſs. He is perfectly a gentleman, and is univerſally reſpected by Europeans for the honour, integrity, prudence, and humanity of his character. The Turks know little how to eſteem a man of ſo much worth; for after rendering the moſt important ſervices to the porte, he was treated with ingratitude, and now, being advanced in years, is wholly neglected.

German

German ſoldiers complain of it, and an old ſoldier is a good judge. It ſeems prepoſterous indeed to make all the ſabres in a regiment of equal weight, without regard to the ſtrength of the arm to uſe it; beſides, a *ſharp light* ſabre will make a deeper cut than our heavy ſabres now in uſe. Among the Turks, every ſoldier chooſes his own ſabre, and takes ſuch a one as he can manage with eaſe; thus, if he miſſes his ſtroke he can recover his guard, whilſt a man with a heavy ſabre is loſt. The part graſped by the fingers in European ſabres is much too thick, and weakens the hold. Much is talked in Europe of the balance of a ſabre by making it heavy in the hand*; this cannot be the caſe in any degree, except the knob or pommel project out of the hand towards the elbow, which will enable him to raiſe up the point quick by the force of the wriſt, after he has given a blow; but the weight of the fall of the blow is diminiſhed in both caſes. Let any man ſtrike a blow with a

* The fulcrum is the fore-finger, and the back part of the hand preſſes down the pommel; but a man in battle does not keep his hand at one height; he lifts up his arm, and conſequently has the weight of the handle of his ſabre to lift up, and the power is in the elbow and ſhoulder, not in the wriſt alone. It cannot be expected that men in action, particularly new troops, will uſe their ſabres in the ſame manner they do on field days.

ſabre heavy in the hand, and then take out the blade, and put on it a light ſmall handle, and ſtrike another blow with it, and he will find the difference. Let him ſtrike with each fifty blows as quick as he can, and obſerve the difference of time, and the fatigue, and he will be convinced. The ſharpneſs of the edge of the Turkiſh ſabre, and the velocity which the arm gives to a light weapon, compenſates for the weight of the ſabre. All their attention has been paid to the ſabre *for ages* (with it they conquered their empire) and it certainly deſerves ſome attention for cavalry. The edge of our ſabres is never ſharp enough, and the angle of the edge is too acute. In regard to its crookedneſs it has an advantage, as a blow ſtraight down gives a drawing cut; and it is a good defence, for the arm being held out horizontally with the ſabre upright in the hand, a ſmall motion of the wriſt turning the edge to the right or left, covers the body by the crook of the ſabre; the ſhoulder of the edge, not the edge itſelf, forms the parry. Fencing with the crooked ſabre was formerly taught to the janizaries. The puſh with the ſabre is alſo a good attack. If, however, the puſh only is preferred for cavalry, the lighter and longer the ſabre is the better, and the nearer it is to a ſpear or lance. The blow upwards

is

is eſteemed the moſt dangerous by the Turks, as it is the moſt difficult to parry.

Many of their cavalry make uſe of the ſpear, which, for a cloſe regular front, is perhaps the beſt weapon; but as the Turkiſh horſe wheel round in full ſpeed, and are never in a regular ſtraight line, perhaps no weapon is ſo advantageous as their light ſharp crooked ſabre. No body of cavalry that keeps together, and makes its evolutions without being broken (that is keeping a cloſe front in a line) can give a ſhock to the Turkiſh cavalry; they wheel about and retreat much faſter than regular cavalry can advance, and this not in a body, but each man turns his horſe round in his place. Much might be ſaid for and againſt their cavalry; it is foreign to my preſent purpoſe, and would require a long diſſertation to put them and our cavalry in a comparative view. Only let it be remembered, that though their infantry can neither be oppoſed to European cavalry or infantry, nor their cavalry to European infantry, yet their cavalry is generally ſuperior to all the cavalry they have been oppoſed to hitherto; I mean the better kind of their cavalry, which is now not very numerous, and can make no effectual oppoſition to an European army of good infantry with cannon.

Their

Their beſt Turkiſh ſabres have one great defect, brittleneſs; they are apt to fly like glaſs by a blow given injudiciouſly, though a perſon uſed to cut with them will, without any danger of breaking a ſabre or turning its edge, cut through an iron nail as thick as a man's finger. Few accidents happen in conſequence of ſabres breaking among the Turkiſh cavalry, but very frequently amongſt the infantry, from ignorance of their uſe. In regard to this I will cite a fact which fell under my particular knowledge. At the ſtorming of Oczakow, a lieutenant of the fleet of the Black Sea, a Mr. Fox, an Engliſhman, ſerved as a volunteer, and marching at the head of a column of 200 Ruſſian grenadiers, was oppoſed by a body of Turks: he was a man of prodigious bodily ſtrength and great courage; he fought at the head of the column in the line, with a Turkiſh ſabre; it was ſoon broken, and the ſoldiers ſupplied him with others they picked up from the ground, belonging to the Turks that were killed, moſt of which, from his want of ſkill, he broke, till the Turks retreated. He killed a number of Turks, and eſcaped without a wound, defending himſelf with the remainder of one ſabre till he was ſupplied with another. None of theſe Turks had the leaſt notion of parrying the blows.

This

This Mr. Fox was a volunteer afterwards at the ſtorming of Iſmail, where he was killed. He is remembered in the Ruſſian army to this day as a great hero. As ſoldiers, even the beſt taught to uſe the crooked ſabre, are not always ſo calm in action as to make the beſt uſe of it, a blade tempered in the manner of the beſt blades in Europe is preferable, provided the edge be *perfectly ſharp*, and the angle of it *not too acute*; and as to the crooked form, it alſo requires coolneſs and knowledge to uſe it, for if the part which bends moſt forward and the point do not deſcend in a ſtraight line, the point will turn the ſabre ſideways by its weight, as ſoon as the crooked part ſtrikes, and prevent its cutting; for this reaſon a ſtraighter blade, in an ignorant or timid hand, is preferable; but a light blade and thin hilt is abſolutely neceſſary for the ſafety of the ſoldier. It may be remembered that the Romans, with their ſhort ſwords, had a great advantage over the Gauls, whoſe long heavy ſwords ſoon tired them. A Turk, with his light ſhort ſabre proportioned to his ſtrength (for they are not long taking the chord of the ſegment) will not tire ſo ſoon as an European with his long heavy ſabre. I ſpeak of cavalry, for the ſabre, after the invention of the bayonet, is a bad weapon for infantry.

Their

Their laws of war are thoſe of the moſt ferocious barbarians: believing, from the prejudices of their religion, that they have a right to carry fire and ſword at pleaſure among the infidels, they are checked in their bloody career by no ideas of mercy. They have a right, as they imagine, to put to death all their priſoners, of whatever age or ſex, whether they throw down their arms, capitulate, or by whatever method they are taken, and this right extends, not only to the moment of capture, but for ever afterward, unleſs the captive embrace the Mahometan religion. The heads of the enemy's ſubjects are valued by the government at a certain price, and for every one that is brought in five ſequins are paid out of the treaſury. This is frequently a ſource of the greateſt crimes, as it is impoſſible to diſtinguiſh the head of an enemy from that of a wretched peaſant or unfortunate traveller, who has been aſſaſſinated for the ſake of the reward. It is the common cuſtom after an action, when the grand vizir returns to his tent, for the ſoldiers to line the path with heads which have been thus chopped off.

The barbarous law of Turkiſh warfare, which condemns all their priſoners to death, is not indeed always practiſed; but it is not humanity which prevents it; avarice or brutal deſire

deſire are the cauſes of prolonging to the ſlave a miſerable exiſtence. At other times the ferocious conqueror butchers in cold blood his captive, or drags him along loaded with injury and inſult. Such is the faithful picture drawn by Count Ferrieres and others of the treatment of the Auſtrian priſoners (many of them officers of diſtinction) in their way to Conſtantinople. Thoſe who fell ſick on the road, or appeared incapable of being converted to the purpoſes of labour, were cruelly mangled by the *common waggoners*, who chopped off the heads of ſome, and maimed others from the impulſe of mere barbarity; and the proceeding of the common waggoners was *lawful*, and conformable to cuſtom.

The naval force of the Turks is by no means conſiderable. Their *grand fleet* conſiſted of not more than 17 or 18 ſail of the line in the laſt war, and thoſe not in very good condition; at preſent their number is leſſened. Their *gallies* are now of no uſe as ſhips of war; but there are about twenty large veſſels called *caravellas*, which belong to merchants, and in time of war are frequently taken into the ſervice of the porte, and carry forty guns. Theſe were the veſſels, of which ſeveral were loſt, during the laſt war, in the Liman, and between Kilburon and Ochakof. Their ſhips in general are roomy, and larger, for the num-

ber of guns, than ours. In regard to their conſtruction, they are built of good oak wood, but the timbers being too far aſunder, they are very weak. From the ſlightneſs of their make they are liable ſoon to become hogged; to prevent which, they build them with their decks curved up, ſo that when the two ends ſettle, the veſſels become ſtraight. Such ſhips do not laſt long, and are ſubject to be leaky. In 1778, the fineſt ſhip in the fleet foundered in the Black Sea; being too weak, ſhe worked her caulking out, and leaked between all her planks. The famous captain paſha, Haſſan, attributed it to the bad caulking, and when the fleet came back into the port of Conſtantinople, he ordered all the captains of the ſhips of war to attend in perſon the caulking of their own ſhips all the time, on pain of death. One of them, being one day tired of ſitting by his ſhip, went home to his houſe, not above a quarter of a mile off. The captain paſha happened to go himſelf to the arſenal to ſee the work, examined the caulking, found fault, and aſked for the captain; the truth was obliged to be told him; he ſat down on a ſmall carpet, ſent one man for his blunderbuſs, and another to call the captain; as ſoon as the unfortunate man came near him, he took up his blunderbuſs and ſhot him dead without ſpeaking a word to him. "Take and

"bury him," he ſaid, "and let the other "captains attend him to the grave, and the "caulking be ſuſpended till they return."

The ſhape of their ſhips bottoms is conſidered by all thoſe who are judges (ſuch as French ſhip-builders and Engliſh ſeamen, whoſe opinions I have heard) as the moſt perfect. It is certain they are very faſt ſailors, but their upper works are very inferior to the ſhips of other nations. It is for the ſake of ſtrength, and the improvement of their upper works, that they have ſometimes employed French ſhip-builders. I was acquainted with Mr. Le Roy, who built them ſome ſhips at Conſtantinople; he aſſured me, that he took as models for the bottoms, Turkiſh veſſels.

They build their ſhips at Meteline, Stanchio, Sinope, or at Conſtantinople. Thoſe at Sinope coſt (a ſhip of the line) only £. 9,000, without their guns and rigging. Their guns are always of braſs. It appears therefore that the Turks might eaſily have ſhips of the beſt conſtruction; but they have no nurſery for ſeamen. The Greeks navigate their veſſels, together with a few Malteſe and other ſlaves, and theſe are very timorous, for on the ſmalleſt accident the captain hangs them. The Turks fight the guns, and ſome of the loweſt claſs aſſiſt in getting up the anchors, pulling at the end of a rope, &c. They, however, row

and manage their narrow ſharp boats in the channel of Conſtantinople better than any other people. They get their beſt ſailors from the coaſt of Barbary, but not in great numbers; thoſe employed in the trade of the Black Sea, and who belong to the coaſt of Anatolia, are wretchedly bad; they navigate veſſels of the worſt conſtruction poſſible, which can never ſail but before the wind; when the wind changes they run into port; this is the reaſon ſo many mercantile veſſels are loſt in the Black Sea, and not from the dangerous navigation of that ſea.

The famous captain paſha (before mentioned) collected all the good ſailors he could engage from Barbary, the Adriatic gulph, Idrea (famous for a faſt ſailing kind of cutters) and other parts, but ſtill his fleet was badly manned, and without the Greeks never could have put to ſea in 1778.

As the eſtabliſhment of the navy has been moſtly taken from the Chriſtians, and has not the authority of their ancient inſtitutions to plead for its abuſes, there would be a great poſſibility of its improvement, were it not for that habitual indolence which leads the Turk quickly to abandon any arduous undertaking.

Never was there ſo great a proſpect of improvement in the Turkiſh marine, as that afforded

forded by the exertions of the celebrated Haſſan, captain paſha or high admiral, who was promoted to that important office for his military talents, and the bravery which he diſplayed at Tcheſmé. He employed all the influence which his official and perſonal character both gave him, and which, under ſultan Abdul Hamid, was almoſt unlimited, to introduce various reforms into the Turkiſh navy, and, had he been properly ſeconded, would have certainly raiſed it to conſiderable importance, though not to an equality with the Ruſſian fleet now in the Black Sea.

I cannot avoid making a ſhort digreſſion relative to him. The name of Haſſan being very common among the Turks, there have been ſeveral Haſſan Paſhas, who have borne the ſupreme command in their marine; it will therefore be proper to diſtinguiſh this illuſtrious man by his ſurname *Gazi*, or Conqueror, given him by the ſultan—this appellation exactly anſwers to Imperator during the Roman republic. Two reaſons particularly induce me to delineate his character; the aſperſions which have been caſt upon it, and the ſtriking inſtances which it diſplays of the inefficacy even of the greateſt talents under ſuch a government as that of Turkey. It is uncertain what country gave him birth. He was brought up at Algiers, where he raiſed himſelf to a conſidera-

ble office in the ſervice of the dey. M. de Peyſſonel, who is intereſted in preſenting the beſt pictures of Turkiſh manners, eagerly ſeizes the opportunity of mentioning this great man, and though in ſome inſtances rather too partially, he upon the whole gives a much more juſt impreſſion of his character than what we gather from Baron de Tott, who had a perſonal enmity to him. The natural abilities of Gazi Haſſan Paſha were great; his defects were thoſe of education. In perſon ſtrong and vigorous, he improved his conſtitution by temperance, and hardened it by the fatigues of a military life. The acts of bravery, which deſervedly elevated the name of Gazi Haſſan above that of any modern Turk, are too numerous and ſtriking to need repetition; they bordered indeed ſometimes upon raſhneſs; and it is upon this account that Tott cenſures his daring attempt at Lemnos. His conduct, however, on that occaſion, well deſerves the applauſe given to it by Peyſſonel; it was one of thoſe daring enterprizes, which by their audacity ſeem to enſure ſucceſs. The Ruſſians were ſurpriſed, unarmed and unprepared, and were forced to embark with the moſt diſgraceful precipitation; it ſeems however a myſtery, why their fleet, formidable as it was, ſhould ſet ſail, and it can only be accounted for from the

panic

panic with which the bold exploit of Haſſan had filled them. It has been inſinuated that he was addicted to the unnatural vices too frequent among his countrymen; but this aſperſion is altogether unfounded: he had one wife only, and no other amour *of any kind.*

The ridicule which Tott has thrown upon him for a want of ſcientific knowledge is no more than applies to his countrymen univerſally; but though poſſeſſing little ſcience himſelf, he by no means deſpiſed it in others, and the improvements which he ſuggeſted in the Turkiſh marine diſplay, if not an extenſive acquaintance with firſt principles, at leaſt a bold and vigorous graſp of native genius. Cruelty alſo has been laid to his charge, but without ſufficient allowance for the ſtate of things in which he was placed. The command of an undiſciplined and tumultuous force is not always to be preſerved by lenient meaſures; his diſcipline therefore was ſevere, his puniſhments ſtriking, and often ſanguinary, but never wantonly cruel; he put ſuddenly to death, but never tortured.

Where a ſimilar ſeverity was not called for, he diſplayed a clemency unuſual in a Turk. Though ſtrictly religious, he was mild and equitable to Chriſtians in general; the inhabitants of the Greek iſlands under his dominion, ever found in him a protector, and

the Greeks of the Morea, through his influence, were preſerved from total extirpation. His reſpect for Europeans, proceeding from his acuteneſs and liberality, was known to all thoſe reſident at Conſtantinople, and to none more than to the Britiſh ambaſſador *, who poſſeſſed his particular friendſhip, and had great influence over him. The reforms and improvements which this great man introduced, and which he would have carried much farther, were very comprehenſive, including both the conſtruction of the veſſels, the education of officers, and the ſupply of ſeamen.

As to the veſſels themſelves, he entirely altered their rigging, and lowered the high poops, which held a great deal of wind, and were very unwieldy and inconvenient in battle; theſe improvements were conducted by an Engliſhman, who rigged the veſſels in the Engliſh manner.

He alſo gave them regular tiers of guns: formerly there were guns of all ſizes on the ſame deck; they now only keep on the lower tier, two, four, or ſix of their large braſs guns, ſome of which carry a ſhot of one hundred pounds, and are placed in the middle of

* I cannot help obſerving, that Sir Robert Ainſlie poſſeſſed, in general, a greater influence at the porte than any Britiſh ambaſſador before him.

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the tier. What was of infinitely more importance to the Turkiſh marine, was the reform which he endeavoured to introduce in the mode of collecting ſailors, and keeping them at all times ready for ſervice. It is uſual, as ſoon as the fleet enters the port of Conſtantinople in autumn, to lay up the ſhips in the harbour, and diſmiſs the ſailors, who all go to their homes till St. George's day, O. S. (4th May, N. S.); for in moſt maritime matters they follow the Greek calendar, their own year being compoſed of lunar months, and its periods ſubject to much variation. Before this day the fleet never ſails, ſo that during the winter it lies quite defenceleſs, and the Ruſſians might come down the Black Sea, and deſtroy it in the port of Conſtantinople without oppoſition.

Haſſan, foreſeeing this, propoſed building a large edifice at Conſtantinople for the ſailors to live in, as in barracks, that they might be always at hand. The porte not furniſhing the ſums neceſſary, he built one on a ſmaller ſcale at his own expence; but it is little uſed ſince his death, as the ſailors go to their own homes in different parts of the empire as before.

It is ſaid that the vizir, and other great officers of the porte, were fearful of ſeeing the grand admiral with ſo great a force conſtantly at his diſpoſal in the city. He, indeed,

deed, very probably had in view, to have a body of men at his command capable of keeping the janizaries in awe; though without this he was dreaded by them, and no riots happened, in his time, of conſequence; the few that did, he quelled in an inſtant, and ſlew without mercy all the ring-leaders. In 1776 (or thereabouts) he eſtabliſhed a ſeminary and an academy at Conſtantinople, for giving a regular education to young men for officers for the navy; but it came to nothing, as all innovations in Turkey ever muſt, from prejudice, from envy, jealouſy, and fear of ſome unforeſeen and imaginary baneful conſequence to the porte. Since that another fruitleſs attempt has been made.

The beſt mode of eſtimating the importance of the Turkiſh navy will be by a compariſon of its conduct with that of its opponents. For this purpoſe I ſhall ſubjoin a few obſervations on ſome of the moſt memorable naval tranſactions of the laſt and preceding wars.

Gazi Haſſan Paſha, who ſo much diſtinguiſhed himſelf in the memorable affair of Tcheſmé, was at that time the Turkiſh admiral's captain, or *capitana*, called alſo vice admiral by the Europeans, but improperly. That the conduct of Gazi Haſſan on this occaſion diſplayed equal judgment and reſolu-

tion

tion cannot be doubted; he would probably have ſucceeded in boarding and taking admiral Spiritoff's ſhip, but for the taking fire and blowing up of both veſſels. This event has been attributed to the deſperation of the Ruſſians; but as I was informed by admiral Kruſe (who was then captain of Spiritoff's ſhip) it aroſe accidentally from the wadding of the Ruſſian guns, which ſet fire to the Turkiſh veſſel. (See Peyſſonel, 101.) The event of the conteſt at Tcheſmé is well known: the Turkiſh fleet was totally deſtroyed, owing to the ill conduct of the captains, the cowardice of the men, and to the ignorance of Jaffer Bey, who was afterwards degraded from the poſt of captain paſha, and his place ſupplied by Gazi Haſſan.

In the ſubſequent war, Gazi Haſſan himſelf commanded in the Black Sea; yet notwithſtanding his exertions, his talents, and the great powers with which he was inveſted (more than any of his predeceſſors ever poſſeſſed) the Turkiſh fleet remained in a ſtate of impotence. During the whole of the ſummer of 1788, the captain paſha lay with ſeventeen ſail of the line off the iſland of Berizan. The Ruſſian fleet, conſiſting of three ſail of the line (with only their lower tier of guns in) and a number of ſmall veſſels, lay at a little diſtance from him, between

tween Kilburon and Ochakof, to protect the ſiege, and block up the port of the latter place. The captain paſha knew very well that the guns from Kilburon Point could not hurt him, as they were maſked by the Ruſſian fleet; he was alſo well acquainted with the channel, and poſſeſſed undoubted bravery himſelf; yet he never dared to ſail in and attack the enemy, becauſe he could not rely on his own ſhips doing their duty, and manœuvring properly. The Ruſſians expected an attack, and thought the event dubious. The remainder of their fleet lay in the port of Sebaſtopolis, under the command of admiral Wainowitz, and though not one fourth as ſtrong as the Turks, it failed to attack the captain paſha, who went out to meet it, and a running fight enſued, which ended to the advantage of the Ruſſians, though they put back to Sebaſtopolis; and even for this meaſure the admiral was cenſured.

In the laſt campaign of the war, the whole Turkiſh and Ruſſian fleets met, and fought at ſea; and notwithſtanding the very great inferiority of the latter, they were victorious, and purſued the Turks, who were flying ignominiouſly before them into the Boſphorus of Conſtantinople. The Ruſſians were already in ſight of the entrance, when a frigate reached their admiral with news of the concluſion

cluſion of peace, which put an end to the purſuit.

I might have mentioned the action in the Liman the ſame year, in which the Turks loſt the greateſt part of their veſſels; but that was owing more to accident than any other cauſe. If ſuch was the event of a conteſt, when the ſuperiority was greatly in favour of Turkey, what is not now to be expected, when the Ruſſian fleet at Sebaſtopolis is ſo conſiderably augmented? It is now ſtrong enough to riſk the loſs of one half of its numbers in an attack on Conſtantinople, and the remainder alone will be more than a match for the ſultan's navy.

As the laſt hope of the Turks lies in their fortreſſes, particularly in thoſe of the Dardanelles, which they believe impregnable, I ſhall add the following obſervations on this ſubject.

They are ignorant of the art either of fortifying or defending, and, above all, of attacking places. They have not one fortreſs in the empire well fortified by art; a few are ſtrong by nature, but none ſo much ſo that the Ruſſians could not now take them either by a regular ſiege or by aſſault. Prince Potemkin, had he choſen, could as eaſily have taken Ochákof on the 1ſt of July, when he appeared before it, as on the $\frac{6}{17}$th of December,

ber, when he ſtormed it under augmented difficulties. It was a political ſiege.

The Dardanelles, ſaid to be ſo formidable, may be eaſily paſſed by a fleet, or the caſtles may be beaten down by batteries erected on ſhore, or by ſea, from ſituations on which the great artillery cannot bear on ſhips. There are, on each ſide the water, fourteen great guns, which fire granite balls; theſe guns are of braſs, with chambers like mortars, twenty-two Engliſh feet long, and twenty-eight inches diameter of the bore *; they are very near the level of the ſurface of the water, in arched port-holes or embraſures with iron doors, which are opened only when they are to be fired; the balls croſs the water from ſide to ſide, as they are a little elevated. Theſe monſtrous cannon are not mounted on carriages, but lie on the paved floor, with their breech againſt a wall; they cannot be pointed, but the gunner muſt wait till the veſſel he intends to fire at is oppoſite the mouth, and they are at leaſt half an hour in loading one of theſe guns. All veſſels coming from Conſtantinople are obliged to ſtop at theſe caſtles, and ſhow their firman, or order from the porte, to let them paſs; but there are examples of

* A gentleman, who has meaſured them ſince me, ſays, they are only twenty-three inches; one of us muſt have made a miſtake.

veſſels

veſſels in bad weather ſailing through the channel without receiving any harm, though the Turks have fired at them. It is true, that in going with the ſtream, which with a northerly wind runs ſtrong, it is eaſier for a veſſel to paſs them, yet with a ſoutherly wind the current runs up, though not ſo ſtrong, and I believe an Engliſh fleet with a briſk gale would pay little attention to theſe terrible batteries, the guardians of the Turkiſh capital; they are, like the Turks themſelves, formidable only in appearance*. There are other batteries of good cannon, but by no means dangerous; ſome of them at ſuch a diſtance, and on ſuch high hills, that they are quite uſeleſs. The following circumſtance proves that the batteries in the channel of Conſtantinople, and at the entrance from the Black Sea, cannot hurt a fleet ſailing in with a fair wind. In the firſt campaign, one of the Ruſſian veſſels (a 64 gun ſhip) was ſeparated from the fleet cruiſing in the Black Sea, and being diſmaſted in a gale of wind, was forced into the channel of Conſtantino-

* There is in the arſenal of Conſtantinople the breech of a cannon which was melted in a fire a century ago, of a moſt enormous ſize (I am ſorry I have not the meaſure of it) but thoſe of the Dardanelles are diminutive in compariſon to it. It was one of thoſe uſed at the ſiege of Conſtantinople.

ple; though only under jury-maſts, and moving ſlowly, the Turks, by an inceſſant fire from all their batteries, were not able to ſink, nor even to hurt her; ſhe caſt anchor in the bay of Buyukderé, after having paſſed all the moſt dangerous batteries, and then ſurrendered herſelf. The captain was an Engliſhman; he was blamed for not continuing his courſe, and ſailing quite through to the Archipelago.

Another fortreſs, whoſe importance has been the ſubject of much diſcuſſion, is Ochákof (ſpelt by the Poles Oczakow, and called by the Turks Ozi) I ſhall therefore take occaſion to rectify a common miſtake reſpecting it.

It is aſſerted by ſome, and denied by others, that this fortreſs defends the entrance into the Liman. The report of maſters of merchant veſſels has been inſiſted on, on one ſide, and that of thoſe who have obſerved the courſe ſhips of war take on the other ſide. They were both in the right.

Merchant ſhips, if they are ſmall, as thoſe in the Black Sea generally are, may ſail out of the channel, and go within reach of the guns of Ochakof, but the channel for ſhips of war is at leaſt four miles from Ochakof, and within fifty fathoms of the point of Killburon (not the caſtle) on which the Ruſſians have

have erected ſtrong batteries, the platforms of which are only two feet above the level of the ſea. Theſe batteries were erected after the Turkiſh fleet entered the Liman, in June 1788, and before all the remainder of it got out again after their defeat. The conſequence was, that not one large ſhip did, after that, get out. Six of them attempted to force the paſſage, and were ſunk (though they were not large veſſels) oppoſite the batteries of the point. This obliged the remainder in the Liman, which were ſmaller veſſels, to take ſhelter under the guns of Ochakof, in a ſmall port on the oppoſite ſide, within the Liman, where they were burnt by the Ruſſian fleet the 1ſt of July. That ſmall veſſels may ſail out of the channel, and out of the reach of the guns at Killburn Point, and even of the fleet in the channel, the captain paſha proved. On the 22d of Auguſt, he ſent twenty-two ſmall veſſels (having 2,500 men on board, and proviſions for the garriſon) from his fleet (with a wind which prevented the Ruſſian fleet going out to ſea to meet them) between the channel and the ſhore of Ochakof; they arrived ſafe without the Ruſſian fleet having fired one gun at them; two of them run aſhore near the town, the reſt ſailed out again as they came, the ſame night.

Had the Ruſſian batteries been conſtructed on the point of Killburn before the Turkiſh fleet entered the Liman, it could not have paſſed them till the Turks had made themſelves maſters of them: it follows that the point of Killburn, and not of Ochakof, is the key of the Boriſthenes *.

The preſent reigning ſultan, Selim, has made an attempt to introduce the European diſcipline into the Turkiſh army, and to aboliſh the body of janizaries; an attempt, which, whatever ſucceſs it may ultimately be attended with, will form a memorable epocha in the hiſtory of the empire.

A trifling circumſtance gave riſe to it. The grand vizir, Yuſef Paſha, in the late Ruſſian war, had a priſoner who was by birth a Turk, but being carried early in his youth to Moſcow, he had become a Chriſtian, and found in a Ruſſian nobleman a patron who gave him a good education, and placed him in the army. He was a lieutenant when he was taken priſoner, and had the reputation of being a good officer. The vizir took pleaſure in converſing with him, for he had not wholly forgotten his mother tongue. He

* This place is often called Kinburn; its proper name in Turkiſh is Kill or Küll-buron; that is, Hair-point, from its ſhape. The Ruſſians write it Kilburn.

repreſented

repreſented the advantages of the European diſcipline, not only in battle, but in every other point of view, and particularly in ſecuring the army from mutiny. By his perſuaſion the vizir formed a ſmall corps, compoſed of renegadoes and a few indigent Turks, to whom the priſoner taught the European exerciſe, which they uſed to perform before the vizir's tent to divert him.

Peace being concluded, the vizir returned to Conſtantinople, and conducted this corps with him. They were left at a village a few leagues from the capital. The ſultan hearing of them, went to ſee *how the infidels fought battles*, as he would have gone to a puppet-ſhow; but he was ſo ſtruck with the ſuperiority of their fire, that from that inſtant he reſolved to introduce the European diſcipline into his army, and to aboliſh the janizaries; he therefore cauſed the corps to be recruited, ſet apart a branch of the revenue for their maintenance, and finally declared his intention of aboliſhing the inſtitution of janizaries. This ſtep, as might be expected, produced a mutiny, which was only appeaſed by the ſultan's conſenting to continue them their pay during their life-times; but he at the ſame time ordered that no recruits ſhould be received into their corps.

The new ſoldiery are taught their exerciſe

with the muſket and bayonet, and a few manœuvres. When they are held to be ſufficiently diſciplined, they are ſent to garriſon the fortreſſes on the frontiers. Their officers are all Turks, and are choſen out of thoſe who perform their exerciſe the beſt.

What they may become in time it is difficult to foretel; at preſent there is no other knowledge in the army than is poſſeſſed by a drill ſerjeant; nor indeed can more be expected from them, till they have gained experience in actual war; and it muſt be remembered that they are ſtill Turks, a very different people from thoſe whom Peter the Great taught to conquer the Swedes. Their ignorance of thoſe manœuvres, which, more than numbers or perſonal bravery, decide the fate of battles, will make their defeat eaſy to the Ruſſians, ſhould ever they become numerous enough to form an army, the firſt time they meet in the field: it will then be ſeen whether they can make a retreat, or are to be rallied, and whether the new diſcipline will not all at once be abandoned. They have hitherto no confidence in it; and they are devoid of the enthuſiaſm and *eſprit de corps* of the janizaries. In the firſt campaign, however, they probably will be driven out of Europe.

Merely the inſtitution of this melice is an important

important event; and Selim may, perhaps, effect by policy, what ſeveral of his anceſtors have attempted by force. Could he put himſelf at the head of a diſciplined army, he would conquer the ulema as eaſily as the janizaries, and the Turkiſh power, though it would never again be formidable to Europe, might be reſpectable in Aſia. The ulema ſee their danger, and oppoſe theſe changes with all their might. The whole is too new, has too many difficulties to encounter, and has made too ſmall a progreſs for us to form an opinion how far the ſultan will ultimately ſucceed.

The man who was the cauſe of this revolution in the military ſyſtem, the Ruſſian priſoner, and who had again become a Mahomedan, was rewarded for his ſervices in the Turkiſh manner; for ſome miſdemeanour, real or imputed, his head was ſtruck off.

CHAPTER IV.

Of the Turkiſh Religion—Its Effect upon the Law, upon the Tranſactions of the Government, and upon the People at large. The Character, Learning, and Diſtinctions of the Ulema.

THE philoſophic obſerver of mankind regards, as a chief object of his ſpeculation, the manners of a nation; it is from them, in general, that political inſtitutions emanate, and it is to them that they always owe their efficacy. But manners themſelves will be found to be marked with the character of previous inſtitutions, and of the hiſtorical events of the people among whom they predominate. Thus there is a continual action and re-action of cauſes; and the human character is alike formed by general manners and by particular incidents. The connection between theſe is ſo intimate, that we may almoſt with certainty determine the ſtate of the one from a knowledge of the other. The beauteous fabric of political liberty cannot be upheld by a corrupt, an effeminate, or a daſtardly

tardly people; nor can deſpotiſm give birth to a noble and ingenuous frame of mind.

The moſt ſtriking, as well as the moſt diſguſting feature of Turkiſh manners, is that haughty conceit of ſuperiority, ariſing from the moſt narrow and intolerant bigotry. There have been but too many inſtances in hiſtory, of nations who, having proudly arrogated to themſelves the title of favourites of the Almighty, have on that account exerciſed an inſolent diſdain toward all who were without the pale of their religion. In no inſtance, however, has this folly appeared more diſguſtingly conſpicuous than in the Turkiſh nation; it marks the public and the private character; it appears in the ſolemnity of their legal acts, in the ceremonies of the court, and in the coarſe ruſticity of vulgar manners. As it is not my intention to enter into a metaphyſical diſcuſſion of the Mahomedan dogmas, I ſhall, under the head of religion, only enquire into the various operations of the extenſive principle throughout the different orders of ſociety.

If we liſten to the dictates of their law, dictates which ought to have been conceived with caution and uttered with calmneſs, we hear nothing but the accents of intolerance breathed forth with all the inſolence of deſpotiſm.

Every *raya* (that is, every ſubject who is not of the Mahomedan religion) is allowed only the cruel alternative of death or tribute; and even this is arbitrary in the breaſt of the conqueror. The very words of the formulary, given to their Chriſtian ſubjects on paying the capitation tax, import, that the ſum of money received, is taken as a compenſation for being permitted to *wear their heads that year.*

The inſulting diſtinction of Chriſtian and Mohamedan is carried to ſo great a length, that even the minutiæ of dreſs are rendered ſubjects of reſtriction. A Chriſtian muſt wear only clothes and head-dreſſes of dark colours, and ſuch as Turks never wear, with ſlippers of black leather, and muſt paint his houſe black, or dark brown. The leaſt violation of theſe frivolous and diſguſting regulations is puniſhed with death. Nor is it at all uncommon for a Chriſtian to have his head ſtruck off in the ſtreet for indulging in a little more foppery of dreſs than the ſultan or vizir, whom he may meet incognito, approves.

If a Chriſtian ſtrikes a Mahomedan, he is moſt commonly put to death on the ſpot, or, at leaſt, ruined by fines, and ſeverely baſtinadoed; if he ſtrikes, though by accident, a *ſherif* (or *emir* as they are called in Turkiſh,

i. e.

i. e. a deſcendant of Mahomed, who wear green turbands) of which there are thouſands in ſome cities, it is death without remiſſion.

The teſtimony of Chriſtians is little regarded in courts of juſtice; at beſt, two teſtimonies are but conſidered as one, and are even overborne by that of a ſingle Mahomedan, if reputed at all an honeſt man.

The Chriſtians can build no new church, and not without great ſums obtain a licence even to repair old ones. If a Mahomedan kills a Chriſtian, he is generally only fined. At Conſtantinople indeed they are (on account of the police neceſſary in the capital) ſometimes puniſhed with death, according to the circumſtances of the caſe, but always if attended with robbery, or by ſecret aſſaſſination in his houſe or on the highway, or in any manner ſo as to diſturb the police, which is properly the crime that is puniſhed.

Sultan Muſtafa, father of Selim, the preſent grand ſeignior, when he mounted the throne, propoſed to put to death all the Chriſtians in the whole empire; and was with difficulty diſſuaded from doing it, on the ground of the loſs of capitation. This prince, however, in the courſe of his reign, appeared to be actuated by a love of the ſtricteſt juſtice. What muſt that religion and thoſe principles be,

be, which could induce a juſt, at leaſt a well-intentioned man, to maſſacre whole provinces of defenceleſs ſubjects!

It is ſcarcely credible how far the littleneſs of pride is carried by the porte in all their tranſactions with the Chriſtian princes. Whenever they conclude any treaty, the inſtrument which remains in the hands of the Turks repreſents the other contracting powers as proſtrated at the foot of the ſultan's throne, and ſupplicating his favour and protection. The preſents which are made to the ſultan, on the arrival of an ambaſſador, or on any other occaſion, are regiſtered in the archives of the empire, as tributes paid by ſuch and ſuch *infidel karols* (the Poliſh or Slavonian name for king or prince, never given by the Turks but to infidels) to the ſublime porte for its protection. Theſe treaties, ſuch as they are, amount only to a temporary remiſſion of that implacable enmity with which their religion inſpires them againſt every thing which is not Mahomedan. To ſupport their faith, and to extend their empire, are the only law of nations which they acknowledge; and in ſupport of theſe principles they muſt be ever ready to direct the whole of their force againſt the arms of the infidels. It is indeed permitted them, whenever their own ſecurity is threatened,

to conclude a *truce*, for the ſake of renovating their ſtrength, and enabling themſelves more effectually to ſerve the cauſe of Mahomed; and this is the explanation which they give to their own moſt ſolemn treaties of peace. In this they are much aſſiſted by the nature of the Arabic language, which they mix with the Turkiſh in their public acts, and which, by the various application of its terms, literal and metaphorical, enables them to give whatever interpretation they pleaſe to any contract. Thus, *ſulch ebedy* properly ſignifies a perpetual peace, while *daïm*, the term ſynonymous to *ebedy*, ſignifies the ſame thing, but leſs forcibly: nevertheleſs it coſt the court of Vienna, within this century, a long and difficult negotiation to ſubſtitute the firſt for the other in a treaty which was, not long after, broken by open hoſtilities.

It has been contended by ſome writers with apparent probability, that the Turks, reſtleſs and diſtracted as they are at home, would be unwilling to augment their confuſion by engaging in foreign conteſts; but there are two obſervations which may be made in anſwer to this argument; firſt, that the government itſelf is too ignorant and incautious to be ſwayed by ſuch conſiderations. We muſt not look on the porte as a cabinet under the guidance of enlightened politicians, but

but of a ſet of wretches continually fluctuating between the hope of amaſſing plunder by means of war, and enjoying it in the tranquillity of peace; or of hot-headed fanatics, who conſider the deſtruction of infidels as the moſt meritorious duty of a muſulman. Secondly, it may be doubted whether policy would not lead the miniſters of the porte frequently to encourage wars, which would divert the turbulent ſpirits from domeſtic ſedition to the hope of obtaining glory and plunder in a foreign conteſt.

I ſhall adduce but one inſtance from hiſtory in ſupport of my opinion; it is the conduct of Turkey in the conqueſt of Cyprus, as deſcribed by the faithful and eloquent pen of the biſhop of Amelia.

Sultan Selim II. who at that period ſate on the throne, neither endeavoured to extend by conqueſt the empire his grandfather left him, nor to make it flouriſh by policy. He left all the management of affairs to his vizir, and gave himſelf up to exceſs in every kind of the moſt beaſtly debauchery. The people, diſcontented at his unambitious reign, murmured ſo loudly, that it was deemed neceſſary by the vizir to ſatisfy them: *they affirmed, that ſultans were not ſet up to enjoy peaceably what their predeceſſors had left them; but to enlarge their empire by new conqueſts, and*

and finally reduce the univerſe to the Mahomedan law; for this ſpirit of conqueſt and pillage is the ſpirit of the whole Turkiſh nation, from the vizir to the peaſant. It was reſolved to make war on the Venetians, and to take Cyprus, though without any juſt pretence whatever.

The powers of Chriſtendom were at variance among themſelves, and differences of religion had cauſed domeſtic wars. France was allied with the porte; Venice was in great confuſion by the blowing up of its arſenal, ſuppoſed to be done by Turkiſh emiſſaries; there was a great ſcarcity of corn alſo in Europe; ſo that the ſultan, awoken from his lethargy, thought now of nothing leſs than conquering all Europe, and began with Cyprus. *They ſolemnly aſſured the Venetians*, that the preparations they were making at Conſtantinople were deſtined to aſſiſt the Moors in Spain; for oaths, and ſolemn aſſurances and proteſtations of public faith had always been, and is to this day, with them ſtate policy. The vizir, who for perſonal reaſons did not deſire this war (he being bribed alſo by the Venetians) objected to the violation of a treaty which the ſultan had ſo ſolemnly ſworn to obſerve. The ulema were hereupon conſulted, and unanimouſly anſwered "*that a treaty made with the enemies of God and his prophet*

prophet might be broken, there being nothing ſo worthy a Mahomedan as to undertake the entire deſtruction of Chriſtians." This ſentence ſtands on record, with thouſands more of the ſame kind.

The manners of the court itſelf, tinctured as thoſe of all courts are with deceit, are not ſufficiently poliſhed to avoid a conduct, not merely haughty, but indecent, to the repreſentatives of chriſtian ſovereigns. The ſtupid and incorrigible ignorance of the Turk makes him treat his moſt favoured allies only as dependents; hence their ambaſſadors are received merely as deputies from tributary ſtates. Every ſolemnity at which the foreign miniſters aſſiſt in Turkey, occaſions them a new ſpecies of humiliation, in which they are led from indignity to indignity, a ſpectacle to the ſtupid populace, who inſult them with the coarſeſt language as they paſs, and meaſure by this ſcale the greatneſs of their ſovereign. The miniſter, who is to obtain an audience of the ſultan, muſt preſent himſelf at the porte by four o' clock in the morning, where, after three or four tedious hours occupied in unmeaning ceremonies, he is informed that he may be permitted to ſee the reſplendent face of the emperor of the world *(Gehan Padiſha)* who among his other pompous titles bears that of *Alemum pennati, refuge of the*

the world; after which he is reſeated in a ſolitary corner of the divan, on the left, near the door, and the vizir ſends to the ſultan a ſhort note called *talkiſh*, which is in ſubſtance, "that the infidel *(ghiaur)* of ſuch a court, "after having been ſufficiently fed, and de- "cently clothed, by the ſpecial grace of his "ſublime majeſty, humbly ſupplicates leave "to come and lick the duſt beneath his il- "luſtrious throne." The talkiſhgee (or billet bearer) having returned with the anſwer of the emperor, the vizir and all his aſſiſtants riſe with reſpect at the ſight of the *ſacred* writing *(khat-iſherif)*, and the ambaſſador is conducted to the audience, the ceremonies of which are too well known to need repetition. It may not, however, be amiſs to notice, that the miniſters and their ſuite, who go into the audience chamber, are inveſted with a *kaftan* or Turkiſh garment, which covers entirely their own dreſs, and reaches to the ground; and that ſome writers have abſurdly repreſented this robe as a mark of honour ſhown to them; the truth is, that the Turks wiſhing them to appear in every thing as vaſſals of their empire, obliged them formerly to be habited entirely in the Turkiſh dreſs, except the head, which was covered with a hat, and to let their beards grow previouſly to admiſſion into the ſultan's preſence, as their tributaries

tributaries, the Raguſeans, do at the preſent day. This humiliating maſquerade was aboliſhed by means of the ambaſſadors of England and Holland, who acted as mediators in the treaty of Paſſarowitz (in 1718) and who took advantage of the dejected ſtate of Turkey to eſtabliſh the cuſtom, that the European miniſters ſhould appear in their national dreſſes. The inveſtiture of the kaftan is only a remains of the ancient uſage, and is no more to be conſidered as an honour than the cuſtom of wearing a hat at the audience, which is ſo far from being a matter of favour, that no European miniſter would be permitted to appear otherwiſe before the ſultan or vizir. The Turks conſider a European's pulling off his hat exactly as we do a man's pulling off his wig.

Particular inſtances of Turkiſh inſolence, even to the repreſentatives of their moſt powerful allies, are frequent and ſtriking.

It is not fifty years ſince the grand vizir, Gin-Ali-Paſha, adviſed the divan to confine all the ambaſſadors to a ſmall iſland near Conſtantinople, as lepers, or other infectious and unclean perſons.

In 1756, the Sieur Du Val, drogoman to the French ambaſſador, Mr. de Vergennes, having announced the double bond of alliance and marriage, which had united his court

court with the houſe of Auſtria, received from the reis-effendi no other anſwer, than "that *the ſublime porte did not trouble itſelf* "*about the union of one hog with another.*" This marriage was not very agreeable news to the porte. A ſimilar anſwer was given by the vizir Kiuperli to the French ambaſſador, Monſieur de la Haye, even in the brilliant æra of Louis XIV.: when that miniſter announced the ſplendid ſucceſſes of his ſovereign over the Spaniards, the vizir replied, with the barbarous inſolence of an Ottoman ſatrap, "*What care I whether the dog eat the* "*hog, or the hog eat the dog, ſo that the intereſts* "*of my ſovereign proſper.*" The ſame vizir offered a more atrocious inſult to the ancient ally of the porte, in the perſon of the ſon of Monſieur de la Haye, whom he cauſed to be thrown into a dungeon, after receiving publicly a blow, which broke one of his teeth. The ſole cauſe of this outrage was the refuſal of young De la Haye to explain a letter, which he had written in cypher to a friend at Venice.

It is not to be denied, that theſe degradations are frequently increaſed by the ſervility of the miniſters themſelves, who, by a manly reſiſtance, might generally avoid ſuch indignities; for the barbarous inſolence of the Turks, which is augmented by timidity,

ſhrinks into nothing before a reſolute and dignified firmneſs. Such was the conduct of Monſieur de Ferioles, ambaſſador from France in the laſt century, who having taken his ſword, either inadvertently or by deſign, to the audience of the grand ſeignior, not only refuſed to lay it aſide, but gave a kick in the belly to an officer of the ſeraglio who attempted to take it from him by force; and finding that he was denied admiſſion, thus armed, to the imperial audience, he returned with his ſuite to his houſe at Pera, after caſting off the kaftan with which he had been inveſted. Yet this ambaſſador remained a dozen years longer at Conſtantinople, and tranſacted the buſineſs of his office with credit to himſelf and advantage to his country.

In 1766, the porte, wiſhing to ſhow ſome mark of contempt to Poland, required the Poliſh envoy to appear at the audience of the vizir without a ſabre; with this demand he refuſed to comply, declaring that the ſabre was part of the Poliſh dreſs, and that as other miniſters wore their ſwords, he would not appear at any audience in a manner contrary to the ancient etiquette. The conſequence of his firmneſs was a compliance on the part of the vizir, who received him with all the uſual ceremonies.

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In the laſt war, it was offered to ſome Turkiſh priſoners to ſerve as volunteers in the Ruſſian flotilla againſt Sweden. On account of the pay, they accepted the offer with gladneſs, and behaved very well in ſeveral actions. On their return they were aſked, in my preſence, why they fought againſt their friends? their anſwer was, "*They "are all hogs alike to us, whether they wear "green or blue coats.*" The conformity of this anſwer with thoſe of the great officers of the porte is truly ſtriking.

It is not only in the formalities of the law, or in the etiquette of the court, that a barbarous inſolence is diſplayed. The peaſant, no leſs than the ſultan, thinks it unworthy of him to diſſemble the contempt which he bears towards all unbelievers. The very porter employed by a chriſtian merchant will return his addreſs with inſult; and ſo degrading is any connection with infidels eſteemed, that the janizaries employed as guards to a European have the general appellation of hog-drivers. No Turk of the loweſt condition will riſe from his ſeat to receive even an ambaſſador: to avoid this incivility in viſits from foreign miniſters, the vizir, or other perſon, comes into the audience chamber after the miniſter, and they both ſit down at the ſame time.

As a proof of the contempt in which the Turks hold all foreigners, and their perſuaſion of their own ſuperiority, which they even imagine is granted by other nations, I ſhall mention one or two anecdotes, of which I myſelf was a witneſs.

A Turkiſh priſoner of Ochakof, meeting at Cherſon, where he had liberty to walk about the town without reſtraint, a Ruſſian officer on a narrow pavement where only one perſon could paſs, and the ſtreets being exceedingly dirty (over the ſhoes) when he was within a few yards of him, the Turk, as if he had been in the ſtreets of Conſtantinople, made a ſign with his hand to the officer to deſcend from the pavement into the dirt. This appeared to the officer ſo exceedingly ridiculous, that he burſt out into a fit of laughter, upon which the Turk abuſed him in the groſſeſt language, ſuch as is uſed to infidels in Turkey, and ſtill inſiſted on the officer's going out of his way; he, not being a violent man, only beckoned to a ſoldier, who puſhed him headlong off the pavement; to this the Turk ſubmitted with ſilent reſignation; but, unluckily for him, it was near the houſe of the governor, who had ſeen and heard the whole; he reprimanded the fellow for his inſolence, and was threatened with the ſame treatment as the Ruſſian

Ruſſian priſoners endure at Conſtantinople. The Turk's anſwer was, "*They are infidels, but "I am a Mahomedan.*" This procured him a good drubbing, but he all the while hollowed out, that it was not lawful to ſtrike a muſelman; and as ſoon as he was ſet at liberty, he went away ſwearing vengeance againſt the firſt infidel he ſhould meet when he got back to Turkey.

Some of the Turkiſh priſoners, who were ſaved from the fury of the Ruſſian ſoldiers at the ſtorming of Ochakof, were put the next day, out of compaſſion, promiſcuouſly, into a warm ſubterraneous room among the Ruſſian wounded. When afterwards an officer came to remove them, and diſtribute them to other different parts, ſome Turks ſtood up, and with an authoritative voice objected to the company being ſeparated, except in ſuch parties as they dictated. Had their language been that of entreaty they would have been liſtened to, for they wanted to put relations and acquaintances together. Nothing certainly is more cruel than in ſuch circumſtances to ſeparate friends and relations when it can be avoided. Prince Potemkin, who was a very humane man, had ordered expreſsly to alleviate in this reſpect the hard deſtiny of the captives. They were reminded of their own ſavage conduct on ſimi-

lar occaſions, where wives and daughters were ſeparated from huſbands and fathers, and how otherwiſe they were treated. The anſwer was, "*They were not Mahomedans.*" Several of the women ſaid to the Turks, "LET "THEM *do as they will, they are our maſters* "*now.*" In the two firſt words they expreſſed the ſame notion of their ſuperiority as the men had done, but the remainder of the ſentence is not uncharacteriſtic of Turkiſh women in general.

I have often been ſurpriſed, at different extremities of the empire, and from different claſſes of people, to receive anſwers in exactly the ſame words; for example, every Turk will tell you, vizir or porter, at Belgrade or Bagdad, that they gained the empire by the ſabre, and by the ſabre they will defend it; and centuries ago they ſaid the ſame.

The enervation of mind, ſo common among the Turks, makes them at once ſuperſtitious and diſinclined to bear up againſt the evil which advances with giant ſtrides againſt their ſtate. In the moment of popular apprehenſion, prodigies and predictions are eaſily forged; to theſe the credulous Turks eagerly liſten; the lower orders are at the preſent day perſuaded that the Ruſſian ſtandard will enter Conſtantinople through a cer-

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tain gate, ſaid to be pointed out by an ancient prophecy, and the great men are ſo far from oppoſing this weakneſs by ſuperior energy, that they look to the Aſiatic ſhore as a ſecure retreat from the fury of the conquerors.

It ſeems a kind of moral paradox, that the ſame people, who are thus averſe to taking the neceſſary precautions againſt evils of ſuch magnitude, ſhould nevertheleſs bear them, when they arrive, with a fortitude and reſignation bordering upon apathy. The cauſe of this extraordinary conduct is to be found in the predeſtinarian dogmas of their religion operating upon their minds, diſpoſed by habitual inactivity and inceſſant examples of the inſtability of fortune under their deſpotic government, to acquieſcence in what appears to be the will of providence. An inſtance which occurred to me is too remarkable not to deſerve notice.

The Turkiſh women and children (in number about 400) who were brought out of Ochakof, when the city was taken, to the head-quarters of the Ruſſian army, were put all together the firſt night under a tent. No better accommodations could, under the preſſure of the circumſtances, be made for them, though it froze exceedingly hard, and they ſuffered dreadfully from cold and nakedneſs,

and many from wounds. As I ſpoke Turkiſh, I had the guard of that poſt, and the ſuperintendance of them that night. I obſerved that there reigned a perfect ſilence among them, not one woman weeping or lamenting, at leaſt loudly, though every one, perhaps, had loſt a parent, a child, or a huſband. They ſpoke with a calm and firm voice, and anſwered the queſtions I put to them apparently without agitation. I was aſtoniſhed, and knew not whether to impute it to inſenſibility, to the habit of ſeeing and hearing of great viciſſitudes of fortune, or to a patience and reſignation inculcated by their religion; and at this day I am equally unable to account for it. One woman ſate in a ſilent but remarkably melancholy poſture, inſomuch that I was induced to offer her ſome conſolation. I aſked her why ſhe did not take courage, and bear misfortunes like a muſelman, as her companions did? She anſwered in theſe ſtriking words, "*I have ſeen* "*killed my father, my huſband, and my children;* "*I have only one child left.*" "Where is "it?" I aſked her with precipitation. "*Here!*" ſhe calmly ſaid, and pointed to a child by her ſide, which had juſt expired. I and thoſe with me burſt into tears, but ſhe did not weep at all. I took that night into my warm ſubterranean room as many of theſe miſerable

miſerable women, periſhing with cold, as it would contain; they ſtaid with me twelve days, during all which time none of them either complained aloud, or ſhowed any ſigns of exceſſive internal grief, but each told me her ſtory (both old and young women) as of an indifferent perſon, without exclamation, without ſighs, without tears.

Patriotiſm and public ſpirit are not to be ſought for in the Turkiſh character. It is a ſpirit of oſtentation and ſuperſtition which has led to the foundation of ſo many moſques, colleges, and caravanſaries, and in thoſe who have leſſer means, to the erection of numerous praying places for the uſe of travellers, called *namas-ghiah*, which point out the direction of Mecca, as well as of fountains, in the public roads and ſtreets.

Having viewed the effects of the religion itſelf on the manners of the different ranks, it remains only to make ſome obſervations on the teachers of that religion, eſpecially as, combining in Turkey the offices of prieſt and lawyer, they form a body of ſo much importance in the ſtate.

The inſtitutions of the clergy cannot but have great influence on the manners of a nation, and this influence is ſo much the greater, by how much the ſuperſtition on which

which it is founded is ſtupidly groſs and univerſally prevalent. In Turkey, their political power, it has been ſeen, is firmly rooted; nor have they omitted any means of perpetuating it, which could be founded on the ignorance of the people. To found moſques, and endow them with treaſures, is held to be one of the moſt meritorious works of a muſelman; and further proviſion is made for the education of youth deſtined to the ſervice of religion and law, by the eſtabliſhment of *medreſſés* or colleges.

Theſe medreſſés are uſually endowed, at the time of founding a moſque, for the inſtruction of youth in the elements of ſcience. They have *profeſſors*, and they confer degrees, from the *ſohta* or ſtudent to the *muderris* or principal of a college; but in fact this is a mere parade of terms. Children are admitted from the *mektebs* or common ſchools, where they learn their alphabet, to ſeminaries which, far from reſembling the colleges of Eaton or Weſtminſter, much leſs of Oxford or Cambridge, are ſcarcely equal to the loweſt of our village ſchools. A profeſſor, for the moſt part ignorant of the firſt principles of ſcience, ſuperintends the inſtruction; and it is ſuppoſed to be neceſſary for the members of the *ulema* to go through all the *rutbés*

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or degrees of office, both in the colleges and in the higher departments, which gradually lead to the ſtation of *mufti* or high-prieſt. Theſe degrees are *ſohta* or ſtudent, *muderris* or principal of the college, *naib* or judge's ſecretary, *kadi* or judge, *molah* or ſupreme judge, *kiabé-molahſi* or judge of Mecca, *iſtambol-effendiſi* or chief magiſtrate of Conſtantinople, and *kadilaſkir* or military judge, of which there are two (one for Europe and one for Aſia).

Intrigue and party connections, however, render it eaſy for the moſt ignorant and inexperienced to attain the rank of *mufti*. Peyſſonel aſſerts, that the pontificate has become a ſort of heritage in ſome great families; but there are no families which may properly be called great; it is true there are a few families who have, by means of cabal, had ſome of the great offices of the ulema in their families for two or three generations. Though this corps has acquired a degree of ſtability, the members of it are far from reſembling families in Europe, whoſe eſtates are hereditary. The ſultan is continually detaching members of the *ulema*, by tempting them to accept offices of the porte, when they become his *kouls* or ſlaves, and he their heir at law. Nor is it only the ſons of the ulema who enter into that corps by a regular progreſſion through the offices: vizirs and

paſhas

paſhas often get their relations into the ulema, to ſecure an inheritance for their families after their death, of what they have given them in their life-times.

In the colleges, indeed, there is a pompous detail of ſciences, which are profeſſed to be taught, but which ſcarcely any one underſtands. The pupils are few; thoſe of the law have the greateſt pretenſion to learning, but even they are groſsly ignorant. In their libraries, indeed, exiſt ſome valuable books, but they are unnoticed, except perhaps now and then by a man of a ſingularly ſtudious turn.

As to the particular ſciences, their juriſprudence and theology conſiſts only of commentaries on the Koran; their aſtronomy is aſtrology, and their chemiſtry alchemy; of the hiſtory and geography of other countries they are perfectly ignorant. Metaphyſics, rhetoric, and grammar, are indeed taught, but not upon rational principles. It is ſcarcely poſſible for an European not to over-rate their learning, by reading theſe details of inſtitutions, and the names of ſciences taught.

Were I, in ſhort, to deſcribe the learning of a mufti, a kadi, or other regularly educated man of the law, in terms correſponding to his knowledge, when compared with Engliſh literature, the picture would be nearly as

as follows: he has, perhaps, read the Bible, and learnt enough of Greek to conſtrue the Greek Teſtament, without, however, knowing the grammar of the language, or being able to read the other authors. He has not learnt Latin, or purſued any claſſical ſtudies; but has merely conſulted ſome old commentaries on ſelect parts of the ſcriptures, and is either a thorough deſpiſer of religion altogether, or a bigotted enemy to freedom of enquiry reſpecting any of its articles. Beſides theſe, he has probably met with tales of ghoſts, genii, and the like, all which he implicitly believes; he has met with ſome old fabulous hiſtorian, like Geoffrey of Monmouth, to whom alſo he gives credit; and as well in hiſtory, as in every other ſcience, believes all the abſurdities which the people at large receive, and which I ſhall hereafter delineate.

Of monks, which exiſt in Turkey, the great line of diviſion is into thoſe who reſide in monaſteries and thoſe who have no fixed habitation; the former, called *mewliahs*, the latter *bektachis*, and each divided into different orders, with their peculiar cuſtoms and laws. The mewliahs are chiefly diſtinguiſhed by the different ceremonies which they perform, ſome howling until they ſpit blood with the great exertions of their lungs, and

others

others turning round to the ſound of muſic until they become delirious with the motion. Some perform hocus-pocus tricks with knives, hot irons, &c.

Of the *bektaſhis*, ſome attach themſelves to the ſervice of the paſhas, ſome to the different *ortas* or companies of janiſaries, and ſome are mere ſtrollers, denominated *ſhehhs* (or ſantons), who pretend to miracles, prophecies, &c. and, roaming about the country, commit the greateſt enormities under the cloak of religion. Theſe *ſhehhs* are more highly eſteemed in Aſia than in Europe, and moſt of all in Egypt. They pretend to be inſpired, or frantic, and in thoſe circumſtances they ſeize on any woman in the ſtreets in Egypt, and oblige her to ſubmit to their embraces; indeed they never make any oppoſition. The people cover the couple with mats for the ſake of decency, and this conduct is looked on with reverence; the woman, ſo far from being diſhonoured, is complimented on the occaſion, and even by her huſband. In Conſtantinople this would not be permitted; the ſhehh would be privately put to death; but they never are ſeized with theſe frenzies in Europe; the utmoſt liberties they take there is to feign madneſs, and madmen (if they are not ſo bad as to be obliged to be confined) are conſidered as holy and inſpired;

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in this ſtate they often tell the truth with great freedom to the vizir, and ſometimes even to the ſultan; but as there is ſtill ſome riſk in that, they generally confine their liberties to thoſe who have leſs power over their heads.

The toleration of the Mahomedans has been much vaunted. Hiſtorians have ſaid: "*The prudent policy of the Mahomedans, the only enthuſiaſts that ever united the ſpirit of toleration with the zeal for making proſelytes, offered the inhabitants of the countries they conquered, their religion and laws on condition that they paid the eſtabliſhed capitation; and ſuch as embraced the religion of the conquerors were entitled to all their privileges, &c.*" A ſimple ſtatement of their conduct, as it appears proved by hiſtorical facts, will ſhow whether their religion is tolerant or intolerant.

They pretend to the right of ſovereignty over the whole earth, and to convert mankind to their religion.

Regardleſs of treaties, oaths, and all other obligations, without provocation they attack every country, when they ſee a proſpect of ſucceſs.

When they have conquered, they put to death all ages, ranks, and ſex; or they ſpare a few, who are reduced to a ſtate of ſlavery, and

annually obliged to ranſom their lives; they are deprived of the rights of citizens of the country they were born in; their property is taken from them; they are marked with infamy, are debarred all friendly intercourſe with the conquerors, and are continually perſecuted and maltreated if they do not deny their God and become apoſtates; they take their children *, and bring them up in the Mahomedan faith, and make them fight againſt their fathers and their fathers religion; for many imaginary or real crimes, ſome of which, in Mahomedans, are not puniſhable at all, they have the option only of death or apoſtacy.

It has frequently been debated at the porte, to cut off all the Chriſtians in the empire, who will not embrace Mahomedaniſm. Every honour and advantage is offered to thoſe who change their religion, and every ſpecies of miſery and humiliation attends them and their poſterity who do not. Is this toleration?

* At preſent, however, they do not take children born in the country from their parents, to recruit the corps of janizaries. This cuſtom ceaſed, when the ſultans wiſhed to weaken that melice.

CHAPTER V.

An Hiſtorical View of the Turkiſh Power.

IN the detail of cauſes which modify the character of nations, it will frequently be found neceſſary to trace back the pages of hiſtory, and purſue the chain of events through ſucceſſive ages, preſenting thoſe ſtriking events, whoſe operations continue when their records are ſcarcely to be found.

If the Ottoman empire is ſtill vaſt and extenſive; if it ſtill attracts the fear or the admiration of its neighbours, and ſwells with ſtupid vanity its ſubjects, theſe effects are not ſurely to be attributed to the wiſdom of its counſels, or to the valour of its forces, as they now exiſt, but ariſe from the ſplendor of its former exploits, and the merited celebrity of its ancient character. It is true that theſe exploits were diſgraced by perfidy and treachery, and ſtained by violence and rapine; and while their crimes exhibited an energy in purſuit, and a brilliancy in ſucceſs, the claim of the Turks to national pre-eminence ſtood undiſputed; but in the enervating lap of ſloth, the ferocious conqueror

has degenerated into a torpid barbarian, whoſe only marks of former proweſs are to be traced in the inſolence of his preſent demeanour, and the ſullen affectation of his fancied dignity.

The Ottoman power and name originated in *Othman* (according to the Arabic pronunciation, or *Oſman* according to the Perſian) who, about the year 1300, aſſumed the title of *ſultan*, and eſtabliſhed his empire at Pruſa in Bithynia: but in order to take a view of the progreſs of the Turks, we muſt trace their hiſtory ſtill higher up, and conſider not only their own origin, but that of the Saracen kalifs, whom they ſupplanted.

The vaſt extent of continent, which, ſpreading from the eaſtern parts of Europe and the north of Africa, comprehends the greater part of Aſia, has been the ſource of many populous nations, and the ſeat of many extenſive empires, which have ariſen with a rapidity only to fall as quickly into ruins. In the early hiſtory of theſe countries, new irruptions and new conquerors continually ſucceeded each other, and the power of founding an empire ſeems ſeldom to have been attended with the ſkill requiſite for maintaining it. Some, however, among the numerous hordes which then ſucceſſively prevailed, aroſe to a greater height, and eſtabliſhed a more laſting name than others. The

The different branches of Tartars (or Tatars) from the north, and the Arabians from the ſouth, carried their arms over extenſive regions, and founded great and permanent empires.

It will not here be requiſite to follow the victorious prophet Mahomed, who, by the faſcination of his religion, as much as by the terror of his ſword, ſubjected ſo many nations; ſuffice it to ſay, that his empire, ſo founded, was, within 200 years after his death, extended by his ſucceſſors, the kalifs or commanders of the faithful, over the north of Africa and great part of Aſia; beſides which they had made great progreſs in the ſouth of Europe, having overrun almoſt all Spain, and entered Sicily, Italy, and France. The ſeat of their government was eſtabliſhed at Bagdad, whence iſſued the mandates of their ſpiritual deſpotiſm over this wide extent of territory; but as an empire ſo haſtily raiſed, and ſo unconnected in its parts, was not eaſily held together, and as the commander of the faithful with the increaſe of power acquired alſo habits of luxury ill adapted to the art of governing, their power was ſoon deſtined to fall under the ſword of more hardy competitors.

Such competitors were found in the Tartar (more properly Tatar) nations, by whom

they were ſurrounded. The moſt ancient records of this part of the world deſcribe the Scythian or Tatar tribes as the invaders of their leſs ferocious neighbours. Their name has been very generally applied to the inhabitants of thoſe vaſt deſerts and mountains ſpreading from China to the Danube, and who, whether of ſimilar or different origin, have at various times poured out their ſwarms on all the ſurrounding countries. The Turkmans, or Turks, were a tribe of theſe Tatars, whoſe original ſeat was beyond the Caſpian ſea, from whence, incited by the deſire of plunder, they deſcended about the year 800, and ſeized upon Armenia, from them called Turcomania.

At this time the Perſian empire was ruled by governors, who were nominally ſubject to the Saracen kalifs, but Mahmud, the Gaznevide, one of theſe governors, having extended his empire * from Tranſoxiana to Iſpahan, and from the Caſpian ſea to the Indus, was inveſted by the kalif with the title of ſultan. Upon the ſucceſſion of his ſon Maſſud † to this dignity, a body of Turks under Tongrul Beg (known in ſome of our hiſtories by the name of Tangrolipix) either invited by the Perſians as auxiliaries, or attacking

* A. D. 997. † A. 1038.

tacking them as invaders (for the hiſtorical accounts differ) obtained poſſeſſion of that kingdom. It is ſuppoſed to be about this time that the Turks embraced the religion of Mahomed, and the *kalif* having called them to his aſſiſtance againſt the rebellious *emirs*, conſtituted the victorious Tongrul *temporal lieutenant of the commander of the faithful* *. From this dignity the ſtep was ſhort to the attainment of the whole power of the kalifat, to which a deſcendant of Gengis-khan finally put an end, in the perſon of the kalif Muſtazem †.

Meanwhile new opponents were riſing againſt the Turks, who, ſcarce ſettled in their new conqueſts, were obliged to yield them to freſh hordes of invaders. The more northern Tatars preſſing upon the Turks, as one ſwarm of thoſe barbarians inceſſantly protruded another, haraſſed them in their newly acquired Perſian empire, and finally obliged them to relinquiſh it in purſuit of freſh conqueſts to the ſouth. It was about the year 1200 that the Turks yielded the kingdom of Perſia to the Tatars; but previouſly to this they had themſelves extended their arms over the greater part of Aſia Minor, whither they now retreated, and fixed the ſeat of their empire at Iconium, in Ci-

* A. D. 1055. † A. D. 1239.

licia, ſince Karamania. Here too they were preſſed by the Tatars, and it was at this time that the European mania of the cruſades having a ſecond time broken out, the Turks found themſelves obliged to cede the whole of Paleſtine to the Chriſtians *. It was not long before they regained this country, taking Jeruſalem †, *and putting to the ſword, without diſtinction or mercy, man, woman, and child.*

The government which the celebrated Salah-uddin, (or Saladin) had eſtabliſhed, was alſo about this time overthrown by the Mamluks (who retained the independent poſſeſſion of that country till the beginning of the 16th century) and various other conteſts ariſing in the Turkiſh empire, it fell for a time into ſmall independent ſovereignties, and remained without a head until the riſe of Othman, who firſt aſſumed the name of ſultan, and from whom therefore our account of the Ottoman race properly begins.

Before we proceed to an hiſtorical detail of the acts of the ſeveral ſultans, I ſhall briefly notice the cauſes of the former greatneſs of the Turks; which may be reduced to the following heads:

1ſt. Their conſtant thirſt after univerſal

* A. D. 1229. † A. D. 1234.

monarchy,

monarchy, looking on the whole world as their property; and the propagation of their religion, excited by ſpiritual as well as temporal motives, never neglecting to ſeize on an advantage, as they were unreſtrained by any ſcruples of injuſtice, or of breach of faith, oaths, or treaties.

2dly. Their concord in matters of religion and ſtate.

3dly. Their perſonal courage in war, ſtill increaſed by ſucceſs, and by the enthuſiaſm of religion.

4thly. Their general devotion to their ſovereign, and the obedience of the ſoldiery and people to their ſuperiors and commanders, to a degree hitherto unknown in hiſtory.

5thly. Their ſtrict obſervance of their ancient military diſcipline, their military education, and the early acquaintance with arms, not of the ſoldiery only, but of the whole people.

6thly. Their great temperance, and conſequent health and vigour of body.

7thly. The plunder of their enemies, the great rewards attending extraordinary valour, the crown of martyrdom waiting for thoſe who died in battle, and the road of honour and power being open to every common ſoldier, who might hope to become grand

vizir, and even to be allied to his ſovereign.

8thly. The ſevere and never failing inſtantaneous puniſhment inflicted on diſobedience, diſloyalty, diſorder, or cowardice.

9thly. The military genius of their ſovereigns, who always were at the head of their armies, and their power unreſtrained either by civil or religious laws.

10thly. Their great reſources for recruiting their armies, every Mahomedan thinking himſelf obliged, when called upon, to take the field, at the ſame time that they had a continual ſupply of troops in the children of their Chriſtian captives, whom they educated in the Mahomedan religion, and trained to the uſe of arms.

Hence it is very eaſy to account for the wide extent of their victories; nor ought we to be aſtoniſhed, that they conquered the whole dominions of the kalifs, the Greek empire, Macedonia, Epirus, Peloponneſus, Servia, Boſnia, Bulgaria, Syria, Paleſtine, Egypt, &c. particularly when we recollect that their opponents were moſtly very inferior to them in all the requiſites for military excellence.

In thoſe barbarous ages, when the Chriſtian ſtates, governed by courtiers, prieſts,

or

or women, diſplayed no traces of intellectual energy; when their feudal government, their ignorance of political œconomy, and their want of ſyſtem in financial and military arrangements, rendered them individually weak and contemptible; and when extended views of general politics, of mutual alliances, and of a balance of power, being unknown, they could not be conſolidated into one powerful confederacy; it was then that the Turks exhibited a ſuperior brilliancy of character, and built up a mighty and extenſive empire. Their civil and military inſtitutions were far ſuperior to thoſe of their cotemporaries; their temperament of mind and body, naturally ardent, was inflamed by the precepts of a ſanguinary religion, which incited them to conqueſt by the moſt flattering promiſes of ſenſual gratification; and they were led againſt enemies they deſpiſed by chiefs of ſingular ſkill, bravery, and ambition. The Ottoman empire, governed by a ſucceſſion of great men, from Othman I. to Mahmoud IV. (with ſcarcely a ſingle exception) thus obtained an eminent reputation, whilſt it widely extended the limits of its territory.

It muſt be owned that their fame, however great as conquerors, has never entitled them to any other homage, has never ranked them among the benefactors or inſtructors of mankind;

mankind; they ſcarcely deſerve even to be reckoned among the ſpecies. Intent upon victory, *they have ſtopt at no means to proſecute their plan of univerſal monarchy; violating every principle of juſtice and national faith; attacking their neighbours without provocation, without claim, without even alledging a reaſon for their conduct; maſſacring the vanquiſhed without pity, or ſparing their lives only to force them to a ſlavery the moſt degrading; ſeizing on their wives and daughters, ſelling or diſhonouring them, regardleſs of the domeſtic miſery of the unhappy ſufferers.*

We have ſeen, in other countries, particular reigns or epochas marked with actions as diſgraceful; but that period or that reign was ever beheld by the nation itſelf, at leaſt by the virtuous part of it, with the indignation it deſerved; *but here is a ſyſtem of wickedneſs and abomination transferred from the origin of the nation to its poſterity to this very day, confirmed by their religion, and approved by thoſe who call themſelves the prieſts of God.* Wherever the Turks have eſtabliſhed their dominion, ſcience and commerce, the comforts and the knowledge of mankind, have alike decayed. Not only have they exemplified barbariſm and intolerance in their own conduct, but they have exinguiſhed the flame of genius and knowledge in others, breaking

and

and defacing even the monuments of ancient art with a kind of ſavage exultation, and proving themſelves the real ſcourges of the human race.

We now proceed to an hiſtorical ſurvey of the uſurpations of their ſovereigns, beginning with

OTHMAN I.

It was by degrees that this prince (a deſcendent of the celebrated Gengis-Khan) reduced under his ſubjection the different toparchies, or petty ſovereignties, into which the Turkman empire of Karamania had fallen. When he firſt aſſumed the title of ſultan, he poſſeſſed the ſovereignty of a ſmall diſtrict, the capital of which was *Karâ-chiſar*. Here he eſtabliſhed his government, and, purſuing his conqueſts, took *Pruſa* in Bithynia, and made it the ſeat of the Ottoman empire or kingdom (for not till the taking of Conſtantinople did the ſultans aſſume the title of imperator) which now extended over the greateſt part of Aſia Minor. He died in 1328, and was ſucceeded by

ORKHAN.

This prince having taken Nikê by ſurpriſe, and made ſlaves of all its inhabitants, removed his court thither. When he had extended

tended his conqueſts to the Helleſpont, his ambition and zeal to propagate Mahomedaniſm would not ſuffer him to ſtop there; he croſſed it, and took Gallipoli. He died in 1359, having been a moſt unjuſt and inveterate enemy to the Chriſtians.

AMURAT I.

Succeeded to his predeceſſor's projects of uſurpation of the country, and extirpation of the religion of the Chriſtians.

He took Adrianople in 1362, and made it the ſeat of his empire, as moſt conveniently ſeated to extend his conqueſts on the Chriſtians. Amurat, as has been before obſerved, formed the celebrated body of ſoldiers called yeniſkari (or janiſaries) which afterwards became the ſtrength of the Turkiſh army. He took Servia, and its capital Niſſa, and Appolonia near Mount Athos. Having a quarrel with the ſultan of Karamania, he ſubdued his country, but did not dethrone him, as he was his ſon in law, but thus laid the foundation of the extenſive empire of the Ottomans in Aſia.

Amurat was ſtabbed, in 1390, by a wounded Chriſtian ſoldier, after he had gained a great battle, in which he gave no pardon, and *maſſacred afterwards an incredible number of Chriſtians.* Ever ſince this event, all Chriſtian

tian ambaſſadors and their ſuite, admitted to the ſultan's preſence, are held by both their arms by two chamberlains during the time they are in the audience room. He ſubdued a great part of Thrace, (or Romania) leaving to the Greek emperor little more than the city of Conſtantinople.

BAYAZET I.

On his acceſſion to the throne he immediately *ſtrangled his younger brother Jacub.* This was the firſt inſtance of the ſanguinary cuſtom, afterwards ſo frequent, of putting to death princes of the royal blood.

In the firſt year of his reign he took Cratova in Servia, which was yielded to him on condition that the Chriſtian inhabitants ſhould depart with life and liberty; but he ſent ſoldiers after them, and *murdered them all without mercy.* He entered into Boſnia, and brought away all the inhabitants whom he judged uſeful, and made ſlaves of them. He croſſed the Danube (the firſt time the Turks paſſed it) and committed horrid cruelties in Walachia, from which he afterwards exacted a yearly tribute. He beſieged Conſtantinople twice, and had nearly taken it; but the great Tamerlane came to its relief, and overcame Bayazet in the greateſt battle that was ever fought. Being taken priſoner, he

he was put into an iron cage (as he told Tamerlane he would have done by him had he been his priſoner) againſt the bars of which he beat out his brains in 1399. Nature has not produced many more cruel and mercileſs tyrants, nor ever a more inveterate enemy to Chriſtians, or to all countries he thought he could conquer. The Turks were now arrived at the height of cruelty, treachery, and thirſt of conqueſt.

MAHOMET I.

Soon after his acceſſion he killed his brothers; ſome of them not till after a long civil war. He regained all his father had loſt, but had not time to augment it much, as he died in 1422.

AMURAT II.

Eldeſt ſon of Mahomet. He ſtrangled his brother Muſtafa. In 1432, he took Theſſalonica (or Salonica) and put men, women, and children to the ſword, except thoſe reſerved for luſt or hard labour. The cruelties here committed cannot be deſcribed, any more than the horrid ravages which he committed in Hungary. He invaded and ſubdued Servia (contrary to his league with the prince of it, his father-in-law) deſtroying all before him. He entered into Tranſilvania,

and killed men, women, and children, as far as he penetrated; he did the ſame in Walachia, and burnt the villages and towns; all kinds of tortures and cruelty, in its moſt dreadful ſhape, was practiſed on the Chriſtians. The famous Scanderbeg, a native of Epirus, greatly checked him.

In 1445, Amurat took Peloponneſus and all Greece; he ſacrificed 600 priſoners to the ſoul of his father, ravaged the country, and deſtroyed every thing pleaſant, beautiful, and grand, and repeated his accuſtomed cruelties. He greatly enlarged the Turkiſh dominions, augmented the body of janizaries, and made them more formidable than they had been before. This cruel tyrant and invader of Chriſtian ſtates died of age, and grief at his ill ſucceſs againſt Scanderbeg, in Auguſt 1450; he was, however, more faithful in obſerving treaties than any of his predeceſſors, or even than his opponent the king of Hungary; but he never made treaties but in diſtreſs, and when he deſpaired of conquering.

MAHOMET II.

The greateſt warrior of all the Turkiſh ſultans, and the greateſt monſter that ever ſate on the throne of the Ottomans, or any other throne. Mahomet II. eldeſt ſon of the late Amurat,

Amurat, began his infamous reign by the murder of his two brothers. His next act was to offer a league with the emperor of Conſtantinople and the deſpot of Servia, his grandfather by the mother's ſide, and at the ſame time to make preparation for the ſiege of Conſtantinople. He never kept his word, his promiſes, his leagues, or even his moſt ſolemn oaths on the Koran, longer than ſuited his purpoſe. He was a monſter of perfidy, of cruelty, and injuſtice, and he is "*the glory of the annals of the Ottoman race.*"

He took Conſtantinople the 29th of May, 1453. "The emperor was, happily for him, killed in defending it. The barbarians entered the city, howling more horribly than the beaſts of the foreſt with thirſt of blood; they ſlew defenceleſs men, women, and children, by thouſands, without the leaſt reſpect to dignity or beauty, to age or youth, to ſex or condition. All who could fled to the church of St. Sophia, hoping that the ſacredneſs of the place would inſpire reſpect for the duties of man, of whatever religion he be; they were there all ſlain, except a very few, reſerved for purpoſes worſe than death; and the church was converted into a ſtable. Every common ſoldier had permiſſion, for three days, to maſſacre, to violate, and to pillage without reſtraint. Riches

were

were worſe than poverty, and beauty worſe than deformity. A hundred thouſand barbarians ſatisfied their avarice, their ſavage cruelty, and their brutal luſt, or all. No tongue can deſcribe their miſery. Three long days and three long nights the air was ſhaken with their cries. The ſultan heard it in his camp, and it lulled him to ſleep. The dogs ran into the fields howling with compaſſion, or leaped into the ſea.

" After three days, the few Chriſtians, ſpared for the cruel purpoſes of the conquerors, were driven like hogs into the fields. The ſultan entered the city; his horſe was ſtopped ſometimes by heaps of the ſlaughtered, and ſometimes waded through pools of blood. He made in the holy temple of St. Sophia a ſumptuous feaſt for his paſhas and officers, and as he ſate banquetting he cauſed to be killed, for his diverſion and that of his gueſts, great numbers of his priſoners of the firſt diſtinction for birth, eminence, and learning, among whom were many of the late emperor's relations; and theſe feaſts he repeated daily till he had deſtroyed all the Grecian nobility, prieſts, and perſons of learning or note, who had fallen into his hands, of both ſexes and all ages. Many Venetian ſenators, and Genoeſe nobles, and rich merchants, were

among the priſoners; they were in like manner murdered for his diverſion while he was feaſting, and to entertain his court."

Thus ended the Greek empire!

Thus was founded the ſeat of the Turkiſh empire, which Chriſtian princes have ſince thought it juſtice to defend from the attacks of other Chriſtian princes, and from the ſtruggles of the wretched remainder of an injured and unhappy people, ever ſince living in miſerable bondage!

Unprovoked, the Turks attacked them, and never ceaſed till they had uſurped the throne of their empire, as they had done thoſe of ſo many other ſtates and kingdoms, murdering millions in cold blood, and by tortures of the moſt unheard of barbarity.

He took Servia, and the empire of Trapizonde, putting all the family of the emperor to death. After triumphing over the Venetians, he took Otranto in Italy, and murdered all the inhabitants, according to the Turkiſh cuſtom, except a few he choſe out to make ſlaves of.

He died (by poiſon as ſuppoſed) in the year 1481, after having put to death above 800,000 Chriſtians of both ſexes.

BAYAZET

BAYAZET II.

Eldeſt ſon of the late ſultan, had a long civil war to ſuſtain againſt his brothers, whom he had not an opportunity of ſeizing and putting to death when he ſucceeded to the throne. He formed a project of putting to death the whole corps of janizaries, but, as it was diſcovered, it became impracticable. He attacked without provocation the Venetians, and committed horrid maſſacres: he alſo attacked the Egyptians. After a troubleſome reign, he was depoſed by his ſon, and poiſoned, in 1512.

SELIM I.

The greateſt monſter of this monſtrous race. After poiſoning his father, he ſtrangled his elder brother, and murdered his five ſons; he caught another brother, and ſtrangled him alſo. He made great conqueſts over the Perſians, and in Aſia, and took Cairo after a hard ſtruggle with the Mamaluks. After a bloody reign, he died a lamentable death of a cancer in his reins, as he was planning an attack on Italy and Rhodes, in September 1520. He commanded his ſon to turn his arms againſt the Chriſtians, and left him many bloody precepts.

SOLIMAN II.

Having freed himſelf from apprehenſion on the ſide of Perſia and Egypt, he directed his attempts againſt the Chriſtians, and ſoon took Rhodes from the knights of St. John, who had held it for two hundred years. The ſentiments of the Turks may be gathered from his ſpeeches to the grand maſter, after he had ſigned, and ſworn to obſerve, the capitulation.

"Although I might *juſtly* and *worthily* "infringe the articles I have preſcribed "with ſuch an enemy *(that is, a Chriſtian)* "from whoſe deſerved puniſhment *neither* "*faith nor oath ought to ſtay* a moſt juſt con- "queror; yet I have determined to be gra- "cious and liberal to thee if thou wilt, by "well-doings, amend thy life, and I will "give thee great preferment in my ſervice," &c. The grand maſter in a noble ſpeech anſwered, "that he preferred death;" which ſo aſtoniſhed Soliman, that he promiſed to obſerve the articles of the capitulation. On the grand maſter's departure from Rhodes, Soliman told him, "What I have done unto "thee was not for hatred, but deſire of ſo- "vereignty."—"I need not war for riches" (in that he ſpoke not truth, as the Turkiſh hiſtory proves by facts) "but for honour, "fame,

" fame, and immortality, and the extenſion " of my empire; for it is the property of a " ſovereign, royally deſcended, by ſtrong hand " to take from others, and to invade others, " not from a covetous mind, but from the " honourable deſire of rule and ſovereignty; " for whilſt my neighbour ſtandeth I count " it juſt by force of arms to remove him."

He then attacked Hungary, took Buda, and *murdered the garriſon*, which had *capitulated*. He entered into Auſtria with fire and ſword: " *The old were ſlain, the young led* " *into captivity, women raviſhed before their* " *huſband's faces, and then ſlain with their* " *children, infants ript out of their mother's* " *wombs, others taken from their breaſts, cut in* " *pieces, or thruſt upon pointed ſtakes, and other* " *incredible cruelties*." He laid ſiege to Vienna, but finding a moſt deſperate reſiſtance raiſed the ſiege, and before he withdrew *maſſacred all his priſoners, men, women, and children*. This ſiege coſt him 80,000 men. He made John king of Hungary tributary to him, entered again into Auſtria, and repeated his cruelties, killing at one time 4,000 priſoners. He took, in 1534, Bagdad, all Aſſyria, and Meſopotamia, formerly ſeparate kingdoms, but then belonging to Perſia. He ſent 200,000 men into Macedonia, to be tranſported into Italy, and actually landed a

part of this army in Apulia, and took Caſtrum. Turning his forces, however, from Italy againſt the Venetians, he beſieged Corfu, but not ſucceeding, he carried away 16,000 young people of the iſland into perpetual ſlavery, yet made other conqueſts on them during a long war. He again came to Buda, and converted Hungary into a Turkiſh province, making an alliance with the French to attack the Emperor. He made a fruitleſs attempt on Malta, but carried off from Goza 6,300 young people into ſlavery. The Turks then attacked and took Tripoly, belonging to the order of Malta, but did not keep the capitulations, as they ſaid *no faith was to be kept with dogs.* Ali Paſha of Buda invaded Upper Hungary, and took Temeſwar, and, *contrary to the capitulation, murdered the garriſon.*

Soliman, being ſuſpicious of his ſon Muſtafa, cauſed him to be ſtrangled in his preſence, but afterwards found he was innocent; he ſtrangled alſo Muſtafa's ſon. Chihangar, another ſon of Soliman, killed himſelf in deſpair. He cauſed a third ſon Bayazet, together with five of his children, to be ſtrangled. He ſent a fleet and army againſt Malta, attacked it a ſecond time, and took the fort of St. Elmo; but meeting with great loſs raiſed the ſiege. In ſhort, after doing in various

parts of the world much miſchief to the Chriſtians, and committing every where great cruelties, he died of a bloody flux, the 4th of September, 1566.

SELIM II.

Set the ruinous example to his ſucceſſors of not going himſelf to the wars, but carried them on by his lieutenants. He ſoon ſought a pretence to declare war againſt the Venetians, who, in this bloody conteſt, loſt Cyprus and a part of Dalmatia. He ſent an army into Moldavia againſt the waywode. At laſt a peace was made, to which the Turks ſwore *ſeven times*; yet the waywode was murdered by the paſha, unmindful of his oaths. They then overran all Moldavia, putting all the nobility, and many thouſands of others, to the ſword; and all Walachia fell into the hands of the Turks, in 1574. The 9th of December this ſame year Selim died.

AMURAT III.

Eldeſt ſon of the late ſultan, whoſe death was concealed, as was uſual, till the new ſultan was arrived. The janizaries, who had a cuſtom in interregnums to plunder and even maſſacre their fellow-citizens, Chriſtians and Jews, were diſappointed and murmured; he was obliged to give them large ſums to

appeaſe them. He, on his acceſſion, cauſed five of his brethren to be ſtrangled in his preſence. Though he was of a peaceful temper, he continued his father's wars, becauſe he feared to be thought to degenerate from the Ottoman princes, but went not himſelf into the field. In October 1575, he penetrated into Ruſſia and Poland, and made great ſlaughter. It was debated in the divan, whether the league with the Chriſtians or Perſians ſhould be broken; for they hold it lawful, when it is the intereſt of the empire, to break all oaths and treaties with thoſe of a different faith with themſelves. It was determined to make war againſt Perſia. The event of this war was favourable to him. It was attended with their uſual cruelties. The janizaries having now loſt their ſubmiſſion, and in a great part their diſcipline, began to kill their commanders whenever they were diſſatisfied with them. Amurat had permitted their children to be enrolled in their corps. He made war on the emperor of Germany, and, as uſual, cauſed much deſolation. He died the 18th of January 1595.

MAHOMED III.

Eldeſt ſon of the late ſultan. He put to death all his brothers (in number nineteen) and ten of his father's wives, whom he ſuppoſed might

might be with child. The janizaries, notwithſtanding the new ſultan's preſence, plundered the city, and had nearly killed their ſultan and plundered the palace. He carried on his wars againſt the German emperor by his paſhas, but not being ſucceſsful, he went himſelf to Buda with 200,000 men, and having taken Agria, returned to Conſtantinople. This war was carried on with various ſucceſs, but with great fury. When the Turks took Alba-regalis, by capitulation, the Chriſtians were to march out in ſafety with their arms, but the Turks put them all to death, as well inhabitants as 3,000 ſoldiers. The inſolence of the janizaries became very great, and they were continually mutinying and fighting with the other ſoldiers. The paſhas in many provinces rebelled, and the ſultan through fear made peace with them, pardoned them, and confirmed them in their offices; but he put to death other paſhas who were in his power, which cauſed thoſe who had any thing to apprehend to rebel again. He put to death his own ſon and his ſon's mother, on ſuſpicion of a deſign to dethrone him. The janizaries attempted to depoſe him. Whilſt treating with the emperor of Germany for peace, the ſultan died at Conſtantinople, in January 1604.

ACHMET

ACHMET I.

The ſecond ſon (the eldeſt having been ſtrangled by his father) ſucceeded to the throne at the age of fifteen. The Turks were not earneſt with the negotiation for peace, but wanted to deceive and fall on the Germans; the war therefore continued, but at length peace was concluded in 1607. There was nothing very remarkable in his other wars with different nations. He died 15th November 1617 *.

MUSTAFA I.

The brother of the late ſultan, who had been preſerved, but with ſuch ſecrecy that it was ſcarcely known whether he was alive or dead. During his brother's reign, the council had determined he ſhould be preſerved, as Achmet was but fifteen years old, and there were only theſe two heirs to the throne, but that he ſhould be kept in cloſe confinement. Muſ-

* In his 23d year, he beat his ſultana, who was mother of a daughter, and wounded and trod on her, becauſe ſhe had ſtrangled one of his ſiſters ſlaves, of whom he had become enamoured. The ſultana, having heard of this amour, ſent for her, ſtrangled her, and put her clothes on one of her own ſlaves, whom ſhe ſent to the ſultan, and on her return ſtrangled her alſo, as ſhe had done many others, who appeared to be with child of the ſultan.—*This anecdote ſhews the deſpotiſm of this government, even among the women of the ſeraglio.*

tafa,

tafa, being twenty-five years of age, was drawn out of a cell, and proclaimed ſultan. He became uncommonly cruel; he cauſed young Oſman, eldeſt ſon of Achmet, to be confined under a ſtrong guard, and put to death the other ſons of Achmet. He offered many indignities to the Chriſtian ambaſſadors—indeed, in the laſt reign, the Europeans in Conſtantinople were all ordered to be ſlain, but the vizir and other great officers diſſuaded the ſultan from this ſtep. When Achmet had children of his own, it was determined to put Muſtafa, his brother, to death; and though it was concluded in the council of the divan, yet Achmet was diverted from it by omens.

When an emperor mounted the throne, it was uſual to put to death his brothers and nephews; but when he had children grown up, he entruſted them with governments and the command of armies; this cuſtom had now ceaſed. When the father died, the vizir kept his death, if poſſible, ſecret till the new ſultan arrived, who generally contrived to ſeize his brothers and put them to death; ſometimes they fled, but they were generally caught ſooner or later, and put to death. It is for this reaſon, that the ſultan always goes to ſome moſque in the city to public prayers every Friday, or ſhows himſelf in public, for otherwiſe the people

people imagine he is dead, and make a rebellion.

When the late ſultan, Achmet, found death approach, his counſellors adviſed him to ſettle the ſucceſſion. His own children were young. He ſent for his brother, and told him his reſolution of making choice of him to ſucceed to the throne, which much amazed him, as the empire belonged to his own ſon. He recommended to him the children he had by the ſultana, entreating him to uſe them as he had done him, leaving the children he had by concubines to his diſcretion.

Muſtafa, by his cruelties, became ſo odious, that the grand-vizir, who was gone againſt the Perſians, returned with his army, depoſed him, not having reigned a year, and ſent him to his priſon again, and placed Oſman on the throne.

OSMAN I.

He ſent a fleet into the Mediterranean, landed at Manfredonia, and carried of 1,600 ſlaves. He made war againſt Poland, and marched himſelf at the head of 300,000 men, with 300 field pieces and 100 double cannon, but he had no ſucceſs, and was reduced to ſue for peace.

Contrary to the will and advice of his miniſters, the ſultan married, without any pomp,

pomp, the grandchild of a ſultana who had been married to a paſha, only for her beauty, which was ill-interpreted, his anceſtors of late years not uſually taking wives, eſpecially of a Turkiſh race, on account of their relations.

The ſultan, who had been diſcontented with the janizaries ever ſince his diſgrace in Poland, meditated revenge againſt them, and the abolition of a corps now grown too formidable, mutinous, and meddling with the government, and having loſt their ancient diſcipline and ſubordination. The janizaries had, contrary to their inſtitution, married, and entered into trades; their children were alſo janizaries, a privilege conceded them in a former reign, and they were more pleaſed to ſtay at home, than to face the dangers of a foreign campaign. His vizir promiſed to provide him a new ſoldiery of the Curds (who inhabit the mountains between Smyrna and Mount Lebanon,) 40,000 of whom were to be enrolled as his body guards; that the paſhas of the provinces ſhould train up to arms a certain number of the inhabitants, to be ready to ſerve in foreign wars, and to conſtitute a greater army than any of his predeceſſors, and enable him to make greater conqueſts at far leſs expence. It was agreed between the ſultan and vizir, that the former ſhould

ſhould go into Aſia on ſome pretence, as that of going to viſit Mecca, or to reduce Sidon, which had rebelled; but the ſultan was not cautious enough in his preparations, melting metals, conveying away all his treaſures, and uſing imprudent expreſſions and threats to the janizaries. In the mean time the vizir had provided 20,000 men in Aſia to be depended upon, beſides the emir of Sidon, whom he had gained, under pretence of a war againſt Perſia. At Damaſcus, the ſultan was to cut off all his guards, and ſtay there till he had regulated his new army, then to return to Conſtantinople, and root out the janizaries, ſpahies, tamariots, and all their officers, to ſettle a new government, and change the name of the city. He then hoped to conquer all Chriſtendom, in the mean time he was to live in friendſhip with all powers.

Certainly this was a well-grounded deſign, and the reformation of the army had become neceſſary; the empire languiſhed under inſolent and lazy ſlaves, and the ſultan found himſelf dependent on the janizaries for life or death, peace or war. A civil conteſt, however, would have been produced; for the ſoldiery in Europe would have ſet up another ſultan; but he had all the treaſure, and if he ſucceeded, he would have ſaved an immenſe expence;

expence; for the janizaries conſumed all the revenues of the empire.

The ſoldiery, however, oppoſed the departure of the ſultan, and threatened to ſet up another in his place. They ran to the ſeraglio, but without arms, and demanded that he ſhould remain in the city of Conſtantinople; that he ſhould deliver up the vizir and other great officers accuſed by them of conſpiring againſt the ſtate. The ſultan conſented not to go to Aſia, but refuſed to deliver up thoſe whom they demanded, and perſuaded them to ſtay till Saturday, which was council day—this happened on Wedneſday, 7th May, 1622. The next day the tumult began again, and the vizir adviſed the ſultan to go to Aſia in his own boats, but he refuſed. The vizir appeared to appeaſe them, but they cut him in pieces. The emperor then endeavoured to get over to Aſia, but not ſucceeding, he hid himſelf in a private place. The rebels demanded their ſultan and more ſacrifices, and ſaid they muſt have a ſultan, and if he would not appear, they would make another: having waited ſome time, they reſolved to enter the palace, but took a ſolemn oath not to plunder it; they there killed the kiſlar-aga, and not finding ſultan Oſman, they demanded Muſtafa, who had been dethroned; they found

found him in a vault, where Oſman had put him, with two negro women. They carried Muſtafa to the old ſeraglio, and there left him; Oſman came out after their departure, and having conſulted with ſome of his friends, it was reſolved to ſend to the women of the old ſeraglio to put Muſtafa to death; but he had a party among theſe women, and the noiſe alarmed the guard, who reſcued him. The next day the ſultan went to the college of the janizaries, and by intreaties had nearly prevailed, but for the indiſcretion of the janizary aga, who, being too zealous for him, began to threaten the janizaries, who thereupon ſlew him and others who came with Oſman. Him they carried to the new ſultan, who only nodded conſent to what they propoſed, and he was ſent as a priſoner to the Seven Towers. The new vizir made by Muſtafa knew the ſtorm might paſs over if Oſman lived; a conſultation therefore was held by the chief officers, and it was determined to ſearch how many of the blood royal were left alive, that if two remained Oſman ſhould be put to death. Two of his brothers were found; one about twelve the other about ſeven years of age, and the vizir then went with executioners to the priſon, and ſtrangled Oſman. The ſoldiers, who did not intend to go ſo far, ſoon repented. The paſha of Erzerum

zerun broke out in open rebellion, and declared himſelf the avenger of his prince's blood.

MUSTAFA I. *(re-enthroned.)*

On Saturday, 1ſt June 1622, the capi-aga or major-domo having received a ſecret order to remove the brothers of the late ſultan Oſman from their lodgings, and in the night to ſtrangle them; as he was performing his command, aided with a few of his executioners to carry away the princes, they cried out; the pages running to the noiſe, and encouraged by the kiſlar-agá, who had ſome ſuſpicion, without further examination killed the capi-agá, almoſt every order of men having now riſen againſt their own chief. That night they ſent ſecretly to the janizaries and ſpahies. The ſoldiers returned in fury to the court in favour of the pages, and demanded juſtice againſt thoſe who thus would have made an end of the Ottoman race, only this Muſtafa being left alive, who was ſo holy a ſaint that he would not people the world with ſinners, nor endure any woman near him. The innocent ſultan proteſted he knew nothing of the matter; and that if ſuch command was procured, it was obtained fraudulently. He was eaſily believed himſelf, but his mother (another Livia) and Daout

Paſha, who had married her daughter, were vehemently ſuſpected. This tumult was however appeaſed. The ſtate of the empire was deplorable: the ſovereign an idiot, the next heir a child, and all the great men and ſoldiers either deſtroyed, or mutinous, or corrupted.

The Perſians ſeized this opportunity to recover the province and city of Bagdad. Had the Chriſtian princes opened their eyes, they might alſo have regained much that they had loſt.

The vizir took occaſion to blame the janizar-aga, and to have him exiled to be ſtrangled, and ſome other paſhas, to make room for depoſing Muſtafa, and placing on the throne Murat, a child and brother of Oſman's, many being of his party. The janizaries roſe and reſcued their aga. A new faction now aroſe between the reigning ſultan Muſtafa and Murat. No ſecurity was left for any man; the rebellious ſoldiers had the government in their hands. The vizir retired. The ſoldiers adhered to the ſultan of their own creating; but the lawyers and churchmen (the ulema) planned a revolution, and affirmed publicly, that the conſtitution was ſubverted, the foundation of the ſtate diſſolved, the ſultan unlawful, and all thoſe who adhered to him guilty of hereſy, in having deſpiſed the inſtitution of Mahomed.

This

This ſpread all over the empire by correſpondence with their own body, and the whole nation was divided in ſentiment.

The ſoldiers ſtill continued in their mutinous diſpoſition even in Conſtantinople, and their inſolence grew to ſuch a height, that going in troops to the court, they demanded all offices of profit, inſiſted on being ſtewards to the revenues of the moſques, (which are great) demanded the farms of the cuſtoms, and committed inſufferable outrages. The vizir durſt deny them nothing; they drank wine in the ſtreets, contrary to their law, and ſtood in companies in the open day, exacting money of all Chriſtians who paſſed, to pay for their wine, and ſtabbed without mercy thoſe who refuſed to ſubmit to their extortions. None durſt meddle with men who had killed their own ſovereign. At Smyrna the janizaries aſſaulted the Chriſtian conſuls, and took money from them; nor did they without difficulty eſcape with their lives. Rebellion appeared in ſeveral provinces. The treaſures were exhauſted by the immenſe ſums given to the janizaries at each new acceſſion to the throne, and by the burden of ſeveral expenſive wars.

The ſpahies demanded juſtice for the death of the late ſultan, and the puniſhment of the vizir who had murdered him, but who had

ſince abdicated that office. The janizaries protected him, but at length conſented to his puniſhment, and he was carried to the ſame chamber where the ſultan was ſtrangled, and there met his fate; he even pointed out the corner where the regicide was performed, and deſired to die there, which was granted.

On 20th January, 1622, a peace with Poland was ſigned by the mediation of the Engliſh ambaſſador.

The ſoldiers now openly plundered people when they wanted money, ſo that it was thought prudent to remove the royal mint into the ſeraglio, and coin all the metal they could find to ſatisfy the ſoldiery.

The paſha of Erzerun, with ſome others, raiſed a great army, and marched towards Conſtantinople, declaring his intention to reduce the janizaries of the city to obedience and diſcipline; to puniſh thoſe who had murdered the late ſultan Oſman, and to ſettle a new ſultan lawfully, who ſhould be able to govern; aſſerting at the ſame time that Muſtafa was an idiot, governed by a woman and by his vizir. The army at Conſtantinople refuſed to march againſt the paſha of Erzerun, and the empire was from one end to the other in confuſion.

The chief cauſe of this evil was, that their three laſt emperors had not gone into the field

field themſelves, excepting once, when Mahomet III. for the maintenance of his credit with the ſoldiery, went to Hungary, and took Agria. The people and miniſters were deſirous of depoſing Muſtafa, and placing on the throne Murat, brother of Oſman; but they feared that the vizir, who was in effect emperor, aſſiſted by the janizaries, would maintain the ſovereign they had placed on the throne; they alſo feared the low ſtate of the finances, which would not allow of giving the uſual ſums to the janizaries at the acceſſion of a new ſultan; but the report that the paſha of Erzerun had declared himſelf the avenger of the late ſultan, had put to death all the janizaries that fell in his hands, with their wives and children; that he was advancing with an army; and that the ſoldiers ſent againſt him had diſbanded, ſtruck them with ſuch fear, that they joined the civil power to depoſe Muſtafa, and place Amurat on the throne, and conſented to relinquiſh their uſual donations on a ſultan's mounting the throne. Muſtafa was therefore re-conducted quietly to his priſon, and

SULTAN AMURAT IV. (or MURAT)

In 1623, aſcended the throne, being only fourteen years of age. The vizir ſent againſt the paſha of Erzerun could or would do nothing; for the beglarbeg of Anatolia had joined the paſha and the ſpahies were on his ſide.

The Coſſaks at this period entered the Boſphorus with 150 ſmall ſhips and boats, and deſtroyed Buyukderé and Yenikoi, within about twelve or fifteen miles of Conſtantinople, on the European, and Stania on the Aſiatic ſide. They returned the next night quietly, having alarmed the capital. The paſha of Erzerun and the king of Perſia ravaged the countries in Aſia. Algiers and Tunis began to caſt off their allegiance to the porte, and to become independent ſtates. The paſha of Erzerun, however, was pardoned, and admitted to another paſhelik, that of Boſnia; for the porte thought it dangerous to bring matters to the utmoſt extremity, ſo low was it fallen; beſides, they did not wiſh the janizaries to triumph, and the grand ſeignior, ſecretly, was not diſpleaſed at the paſha's conduct.

A. D. 1630. The government of the empire was chiefly in the hands of four paſhas, who

who had married ſiſters of the ſultan. The ſultan was much given to wine, and often ſhowed himſelf abroad, unlike a prince, with debauched young men, ſo that conſpiracies were formed againſt him. The people were diſcontented with burthenſome taxes, and the ſoldiery diſorderly, and without diſcipline, and inſolent at receiving no pay. The paſhas in the provinces were almoſt independent ſovereigns, and the empire ſhook on its weak foundation.

The head of the ſpahilar-agaſi (general of the ſpahies) being cut off, the ſpahies rebelled, and the janizaries joined them; they threw ſtones at and wounded the vizier, whom they with threats obliged the ſultan to depoſe, and deliver up to them, when they cut him in pieces. They next cauſed the mufti to be depoſed, and demanded to ſee the brother of the grand ſeignior, which was granted; they then charged the new vizir and mufti to become ſecurity for his life. The ſedition was not appeaſed till the ſoldiery had ſlain more victims. The ſultan, in the mean time, was contriving how he could get rid of them, and wiſhed to have killed his brother, but the guarantee of the vizir and mufti prevented it. He made another vizir, and conſulted with him how to weaken the ſoldiery; and he really cut off a great number of ſpahies and janizaries ſecretly,

ſending them on various pretences to divers parts, and aſſaſſinating them by night.

A. D. 1631. Being become now more manly, he went out on horſeback often, with a martial appearance, exerciſed his ſoldiers, and reduced them to more obedience. In Aſia and in Hungary there were ſtill ſeditions amongſt the janizaries, who, for want of their pay, killed their commanders.

A. D. 1632. Amurat had now borne him a ſeventh daughter; and though he was much troubled that he had no ſon of his favourite ſlave, yet he was ſo much in love with her, that he reſolved to create her ſultana, had not his mother declared againſt it, as a thing not uſual for any woman to be honoured with that title before ſhe had ſecured the inheritance by the birth of a male child.

He put to death two chiefs of the ſpahies, and eight principal janizaries, thinking to extinguiſh the ſpirit of ſedition; but fearing another inſurrection, he retired to Scutari, to the old ſeraglio, and fortified himſelf there.

He was ſo little regardful of the laws of nations, that he cauſed to be impaled a French interpreter, and put the ambaſſador into priſon, and committed other violences. Soon after he made peace with the Perſians, but broke it again immediately. He alſo made peace with the emperor of Germany.

A. D. 1633. A ſingular fight was maintained between two Engliſh merchant ſhips loading corn (which was then prohibited) in the gulph of Vola, againſt the whole fleet of the captain paſha's gallies. They killed 1,200 ſlaves and a great number of Turks, with the captain paſha himſelf, and when they could maintain the fight no longer, they blew themſelves up. They ſunk three gallies, and forced the fleet into port to repair. This action is remembered, and talked of to this very day in Turkey. The matter was compromiſed at the porte on paying 40,000 dollars; but the Engliſh only paid one third of it, the French and Venetians paid the other two-thirds, and why is not known.

A. D. 1634. Murat, growing now in years, took the government entirely on himſelf, and determined to make himſelf feared. He was ſevere with his officers, and extremely ſo with the ſoldiers, declaring that he expected implicit obedience. The people mutinied at ſome taxes, but he cut off the heads of fifty ringleaders. He hanged a kadi, to the great diſpleaſure of the ulema; he went then to Pruſa; he diſpatched a boat to Conſtantinople to bring to him the mufti and his ſon, both of whom he immediately ſtrangled. This tyranny ſtruck terror into the whole empire; for

for former emperors but rarely uſed to put to death the muftis. The particular death allotted for muftis is, by braying them in a mortar uſed only for that purpoſe; but it is ſeldom practiſed. Murat reflecting on the ill effect that wine had on him, and the dangers that it might produce on the people, ordered all the wine in the town to be ſtaved out in the ſtreets, on pain of death.

He hanged a Venetian merchant for having on the top of his houſe a high gallery, becauſe he ſuppoſed he might look into the gardens of the ſeraglio, and impriſoned all the European merchants, who were not releaſed till they paid 40,000 dollars. He ſearched all the houſes of the foreign miniſters for arms, and took away even the ſword of the Engliſh ambaſſador. He attacked the Poles without declaring war. An ambaſſador was ſent from Poland; Murat, contrary to cuſtom, ſpoke himſelf, and told him, "*that all Chriſtian kings ought either to "receive the Ottoman laws, or pay him tribute, "or try the ſharpneſs of his ſword.*" He then ordered war to be declared againſt Poland, though his war with Perſia was not finiſhed; but the Poles beat the Turks, and made them ſue for peace, which the Poles refuſed, till the paſha who entered their country was put to death, and ſome others. Peace was then

then concluded. The captain paſha meeting the new French ambaſſador at ſea, going to Conſtantinople, inſulted him, and cauſed him to go on board his ſhip. After his arrival at Conſtantinople, the French drogoman, who had brought complaints againſt the captain paſha, was hanged by order of the ſultan, and the ambaſſador forced ſuddenly and unexpectedly on board a ſhip, and obliged to depart.

Murat ſet out himſelf for the war in Perſia, at the head of 100,000 men, in April 1634, and when he reached Erzerun, he muſtered his army, 300,000 fighting men, well diſciplined, and rendered obedient by his ſeverity: he ſet them alſo examples of frugality and patience, and became more temperate. He took Rivan, but entering further into Perſia, loſt a vaſt number of horſes. He utterly deſtroyed Tauris by fire and ſword, and returned, leaving his army at Aleppo and Damaſcus, in December 1635. After his departure, the Perſians recovered what they had loſt, and the people murmured again at Conſtantinople. The janizaries were diſpleaſed at ſeeing the Boſtangees take their places as guards of the grand ſeignior; the ulema were enraged, becauſe ſeveral of their corps, kadis and others, had been beheaded on pretext of faction.

Having

Having now eſtabliſhed his authority over the military and the ulema, he gave looſe to the utmoſt violence and ſeverity on the moſt trifling occaſions. He puniſhed the uſe of tobacco with death, and inflicted the ſame puniſhment on his cook, for not ſeaſoning a diſh according to his palate. To deſtroy his ſubjects formed his daily amuſement, either by ſhooting them with arrows, as he ſate in his kioſk, on the ſhore of the Boſphorus, or by firing a carbine at any one who looked out of a window at him when ſailing in his boat. To theſe crimes were added the loweſt debaucheries, and his chief companions in drunkenneſs were the revolted Perſian general, who had delivered up Revan, and an Italian of the ſeraglio. Murat's uncontroulable violence now prompted him to attack at once Ruſſia and Perſia. Raiſing, therefore, a vaſt army, he ſet out on an expedition againſt the latter country, but previouſly cauſed one of his brothers to be ſtrangled, leaving alive only Ibrahim, the ſole ſurvivor of the Ottoman race, but weak both in mind and body.

It was now that the vigour of Murat's diſpoſition appeared in its beſt light. He took the field in May 1638, reviewed his forces with care, diſmiſſed the invalids on half pay, heard and determined all diſputes in the army, and preſerved ſo ſtrict diſcipline, that

that the countries through which he paſſed ſuffered none of the hardſhips uſually attending the march of a large army. The reſult of this campaign was the capture of Bagdat, the ancient Babylon, which event was ſoon ſucceeded by a peace, and Murat returned in triumph to Conſtantinople, on the 10th June 1639.

The Venetians having greatly ſuffered by the piracies of the Algerines and Tuniſines, ventured to make ſome repriſals, which ſo much offended Murat, that he iſſued an immediate order to put to death the Venetian ambaſſador, and all his countrymen in Turkey; and though this order was by the prudent management of the vizir recalled, yet Venice was threatened with a war, which they could only avert by paying 250,000 ſequins. The language of the *kaimakan*, on this occaſion, was, "we know that the "other powers of Chriſtendom are too weak "to aſſiſt you, take your choice therefore: "we ſell you peace at this price; if you "think it not worth your money, refuſe it." Whilſt Murat was intent on new hoſtilities, and raiſing forces, though he had not determined whom to attack, he returned to his former debaucheries, and was ſuddenly carried off by them, on the 8th of February 1640, in the 17th year of his reign, and 31ſt of his age.

Thus

Thus periſhed one of the moſt ferocious deſpots that ever inſulted and diſgraced humanity. Breathing vengeance againſt whole nations, he threatened to ſubdue all Chriſtendom, and impoſe on it the yoke of Mahomedaniſm, and; this not from motives of ſuperſtition, ſince he deſpiſed the dictates of that religion, and ſeldom faſted in Ramadan, or kept any other of its ordinances. So entirely was he a ſtranger to family affection, that he not only murdered his uncle and two of his brothers, but often expreſſed a wiſh to be the laſt of his race, and actually deſtined the crown for the khan of the Crim Tatars. The activity and energy of his mind had enabled him to ſuppreſs all ſedition, and to render himſelf completely abſolute; but this power he uſed only to the gratification of his own avarice, dying poſſeſſed of fifteen millions of gold, though the country was in a ſtate of poverty.

IBRAHIM. (A. D. 1640.)

Notwithſtanding a donation of the crown to the Tatar khan, made by Murat, in one of his fits of drunkenneſs, Ibrahim was unanimouſly raiſed by the paſhas to the throne. This prince, who was deformed and weak in body, had his natural imbecility augmented by the long confinement which he had undergone

dergone in a ſmall room, with only a ſingle window at the top. Coming thus unexpectedly to liberty and empire, he was intoxicated by the new pleaſures which they preſented, and giving up the adminiſtration of government to the former miniſters, he devoted himſelf entirely to the luxuries of the harem. The vizir, thirſting for military glory, projected an attack on the Ruſſian fortreſs of Aſac (or Azof) but this ended only in diſgrace. The following year, however, (1642) re-animated the Turks by the birth of an heir to the Ottoman throne. A peace was concluded with the German emperor, and a league with Perſia. The German peace was ſoon broken by the Turks, who made an unſucceſsful attempt to ſurpriſe the fortreſs of Rab (now called Giavanne.) The fears for the extinction of the Ottoman race were ſtill further removed in 1643, by the birth of two more ſons to Ibrahim, who daily devoted himſelf, with renewed avidity, to ſenſual exceſſes, exceeding whatever is related of Sardanapalus and Heliogabalus. The reſtleſs diſpoſition of the divan led them, in 1644, to plan an attack on the iſland of Candia, but being then at peace with the Venetians, they concealed their deſign under the ſemblance of amity, until their fleet was fitted out, and had ſailed toward that iſland.

The

The Turks then threw off the maſk, and, in June 1645, landed 74,000 men in Candia, where, in their firſt campaign, they took the ſtrong city of Cauca with their uſual violence and ſlaughter, and thus began in injuſtice a long and bloody conteſt, which laſted until the end of that century.

The ſultan, in the mean time, regardleſs of every thing but his pleaſures, continued to give a looſe to the moſt unbounded ſenſuality; and carrying his deſires beyond the bounds of the harem, went at length ſo far as to ſeize the daughter of the mufti. This outrage was the cauſe of his downfal. The great officers of ſtate and the ſoldiery embraced the cauſe of the venerable divine, and his eccleſiaſtical power was made the inſtrument of vengeance againſt the tyrant. A fetva was iſſued by the mufti, charging the ſultan to appear, and adminiſter juſtice to his people; and this being treated with contempt, was followed by another, declaring, "that he who obeyed not the law of God was no true muſelman; and though the perſon were the emperor himſelf, yet being become by his filthy actions an infidel, he was, *ipſo facto*, fallen from his throne." Upon the authority of this fetva, the janizaries quickly depoſed Ibrahim, and ſent him to his former priſon, where, after ſome days, he was ſtrangled, and his ſon Mahomet exalted

alted to the throne. The weight and efficacy which, in this tranſaction, appeared to be given to the fetva, was in fact owing to the previous concurrence of the great officers of ſtate, and to the general contempt into which the ſultan, by his ſenſuality and cowardice, had fallen.

MAHOMET IV. (A.D. 1650.)

This emperor being but ſeven years old at the depoſition of his father, it was determined that his minority ſhould continue ten years longer, during which time his mother, aſſiſted by the principal paſhas, undertook the government. The Venetian war was reſolutely purſued abroad; but at home great diſſenſions took place between the different factions. Murat, the predeceſſor of Ibrahim, a warlike prince himſelf, had promoted only brave and fiery ſpirits to command in the diſtant paſhaliks; but theſe, during the reign of his weak and timid ſucceſſor, had aſſumed ſo much power as to become almoſt independent. To this ſource of diviſion was added the mutual jealouſy of the ſpahies and janizaries, the former aſſerting themſelves as avengers of the death of ſultan Ibrahim, and claiming a precedency over the latter in affairs of government. The ſeraglio itſelf was farther divided by different

parties, ſupporting the oppoſite claims of the mother and grandmother of the young ſultan to his guardianſhip; and all theſe cauſes together concurred to render in a great meaſure uſeleſs the mighty preparations of the Turks to purſue the war in Candia. The minority of the ſultan was one continued ſcene of diſcord and revolt.

In 1651, the ſpahies of Aſia marched toward Conſtantinople, demanding the heads of the vizir and janizar aga; and this affair was compromiſed by the diſcharge of theſe officers from their employments.

In 1652, a rebellion broke out in Egypt and at Damaſcus, but was ſoon quelled; and the following year the paſha of Aleppo marched with a great body of inſurgents againſt Conſtantinople. This paſha, after cauſing great terror in the capital, ſettled the buſineſs by treaty, and though a rebel, was ſo highly eſteemed for his abilities, that on the death of the vizir, in 1655, he was elevated to that important poſt.

The ill ſucceſſes of the Turkiſh arms in the Venetian war ſo much irritated the inhabitants of Conſtantinople, that they came in a body to the gates of the ſeraglio, tumultuouſly demanding peace; nor was this rebellion ſubdued by the divan without great difficulty, and by the ſacrifice of the new vizir.

In

In the year 1656, whilſt new preparations were making for war, a ſedition, more terrible than any of the preceding, broke out at Conſtantinople. The ſpahies and janizaries uniting, with the pretence of reforming the abuſes of the ſtate, ran in arms to the divan, and depoſed the grand vizir and other officers. They entered the imperial palace, plundered the treaſury of two millions of gold, and even threatened to depoſe the ſultan. The city was for ſeveral days given up to all the horrors of pillage, until the rebellion beginning to abate, through a want of union and of ſettled views among the ringleaders, authority returned to its former channel; the celebrated Kiuperli, paſha of Damaſcus, was called, at the age of eighty, to the poſt of vizir, and the grand ſeignior himſelf, attended by his chief officers, rode through the city to put to death the rioters, and to reſtore public tranquillity.

1657. The grand ſeignior from this time took the government into his own hands, and employed himſelf in forwarding the military preparations; but finding the janizaries mutinous on account of the non-payment of their arrears, he attempted to quell them, by puniſhing the ringleaders with death. The diſcontents at Conſtantinople, however, were augmented by the ſucceſſes of the Ve-

netians, until the vizir, going himſelf at the head of a very great force, took the iſlands of Tenedos and Lemnos, which ſucceſs elevating the grand ſeignior, he went with great pomp to Adrianople, where he offered peace to the Venetian envoys on condition of their ſurrendering Candia and Cliſſia, in Dalmatia, and paying 3,000,000 crowns of gold; but this offer was too unreaſonable to be accepted.

1658. The grand ſeignior was for a while diverted from his intended invaſion of Dalmatia by the defection of the paſha of Aleppo, who having revolted, and marched toward Conſtantinople, which was at that time afflicted with the plague, proclaimed a youth that was with him ſultan, as ſon of ſultan Murat, and refuſed to liſten to any terms of accommodation.

1659. The power of the paſha increaſing rapidly, the vizir marched at the head of a large army to give him battle, but was defeated with great loſs, and the grand ſeignior himſelf being obliged to take the field, the paſha offered to treat with him, which the ſultan accepting, ſent one of his creatures, who, under pretence of negociating, aſſaſſinated the paſha. Some others, who afterwards attempted to proſecute the plans of the deceaſed paſha, were artfully diſunited

and

and reduced by the management of the vizir.

1660. The porte now turned their efforts againſt the Venetians; but they being aſſiſted by a ſupply of French forces, proſecuted the war with vigour.

1661. Meanwhile having, under pretence of the rebellion of Ragotſki in Tranſilvania, reduced the important fortreſs of Varadin, contrary to the general peace concluded between the emperor and the grand ſeignior, a cauſe of war aroſe between Turkey and the German empire. This did not immediately break out, though the paſha of Buda, entering Tranſilvania, raiſed a faction there in favour of Turkey, and overthrew the leader of the oppoſite party. The old vizir Kiuperli now adviſed the grand ſeignior to remove his court to Adrianople, where he himſelf ſoon died, but not till after he had procured the nomination of his ſon to ſucceed him, who was no ſooner elevated, than he began to remove his moſt potent enemies by death or baniſhment. During theſe commotions the Venetian war was but faintly carried on.

1662. The revolt of the paſha of Magnatia and of the Georgians occupied the porte for ſome time, and the vizir being alſo employed in eſtabliſhing his own influence more ſecurely, the views of hoſtility againſt the

German empire were not proſecuted with much ardour, until at the latter part of the year, the commotions being moſtly terminated, the vizir prepared for war, and the paſha of Buda laid waſte great part of Tranſilvania, though it was ſubject to the porte.

In 1663, after deceiving the Germans for ſome time with a ſhow of pacific intentions, the ſultan openly declared hoſtilities, by marching at the head of his forces from Conſtantinople; and though the Germans made fair offers of peace, they were haughtily rejected by Mahomet. The ſultan proceeded with the army as far as Adrianople, and then the vizir taking the command, marched toward the confines of Hungary. An inſtance of his cruelty on this expedition deſerves notice.

A choſen body of 8,000 Germans having attacked the Turks by night, and committed great ſlaughter, were at length repulſed, with the loſs of 400 killed and 1,800 priſoners. Theſe latter the ſanguinary vizir condemned to death, and remained himſelf a ſpectator of their murder on the ſcaffold, until the murmurs of his army obliged him to deſiſt, after having ſtruck off 1,400 heads.

The Turkiſh forces, continuing to advance, ſtruck ſuch terror into the emperor, that he retreated from Vienna with the records and other

other articles of importance; and by this timidity, no leſs than by the diſtracted ſtate of his councils, contributed much to exalt the arrogance of the Turks; but at length the valour of the German generals, and of their confederates the French, having turned the tide of war, and the vizir being beaten with great loſs, a peace was concluded, by which the Turks reduced their former inſolent propoſals to the ceſſion of the fortreſs of Nieu Hauſel.

This affair being fully ſettled, in 1665, the ſultan began to turn his thoughts to the poſſeſſion of the Iſle of Candia, and returned to Conſtantinople, to prepare for the proſecution of his deſign. Hoſtilities proceeded in the following year with great vigour on both ſides, and the vizir with a great force landed on the Iſle of Candia.

The year 1667 opened with an embaſſy from Poland, to complain that the Tatars, ſubject to the ſultan, had invaded that country, and carried off *an hundred thouſand* perſons into ſlavery; but of theſe complaints no notice was taken.

On the 11th of May, in this year, began the famous ſiege of Candia by an army of 70,000 Turks, provided with every neceſſary for the attack of ſuch a place, and furniſhed with cannon, ſome of which carried balls of

120 pounds weight. So certain were the Turks of ſpeedy ſucceſs, that great preparations were made at Conſtantinople for rejoicing and illuminations on the capture of Candia; but that place reſiſted the moſt furious and repeated attacks with heroic firmneſs, and the vizir was obliged to continue the whole of the winter in the trenches. A ſecond year paſſed in a repetition of the ſame furious attacks, and the ſame obſtinate reſiſtance. In two aſſaults, the Turks loſt 30,000 men; but by continual ſupplies of men and ammunition, they were ſtill enabled to preſs forward, and at length carried the outworks of the Chriſtians.

The ſultan finding, in the year 1669, that the great expence and exertion fruitleſsly made in this ſiege produced nothing but diſgrace, began to apprehend the elevation of his brothers to his throne, and therefore ſent orders to have them ſtrangled; but the people of Conſtantinople taking up arms in their favour, for the preſent prevented his deſigns from being put in execution. From theſe fears he was at length releaſed by the ſurrender of Candia by a capitulation, which formed the baſis of a treaty of peace with the Venetians. In this celebrated ſiege it was computed that 40,000 Chriſtians, and nearly 120,000 Turks, were deſtroyed.

In

In 1670, the vizir returned home in triumph, and joined the grand ſeignior in taking ſteps for the removal of his brothers. To this end it was judged neceſſary to diſpatch the moſt turbulent of the janizaries on an expedition againſt the Poliſh frontiers, and during their abſence prince Orkhan was privately ſtrangled.

The year 1672 was ſignalized by the Poliſh war. The ſultan, levying a great force, and being joined by numerous bands of Tatars, entered Poland, ſpeedily conquered the Ukraine, and obliged the Poles * to pay a yearly tribute of 22,000 ducats. The divan was, however, diſſatisfied with this peace, and obliged the ſultan to recommence the war, notwithſtanding the menaces of the czar of Ruſſia, who endeavoured to intereſt all the ſovereigns of Europe in the defence of Poland. Owing to domeſtic diſturbances, the Turkiſh army was very formidable. The Poles repelled this ſecond irruption more bravely than the former; but in the ſucceeding campaign, the Turks again gaining the advantage, ſwept away all the inhabitants of the countries they invaded, diſtributing

* The Turks and Tatars had killed or carried into ſlavery more than 300,000 Poliſh ſubjects.

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the captives of both ſexes as ſlaves among the ſoldiery *.

In 1676 died the vizir *Achmet Kiuperli*, to whom was chiefly to be attributed whatever ſucceſs had attended the reign of Mahomet, and whoſe merits were moſt admirably exemplified by being contraſted with the vices of his ſucceſſor *Kara Muſtapha*. This new vizir practiſed every ſpecies of rapine and fraud to enrich and ſtrengthen himſelf, and thinking war moſt favourable to his influence (that with Poland being ended) in 1680, he called together a moſt ſolemn council, in which he uſed every argument to prove, that a war would highly conduce to "the honour and advantage of the ſtate," this being the only ſtandard of political morality in Turkey. Though he was unſucceſsful at this council, he prevailed better with the grand ſeignior the following year; perſuading him that the ſituation of circumſtances enabled him to fall on the emperor of Germany with advantage, and that the French court would favour his views. This may be called the criſis of the Othman power, when having attained the acme of its fame and

* The fine country of the Ukraine was rendered a deſert. The Turks took Human, and of above 100,000 men, who were in it, very few eſcaped.

ſplendor, its own inordinate ambition, and the prevalence of evil councils, puſhed it onward to its decline.

The porte and the emperor were united by a league or truce of twenty years, three years of which remained yet unexpired, and the infraction of this treaty was the firſt ſtep toward that ſtate of degradation, in which the preſent age beholds this once mighty empire.

As the preſent hiſtorical ſketch is intended principally to exhibit the means of violence and blood, by which the Turkiſh ſceptre has been ſuſtained; and as we have now reached the point of its wideſt extenſion, the remaining part of its hiſtory will require but ſlight notice; it will be ſufficient to point out thoſe leading events in the reign of the ſucceeding ſovereigns, which moſt immediately affected the political ſtate of the empire.

The imperial war was long and bloody; the Turks, at firſt ſucceſsful, penetrated to Vienna, and laid ſiege to that capital, but were forced to raiſe it by Sobieſki. The tide of their fortune now turning, Mahomet was depoſed by the janizaries, and the war was continued, though with no better ſucceſs, by the two following ſultans, Achmet II. and Muſtapha II. The latter, indeed, attempted to reanimate the military ſpirit of his

his ſubjects by taking the field in perſon, but being defeated by the famous Prince Eugene, concluded the peace of Carlowitz in 1699, by which Tranſilvania was ceded to the emperor.

Theſe circumſtances conſpiring with others to render Muſtapha unpopular, he was depoſed, and ſucceeded by his brother Achmet III. who forced the Ruſſians to cede, at the peace of Pruth, many important fortreſſes. The inordinate ambition of this prince next led him to attack the Venetians and other Chriſtian powers; but his ſucceſs herein was widely different, being reduced, by repeated defeats, to conclude, at Paſſarowitz, in 1718, a peace highly diſgraceful to the Turkiſh empire.

His war with Kouli Khan, the Perſian uſurper, proved no leſs unſucceſsful; and the event of all theſe diſgraces was, at length, a revolt, in which he was depoſed, and ſucceeded by Mahomet V.

The year 1730, which produced the rebellion of the janizaries, the depoſition of *Achmet*, and the elevation of his nephew *Mahomet*, in its conſequences was alſo productive of a conſiderable alteration in the mode of carrying on the government.

From the time of Mahomet II. it had been uſual to delegate the whole adminiſtration

tion to the vizir, but as this and the preceding rebellion had originated in the overgrown power and ambition of theſe officers, Mahomet, by the advice of his *kiſlar-aga*, an experienced man, took the power into his own hands and determined to change his vizirs frequently.

Mahomet, however, afterwards confided much in the ſucceſſor of this kiſlar-aga, a man of the utmoſt rapacity and inſolence, who, extending his attacks both againſt the janizaries and the ulema, thoſe bodies conſpired his overthrow, and began to ſhow their intentions, by ſetting fire to Conſtantinople. The frequent repetition of theſe fires at length arouſing the ſultan, he conſulted with the mufti, and by his advice ſacrificed the kiſlar-aga and all his dependents, and ſeized on their ill gotten treaſures, including a vaſt quantity of precious ſtones, and above 30,500 purſes (£. 1,900,000) which was paid to the haſné.

The death of the *kiſlar aga* gave another change to the interior government. His ſucceſſor entered into a cloſe connection with the vizir, which laſted till 1754, when, on the death of *Mahomet*, his brother *Oſman* came from confinement to the throne; and the *kiſlar aga* and his ſecretary, the *janigi efſendi*,

fendi, gained the confidence of the new ſovereign, and aſſumed their former power.

On the death of Oſman, in 1757, Muſtapha, the ſon of Achmet (before-mentioned) ſucceeded, and he having an intimate connection with the vizir *Ragib Mehemet*, followed his counſel, and deprived the *kiſlar aga* of his place and influence, and attached to the vizirat great part of the emoluments formerly given to the kiſlar aga; ſuch as the management of the revenues of the harem, ariſing from large diſtricts in Aſia and Europe, and the appointment of all the officers. Since that time vizirs have been removed leſs frequently *.

From this digreſſion to the ſubject of adminiſtrative government we return to notice the military affairs of the empire. Mahomet V. ſucceeding to the conteſt againſt Kouli Khan, carried it on with no better ſucceſs than his predeceſſor, and was forced to an inglorious peace. Being afterwards en-

* The depoſition of a vizir or effendi does not much affect the progreſs of public buſineſs; for the different departments are very minutely ſubdivided, and the ſubordinate officers continue in moſt of them unaffected by a change of the ſuperior. Theſe ſubordinate officers of the ſeraglio amount to ſome hundreds, and as they always pretend to follow precedent, they can expedite or procraſtinate buſineſs at will, by means of this ſubdiviſion.

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gaged in a war with the Germans and Ruſſians, the latter advanced ſo rapidly againſt him as to threaten his capital itſelf, and thus forced him to conclude a haſty peace.

Oſman III. dying in 1757, was ſucceeded by Muſtapha III. who, in the beginning of 1769, determining to attack the Ruſſians, ordered the Tatars, under Krim Guerai, to invade their territory. The ravages committed by theſe barbarian hordes I have elſewhere deſcribed; they were ſuch as the late empreſs, who then ſate on the throne, could not but view with indignation, and avenge with power.

A bloody war commenced with the exploits of Prince Gallitzin, who attacking the Turks at Choczim, in their intrenchments, gained a complete victory, on the 30th of April 1769. The ſame general gained another important victory, near the ſame place, on the 13th of July following; but was prevented from carrying the fortreſs of Choczim itſelf by the prudent and cautious meaſures of the vizir. The undiſciplined and turbulent ſtate of the Turkiſh forces, however, agreeing ill with ſuch prudence, this great officer was ſacrificed to the clamours of the janizaries, and ſucceeded by a man no ways his equal in military ſkill.

The new vizir attempting to croſs the Nieſter

Nieſter in the face of the enemy, on the 9th of September, was defeated by Prince Gallitzin, with the loſs of 7,000 men killed on the ſpot. A ſimilar attempt, renewed on the 17th of the ſame month, met with ſimilar fortune; the Turks were defeated, and obliged to abandon Choczim; and it was ſuppoſed that theſe two defeats coſt them 28,000 killed, wounded, and priſoners, beſides nearly 50,000, who deſerted the army in its tumultuous retreat.

Prince Gallitzin retiring with honour, reſigned the command to General Romanzoff, who, having ſpeedily over-run Moldavia and Walachia, and received the oaths of allegiance, readily offered by its inhabitants, gained two ſplendid victories over the Turkiſh forces, on the 18th of July and the 2d of Auguſt, 1770.

The enterpriſing ſpirit of the empreſs led her to adopt the more ſtriking and novel meaſure of ſending a fleet into the Mediterranean, and thus attacking the Turkiſh empire on both ſides; and this meaſure was crowned with ſucceſs. The inhabitants of the Morea flew to arms on the approach of the Ruſſians. But the moſt brilliant action of this naval campaign was the victory of Tcheſmé, an harbour on the coaſt of Natolia, into which the Turkiſh fleet being driven, were all deſtroyed

ſtroyed by fireſhips. Theſe, and other ſucceſſes of the Ruſſians, forced the Turks to conclude a diſhonourable peace on the 21ſt of July, 1774, ſhortly after the death of Muſtapha, and the acceſſion of his brother Abdulhamid.

We have thus brought down our view of the Turkiſh hiſtory to our own times: the peace of 1774 was the firſt great ſtep toward the limitation of an empire, which, as we have ſeen, was originally founded on rapine and injuſtice. This blow was effectually followed up by the ſucceeding war, which was terminated ſo favourably to Ruſſia, in 1790; and it is ſcarcely to be doubted, that another war, conducted on ſimilar principles, muſt totally extinguiſh the Turkiſh power in Europe; an event deſirable to moſt Chriſtian nations, and particularly to Great Britain.

I have ceaſed enumerating all the maſſacres and breaches of faith the Turks have committed for this laſt century and a half. Their conduct has been uniform. Cyprus and Candia would furniſh a volume.

CHAPTER VI.

Of Arts and Sciences, Commerce, and General Manners.

HAVING traced the outline of thoſe grand leading cauſes of national importance or decline, which ariſe from religious and political inſtitutions, and from the events of paſt ages, it may not be amiſs to turn our view to the more domeſtic circumſtances or prejudices of a people, their knowledge or prejudices relative to commerce and the arts, and their habits of mutual intercourſe and aſſociation.

From what has already been ſaid of the cauſes affecting the Turkiſh character, it muſt be evident that it affords but a ſterile ſoil for the culture of the arts. All their habits tend to an indolence little favourable to the emanations of genius; hence reſults a want of curioſity for the objects of ſcience in general; and to theſe muſt be added the reſtraints of their religion and government.

A religion abounding in the groſſeſt ignorance and ſuperſtition, and which, at the ſame time, teaches its followers that they alone

alone are the favoured of God; that as their faith is the pureſt, ſo are they, themſelves, the wiſeſt of mankind, precludes them from copying their more enlightened neighbours, and even leads them to conclude that the purſuits of infidels muſt be at leaſt frivolous, if not immoral.

The ſuperſtitions of this religion have not, like the ſplendid mythology of ancient Greece, or the religious pomp of modern Rome, any medium of communication with the arts, ſuch as would be ſupplied by the decoration of temples, or the pageantry of public games and proceſſions: Mahomed ſtrenuouſly and ſucceſsfully combated the idolatry of his countrymen, and through fear of their relapſe, ſtrictly forbade any appeal to the ſenſes by ſtatuary or painting. However, the Perſians, and ſome of the Arab kalifs, only conſidered this prohibition as relating to the repreſentation of figures as the object of worſhip.

It is true, that this religion has not univerſally acted with ſo much force to the extinction of intellect. Under the ſplendid reign of Abdurrahman, the founder of the Arabian monarchy in Spain, it aſſumed a more civilized form. That political ſovereign promoted intermarriages between his Mahomedan and Chriſtian ſubjects, and favoured the

natural propenſity of the Arabs to literature and ſcience, at a time when the reſt of mankind were ſunk in ignorance and barbariſm; but in all theſe proceedings he departed widely from the ſpirit of intolerance and bigotry, which the Turks have uniformly attached to their religion, and he is to be viewed more in the light of a liberal politician than of a religious enthuſiaſt. The lively manners and ardent minds of the Arabs tempered the influence of a religion fundamentally barbarous and gloomy; but the Turks have not only given to ſuperſtition its full ſway, but have even augmented its influence by circumſtances of additional barbariſm.

The ſuſpicions of deſpotiſm muſt ever tend to degrade and brutalize its unhappy ſubjects. Few are the inducements which the torpid Turk has to apply himſelf to ſcience, and thoſe few are annihilated by the fear of exciting diſtruſt in the government. Travelling, that great ſource of expanſion and improvement to the mind, is entirely checked by the arrogant ſpirit of his religion; and intercourſe with foreigners among them, further than thoſe immediately in their ſervice, by the jealouſy with which ſuch intercourſe is viewed in a perſon not inveſted with an official character.

General

General knowledge is, from theſe cauſes, little if at all cultivated; every man is ſuppoſed to know his own buſineſs or profeſſion, with which it is eſteemed fooliſh and improper for any other perſon to interfere. The man of general ſcience, a character ſo frequent and ſo uſeful in Chriſtian Europe, is unknown; and any one, but a mere artificer, who ſhould concern himſelf with the founding of cannon, the building of ſhips, or the like, would be eſteemed little better than a madman. The natural conſequence of theſe narrow views is, that the profeſſors of any art or ſcience are themſelves profoundly ignorant, and that the greateſt abſurdities are mixed with all their ſpeculations.

I ſhall elucidate this by detailing the opinions received, not only by the populace, but even by the pretended *literati*, in various branches of knowledge.

ASTRONOMY.—From the mufti to the peaſant it is generally believed that there are ſeven heavens, from which the earth is immoveably ſuſpended by a large chain; that the ſun is an immenſe ball of fire, at leaſt as big as a whole Ottoman province, formed for the ſole purpoſe of giving light and heat to the earth; that eclipſes of the moon are occaſioned by a great dragon attempting to devour that luminary; that the fixed ſtars

hang by chains from the higheſt heaven, &c. &c. Theſe abſurdities are in part ſupported by the teſtimony of the Koran; and the aſtronomers, as they are called, themſelves all pretend to aſtrology, a profeſſion ſo much eſteemed, that an aſtrologer is kept in the pay of the court, as well as of moſt great men.

GEOGRAPHY.—Of the relative ſituation of countries they are ridiculouſly ignorant, and all their accounts of foreign nations are mixed with ſuperſtitious fables. They diſtinguiſh different Chriſtian ſtates by different appellations of contempt.

EPITHETS which the Turks apply to thoſe who are not Oſmanlis, and which they often uſe to denominate their nation.

Albanians	gut-ſellers	*(giguirgee)*
Armenians	t-rd-eaters, dirt-eaters	*(bokchee)*
Boſniaks and *Bulgarians*	vagabonds	*(potur)*
Chriſtians	idolaters	*(purpureſt)*
Dutch	cheeſe-mongers	*(penirgee)*
Engliſh	atheiſts	*(dinſis)* i. e. having no religion.
Flemmings	panders	*(ſelamink, pezevink)*
French	faithleſs	*(franſis, imanſis)*
Georgians	louſe-eaters	*(bityeyedſi)*
Germans	infidel blaſphemers	*(gurur kiafer)*
Greeks of the iſlands	hares	*(tawſhan)*
Italians or *Franks*	many-coloured	*(firenki, baſſarrenki)*

Jews

Jews - -	mangy dogs - -	(*chefut*)
Moldavians - -	drones - -	(*bogdan, nadan*)
Poles - -	insolent infidels -	(*fudul guiaur*)
Russians - -	mad infidels -	(*russ, menkins*)
Spaniards - -	lazy - - -	(*tembel*)
Tatars - -	carrion-eaters - -	(*lashyeyedgee*)
Walachians -	gypsies - - -	(*chingani*)

Before the Russian fleet came into the Mediterranean, the ministers of the porte would not believe it possible for them to approach Constantinople but from the Black Sea. The captain pasha (great admiral) affirmed, that their fleet might come by the way of Venice. From this, and a thousand similar and authentic anecdotes, their ignorance of the situation of countries is evident; and as to the stories which they universally believe, they are such as the following: that India is a country far distant, where there are diamonds, fine muslins, and other stuffs, and great riches; but that the people are little known; that they are Mahomedans mostly, but do not acknowledge the kalifat of their sultan; that the Persians are a very wicked people, and will be all damned, and changed into asses in hell, and that the Jews will ride on them; that the European nations are all wicked infidels, knowing an art of war, which is sometimes dangerous, but will all be conquered in time, and reduced to

the obedience of the ſultan, that their women and children ought to be carried into captivity, that no faith is to be kept with them, and that they ought all to be maſſacred, which is highly meritorious, if they refuſe to become Mahomedans; yet they have among them a prophecy, that the *ſons of yellowneſs*, which they interpret to be the Ruſſians, are to take Conſtantinople; that the Engliſh are powerful by ſea, and the French and Germans by land; that the Ruſſians are the moſt powerful, and they call them the *great infidels*; but they are acquainted with no details of theſe countries.

ANCIENT HISTORY.—They have heard of an Alexander, who was the greateſt monarch and conqueror, and the greateſt hero in the world. The ſultans often compare themſelves to him in their writings. Sultan Mahomed IV. in his letter to the Ruſſian czar, Alexis Michaelovitz, calls himſelf "*maſter of all the univerſe, and equal in power "to Alexander the Great.*" They talk of him always as the model of heroiſm to be imitated, but they know not who he was. Solomon, they ſay, was the wiſeſt man, and the greateſt magician, that ever exiſted. Palmyra and Balbek, they ſay, were built by ſpirits at the command of Solomon.

POETRY

POETRY and GENERAL LITERATURE.—They have a few poets, as they are called, whoſe compoſitions are moſtly little ſongs and ballads; but in theſe, as well as their proſe writings, they differ widely from the ſimplicity of the Arabs, as they abound with falſe conceits; and the language is a barbarous mixture of the Turkiſh with Perſian and Arabic, not unlike that "*Babyloniſh* "*dialect*" of our puritans, which Butler compares to "*fuſtian cut on ſatin.*"

Of the general taſte of the Turks, Tott has given a juſt deſcription, when he ſays, "*a double meaning, or a literal tranſpoſition,* "*forms the extent of their ſtudies and literature,* "*and every thing that can be invented by falſe* "*taſte, to fatigue the mind, conſtitutes their de-* "*light, and excites their admiration.*"

This leads me to a conſideration of the Turkiſh language, a point on which I ſhall make ſome obſervations rather more at length, as it has not been hitherto treated with any degree of accuracy. The origin of the Turkiſh language was the *Zagutai*, a dialect of that Tatarian tongue, which has been ſpread ſo widely by the hoſtile incurſions of different barbarians.

The conjectures of Tott on this ſubject are juſtly corrected by Peyſſonel, whoſe obſervations on the different origin of theſe languages are deſerving attention. Among the

the barbarous hordes that have at different periods overflowed Europe and Aſia from the north and weſt, he diſtinguiſhes three great and diſtinct nations, differing in origin and in language, the Celts or Teutons, the Fens or Slavonians, and the Huns or Tatars. It may be doubted, whether in the firſt claſs he does not confound two very different tribes, as the remains of the Celtic and Teutonic languages ſtill exiſting in Europe certainly bear a marked difference. Theſe, however, he thinks (with juſtice) were the firſt of the barbarian invaders, including the Vandals, Goths, Oſtrogoths, Viſigoths, &c. who all iſſued from the countries between the Northern Ocean and the Baltic Sea. The ſecond in order of time were the Fens, Venni, or Slavonians, who inhabited the borders of the Danube and the Euxine, and from whoſe language the Slavonian, Ruſſian, and Poliſh of the preſent day are derived. The lateſt of all were the Huns or Tatars, who, proceeding from what has been called the Platform of Tatary, have ſpread from the ſea of Japan to the frontiers of Poland, and have at different periods ſeized upon the Chineſe, Indian, Perſian, and Turkiſh empires.

The Zagatai language, as muſt neceſſarily be the caſe with a tongue ſpoken by ſuch barbarians,

barbarians, was poor and confined, and its deficiencies have been ſupplied by the adoption of terms from the Arabic and Perſian.

The Turkiſh language is the eaſieſt of any one we are acquainted with, becauſe it is the moſt regular. It has only one conjugation of the verbs (excepting a difference of *ek* and *ak* in the infinitive, which the ear ſoon learns to diſtinguiſh) and but one declenſion of the nouns. There is no exception, nor any irregular verb or noun, in the language. The caſes and perſons are determined by the termination, as in Latin, but the phraſeology is much more eaſy, and the tranſpoſition is not carried to ſo difficult a length. They have compound words, as in Greek, though they are more limited in their uſe. It is true, the Turkiſh language is not very copious, yet it is manly, energetic, and ſonorous. To ſupply the want of words, or more frequently, from a deſire of appearing learned, their writers introduced Arabic and Perſian, and theſe languages are now conſiderably mixed with the dialects ſpoken at the ſeraglio (or court,) and at the bar (or makami). The Arabic is moſtly intermixed in topics of ethics, religion, or law; and the Perſian, in ſubjects of gallantry, poetry, and at the ſeraglio. Had they only naturalized foreign words, and adapted them to the gram-

mar

mar of their own language, as we do in Engliſh, they would have enriched it, without making it more difficult, and have preſerved its character; but theſe words and phraſes preſerve the grammar of the language they belong to, which creates a real difficulty, and renders it neceſſary, in order to read a *firman*, or a piece of poetry, to know ſomething of the Arabic and Perſian grammars. This will beſt be demonſtrated by an example: Suppoſing the Latin to be Arabic, and the Perſian French, a Turk would write, if Engliſh were his language, in the following manner;

Language of a Mufti or Doctor.

I do not love *deplorare vitam*, as many, and *ii docti, ſæpe fecerunt*; nor do I repent that I have lived at all, becauſe I have *ainſi vecu*, as not *fruſtra me natum exiſtimem:* I do not aſſert that *tædium vitæ* proceeds more from want of ſteadineſs in our true religion, than from *atra bilis*. If a man deſtroys himſelf, he is either *inſanus*, and a holy fool, or one poſſeſſed *demonis*, or he is *un athée*—an infidel, or a Frank. Pray *deum* that he may preſerve you againſt thoſe who blow on *nodos funum*, and whiſper in the ear.

Language

Language of a Turkiſh Poet.

The eyes of *l' abbreuveuſe* * ineb ia'e me more than *le vin*, and *ſes fleches* penet a e *la moële de mes os* quicker than thoſe from the bow.

This is the firſt couplet of a ſong in pure Arabic, (compoſed by an Arabian,) which I have thus written, to ſhew how a Turk would expreſs the ſame ſentiment with reſpect to the language; the genuine Turkiſh compoſitions are ridiculouſly hyperbolical.

It muſt be obſerved, that very few of thoſe, who lard their writings or diſcourſes with Arabic or Perſian phraſes, are much acquainted with thoſe languages; but they have learnt the phraſes and terminations moſt in uſe, and know the meaning of a ſentence, without underſtanding each word ſeparately, or having much idea of the grammar.

It is aſtoniſhing that they have not perfected their alphabet. They write generally without points, and it is then impoſſible to read their writing without knowing the language well. When they read foreign words or names, two people ſeldom read them alike. If the perfection of a written character be to repreſent words in a clear

* She who pours out the wine.

and

and unambiguous manner to the eye, they certainly are farther from it than any other nation, and they have remained in this ſtate of imperfection, without making the leaſt attempt to improvement, ſo long, that no effort is now to be expected from them. Many of the letters have each three different forms, when they begin, are in the middle, or end a word. The Arabic printed in Chriſtian countries, and on Mount Libanus by the Maronites, is more diſtinct and eaſier read than the written, though this is more elegant in its appearance, which is but a ſecondary quality. It requires great practice to be able to read the Arabic character quick.

Upon theſe different circumſtances relating to the Turkiſh language are grounded the different opinions of the Baron de Tott and M. de Peyſſonel, the former of whom juſtly ranks, among the obſtructions to ſcience in Turkey, the difficulty of writing and reading the language. To this Peyſſonel oppoſes the facility with which the Baron himſelf acquired a knowledge of the Turkiſh language, without obſerving that this knowledge only extended to *ſpeaking* it, a taſk which was comparatively eaſy. Mr. de Tott never acquired ſkill enough to read it readily. Peyſſonel alſo adduces, as an additional argument, the ability of ſeveral European

pean interpreters, whoſe names he mentions; but this eulogium was only applicable to the celebrated M. Muragia, and not even to him in its full extent; nor does this prove any thing in favour of the Turks themſelves, ſince the advantage which they poſſeſs as natives is more than counterbalanced by their habits of apathy and indolence. Peyſſonel is equally incorrect in comparing the different characters of the Turks to the different hands, the italic, running hand, engroſſing, &c. uſed in other parts of Europe.

In thoſe countries, the different hands have all ſuch a degree of ſimilarity, that few are at a loſs to write, and none to read them at all, and a perſon who had only ſeen one hand, in a few hours might learn the others; but in Turkey, ſcarcely any perſon is verſed in the different characters, except the *profeſſed writers*, and even among them theſe characters are employed each for its diſtinct and peculiar purpoſe: the *neſhki* is uſed in works of ſcience; the *tealik*, for poetry; the *divani*, for ſtate papers, commiſſions, and epiſtolary correſpondence; and the *ſalus*, for inſcriptions, deviſes, &c. If the difficulty preſented by theſe various characters ſeems at firſt view light, it muſt be remembered, that a ſlight obſtacle, thrown in the way of an indolent

Turk, becomes inſuperable from his general diſregard of ſcience.

The art of *printing*, though often attempted, has never been introduced among the Turks, and this not owing to the difficulty of forming Arabic types, as has been by ſome alledged, for the Chriſtians of Mount Lebanon, as well as we, print books with Arabic characters: if they require the beauty of the written character, they might engrave on copper; but the true cauſe of this neglect, is the Turkiſh indolence and contempt for all innovations.

Is it not matter of aſtoniſhment, that ſince the firſt eſtabliſhment of their manufactory of carpets, they have not improved the deſigns, and particularly as they are not forbidden to imitate flowers? The ſame may be ſaid of their embroidery, and of the ſtuffs made at Pruſa, Aleppo, and Damaſcus. Their carpets owe their excellency only to the materials they are made of.

In all the Turkiſh arts, the traces of ſuperſtition are obſervable. Their *architecture* does not imitate that of ancient Greece, nor have they corrected one fault, or conceived any idea of proportion, from the perfect models they have daily before their eyes. In ſhort, they have never ſtudied architecture; and as to the practice of Europeans, it would

be derogatory to the Muſelman dignity to copy infidels. They have taken their notions of general forms from the Arabs, and have added nothing of their own. The church of St. Sophia, after it became a moſque, however, is the model by which moſt of the other moſques in Conſtantinople have been built; and this perhaps was owing to the architects being Greeks or Armenians. Though many of them have ſome notion of the rules of their own art, they are not permitted to purſue them beyond what the Turks conceive to be the *mahomedan* form; they look indeed with a kind of reverence on the noble ruins of Greece, believing them to have been built by devils or genii; they are alſo jealous of Europeans, who wiſh to obtain poſſeſſion of any parts of thoſe remains; but the only uſe they themſelves make of them, is to pull in pieces the marble edifices to burn them into lime. The plaſter of their walls, made of this lime, is very fine and beautiful; but who does not lament, that to produce it, perhaps the divine works of Phideas and Praxiteles have been conſigned to the furnace. This marble lime, mixed with pounded marble unburnt, forms a plaſter ſuperior in whiteneſs to the Indian chinam, but unequal to it in poliſh and hardneſs. Among the moſques and public buildings at

Conſtantinople are to be found many fine edifices; but they are copied from the Arabian buildings in Aſia, where there are much grander ſtructures than at Conſtantinople, though of as late a date *.

* On the origin of the moreſque and gothic architecture many learned diſſertations have been written. It is not to my preſent purpoſe to make extracts from them, for I ſhould have nothing new to ſay on the ſubject. With reſpect to the general form of the moſques, baths, caravanſaries, bazars, and kioſks, in the different parts of the empire, the maſs is, notwithſtanding many ſtriking defects, grand and impoſing; the particular parts are devoid of all proportion; their columns have nothing of their true character, being often twenty and thirty diameters high, and the intercolumniation frequently equal to the height of the column. The capitals and entablatures are the moſt whimſical and ridiculous.

St. Sophia, at Conſtantinople, there is little doubt, was the model which the European architects copied, when they introduced the cupola upon four arches, than which nothing can be more prepoſterous. Thoſe who chuſe to ſee the falſe principles of theſe buildings expoſed, and how far they differ from the grandeur and ſimplicity of the ancients, may read *Friſe's Saggio ſull' Architettura Gottica, Livorno*, and in an excellent little German treatiſe annexed to the tranſlation of it, the peculiar excellencies of the gothic pointed out, excluſively of its defects.

It is worthy, however, of obſervation, that the interior of St. Sophia appears much larger, and that St. Peter's, at Rome, appears infinitely ſmaller than it really is. The cupola of this latter church is of the ſame ſize as the Pantheon; the members of the entablature, which runs round the lower part of the cupola or lanthorn, are marked on the pavement below by different coloured marbles; but no one can, without actual meaſurement, be perſuaded of this truth.

The

The noble productions of *ſtatuary* and *painting* are ſtill more fully ſuppreſſed. Theſe arts are anathematized as irreligious; becauſe a blind and ſtupid fanaticiſm has declared that it is impious to emulate the works of God. Hence the incitements to virtue and animation, which we experience in viewing the ſtatues or portraits of the benefactors of mankind, are wholly loſt; hence too, the Turk can never be arouſed by thoſe flaſhes of genius, thoſe glowing energies of mind, which the hiſtoric pencil, in deſcribing ſome important ſcene, arreſts and renders immortal. So far is this bigotry carried, that neither the effigy of the ſovereign, nor the repreſentation of any imaginary being (as in the ancient medals) is permitted to be imprinted on their money.

The only uſe of theſe arts which is allowed, is the imitation of inanimate nature, in carving or painting the interior of a room. Even here they frequently uſe as ornaments paſſages from the Koran; but they generally paint the walls with flowers or landſcapes. Their ingenuity is, however, merely mechanical; and of ſcientific rules they are perfectly ignorant: perſpective is totally unknown to the painters themſelves.

The ſcience of the Turks in making aqueducts, has been vaunted by ſome authors; but

leſt it ſhould thence be concluded that they have a knowledge of hydraulics, I will here ſtate in what this ſcience conſiſts. When water is to be conducted, they begin by laying pipes of burnt clay underground, to the diſtance of about a quarter of a mile, more or leſs; they then erect a ſquare pillar, and continue the pipe up till they find how high the water will riſe; then they carry the pipe down the other ſide, (leaving the top open) and continue it underground to the next pillar; and ſo on till they have brought the water to the place intended to be ſupplied with it. It ſometimes happens that all their labour has been in vain; and they find by experience that the place to be ſupplied is higher than the place whence they wanted to bring the water.

The principles of levelling are unknown to them. It would be in vain to tell them that the ſurface of water is not perfectly flat; that there is ſuch a thing as refraction; and that a levelling inſtrument alone will not tell them the height to which water will riſe. The moſt learned man among the ulema does not know, that as the whole ſine is to the angle of refraction, ſo is the diſtance of the object to its apparent elevation by refraction. They have no means of calculating the lateral preſſure of arches or of cupolas; though they

they generally err on the right ſide, yet accidents ſometimes have happened. I once ſucceeded in making a Turkiſh mathematician underſtand the principle of a catenarian arch, by ſuſpending a chain; but when he endeavoured to explain it to an architect, who was erecting a conſiderable building for the late captain paſha, Gazi-Haſſan, he received for anſwer, that the figure deſcribed by a chain hung up by the two ends might be applicable to the conſtruction of the bottom of a ſhip, but not to that of an arch of maſonry.

It is a certain fact, that a few years ago a learned man of the law having loſt an eye, and being informed that there was then at Conſtantinople a European who made falſe eyes, not to be diſtinguiſhed from the natural, he immediately procured one; but when it was placed in the ſocket, he flew into a violent paſſion with the eye-maker, abuſing him as an impoſtor, becauſe he could not ſee with it. The man, fearing he ſhould loſe his pay, aſſured him that in time he would ſee as well with that eye as with the other. The effendi was appeaſed, and the artiſt liberally rewarded, who having ſoon diſpoſed of the remainder of his eyes, left the Turks in expectation of ſeeing with them.

The uſe of wheel carriages is almoſt un-

known in Turkey. There is a kind of cart, uſed at Conſtantinople, and in ſome few other parts, moſtly for women to travel in. In moſt parts of the Aſiatic provinces they have no idea of a wheel. All their merchandize is carried by horſes, mules, or camels, in every part of the empire.

The ſultan has a coach or carriage, exactly of the ſhape of a hearſe in England, but without any ſprings; it was, when I ſaw it, drawn by ſix mules. The pole was of an enormous thickneſs, as well as every other part. I enquired the reaſon; the anſwer was, that if the pole, the axletree, &c. broke, the man who made it would loſe his head. The ſultan never uſes a carriage as any kind of ſtate; it is only in excurſions into the country that it follows him.

The people in Moldavia and Walachia, on the contrary, conſtruct waggons for carrying merchandize on very juſt principles of mechanics. Caſks too are not in uſe, except among the Greeks.

It may be inferred from Peyſſonel, that the ſcience of medicine has made conſiderable advances, and commands a high degree of reſpect in Turkey, when we find that the dignity of firſt phyſician to the grand ſeignior is marked by the title of *hakim bachi effendi*; that he wears the large round turban called

called *eurf*, the ſame as that borne by men of the higheſt rank in the law; and that the Mahometan who attains this dignity muſt have paſſed through the *médréſſés*, and have reached the order of the *muderris*; but the fact is, that the ſtate phyſician is a mere nominal dignity, enjoyed by men of no ſkill in this ſcience, whilſt the man to whom the care of the ſultan's health is intruſted is always a Greek, a Jew, or an European, and it is merely for form ſake that the conſent and preſence of the *hakim bachi* muſt be obtained for the adminiſtration of remedies, of whoſe medical properties he is in general profoundly ignorant. When the Turks take a purgative medicine, they never commend it except it be moſt violently cathartic. They have no notion of the ſalutary effects of a gentle laxative.

Navigation, and the uſe of the magnet, none have the leaſt idea of but the people of the navy, and they know ſo little, that their compaſſes are made to point to the true north with the variation allowed, and by the ſame compaſſes they ſteer their ſhips in all ſeas. Very few in the navy can take a meridian obſervation.

The only people who have the ſmalleſt idea of navigation, are the Algerines in their ſervice; and even theirs is chiefly practical

knowledge. They rely on the Greeks to navigate their ſhips of war. Their merchant ſhips take care not to loſe ſight of land; and this is the principal reaſon why ſo many of them are loſt in the Black Sea.

The want of field-pieces among the Turks, which induced Baron de Tott to undertake a new foundry, is a complete proof of the inactivity of this people. It is true that they had foundries of large braſs cannon; but they had not even attempted to caſt thoſe of a ſmaller kind, or of a different metal, although their furnaces are of *uſine*, which is particularly adapted to the caſting of iron. To the preſent day they are ignorant of the art of caſting iron, even for bomb ſhells; and this is the reaſon why all the Turkiſh cannon, both for land and ſea ſervice, are of braſs.

Though they have many fine large cannons at preſent, they are defective in the make of the carriages, particularly for field-pieces; and whilſt other nations are making daily improvements in this reſpect (by the conſtruction of flying artillery, &c.) the Turks, from their ignorance of mechanics, employ artillery the moſt awkward and inefficacious.

The defective ſtate of general ſcience in Turkey is owing to that want of union amongſt its branches, and to that deficiency of

of combination, both in theory and practice, whoſe cauſes I have already traced out; but in every country individual exertion will do much, and inſulated facts will be everywhere diſcoverable, like the caſual flowers of the deſert, which ſhow what the human mind is capable of attaining, even in deſpite of accumulated obſtacles. The great advantage which a highly civilized country poſſeſſes, is in the quick and ready combination of theſe facts, and in forming out of them general principles, which abridge the labour and facilitate the progreſs of the artiſt and the philoſopher. It frequently happens, however, that the moſt barbarous people poſſeſs, in particular branches of art, an accuracy of principle, or a dexterity of operation, even ſuperior to their more poliſhed neighbours; and hence it will be found of uſe to collect detached information of this kind from every part of the globe. In the intercourſe of mind, ſomething is to be gleaned from a ſoil the moſt unpromiſing; I ſhall, therefore, make no further apology for the introduction of ſome unconnected remarks on detached inſtances of ſkill among the Turks in various arts and ſciences.

It might reaſonably be expected that a nation of warriors ſhould have expert ſurgeons at leaſt, and that they ſhould have paid attention to the improvements and diſcoveries made

made by other nations. Nothing of this, however, is the caſe. They perform no operations, nor will they conſent to an European's making an amputation, though the loſs of life be a certain conſequence of omitting it. Their art is ſimply confined to healing, and at moſt extracting a ball and a ſplinter of a bone. It muſt be confeſſed that, as their habit of body is generally healthy, nature performs often wonderful cures. They rely much on balſams, mummy, &c. There is in Conſtantinople a Perſian extraordinarily expert in the art of healing. The Arabs bury a perſon, who has received a wound in his body, up to the neck in hot ſand for twenty-four hours.

I ſaw in the eaſtern parts of the empire a method of ſetting bones practiſed, which appears to me worthy of the attention of ſurgeons in Europe. It is by incloſing the broken limb, after the bones are put in their places, in a caſe of plaſter of Paris (or gypſum) which takes exactly the form of the limb, without any preſſure, and in a few minutes the maſs is ſolid and ſtrong. If it be a compound fracture, the place where the wound is, and out of which an exfoliated bone is to come, may be left uncovered, without any injury to the ſtrength of the plaſter encaſement. This ſubſtance may be eaſily cut with a knife, and removed, and replaced

with another. If, when the ſwelling ſubſides the cavity is too large for the limb, a hole or holes being left, liquid gypſum plaſter may be poured in, which will perfectly fill up the void, and exactly fit the limb. A hole may be made at firſt by placing an oiled cork or bit of wood againſt any part where it is required, and when the plaſter is ſet, it is to be removed. There is nothing in gypſum injurious, if it be free from lime; it will ſoon become very dry and light, and the limb may be bathed with ſpirits, which will penetrate through the covering. Spirits may be uſed inſtead of water, or mixed with it (or vinegar) at the firſt making of the plaſter.

I ſaw a caſe of a moſt terrible compound fracture of the leg and thigh, by the fall of a cannon, cured in this manner. The perſon was ſeated on the ground, and the plaſter caſe extended from below his heel to the upper part of his thigh, whence a bandage, faſtened into the plaſter, went round his body. He reclined back when he ſlept, as he could not lie down. During the cure, where they ſaw matter or moiſture appear through the plaſter coating, they cut a hole with a knife to dreſs the wound, or let out the matter more freely.

On this occaſion I cannot help mentioning the treatment of parts frozen in Ruſſia, not

not by the ſurgeons, but by the common people, the ſucceſs of which I was an eye-witneſs to in ſeveral caſes, as well as to the failure of the common mode of treating frozen parts by the moſt able ſurgeons of the army. I ſhall ſimply ſtate the facts I relate to.

After Ochakof was taken, I received into my ſubterranean lodging as many priſoners as it would receive, all of which were either wounded or had a limb frozen. Among them were two children, one about ſix and the other about fourteen years of age; the latter had one of her feet frozen to the ancle, the other all the toes, and the ſole of one of her feet. The ſecond day the parts appeared black (the firſt day they were not much obſerved.) The French ſurgeon whom Prince Potemkin had ſent for purpoſely from Paris, and who was a man of note, ordered them to be conſtantly bathed with warm camphorated ſpirits; the elder was removed to the hoſpital, when a mortification began; the younger I kept with me, and as we removed into winter quarters, I carried the child with me. The mortified parts ſeparated, the bones of the toes came off, and, after a long time, the ſores healed. I ſhould have ſaid, the ſurgeon was for immediately amputating both the limbs.

Near

Near to me were ſeveral women, whoſe feet had been in like manner frozen; but as no ſurgeon attended them, the Ruſſian ſoldiers and waggoners undertook the cure. It was alſo the ſecond day when they applied their remedy, and the parts were perfectly black. This remedy was gooſe-greaſe, with which the parts were ſmeared, warm, and the operation often repeated: their directions were, never to let the parts be dry, but always covered with greaſe. The conſequence was, that by degrees the circulation extended lower down, and the blackneſs decreaſed, till, laſt of all, the toes were only diſcoloured, and at length circulation was reſtored to them.

I can account for this no otherwiſe, than that the fat kept the pores ſhut, and prevented the air from promoting putrefaction; in the meantime the veſſels were continually abſorbing part of the ſtagnated blood, till by degrees the whole circulation was reſtored. It is known that extravaſated and ſtagnated blood will remain a long time in the body without putrifying, if it be not expoſed to the air. I conclude alſo, that in theſe caſes of froſt, the mortification firſt begins on the ſurface, which is in contact with the air.

I only relate facts however, and leave it to others to account for them.

This

This is a general practice of the peaſants throughout all Ruſſia. If a part is diſcovered to be frozen, *before the perſon comes into a warm room*, the froſt may be extracted by plunging the part into cold water, or rubbing it with ſnow till the circulation returns.

The wherries or boats of Conſtantinople are conſtructed much on the principle of the Deal boats, but they are more ſharp and curved, not ſo light, but very apt to overſet if people ſhift their places in them unwarily. Their ſhape is very elegant. The boatmen have a large marble weight for ballaſt, which they place after the paſſengers are ſeated. Though they are large, they row exceedingly faſt, and were always eſteemed the quickeſt going boats in Europe; but I ſaw a gondola, brought to Conſtantinople by a Venetian ambaſſador, keep pace with them. The gondolas, every body knows, are built on a contrary conſtruction, being quite flat at bottom. The boſtangi-baſhee (maſter of the police) has a boat of twelve oars, which rows with ſurpriſing velocity; but no one is permitted to build on that conſtruction: this boat goes nearly twice as faſt as the common ones, and conſequently as the gondolas. They are dangerous ſea boats, though they ſail faſt. It is not many years ſince they were brought to ſuch perfection, as may be ſeen by a boat now

now preſerved (I think, of ſultan Achmet III.) the merit, however, is their own. The Turks row in general better than the Chriſtian or Jew boatmen.

The Turks uſe copper veſſels for their kitchen utenſils, which are tinned with pure tin, and not, as in moſt parts of Europe, with ſolder compoſed of tin and lead, which is much ſooner corroded by acids and fat; and though it has not been obſerved that any violent diſorders have been produced by the veſſels in common uſe (except from the copper itſelf) as the quantity of lead diſſolved is ſmall (the admixture of tin rendering lead more difficult of ſolution) yet many chronic maladies may be owing to this baneful metal getting into the habit in ſmall quantities, and particularly of the nervous kind. There is no country in Europe where the quantity of lead uſed in tinning is ſo great as in this iſland; an abuſe which certainly merits the attention of this government, as it did ſome years ago that of France, who prohibited at the ſame time, under pain of death, the uſe of all preparations of lead in wine, or other liquors; a regulation very neceſſary in England, as is alſo the eſtabliſhment of ſome means to prevent ſuch part of the tea being ſold which comes in immediate contact with the

the lead, in cheſts where it happens to be corroded, as is frequently the caſe.

Nothing can be more clumſy than the door-locks in Turkey, but their mechaniſm to prevent picking is admirable. It is a curious thing to ſee wooden locks upon iron doors, particularly in Aſia, and on their caravanſaries, and other great buildings, as well as on houſe doors. The key goes into the back part of the bolt, and is compoſed of a ſquare ſtick with five or ſix iron or wooden pins about half an inch long, towards the end of it, placed at irregular diſtances, and anſwering to holes in the upper part of the bolt, which is pierced with a ſquare hole to receive the key. The key, being put in as far as it will go, is then lifted up, and the pins entering the correſponding holes raiſe other pins, which had dropt into theſe holes from the part of the lock immediately above, and which have heads to prevent them falling lower than is neceſſary; the bolt, being thus freed from the upper pins, is drawn back by means of the key; the key is then lowered, and may be drawn out of the bolt: to lock it again, the bolt is only puſhed in, and the upper pins fall into the holes in the bolt by their own weight. This idea might be improved on, but the Turks never think of improving.

The

The Greeks have a very curious manner of painting in freſco, which has many advantages. I alſo ſaw the ancient method of painting with wax, and fixing the colours by heat, practiſed by a Greek, and at a place I leaſt expected it, at the Dardanelles; for at Conſtantinople it is unknown. Whether this be exactly the encauſtic painting of the ancients it is hazardous to affirm, though I myſelf have not the leaſt doubt reſpecting it. Thus much is certain, that it has, with regard to facility, very conſiderable advantages over the oil painting now in uſe; it has all its freedom, and the vivacity of its colours, added to ſolidity, and the durability which the experience of twenty centuries has proved wax painting to be poſſeſſed of. It was my intention to have treated on it in this place; but as it does not regard Turkey, the immediate ſubject of this work, and would be a diſſertation of conſiderable length, I intend ſhortly to print it ſeparately, with the Greek manner of freſco painting, in which all colours may be uſed on a lime-wall.

The Armenian jewellers ſet precious ſtones, particularly diamonds, to much advantage, with a foil, which, under roſes, or half-brilliants, is remarkably beautiful, and is not ſubject to tarniſh. Their method is as follows: an agate is cut, and highly po-

liſhed, of the ſhape deſired; in a block of lead is formed a cavity of about its own ſize; over this is placed a bit of tin of the thickneſs of ſtrong brown paper ſcraped bright. The agate is then placed on the tin, over the cavity, and ſtruck with a mallet. The beautiful poliſh the tin receives is ſcarcely to be imagined. This is in general kept a ſecret, and ſuch foils ſell for half and three quarters of a dollar each.

The jewellers, who are moſtly Armenians, have a curious method of ornamenting watch caſes, and ſimilar things, with diamonds and other ſtones, by ſimply glueing them on.

The ſtone is ſet in ſilver or gold, and the lower part of the metal made flat, or to correſpond with the part to which it is to be fixed; it is then warmed gently, and the glue applied, which is ſo very ſtrong that the parts never ſeparate.

This glue, which may be applied to many purpoſes, as it will ſtrongly join bits of glaſs or poliſhed ſteel, is thus made:

Diſſolve five or ſix bits of maſtic, as large as peas, in as much ſpirit of wine as will ſuffice to render it liquid; in another veſſel diſſolve as much iſinglaſs (which has been previouſly ſoaken in water till it is ſwollen and ſoft) in French brandy or rum, as will make two ounces, by meaſure, of ſtrong glue, and

and add two ſmall bits of gum galbanum or ammoniacum, which muſt be rubbed or ground till they are diſſolved; then mix the whole with a ſufficient heat; keep it in a phial ſtopt, and when it is to be uſed ſet it in hot water.

Cotton at Smyrna is dyed with madder in the following manner:—The cotton is boiled in mild alkali, and then in common olive oil; being cleaned, it will then take the madder dye: and this is the fine colour we ſee in Smyrna cotton-yarn. I have heard five thouſand pounds was given, in England, for this ſecret *.

A remarkable inſtance occurred to my knowledge of an individual fact, which might have been of the utmoſt uſe to ſociety, but which, owing to the ſtate of knowledge and government in Turkey, was wholly loſt to the world. An Arabian, at Conſtantinople, had diſcovered the ſecret of caſting iron, which, when it came out of the mould, was as malleable as hammered iron; ſome of his fabrication was accidentally ſhown to Mr. de Gaffron, the Pruſſian chargé d'affaires, and Mr. Franzaroli (men of mineralogical ſcience) who were ſtruck with the fact, and

* I communicated theſe two proceſſes to a friend, who printed them in the *Bee* four or five years ago.

immediately inſtituted an enquiry for its author. This man, whoſe art in Chriſtendom would have inſured him a ſplendid fortune, had died poor and unknown, and his ſecret had periſhed with him! His utenſils were found, and ſeveral pieces of his caſting, all perfectly malleable. Mr. Franzaroli analized them, and found that there was no admixture of any other metal. Mr. de Gaffron has ſince been made ſuperintendant of the iron manufactory at Spandau, where he has in vain attempted to diſcover the proceſs of the Arabian.

Europeans are much ſtruck to ſee the Turks work ſitting at every art or handicraft where there is a poſſibility of it; carpenters, for inſtance, perform the greateſt part of their labour ſitting. It is deſerving of remark, that their toes acquire ſuch a degree of ſtrength by uſing them, and by their not being cramped up in tight ſhoes, that they hold a board upright and firmly with their toes, while with their two hands they guide a ſaw, ſitting all the while. Theſe people are able to ſtand on the end of their toes, which will ſupport the whole weight of their body.

We have, in Europe, certainly falſe ideas with reſpect to the utility of ſhoes, in preventing the feet of children from becoming too

too broad. The Arabs, who when children wear no ſhoes, and when they are grown up, only ſandals or ſlippers, have the moſt beautiful feet.

In ſome parts of Aſia, I have ſeen cupolas of a conſiderable ſize, built without any kind of timber ſupport. They fix firmly in the middle a poſt about the height of the perpendicular wall, more or leſs, as the cupola is to be a larger or ſmaller portion of a ſphere; to the top of this is faſtened a ſtrong pole, ſo as to move in all directions, and the end of it deſcribes the outer part of the cupola; lower down is fixed to the poſt another pole, which reaches to the top of the inner part of the perpendicular wall, and deſcribes the inſide of the cupola, giving the difference of thickneſs of the maſonry at top and bottom, and every intermediate part, with the greateſt poſſible exactneſs. As they build their cupolas with bricks, and inſtead of lime uſe gypſum, finiſhing one layer all round before they begin another, only ſcaffolding for the workmen is required to cloſe the cupola at top.

At Baſſora, where they have no timber but the wood of the date tree, which is like a cabbage ſtalk, they make arches without any frame. The maſon with a nail and a bit of ſtring deſcribes a ſemicircle on the ground,

lays his bricks, faſtened together by a gypſum cement, on the lines thus traced, and having thus formed his arch, except the crown brick, it is carefully raiſed, and in two parts placed on the wall. They proceed thus till the whole arch is finiſhed. This part is only half a brick thick; but it ſerves them to turn a ſtronger arch over it.

The cities of Bagdad and Baſſora are moſtly built of bricks dried in the ſun, which ſtand ages if kept tolerably dry. The clay is uſed in almoſt a dry ſtate, and beaten into the moulds with mallets. This gives them a wonderful degree of hardneſs.

At the entrance of the deſert, coming from Aleppo, I found a village built in a very ſingular manner; each room was a cupola, and reſembled a hay ſtack, ſome of them a ſugar loaf. The whole was of earth, as they have no wood. The inhabitants ſaid their town had been built by Abraham; that is, they did not remember when the oldeſt houſes were built. They ſaid they were never out of repair, but that they ſometimes plaſtered the upper part, or rather beat earth on it. The walls were compoſed of clay and gravel, and were exceedingly hard. The method they uſe is, to beat each layer of earth till it is very hard.

Such a method is uſed in the province of Lyons

Lyons in France, where they build houſes of ſeveral ſtories, and very ſpacious. The walls are always plaſtered with lime and ſand, and ſtand ſome centuries. Theſe are very ſuperior to the mud walls of cottages in ſome parts of England, where the earth is uſed very moiſt, and mixed with ſtraw. The ancient Romans built in the ſame manner as in France. The excellence of the Venetian plaſter floors, ſo much admired for their hardneſs and beautiful poliſh, depends entirely on their being ſtrongly beaten. The compoſition is only freſh lime and ſand, with pieces of marble, uſed almoſt dry, and beaten till they are quite hard, then ground even and poliſhed. Common earth as well as lime mortar acquires an incredible degree of hardneſs by compreſſion, if it contains no more moiſture than is neceſſary to make its parts unite. A kind of artificial ſtone may be made of gravel with a little lime ſtrongly preſſed, or beaten into moulds.

I have ſeen practiſed a method of *filtering water* by aſcenſion, which is much ſuperior to our filtering ſtones, or other methods by deſcent, in which, in time, particles of the ſtone, or the finer ſand, make a paſſage along with the water.

They make two wells, from five to ten feet, or any depth, at a ſmall diſtance, which

have a communication at bottom. The ſeparation muſt be of clay well beaten, or of other ſubſtances impervious to water. The two wells are then filled with ſand and gravel. The opening of that into which the water to be filtered is to run, muſt be ſomewhat higher than that into which the water is to aſcend, and this muſt not have ſand quite up to its brim, that there may be room for the filtered water, or it may, by a ſpout, run into a veſſel placed for that purpoſe. The greater the difference is between the height of the two wells, the faſter the water will filter; but the leſs it is the better, provided a ſufficient quantity of water be ſupplied by it.

This may be practiſed in a caſk, tub, jar, or other veſſel. The water may be conveyed to the bottom by a pipe, the lower end having a ſpunge in it, or the pipe may be filled with coarſe ſand.

It is evident that all ſuch particles, which by their gravity are carried down in filtration by deſcent, will not riſe with the water in filtration by aſcenſion. This might be practiſed on board ſhips at little expence.

The Arabians and the Turks have a preparation of milk, which has ſimilar qualities to the kumiſs of the Kalmuks: by the firſt it is called *leban*, by the Turks *yaourt*.

To

To make it, they put to new milk made hot over the fire ſome old leban (or yaourt.) In a few hours, more or leſs, according to the temperature of the air, it becomes curdled of an uniform conſiſtence, and a moſt pleaſant acid; the cream is in great part ſeparated, leaving the curd light and ſemitranſparent. The whey is much leſs ſubject to ſeparate than in curds made with rennet with us, for the purpoſe of making cheeſe.

Yaourt has this ſingular quality, that left to ſtand it becomes daily ſourer, and at laſt dries, without having entered into the putrid fermentation. In this ſtate it is preſerved in bags, and in appearance reſembles preſſed curds after they have been broken by the hand. This dry yaourt, mixed with water, becomes a fine cooling food or drink, of excellent ſervice in fevers of the inflammatory or putrid kind. It ſeems to have none of thoſe qualities which make milk improper in fevers. Freſh yaourt is a great article of food among the natives, and Europeans ſoon become fond of it.

No other acid will make the ſame kind of curd: all that have been tried, after the acid fermentation is over, become putrid. In Ruſſia they put their milk in pots in an oven, and let it ſtand till it becomes ſour, and this they uſe as an article of food in that ſtate,

or make cheeſe of it, but it has none of the qualities of yaourt, though, when it is new, it has much of the taſte. Perhaps new milk curdled with ſour milk, and that again uſed as a ferment, and the ſame proceſs continued, might, in time, acquire the qualities of yaourt, which never can be made in Turkey without ſome old yaourt.

They give no rational account how it was firſt made; ſome of them told me an angel taught Abraham how to make it, and others, that an angel brought a pot of it to Hagar, which was the firſt yaourt (or leban.)

It merits attention as a delicious article of food, and as a medicine.

I will here relate the manner the Tatars and Kalmuks make their kumis, or fermented mare's milk.

"Take of mare's milk of one day any quantity, add to it a ſixth part of water, an eighth part of the ſoureſt cow's milk that can be got, but at a future period a ſmaller portion of old kumis will better anſwer the purpoſe of ſouring; cover the veſſel with a thick cloth, and ſet it in a place of moderate warmth; leave it to reſt for twenty-four hours, at the end of which the milk will have become ſour, and a thick ſubſtance gathered at top; then with a ſtick, made at the lower end in the manner of a churn ſtaff, beat it till

till the thick ſubſtance above-mentioned be blended intimately with the ſubjacent fluid; let it reſt twenty-four hours in a high narrow veſſel like a churn. The agitation muſt be repeated as before, till the liquor appears to be perfectly homogenous, and in this ſtate it is called kumis (or koumis) of which the taſte ought to be a pleaſant mixture of ſweet and ſour. Agitation muſt be employed every time before it is uſed. When well prepared in cloſe veſſels, and kept in a cold place, it will keep three months or more without any injury to its quality.

"It ſerves both as drink and food; is a reſtorative to the ſtomach and a cure for nervous diſorders, phthiſis, &c."

The Tatars diſtil this fermented milk, and obtain from it a ſpirituous liquor, which they drink inſtead of brandy.

The butter, which is moſtly uſed in Conſtantinople, comes from the Crim and the Kuban. They do not ſalt it, but melt it in large copper pans over a very ſlow fire, and ſcum off what riſes; it will then preſerve ſweet a long time if the butter was freſh when it was melted. We preſerve butter moſtly by ſalting. I have had butter, which when freſh was melted and ſcum'd in the Tatar manner, and then ſalted in our manner, which kept two years good and fine taſted. Waſhing does

does not ſo effectually free butter from the curd and butter-milk, which it is neceſſary to do, in order to preſerve it, as boiling or melting; when then ſalt is added to prevent the pure butyrous part from growing rancid, we certainly have the beſt proceſs for preſerving butter. The melting or boiling, if done with care, does not diſcolour or injure the taſte.

To the lovers of coffee, a few remarks on the Turkiſh manner of making it, in the beſt way, may not be unacceptable.

Coffee, to be good, muſt either be ground to an almoſt impalpable powder, or it muſt be pounded as the Turks do, in an iron mortar, with a heavy peſtle. The Turks firſt put the coffee dry into the coffee pot, and ſet it over a very ſlow fire, or embers, till it is warm, and ſends forth a fragrant ſmell, ſhaking it often; then from another pot they pour on it boiling water (or rather water in which the grounds of the laſt made coffee had been boiled, and ſet to become clear); they then hold it a little longer over the fire, till there is on its top a white froth like cream, but it muſt not boil, but only riſe gently; it is then poured backwards and forwards two or three times, from one pot into another, and it ſoon becomes clear; they, however, often drink it quite thick. Some put in a ſpoon full of cold water to make it clear ſooner, or lay a cloth

cloth dipt in cold water on the top of the pot.

The reaſon why our Weſt India coffee is not ſo good as the Yemen coffee is, that on account of the climate it is never ſuffered to hang on the trees till it is perfectly ripe; and in the voyage it acquires a taſte from the bad air in the hold of the ſhip. This may be remedied in Italy, by expoſing it to the ſun two or three months: with us, boiling water ſhould be poured on it, and let to ſtand till it is cold, then it muſt be waſhed with other cold water, and, laſtly, dried in an oven. Thus prepared, it will be nearly as good as the beſt Turkey coffee. It ſhould be roaſted in an open earthen or iron pan, and the ſlower it is roaſted the better. As often as it crackles it muſt be taken off the fire. The Turks often roaſt it in a baker's oven while it is heating.

The preſervation of yeaſt having been a ſubject of much reſearch in this country, the following particulars may perhaps deſerve attention. On the coaſt of Perſia my bread was made, in the Engliſh manner, of good wheat flower, and with the yeaſt generally uſed there. It is thus prepared; take a ſmall tea cup or wine glaſs full of ſplit or bruiſed peaſe, pour on it a pint of boiling water, and ſet the whole in a veſſel all night

night on the hearth, or any other warm place; the water will have a froth on its top next morning, and will be good yeaſt. In this cold climate, eſpecially at a cold ſeaſon, it ſhould ſtand longer to ferment, perhaps twenty-four or forty-eight hours. The above quantity made me as much bread as two ſixpenny loaves, the quality of which was very good and light.

A ſpring, which operates both on the individual and national character of the modern European with a force ſecond only to that of political inſtitution, is commerce. Upon the views entertained on this ſubject by a people; upon the extent and modes of their practice, and upon the character which they maintain with reſpect to it, depends much of their importance as a nation.

With regard to the general ideas entertained by all ranks in Turkey relative to commerce, they are no leſs narrow and abſurd than all their other opinions. "We "ſhould not trade," ſay they, "with thoſe "beggarly nations, who come to buy of "us rich articles of merchandize, and rare "commodities, which we ought not to ſell "to them, but with thoſe who bring to us "ſuch articles, without the labour of manu-"facturing, or the trouble of importing them "on our part." Upon this principle it is that

that Mocha coffee is prohibited to be ſold to infidels. It is therefore no wonder that the foreign commerce of the Turks is comparatively trifling; their trade is moſtly from province to province, and even this is inconceivably narrowed by the want of mutual confidence, and the ignorance and ſhortſightedneſs of their views. They have few bills of exchange, or any of thoſe modes of tranſacting buſineſs which the ingenuity and enterpriſe of commercial nations have invented for the facilitation of commercial intercourſe.

The effects which the inſecurity of property, and the watchful avarice of the government produce upon commerce, are ſtill more ſtriking. In an extenſive trade capital and credit muſt be alike great, but from both of theſe the Turk is cut off; he dares not make a diſplay of wealth; and if he has been ſo fortunate as to accumulate a large ſum of money, his firſt care is to conceal it from view, leſt it ſhould attract the bloodſuckers of power. The neceſſary conſequence of this is, that credit, that vital ſpring of commerce, cannot be created, and inſtead of thoſe commercial connections which in this part of Europe ramify ſo widely, and render commercial operations ſo eaſy, all buſineſs is tranſacted either by principals

cipals themſelves, or their immediate factors, in a way little different from the barter of the rude ages.

Nor is it only the inſecurity of property while living which renders the Turk ſo averſe to engage in undertakings of great extent and contingent advantage; the diſpoſition of it by will affords them little means of ſelf gratification in viewing their inheritance tranſmitted to poſterity. The merchants, and others of inferior rank, know, that a ſplendid fortune, at the ſame time that it renders their children objects of ſuſpicion, will not raiſe them to poſts of honour and reſpect, without putting them in a ſituation not to be able to tranſmit it another generation to their poſterity; thoſe who hold any office of the porte know that they have the ſultan for their heir, and his paſhas or other officers for their executors; hence it is that poſterity is of ſo little conſequence in the eyes of the Turk, that he is ſeldom induced to conſult much their welfare, and the hoſpitals, caravanſaries, fountains, bridges, &c. built for charitable purpoſes, only originate in the oſtentation or ſuperſtitious fears of their founders, who build them for the repoſe of their ſouls, or to perpetuate the reputation of their piety.

The natural reſult of this combination of circumſtances is, that commerce is every where

where checked; no emulation takes place, no communication of diſcoveries, no firm and ſolid aſſociation of intereſt; their mechanical arts are in many inſtances worſe cultivated now than they were a century ago, particularly the tempering of ſabres; and ſome of their manufactures have gone entirely to decay.

It remains only to ſpeak of the moral character which they maintain as traders; and this has been variouſly repreſented. All ranks of people have ſome ſlight kind of commerce, or rather a ſort of pedling trade among themſelves, and conſequently the diſtinctive character of the different ranks will appear in this as well as in other circumſtances. Amongſt all of them a certain degree of artifice is common, and is ſcarcely thought diſhonourable, ſuch as the corrupting of brokers and all thoſe who are concerned in making bargains; but the officers and dependents of the porte are univerſally remarked as the moſt venal and cheating ſet of men on the face of the earth.

Honeſty, however, it is ſaid, in ſome meaſure diſtinguiſhes the Turkiſh merchant: this may perhaps be true, if we compare him with the crafty Greek, or ſtill more ſubtle Armenian, who, from the unjuſt oppreſſions under which they labour, are induced to re-

taliate by artifice, on their imperious maſters, the ſource of half that tricking and deception commonly laid to the charge of the lower orders of ſociety.

Much of the civilization of modern Europe has been with juſtice attributed to the influence of female ſociety; to this are owing the high and noble paſſions which excite mankind to deeds of active patriotiſm and benevolence, and the ſofter pleaſures which ornament and endear the ſocial circle. It will be worth while to conſider how far then woman, "*laſt and beſt of all God's* "*works*," made to ſoften the ferocity of man, was made in vain for theſe barbarians; whoſe love is ſenſuality without friendſhip or eſteem.

Polygamy is generally found to be deſtructive to the finer feelings; it is ſo in Turkey. The rich man (who alone is enabled to ſupport ſeveral females) regards them only as the inſtruments of his pleaſures, and ſeeks their ſociety with no other view; hence the women themſelves have no cultivation of mind, but live a ſtupid ſolitary life, ſurrounded by ſlaves, or by women as ignorant and ſpiritleſs as themſelves. Moral virtue and intellectual eminence are alike uncultivated by them, and the deſcriptions of elegance and taſte diſcoverable in their amuſements,

ments, their gardens, and apartments, exiſt only in the imagination of travellers, who, like Lady Montague, aim rather to aſtoniſh than inſtruct.

The women in general only want an opportunity to become unfaithful to their huſbands, and the propoſition generally comes from them; but it is attended with great danger. If a common Mahomedan proſtitute even be catched with a Chriſtian, ſhe is put into a ſack and drowned, and the man put to death, except he become a Mahomedan, which will not always ſave both their lives. Chriſtians of the country have often preferred death.

Marriage is with the Mahomedans merely a civil contract; the wife brings no portion to the huſband, but the huſband ſtipulates in the marriage contract, which is executed before a judge, to allow a certain portion to the wife. The contracts are of two kinds, the *nikiah* and the *kapin*; the former is the proper legal marriage, and every Mahomedan is reſtrained by the koran to four wives of this deſcription. This contract ſpecifies a certain ſum, which is to be given to the wife in caſe of repudiation, or of her huſband's death. The other contract is only an agreement to live together for a certain period, at the expiration of which a ſpecified ſum is to be

given to the woman. It is a juſt obſervation of Baron de Tott, that the kapin or temporary marriage is a neceſſary conſequence of the general inſtitution of polygamy. A ſeparation may be demanded by either party; if it be by the woman, ſhe goes before the judge, and pronounces the following formula: "*Nikia-hum khalal, baſhum uzad,*" i. e. "My dowry given up, my head is free." The huſband, who repudiates his wife, muſt repeat it either three ſeveral times, or three times together, after which he cannot take her back until he has ſubmitted to a peculiar indecent and immoral ceremony.

In converſation the Turks ſometimes diſplay good natural ſenſe; but the wit for which they have been celebrated is no where to be found. This is ſufficiently evident from the exiſtence of the *müſahibs*, or profeſſed ſpeakers, who are indeed little better than buffoons, but who are hired by the opulent to amuſe their company. Can there poſſibly be a greater imputation on the ſocial powers of a people, than their adoption of ſuch a practice? They cannot or dare not ſpeak ſo as to keep up amuſing or inſtructive converſation, and they therefore call in the aid of hired talkers. Derviſhes, particularly thoſe who have the reputation of being mad, but who generally are more rogues than fools, often

often attach themſelves to the great, and amuſe the company. Theſe people ſometimes take very great liberties in their ſpeeches, which is excuſed in them on account of their holy frenzy.

A free people are a ſocial people, fond of friendly intercourſe. Cheerful converſe and unreſerved communication of ſentiment ſoften the nature, refine the manners, expand the heart, and enlarge the underſtanding. Freedom of ſpeaking and acting is the ſource of civilization.

A nation of ſlaves is a nation diſunited; no ſocial ties, no unboſoming of friendſhip; ſuſpicion and fear is in every breaſt; converſation is unintereſting, and conſequently not ſought after; hired buffoons and low jeſters are the ſpeakers to the gloomy audience, or they ſit in ſad and ſtupid ſolitude, ſmoking a narcotic herb, or taking lethargic opium; inſulting haughtineſs and ridiculous pomp take the place of that elevation of ſentiment, and dignity of character, which alone exalts the man of high birth or office above his fellow-citizen; diſguſt and gloom hang over their countenances, and innocent mirth is deemed indecent.

When a Turk drinks wine, it is with an intention of being intoxicated; he therefore

ſwallows a large portion at one draught, or repeats it till he is beaſtly drunk; or if he is fearful of the conſequences of being in that ſtate in the place he happens to be, at leaſt the quantity he preſcribes to himſelf to make him *contented* (as they expreſs themſelves) he drinks off all at once. Such a method of drinking wine, and with ſuch a view, certainly entitles drinkers to the contempt they are held in in Turkey.

From theſe circumſtances, which may be conſidered as forming the more ornamental part of the manners of a nation, we paſs to thoſe more important points which conſtitute the baſis of their moral character.

And here it muſt be obſerved, that ſo wide and various an empire as Turkey cannot but have ſtriking varieties in the morals of its inhabitants; they, however, moſtly agree in the great leading points, and the variations are to be accounted for from peculiar circumſtances of ſituation, origin, and habits. I ſhall therefore firſt notice generally thoſe vices and virtues which belong to the Turks as a nation, and then point out a few of the moſt ſtriking differences obſervable in the various provinces of the empire.

The moral character of the Turks has been repreſented in a favourable light by ſome authors upon two principles; the one,

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a connection of intereſt between the Turks and their own country (which is the caſe of moſt of the French writers except Volney) and the other, from a wiſh to expoſe the vices and follies of other European nations by the contraſt. Of the writers themſelves I ſhall hereafter have occaſion to ſpeak; the chief points of their deſcription will be included in the following obſervations.

Much has been ſaid of the equity of the Turks. If we look to the example of their ſultans, viziers, paſhas, and judges, ſelling juſtice, can it be ſuppoſed that theſe examples have not corrupted the people, though they were naturally good. The truth is, that they have ſo little idea of juſtice themſelves, that when they go to law (that is, appeal to a kadi) they rely more on bribes and cabal than on impartial judgment. Where the judge is not influenced, he is naturally juſt; no man ſcarcely was ever ſo corrupted but he would be ſo. The European merchants, who have a better opportunity of knowing them than foreign miniſters, confined almoſt wholly to their reſidence, and ignorant of the country, or than travellers paſſing haſtily through the country, unanimouſly aſſure us, that they find them very cunning in their dealings, and full of deceit.

The people are ſaid to be humane: the peaceable citizen may be ſo, as in other parts, or as man naturally is; but the dictates of their religion, and the examples they ſee, muſt blunt their feelings; and this citizen, in regard to an enemy, is as ſavage as a tiger. There is, after all (from whatever cauſe) a ferocity in them which may eaſily be awoken, and when they ſtrike, it is with a dagger to the heart.

The temperance of the Turks, which is owing in a great meaſure to their religion, produces its uſual good effect in rendering their intellects clear; their groſs ignorance is not to be attributed to their want of natural ſenſe; the ſoil muſt not only be in itſelf rich, it muſt be cultivated. The Turk has indeed a good capacity, and an habitual prudence, but his government and religion are eternal bars to his improvement. Openneſs of mind and benevolence cannot exiſt where deſpotiſm renders every man ſuſpicious, nor can the votary of an intolerant and ſanguinary religion cultivate liberality and ſcience.

As to the politeneſs aſcribed to the Turks by ſome authors, I never could diſcover it: the Turkiſh ferocity, perhaps, excited fear in them, and produced reſpect: if a man found

found himſelf alone with a tiger, and eſcaped unhurt, he would ſay it was a good-natured animal. The aſſuming ſuperiority of the meaneſt Turk, the deference which is paid to him by all infidels who approach him, and by your own interpreters, impoſe and create reſpect; if the beaſt then only growls, but does not bite, he is praiſed for his civility. If you know their language, you will obſerve the difference of their expreſſions and their manners from thoſe they uſe to their brother Mahomedans; you will obſerve, at beſt, an inſulting condeſcendence, which plainly beſpeaks their contempt of you: they are ignorant of, and above practiſing the true principles of politeneſs. Madame de Genlis ſays, politeneſs conſiſts in making others appear every thing, yourſelf nothing; a Turk makes himſelf every thing, you nothing. We have only to obſerve the ambaſſadors they ſend to foreign courts (who are all people very low in office;) they neither learn the language, or gain any more knowledge of the country than the poſt-horſes which draw them through it: when they return, they repreſent the men as monkies, becauſe they are active, and the women as proſtitutes, becauſe they are unveiled, and live in ſociety with men. Not one word of this is exaggerated. The language and the addreſs

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of the politeſt miniſter of the porte to a foreign ambaſſador very much reſembles the civility of a polite German baron to his vaſſal.

Even their moſt ſtrenuous admirer, Peyſſonel, acknowledges that Turkey remains two centuries behind the reſt of Europe in reſpect to ſcience; that it has neglected naval and military tactics and diſcipline; and that it allows vices in many parts of its adminiſtration to go uncorrected.

That there is a conſiderable difference of character and morals in the different parts of the empire has been before obſerved: the worſt are the people of Anatolia, particularly thoſe bordering on the Black Sea; they are cowardly, treacherous, robbers, aſſaſſins, and indecent; thoſe of Conſtantinople are ſoftened by a city life; thoſe of Aleppo are the moſt refined and civil among themſelves, and remarkably decent, but, like all the Aſiatics, hold Europeans in great contempt, and even hatred; at Damaſcus they are furious zealots; the people of Smyrna are ſavage and dangerous; in European Turkey they have fewer prejudices againſt Chriſtians, becauſe they know more of them, or rather becauſe they are leſs bigoted enthuſiaſts than at Damaſcus, or in Egypt; at Bagdad they are leſs prejudiced by their religion, and more open

open to inſtruction, than in other parts of Aſia; the people of Baſſora, a mixture of Arabs, Perſians, and a few Turks, are mild and docile. It is ſingular, that theſe people, from their communication with India and with Europeans, know infinitely more of our manners, arts, and arms, and are more inclined to adopt them, than thoſe in the frontier towns in Europe, who are prejudiced, inſolent, and proud. The Arabians of the deſert generally pay nearly as much reſpect to a European as to one of their own country, and more than to a Turk, whom they mortally hate.

CHAPTER VII.

On the State of Population in the Turkiſh Empire.

THE aim of all rational politics is to augment the numbers, and increaſe the happineſs of mankind; and hence the ſtate of population is generally the moſt accurate ſtandard of political error or improvement. From the preceding pages we ſhall have ſeen ſufficient reaſon to apprehend that the population of the Turkiſh empire cannot be, in the preſent day, at all proportioned to the extent of its territory. The religious diſtinctions which depreſs into ſo abject a ſtate of ſlavery one great part of the community, and the inſecurity of property, which affects every rank and condition, are both cauſes, whoſe combined operation muſt greatly ſubtract from the numbers of a people, which form the vital ſtrength of a ſtate. Where the cultivator is not ſure of reaping the corn which he ſows, he will ſow only what the immediate neceſſity of ſubſiſtence requires; the political ſtate of the country prevents

prevents his accumulation of capital, and even that ſmall portion which he may chance to poſſeſs, he will not hazard in ſpeculations of ſo very uncertain profit. In this languiſhing ſtate of domeſtic agriculture, Conſtantinople looks for a ſupply of corn to foreign channels, particularly Egypt, Moldavia, Walachia, the Crimea, and Poland.

From a view of the ſtate of Egypt, it will appear that little dependence can be placed on the permanence of this ſupply; ſtill leſs would a wiſe government look to markets, which, like the others which I have enumerated, are either immediately under the direction of a hoſtile ſtate, or perpetually liable to its incurſions. The Ruſſians are, indeed, wiſe enough, in time of peace, to invigorate their own agriculture, by ſupplying Conſtantinople with corn from their provinces. The Crimea, on which the porte uſed greatly to depend, has been deſerted by moſt of its Tatar inhabitants ſince it fell under the imperial dominion; but the Ruſſian and other adventurers, who now occupy it, are making great endeavours to revive its commerce and agriculture; theſe, however, as well as the ſupplies of Poland, are in the hands of Ruſſia, and in the event of a war ſhe can not only withhold them, but perhaps cut off the ſupplies of Moldavia and Walachia, thus expoſing

poſing the Turkiſh capital to the utmoſt diſtreſs. Notwithſtanding theſe evident conſequences of their preſent ſyſtem of policy, the divan purſue thoſe methods of ſupply which give them the leaſt immediate trouble, totally regardleſs both of the decay of their own agriculture and of the future deſtruction which this ſyſtem threatens to their very exiſtence as a nation. It is not only in theory that theſe evils are to be apprehended; a compariſon of the preſent and paſt ſtates of the Turkiſh population will evince the truth of the foregoing propoſitions.

We know not what was the population of this vaſt empire in very remote ages; from the evidence of hiſtory it appears to have been very conſiderable; at preſent it is far from being ſo. Without going farther back than the memory of perſons now living, it is eaſy to prove that depopulation has been, at leaſt in latter times, aſtoniſhingly rapid.

The great cauſes of this depopulation are, doubtleſs, the following:

1ſt. The plague, of which the empire is never entirely free.

2dly. Thoſe terrible diſorders which almoſt always follow it, at leaſt in Aſia.

3dly. Epidemic and endemic maladies in Aſia, which make as dreadful ravages as the

plague itſelf, and which frequently viſit that part of the empire.

4thly. Famine, owing to the want of precaution in the government, when a crop of corn fails, and to the avarice and villany of the paſhas, who generally endeavour to profit by this dreadful calamity.

5th and laſtly, the ſickneſſes which always follow a famine, and which occaſion a much greater mortality.

The plague is more mortal in proportion as it viſits a country ſeldom. At Conſtantinople it is often a great number of years together: it is ſcarcely perceived in winter, and frequently ſhips ſail to Europe with *clean bills of health*, though it is lurking in infected clothes, and in diſtant and little frequented parts of the city. In ſpring it breaks out again. No calculation can be formed of the numbers that die of it in the capital; for their want is never long perceived, there being a conſtant influx of people from the country to the capital. Some years the mortality does not appear to be conſiderable, but at other times they have what is called a *great ſickneſs*, which carries off an aſtoniſhing number. The conſumption of proviſions has been reduced, during ſuch a plague, to three-fourths of what it was when it began to rage.

It

It viſits moſt parts of Aſia every ten or twelve years, and carries off an eighth or tenth of the inhabitants, and ſometimes a fourth or more. The farther eaſt a country is ſituated, the leſs frequently it is viſited. It is ſaid, it never goes where the olive tree does not grow. It reaches Baſſora about every ninetieth year; but then this ſcourge is moſt dreadful. The laſt plague carried off nine-tenths of the inhabitants, and that city had been ninety-ſix years free of it. Farther eaſt it has not been known to go.

The plague, like the ſmall pox, is a diſorder never generated by foul air, or the like, but always produced by contagion. It, doubtleſs, comes from Egypt, though in Egypt it is frequently received back from Conſtantinople.

Dr. Ruſſel ſays, the plague which afflicted Egypt in 1736, and of which it was ſaid that 10,000 died in one day at Cairo, "*was the* "*only one that happened in this century, which* "*was believed by the people of Cairo to have* "*been brought from Upper Egypt; the others* "*were always thought to have been imported* "*from Conſtantinople or Candia, but never* "*from Syria or Barbary.*"

How eaſily would not a regular *quarantine* and *ſhutting up* deliver Turkey from this terrible ſcourge!—but what is to be expected but

but devaſtation from the Turks? No city has better local ſituations for lazarettoes than Conſtantinople—I allude to the Princes Iſlands. When the capital has been really free of it, it always is brought thither either directly or indirectly from Egypt (generally by the way of Smyrna.) Many people, not attending to this circumſtance, have concluded that it was generated in Conſtantinople, and talk much of the bad air produced by the naſtineſs of the ſtreets, which is without foundation. The air of Conſtantinople is exceedingly pure and healthy; but no infected or impure air, loaded with the miaſma of putrefaction, &c. will produce the plague, though it may fevers, both contagious and mortal, in a high degree.

It does not appear from Plutarch's account of the plague at Athens, that it really was this diſorder which afflicted that city in Pericles time. The true plague is never in the air, perhaps (for I ſay this with ſome doubt) not in the breath of a peſtiferous perſon, at leaſt the breath cannot convey it above a few feet, as the Ruſſian ſurgeons have ſufficiently proved, when the plague was at Moſqua (Moſcow) and at Cherſon more particularly, where thoſe ſurgeons, who touched nothing in the hoſpitals, and pulled off their ſhoes on going out, all eſcaped.

The phyſicians at Conſtantinople ſay, the more they ſtudy the plague the leſs they know of it; and as it is there almoſt every year, they have more opportunities of ſeeing this diſorder than any others of the profeſſion. We learn nothing from the Ruſſian phyſicians, who expoſed themſelves very much in the plague at Moſcow, in 1771, and in that which broke out in 1783 at Cherſon (ſee Mertens's Obſerv. and Orreus's Deſcriptio Peſtis; alſo Samoillovits's Memoire ſur la Peſte;) nor is there any thing very ſatisfactory with reſpect to the cure to be learned from Dr. Ruſſel's elaborate treatiſe on the plague, nor from the more ancient authors. It is ſaid that friction with oil has lately been diſcovered, in Egypt, to be a preſervative; ſo much is certain, that the plague is unknown to thoſe nations whoſe cuſtom it is to rub their bodies with oil. It has been obſerved at Conſtantinople, that thoſe who uſed mercurial frictions never catched the plague, how much ſoever they were expoſed to the contagion. May this not have been owing to the greaſe rather than the mercury?

Mr. Matra (who is now agent at Morocco) gave James's powders to an Armenian family, about twenty years ago, at Conſtantinople, and they recovered. I alſo thought I had performed cures with this famous medicine;

cine; but it has had a fair trial in Ruſſia, without producing any ſalutary effect; farther than what was to be expected from an emetic. There is, however, ſome reaſon to believe that it may prevent the plague, if adminiſtered *immediately after the infection*, though perhaps any other ſudorific would be equally ſerviceable.

There is one circumſtance, of which it is of importance to determine the truth, as it is of conſequence with reſpect to quarantine; this is, whether the plague communicated *per fomitem*, (that is, by ſubſtances which, having imbibed the peſtiferous effluvia or miaſma, retain them in an active ſtate for ſome time,) be of a more mortal kind than that by immediate contact with a diſeaſed body; and particularly whether the *fomes* become of a more deadly quality by its being long retained in the ſubſtance, than when newly imbibed by it.

Dr. Cullen ſays, "*It appears to me probable* "*that contagions, as they ariſe from fomites,* "*are more powerful than as they ariſe immedi-* "*ately from the human body.*"

Dr. Lind ſays, "*From a fixt attention to this* "*ſubject for many years, I ſay theſe laſt (wear-* "*ing apparel, dirty linen, &c. long retained in* "*that impure ſtate) contain a more concentrated* "*and contagious poiſon than the newly emitted*

" *effluvia or excretions from the ſick.*" Van Swieten was of the ſame opinion.

On the other hand, Doctor Ruſſel (Treatiſe of the Plague) whoſe opinion with reſpect to the plague is a great authority, thinks differently; he ſays, (page 203) " *I ſhould be* " *inclined to doubt that the peſtiferous effluvia* " *of a perſon labouring under the plague, after* " *the having been ſhut up ſome time in a ſubſtance* " *fitted to imbibe and confine them, would act* " *more powerfully on a perſon diſpoſed to infec-* " *tion, than the ſame effluvia would have done* " *at the inſtant of their emanation from the mor-* " *bid body.*"

It certainly would be a ridiculous preſumption in one, who is not a medical man, to decide between ſuch great profeſſional authorities; but do not facts, mentioned by Dr. Ruſſel himſelf, decide the queſtion? Page 97. ſpeaking of the firſt of the ſix claſſes, under which he arranged the caſes which fell under his immediate obſervation, he ſays, " *None of the ſick recovered, and moſt* " *of them died the ſecond or third day; a very* " *few lived to the fifth.*"—" *Theſe deſtructive* " *forms of the diſeaſe prevailed moſt at the* " RISE *of the plague in* 1760, *and its* RESUS- " CITATION *in the ſpring of the two ſubſequent* " *years,* DECREASING ALWAYS AS THE " DISTEMPER SPREAD: *and though they were* " *found*

"*found diſperſed in every ſtage of the peſtilen-*
"*tial ſeaſon, yet the number of ſubjects of this*
"*claſs was proportionably very ſmall, com-*
"*pared with that of others.*" Again (page 209.) "*But a greater difficulty than that*
"*of perſons not being equally ſuſceptible of*
"*infection, ariſes from the ceſſation of the*
"*plague at a period when the ſuppoſed con-*
"*tagious effluvia, preſerved in apparel, furni-*
"*ture, and other fomites, at the end of a peſti-*
"*lential ſeaſon, muſt be allowed not only to*
"*exiſt in a much greater quantity than can be*
"*ſuppoſed to be at once accidentally imported*
"*by commerce, but in a ſtate alſo of univerſal*
"*diſperſion over the city.*"

It is an incontrovertible fact, in which every author agrees, relative to the plague, which, having ceaſed in ſummer or in autumn, breaks out again in the ſpring, or at any other time of the year, whether communicated by infectious fomites remaining in apparel, &c. in the ſame city, or brought in merchandize, &c. from other parts, that in the beginning ſcarcely any one recovers of the plague, that the diſorder gradually becomes leſs mortal, and laſtly, that it entirely ceaſes.

Quere? May it not be thence concluded, that the reaſon of the mortality in the beginning of the plague is owing to the fo-

mites having been confined a longer time, and become thereby more poiſonous; that when the plague has raged ſome time, and the infection taken from peſtiferous bodies, or effects lately impregnated with *freſh* fomites, this is the reaſon why it is leſs malignant; that the diſorder thus becomes milder, and at length ceaſes to be infectious, till the fomites have again acquired an increaſed degree of malignity by time; that the examples mentioned by Dr. Ruſſel, (page 97.) of caſes of the firſt and mortal claſs, which ſometimes were found at every ſeaſon, were caſes where the ſick had caught infection from old fomites. This cannot be affirmed, but it cannot, I believe, be contradicted, and it would appear, from the gradual decline in malignity of the plague, to be probable.

It would appear that the plague, when it firſt breaks out, and is very mortal, not one in ten, and ſometimes in forty, recovering, is not ſo catching as when it is ſpread over the whole city. Perhaps later in the year, when the pores are more open by the warmth of the ſeaſon, people are more liable to be infected. Mertens (Hiſtoire de la Peſte de Moſcow en 1771) ſays, "*The great cold* "*which reigned during the laſt two months of* "*the year ſo enervated the peſtilential miaſma,* "*that thoſe who aſſiſted the ſick, and buried the* "*dead,*

" *dead, were leſs eaſily attacked by the con-*
" *tagion, &c.*" It appears alſo from him, that froſt will in a very ſhort time entirely deſtroy the fomites: he ſays, " *Dr. Poparetſky,*
" *told me, that the carriers of the dead clothed*
" *themſelves with ſheep ſkins, which had been*
" *worn by thoſe who had had the plague, after*
" *having been expoſed to a ſevere froſt forty-*
" *eight hours, and not one of them caught the*
" *plague.*"

It is natural to conclude, that the plague ſhould be more mortal in hot weather than in cold; but it would ſeem as if the degrees of its poiſon depended not ſo much on the ſtate of the air as on the old or recent ſtate of the fomites; and that the power of the poiſon was diminiſhed by propagation, till it became at laſt little if at all mortal; at leaſt experience in all places where the plague has raged ſeems to prove this.

It alſo appears, that the fomites may be preſerved a long time in infected things, which are not expoſed to the air. Dr. Ruſſel quotes a ſingular inſtance of this from Dr. Mackenzie of Conſtantinople; it is too intereſting not to be repeated: " *Count Caſtil-*
" *lane had, for three years running, perſons at-*
" *tacked in the ſame manner, in the months of*
" *July and Auguſt, notwithſtanding all poſſible*
" *precaution uſed in cleaning the room, and*

" *even white-waſhing it. At laſt, by my own* " *advice to his excellency, he built a ſlight coun-* " *ter-wall, ſince which there has been no ac-* " *cident in that room, now five years ago.*

It has never been determined how long the miaſma or effluvia of the plague, when ſhut up in merchandize or effects, may remain active; there is reaſon to believe that it may many months; there are, indeed, proofs of it in every lazaretto in the Mediterranean, (as well as the contagion brought ſo far as Holland and England in former times) where there are often accidents happen to thoſe who open cotton bales and other packages; and this fomes, probably, was only the perſpiration or effluvia from infected perſons, who laboured at the packing, or perhaps have lain down on ſuch merchandize, or fomes attached to their clothes, though they themſelves were not infected; but if by ſome accident cotton embued with the pus of peſtiferous buboes or carbuncles ſhould be by ſome accident (which is not impoſſible) packed into the cotton ſent to Europe, how long ſuch dried pus would retain its infectious quality is not known, but it is to be feared that it might be very long, though it is to be hoped that, like the matter of the ſmall pox, it may loſe its contagious quality of itſelf in a certain time without airing.

It

It is, however, evident that expoſure to the air will deſtroy this infectious quality; that great cold (as has been ſeen in the inſtances quoted from Mertens) will deſtroy it very ſuddenly; and it would ſeem alſo, that the rays of the ſun and a drying wind will alſo, though not ſo rapidly, arreſt its poiſon, and deſtroy it: on this is grounded quarantine, the utility of which no rational man can now doubt, though formerly ſuch doubts have exiſted. But all quarantines are of no effect where the merchandize are not *opened and aired*; and as that is not the caſe in England nor in Holland, thoſe lazarettoes are of no kind of uſe; they retard trade without ſecuring the country from infection. The quarantines in the Mediterranean only are efficient.

In a ſeparate chapter, treating on the Levant trade, I ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak more at large on quarantine, and the neceſſity of making other regulations in this country, than thoſe which at preſent exiſt. Dr. Ruſſel, indeed, has collected every thing that has been ſaid by others, and has turned this matter ſo ably and ſo fully himſelf, it may ſeem ſuperfluous to ſay more on that head; but it appears to me, that he has not repreſented the danger ſo ſtrongly as he ſaw it; there

there now exiſts a neceſſity of ſpeaking out more plainly.

We may add another cauſe of depopulation, the tyranny of the paſhas, who, in ſome parts of Aſia, ſo much impoveriſh the people, that they prevent marriages being ſo frequent as they are where there is leſs danger of being unable to maintain a family; and this gives riſe to an abominable vice, which brings ſterility with it, and when men are ſo degraded as to become habituated to it, they loſe the natural inſtinct in man for the fair ſex.

Polygamy itſelf is an inſtitution experience proves to be ſo little favourable to population, that the Chriſtian families are generally obſerved to be more prolific than the Mahomedans.

Depopulation is firſt perceived in the country. Cities are filled up with new recruits of inhabitants from the country; but when the cities become deſert, and that not merely by the decay of a particular branch of commerce or manufacture, or any other ſimilar cauſe, but for want of people to emigrate from the country, we may eaſily believe that depopulation has reached nearly its laſt ſtage. This is the caſe even in thoſe parts of the Turkiſh empire where manufactures exiſt; where

where there is bread for thoſe who will ſeek employment; even in theſe places the country is alſo deſert, villages uninhabited, and fields, and gardens, and orchards lying waſte.

Let us take a view of the preſent ſtate of ſome of the moſt conſiderable cities of Aſia.

Aleppo (Haleb) is the beſt built city in the Turkiſh dominions, and the people are reputed the moſt polite. The late Dr. Ruſſel (in his Natural Hiſtory of Aleppo) calculated the number of inhabitants, in his time, at about 230,000; at preſent there are not above 40 or 50,000. This depopulation has chiefly taken place ſince 1770. As this city is built of a kind of marble, and the houſes are vaulted, they are not ſubject to decay and fall in ruins, though they remain uninhabited; they ſtand a monument of the deſtruction of the human race: whole ſtreets are uninhabited and bazars abandoned. Fifty or ſixty years ago were counted forty large villages in the neighbourhood, all built of ſtone; their ruins remain, but not a ſingle peaſant dwells in them. The plague viſits Aleppo every ten or twelve years. About four years ago there was at Aleppo one of the moſt dreadful famines ever known any where.

The whole coaſt of Syria, which a few years ago was tolerably populous, is now almoſt a deſert. Tripoli, Sidon, Laodecia, are

inſignificant

inſignificant places, and the country around them almoſt abandoned. Maundrell, about a century ago, complained of the rapid depopulation of Syria; but from his account it was then in a flouriſhing condition compared with its preſent ſtate.

Moſul has loſt half its inhabitants, and is in a ruinous ſtate.

Diarbekir was the moſt populous city in the Turkiſh empire but a few years ago; it might ſtill have been counted among the firſt cities in the world for magnitude, and, notwithſtanding the exaggerated accounts of Cairo and Conſtantinople, it contained more people in its walls than either of theſe cities. In 1756, there were 400,000 inhabitants, at preſent there are only 50,000. In 1757, ſwarms of locuſts devoured all the vegetation of the ſurrounding country, and occaſioned a famine; an epidemic ſickneſs followed, which carried off 300,000 ſouls in the city of Diarbekir, beſides thoſe who periſhed in the adjacent villages. The plague viſits this country every thirty or forty years.

At *Merdin* there are about 1,000 ſouls. The ſickneſs of 1757 was fatal to this city and its environs: the greateſt part of the town is uninhabited; it is ſubject to endemical ſickneſſes.

Bagdat contained from 125 to 130,000 inhabitants; at preſent there are ſcarcely 20,000.

20,000. The plague of 1773 carried off two-thirds of the people. Here likewiſe are ſeen whole ſtreets and bazars deſolate.

Baſſora (or Balſora, i. e. Bi-al-ſura, called by the Arabs often Al-ſura) contained, twenty years ago, nearly 100,000 inhabitants; the laſt accounts from there mention only 7 or 8,000.

Between *Angora* and Conſtantinople there is a conſtant communication by caravans: there are old people at Conſtantinople who remember forty or fifty villages in the road, of which no veſtiges now remain. (In theſe parts the buildings are not durable, being chiefly timber frames filled with brick or earth, and plaſtered over.) An Engliſh merchant of my acquaintance, whoſe trade as well as his father's was between theſe two cities and Smyrna, has a liſt in his books of all the towns or villages in the road, of which about fifty are not known, even by name, to the preſent conductors of caravans. No longer ago than 1768, it was aſſerted, that upwards of two hundred villages in this part of the country had been forſaken, on account of the oppreſſions exerciſed over the inhabitants.

Though we ſhould admit that the people in Turkey multiply as much as it is poſſible for the human ſpecies to do (which is however very far from being the caſe) yet ſtill it

is

is impoſſible that the fruitfulneſs of the women can keep pace with the mortality of the plague, and the other ſickneſſes which afflict this empire, particularly in Aſia. If ſtill there be a conſiderable number of people diſperſed over this vaſt tract of country, what muſt not the population have been a few centuries ago? Collectively indeed the number is ſomewhat conſiderable, but each diſtrict, conſidered ſeparately, is a deſert compared with the moſt thinly inhabited region in Europe.

If we proceed to a regular calculation, and take for a datum the greateſt number of inhabitants theſe countries could maintain four centuries ago, and allow the greateſt number of births experience of the moſt prolific nations will juſtify; and, on the other hand, deduct at every period they are viſited by the plague and other ſickneſſes the number of deaths which then take place, the reſult will be a much ſmaller number of inhabitants than there now really exiſts; if we reaſon *a poſteriori*, we ſhall find that four centuries ago there were a much greater number than it is poſſible there could have been in fact.

It is therefore reaſonable to conclude, that depopulation could not formerly have made ſo rapid a progreſs as at preſent; and that in a century

a century more, things remaining in their preſent ſituation, the Turkiſh empire will be nearly extinct.

Smyrna is the only city in Turkey where depopulation does not appear; but how often are not its inhabitants renewed? It is the only place of conſiderable trade in Turkey, and from the reſort of foreign ſhips, as it is the centre of export and import trade, muſt long continue to flouriſh.

It is worthy of remark, that the Curds in the mountains, and other independent or rebellious tribes, who do not mix with the Turks, are exempt from the mortality occaſioned by all the calamities which afflict the countries more immediately under the iron ſceptre of the porte.

I ſhould have mentioned a part of Bulgaria, and a great part of European Turkey, except the countries towards the Adriatic and Hungary, as almoſt deſtitute of inhabitants. This ſtate of the country is particularly ſtriking on the road from Belgrade through Sophia, Phillippopolis, and Adrianople, to Conſtantinople. The north or north-eaſtern part of Bulgaria is populous.

In taking a ſeparate view of European Turkey, of Greece, and of Egypt, we ſhall find ſimilar traces of that devaſtation, occaſioned by the complicated evils under which

this empire has ſo long groaned; at preſent I ſhall pay a particular conſideration to the ſtate of the capital itſelf.

Conſtantinople is the more deſerving of our enquiry, becauſe, erroneous as calculations of the number of inhabitants in great cities uſually are, none have been more exaggerated than the population of this city.

The cauſes of this error were probably various, as, firſt, the ſituation of the city on the aſcent of a hill, which, ſhewing every houſe in it, and hiding the voids between them, makes it appear to the greateſt advantage.

Secondly, the crowd of people appears to be prodigious in the ſtreets leading to the cuſtom-houſe, to the harbour (to croſs which the boats are all ſtationed at a very few landing places or *ſcales*) to the great bazars or markets, to the porte, to the baths, and to the principal moſques; but it ſhould be obſerved, that theſe are all ſituated in the ſame part of the city, and that every one who goes out, either for buſineſs or pleaſure, paſſes through theſe ſtreets, and travellers very rarely go farther into the city, where they would find ſtreets nearly deſerted, and graſs growing in many of them, notwithſtanding their narrowneſs.

Thirdly, ſtrangers (and I include moſt foreign

reign miniſters, who are groſsly impoſed on by the ignorance of their drogomans or interpreters) are miſled by the accounts they receive of the number of janizaries, of boſtangees, of boatmen, of artiſans, of ſhopkeepers, &c. without knowing that one and the ſame perſon is commonly in two or three of theſe capacities; for inſtance, almoſt every boatman is a boſtangee or a janizary, and the greateſt part of the ſhopkeepers and artiſans are janizaries. We muſt rely on real calculation.

Firſt calculation.—In Conſtantinople and its environs there are daily conſumed from nine to eleven thouſand kilos of corn. Experience has proved, that one perſon conſumes nine kilos a year, one with another. One kilo of wheat is twenty-two okes, which renders eighteen okes of flour, of which they make twenty-ſeven okes of bread, as their bread is very moiſt, made into flat cakes ſeemingly half baked. An oke is about two pounds and three quarters Engliſh avoirdupois weight. (In France, one pound of wheat produces exactly one pound of bread. This was the rule obſerved by their government with reſpect to the price of bread.) According to this calculation, the medium number of inhabitants would be 426,000 ſouls; and this miſled Sir James Porter, formerly

Engliſh ambaſſador at the porte, as it has done many others, who rely on the information received from interpreters.

It is the policy of the porte, or rather of the vizirs, to keep the price of bread low at the capital; and it is generally cheaper there than at a day or two's journey diſtant. The *miri* ſolely diſtributes the corn, not to the city only, as people have concluded, but to all its ſuburbs, as *Pera*, *Galata*, the neighbouring villages, to the city of *Scutari (Eſcudar,)* and all along the channel of Conſtantinople, which is bordered with large villages to *Kuchuk Chikmagi*, commonly called *Ponte-piccolo*, and thence in a line to *Borgos* and to *Domuſderé*, on the coaſt of the Black Sea, to the *Princes Iſlands*, to nine large villages in Aſia behind Scutari, and thence in a line north, to all the country as far as the Black Sea.

Some years, from 14 to 16,000 kilos of corn have been conſumed. A conſiderable quantity muſt be allowed for the conſumption of veſſels of all denominations that frequent the port, and when corn is dearer in the country than the price at Conſtantinople fixed by the *miri*, it may reaſonably be ſuppoſed that ſome little contraband is carried on.

From

From all this it muſt appear, that not above one half of the corn is conſumed in Conſtantinople, and conſequently, that the number of inhabitants does not exceed 213,000; and if we take for our rule thoſe years in which 16,000 kilos were conſumed (and which by the by have always been thoſe when corn was dear in the country) ſtill the number will be but 292,000; the medium between the higheſt and the loweſt year, when there was no remarkable plague, is 230,000, which I believe to be near the real number of inhabitants.

Second calculation.—The *kaſſab baſhi* (or chief of the butchers) through whoſe office all cattle for ſlaughter muſt paſs, diſtributes to Conſtantinople, Scutari, &c. from 2,500 to 3,000 ſheep a week, or 130,000 to 156,000 a year. It muſt be obſerved, that the Turks eat very little beef; ſome fiſh indeed, and fowls, but the quantity is trifling to the mutton. At Paris they conſumed 10,400 ſheep a week, beſides beef, and 630 hogs, ſalt-fiſh, &c. and one million pounds of bread daily. The annual conſumption of Paris was about 12,800 muids of corn (36,864,000 pounds); 77,000 oxen; 120,000 calves; 32,000 barrels of herrings, 540,000 ſheep, and 32,400 hogs, beſides other articles.

Suppoſe the French to eat only the ſame quantity of bread as the Turks, (and I believe there is not much difference,) the calculation, applied to Paris, would make the number of inhabitants to be about one million.

There are, however, a few ſheep killed by contraband, that have not paſſed through the hands of the *kaſſab baſhi*, and the butchers dependent on him, but their number is very ſmall, as the practice is attended with dangerous conſequences, and the profit ariſing from it inconſiderable.

This calculation of meat produces fewer inhabitants than that of corn, and we muſt take rice into the account to make it anywiſe adequate; but it at leaſt proves the former not to have been too low.

Third calculation.—From about 1770 to 1777, there was no plague at Conſtantinople. The dead, which were carried out of the gates of the city, where a regular regiſter is kept (except when, in time of the plague, they ſurpaſs one thouſand a day, after which they are not counted) amounted only to 5,000 one year with another. This number, multiplied by 36, the largeſt number which poſſibly can be taken, though Conſtantinople is very healthy, and the Turks temperate, gives only 180,000 inhabitants. It muſt be obſerved,

obſerved, that ſome conſiderable people are buried in the city, in their gardens or private burial grounds, and ſome are carried to the cemeteries of Pera and Scutari, an account of all of which is not taken, as ſeveral on that ſide of the city do not paſs the gates: if we allow 1,000 a year for theſe, which is certainly much beyond the truth, by this calculation there would appear to be 216,000 inhabitants. As to the ſuburbs of Pera and Galata, if they are to be included as making a part of Conſtantinople, they are not very conſiderable, conſiſting only of a few long ſtreets. The number of ſouls they contain I have forgotten, and my memorandum is miſlaid: I counted the houſes.

Fourth calculation.—The ground on which Conſtantinople ſtands is not ſo extenſive as Paris. Count Choiſſeul Gouffier, the French ambaſſador, had an exact plan made of it by a Mr. Kauffer, a very good geometrician, which proves this fact; and whoever walks acroſs the city in different directions may convince himſelf of its accuracy. The ſtreets in Paris are very narrow, the houſes four and ſix ſtories high, and inhabited from top to bottom; the ſtreets in Conſtantinople are alſo narrow. The churches, hotels, &c. of Paris, do not take up near ſo much ground as the moſques, baths, palaces, gardens, (of

which whole ſtreets on the upper and back parts have one to each houſe), the ſeraglio, houſes of the great, ſhops, and bazars, where people do not live, &c. The houſes in Conſtantinople are ſpacious, except the very crowded quarter by the water ſide; they are compoſed of a ground-floor *(rez de chauſſée)* which compriſes the kitchen, a ſtable, waſh-houſe, ſtore rooms, &c. a room to receive ſtrangers, and a yard in the centre, except in the above mentioned crowded quarter; over this there is but one ſtory, where the family lives. This is the general conſtruction of all the houſes; they differ only in ſize and the number of apartments. It is a very unuſual thing for two families to live in one houſe; it would be an indecency, and amount almoſt to a crime, except it be two brothers, or a father and a ſon, among the poorer people. Hence it follows demonſtratively, that there cannot be above one fourth of the number of inhabitants in Conſtantinople, which there are in Paris, and whatever objection may be made to my other calculations, this cannot be confuted.

We may therefore conclude, that the population of Conſtantinople is leſs than 300,000 ſouls at preſent, and that it never could have been much more within the walls, with their mode of building houſes.

In

In the year 1777, there were 5,700 private and public boats of all ſizes in the port of Conſtantinople, and in all the villages to the Black Sea. This number is great, but the ſituation of the city muſt be conſidered, and that every one muſt go in a boat who goes into the country, at leaſt to the part frequented, which is acroſs the water, or to the villages, all built by the water ſide, and almoſt inacceſſible by land; that there are ſcarcely any kind of carriages; that the inhabitants of Conſtantinople take great pleaſure in going on the water, and great numbers have boats of their own, almoſt all who can afford it; and that they make no uſe of carriages. In Paris, there were 12,500 coaches or carriages, and infinitely fewer people go in carriages in Paris, than they do in boats in Conſtantinople.

The Turks tell you indeed, and perhaps believe it, that there are 72,000 moſques in Conſtantinople. The Chriſtians out of vanity, to make their ſect appear conſiderable, magnify their own numbers, but no credit is to be given to them; theſe aſſertions cannot be oppoſed to calculations founded on facts.

Cairo is another city, the magnitude of which has been much exaggerated. Volney ſays, the number of inhabitants are 250,000 ſouls. I had an account of the population of

Cairo from a very ſenſible Armenian, who had lived twelve years there, which agreed nearly with Volney's; he made the number to be 230,000. Volney further ſays (on what foundation he does not mention) that all Egypt contains 2,300,000 ſouls—however, the population is there better known than in other parts of Turkey.

The people of the country tell us of 300,000 dying in a year of the plague, in Cairo, but no reliance is to be placed on their calculations.

Various are the opinions of writers and travellers with reſpect to the number of inhabitants in the Turkiſh empire, and difficult, certainly it is, to make a calculation with any degree of accuracy, in a country where there are no regiſters kept of births and burials, (except at Conſtantinople,) or other events which concern the general Mahomedan population of the cities, and where, in the country, not only the ſize, but the number of villages is unknown; there are, beſides, wandering tribes and independent diſtricts, ſuch as the mountains inhabited by the Curds, as wholly unknown in Turkey as in Europe.

With reſpect to Chriſtians and Jews the caſe is different; they keep regular regiſters of their births and burials; but as they remain

main in the ſeveral places they are made, and no account of them is tranſmitted to the government, it is impoſſible for any individual to collect them; nor indeed can one always rely on the affirmation of the biſhops or other perſons, who have the regiſters, without actual inſpection of the books; for ſometimes out of vanity they augment the ſtatement of their population, and ſometimes out of policy with regard to the Turks, they diminiſh the account of their numbers, as they are often taxed or fined *in a body*, to pay certain ſums to a paſha (ſuch unjuſt demands are called *avanias*,) and the ſmaller their numbers appear, they hope the leſs will be the ſum impoſed on them; it therefore requires addreſs even to get at theſe regiſters, which, after all, have not the accuracy of ſimilar documents in Chriſtian countries.

The only datum which we can in anywiſe form a calculation upon, is the karatch, or capitation tax, on all male Chriſtians and Jews above the age of fourteen or fifteen. By knowing the ſum this tax is farmed at (which is leſs than the ſum the collectors receive, and therefore not very accurate) and, more or leſs, the ſum each male pays, we have ſome kind of data to reaſon from. This calculation gives nine million of ſouls; but it is

to

to be remembered, that there is a part of the empire in which the inhabitants are independent, and conſequently pay no capitation, as will be ſeen in the next chapter. The Greeks calculate their numbers to be ſeven millions in all parts of the empire, and there are not many in the diſtant provinces far from Greece.

The only method of calculating the Mahomedan inhabitants would be, the proportion they bear to the Chriſtians in the different cities and provinces, and of which there are ſome vague accounts. In many places there are ten Chriſtians to one Mahomedan, and in others ten Mahomedans to one Chriſtian; in ſome, their numbers are nearly equal. Were I to make a gueſs (for a calculation I could not call it) my opinion with reſpect to the whole population of the Mahomedans in the empire would as widely differ from the generally received notions, as it does with reſpect to the particular population of Conſtantinople.

If their numbers have greatly decreaſed, we need ſeek no other cauſe to account for it than the plague, though there are many others co-operating with great deſtruction.

If we take for granted, that there were fifty millions of people on the continent two centuries ago; that the births are to the burials

burials as twelve to ten, or that one in thirty-ſix die every year, in the common courſe of mortality, or that the number of births to the living are as one to 26, 27, or 28, or any calculation more favourable to the increaſe of population, we ſhall ſtill find that the mortality occaſioned by the plague, taken on an average (as its ravages are ſtated in theſe pages) would reduce theſe fifty millions to little more than ten at this day.

CHAPTER VIII.

On the State of the Turkiſh Provinces.

IT is not enough to confine our view to the metropolis, in order to form an accurate judgment of a great empire; there, indeed, is the centre of government and of opulence, there are placed the ſprings which guide the whole, and thither are brought the products of the general exertion; but it is not from the apparent tranquillity and greatneſs of the capital that we can form a juſt idea of the ſtate of the provinces. Lulled into a fatal ſecurity within the receſſes of his palace, the tyrant frequently knows not the ſcenes of ruin and devaſtation which, under ſanction of his name, are acted at a diſtance by his creatures; he perceives not the increaſing uneaſineſs and diſaffection of his oppreſſed ſubjects, until the tempeſt of rebellion, rolling rapidly forward, breaks over his aſtoniſhed head.

The relaxation of the bands of power has gone too far in the Turkiſh empire not to be,

be, in ſome degree, perceived by the porte; they cannot but feel the weakneſs of their authority over moſt of the diſtant *paſhaliks*; but as ignorance is always confident, they, perhaps, over-rate their remaining power, and truſt to the ſhadow of a name whoſe terror has long ſince paſſed away.

Still, it muſt be acknowledged, that there are circumſtances which counteract the tendency of their political ſyſtem to fall in ruins; there are prejudices, habits, and local peculiarities, which ſerve to hold together the barbarous inhabitants of thoſe extenſive regions. In order to judge of their importance, it will be neceſſary to conſider, in detail, the ſituation of the different provinces, moral and phyſical; to trace "*mores hominum multorum* "*et urbes*," not merely the ſtrength and extent of the countries, but the ſpirit, manners, and diſpoſitions of the people.

Of the dependent provinces of the Turkiſh empire, the firſt rank in the eye of an enlightened European will be held by the deſcendants of that people from whom emanated the ſcience and the refinement of our hemiſphere; of the Grecians, therefore, I ſhall treat at large in another part of this work; and I propoſe to conſider them ſeparately, becauſe the diſtinctions, religious and political, exiſting between them and their Mahomedan

homedan conquerors, together with the relations they bear to the Chriſtian ſtates in general, will furniſh ample matter for a ſeparate diſcuſſion; I ſhall here only remark, that the captain paſha, or grand admiral, is paſha of the Archipelago, and the fleet, or a diviſion, goes annually to collect the tribute: it is then that the poor Greeks moſt feel the weight of the iron ſceptre that governs them, and all the inſults and oppreſſion of the vile ſatraps of the tyrant. When a ſhip of the fleet arrives in a port, all the people who can, fly to the mountains or into the country, others ſhut themſelves up in their houſes, without daring to ſtir out. Every one on the roads are plundered by the ſoldiers and ſailors of the ſhips, and if they are not cut, or wounded with a piſtol ball, or killed outright, they eſteem themſelves happy; even in the ſtreets it is the ſame. Thus the poor Greeks pay another contribution to the fleet, which is heavier to thoſe on whom it unhappily falls than that to the ſultan.

If a woman or a girl, or even a boy, is met by them in any place not immediately under the eye of their officers, or where they might be expoſed to reſiſtance, they are infallibly victims to their brutality. In weak towns and villages this ſometimes happens in the ſtreets. The officers cannot always, and often

ten will not reſtrain them, except where the crime is too public, and complaint might be made to the porte. The captains and officers raiſe contributions for themſelves on the principal inhabitants under various pretences. The Greeks are generally prevented from complaining, out of fear that the next ſhip which comes will take revenge. When the ſhips of war are met at ſea, they are little better than pirates to the Greeks and Raguſans.

With regard to the other countries which are, or have recently been ſubjected to the Turkiſh yoke, I ſhall here give them a brief conſideration, from which it will appear that their ſituation, relatively to ſubordination and internal management, is ſuch as might reaſonably be expected from the wretched ſyſtem of policy which we have previouſly inveſtigated.

Caſting our view over the paſhaliks or governments moſt immediately connected with the ſeat of empire, we ſhall find them diſtracted, diſorganiſed, and ſcarcely yielding more than a nominal obedience to the ſultan: ſuch are the paſhaliks of Aſia Minor and Syria. With regard to the more diſtant provinces, they may be conſidered connected with the porte rather by treaty than as integral parts of the empire. In this light I

view

view Moldavia and Walachia on the north, and Egypt on the ſouth. Theſe unfortunate countries (unfortunate in their political regulation, however bleſt by the bounty of nature) ſuffer, though in different degrees, from the harpy touch of Turkiſh deſpotiſm. I ſhall conſider them ſingly, and add to theſe obſervations a review of the ſtate of the Crimea, with ſome remarks on thoſe Tatar hordes, whoſe ferocity has either been ſoothed or ſubdued by a ſubjection to Ruſſia.

A ſlight ſketch of the ſtate of rebellion or independence of the chief paſhaliks will eaſily demonſtrate the weakneſs and inefficacy of the preſent political ſyſtem of Turkey.

The great paſhalik of Bagdad has been in reality independent, except at very ſhort intervals, ever ſince Achmet Paſha, who defended it againſt Nadir Shah (the famous uſurper of Perſia.) The ſultan only confirms the paſha the people, and principally the ſoldiery of Bagdad, have appointed to govern them with deſpotic power; the firman, however, ſent on theſe occaſions, always mentions the paſha as being nominated by the ſublime porte to this high and truſty office, in conſideration of his virtues, and ſome ſignal ſervice he has rendered to the empire; and this farce is kept up by a new firman ſent every year to continue him in office, as if

if the porte really had the power to remove him. The porte draws no revenue from this extenſive province. The paſha, who has always a large army in his pay, and entirely devoted to him, ſends regularly an account of the revenue of his government, which he always proves is entirely abſorbed by the expences of the army, which he ſtates as neceſſary to be kept on a formidable footing, to ſerve the empire againſt any attacks of the Perſians or Arabs, and by the reparation of fortreſſes, which formerly exiſted, and of which no veſtige now remains, &c. Whenever there is a war with an European power, and the paſha of Bagdad is called on to furniſh his quota of troops, he pretends the neceſſity of keeping them all at home, to defend the province againſt the attacks of the Arabs, and finds means to provoke ſome Arab nation to war; or, in connivance with the prince of the Montefiks (an Arab nation on the banks of the Euphrates) carries on a ſham war. In ſhort, the ſultan is the nominal ſovereign of Bagdad, but the paſha has the real ſovereign independent power in his hands.

In Armenia Major, and all the neighbouring countries, there are whole nations or tribes of independent people, who do not

even acknowledge the porte, or any of its paſhas.

The three Arabias do not acknowledge the ſovereignty of the ſultan, who only poſſeſſes, in theſe countries, a few unimportant towns.

The paſha of Ahiſka cares very little for the porte; and the famous Haggi-Ali-Yenikli-Paſha, of Trabiſonde, was the maſter of all that country; he could bring a large army into the field, and often ſet the porte at defiance.

In the country about Smyrna, there are great *agas*, who are independent lords, and maintain armies, and often lay that city under contribution. The porte never gains but a temporary influence, by ſometimes intermeddling in their quarrels.

All the inhabitants of the mountains, from Smyrna to Paleſtine, are perfectly independent, and are conſidered by the porte as enemies, whom they attack whenever there is an opportunity. They are compoſed of different nations, who have their own ſovereigns or lords, and are even of different religions. Thoſe near Smyrna are Mahomedans; farther down come the Cordes, a very ferocious and faithleſs people. In the neighbourhood of Aleppo there are various ſects of religion. The mountains of Antilibanus are inhabited by

by Druſes and Chriſtians, and have, at times, been formidable to the porte; they have more than once taken Damaſcus, and plundered it.

The nation of Druſes would here deſerve particular mention; but as there are accounts of them already publiſhed, which appeared to me, when I was in that country, very exact, I ſhall forbear ſaying more about them; I cannot, however, avoid taking notice of a great miſtake the Ruſſians made in the laſt war but one, in attacking thoſe people in conjunction with Shech Omar al Daher, of Acri, between whom there never exiſted much harmony. Had they reconciled their difference, which they might have done, they would have had for allies all the countries from Egypt to the Curdes, who, probably, would have joined the league, and the army they could have brought into the field would have been more numerous than that of the ſultan; they would have been maſters of Damaſcus, Aleppo, and all that part of the empire.

The very conſiderable country, which was for ſo many years under the juriſdiction of the ſhech of Acri, never paid any revenue to the porte, and was by it even conſidered as an independent ſtate. Shech Dahar was beſieged in his capital, after the concluſion of

the war, by the famous great-admiral, Haſſan Paſha; he himſelf was killed, and the country reduced to obedience. The porte appointed a paſha to govern it, and he has now become as independent, and more formidable, even than was Dahar himſelf.

Between the country of the Druſes and that of Acri there is a nation inhabiting the mountains on the back of Tyre, (which alſo belongs to them, though there are no houſes now ſtanding on that once famous ſpot,) called *Metuali*; they are of the ſect of Ali, and are ſuch inveterate enemies to the Turks, that they murder every one who comes into their country, or that they can ſurprize.

On the coaſt of Syria, the ſultan only virtually poſſeſſes the ports of Latachia (Laodicea) a ſmall ſhallow harbour and a ruined town; Alexandretta (or Scanderon) the port of Aleppo, a miſerable village, the air of which is ſo bad, that it, perhaps, has not its equal in the world for inſalubrity; Tripoli and Sidon, Jaffa, and a few very inſignificant places. The caravans, which go from Scanderon to Aleppo, are obliged to go by the way of Antioch, as all the country, through which the direct road leads, belongs to the Curds, who will not ſuffer the Turks to paſs it.

All Egypt is independent. The paſha ſent

to,

to Cairo is in effect a priſoner during his government, which is only nominal; the porte draws little or no revenue from it, and no troops, except a few fanatics in time of war with the Chriſtians. The Turks have at different times got poſſeſſion of Cairo, but never could maintain themſelves in the government. The laſt inſtance of their ſubjecting the capital was by the late Haſſan, captain paſha, but it was ſoon loſt again; yet Conſtantinople depends very much on Egypt for proviſions, and above all for rice. The Ruſſians, when they had a fleet in the Mediterranean, very much diſtreſſed the porte, by cutting off the communication with Egypt, and might have done it much more, had they not permitted many neutral veſſels to ſupply them.

In Europe, the Morea, Albania, Epirus, and Scutari, are more or leſs in a ſtate of rebellion; Boſnia, Croatia, &c. obey the porte only as long as it ſuits them, and the ſultan reaps little benefit from them. Theſe latter countries afford the moſt robuſt and warlike ſoldiers in the empire; they are accuſtomed to arms from their infancy, as they are continually fighting among themſelves, diſtrict againſt diſtrict, and often even village againſt village, beſides individual quarrels of families. Theſe troops would be

of great uſe to the ſultan in his wars, but they will not go far from their houſes, and ſerve only when it is to defend their own country: the emperor of Germany has had to contend with them, while only the enervated and daſtardly ſoldiery of Aſia has been oppoſed to Ruſſia.

Lately we have ſeen almoſt all European Turkey in arms againſt the porte, Adrianople in imminent danger, and even Conſtantinople itſelf trembling for its ſafety.

I have ſaid that Egypt is independent; a few words on the peculiar relation of that country to Turkey will not be improper, perhaps. The diviſion of the ſpiritual dignities of the Mahomedans took place, A. D. 970, in an early period of their religion, and the Fatimite kalifs eſtabliſhed themſelves in Egypt, claiming to themſelves the title of *commander of the faithful*, heretofore borne by the kalifs of Bagdad.

Both theſe kalifs ſucceſſively yielded to the force or policy of the Turkiſh princes. The laſt of the Egyptian kalifs called in the Turks to his aſſiſtance againſt the Chriſtian cruſaders, which ſervice being accompliſhed, the new allies *turned againſt the kalif himſelf, and ſtrangled him*, A. D. 1171, when a new dynaſty commenced in the perſon of Salah-ud-din.

The

The Egyptian princes long maintained an independent power by the aſſiſtance of their Mamaluk troops, until, in 1518, they were reduced to ſubjection by Selim the ſon of Bayazet, and have ever ſince remained attached, nominally at leaſt, to the porte; but as their beys were not deprived of their power, and to this day each is governor, or rather ſovereign of a diſtrict, theſe in fact exerciſe a tyranny of the worſt kind over a country, which would be one of the moſt productive in the univerſe, were property protected, while they render little either of tribute or ſubmiſſion to the port.

This corps of *Mamaluks* is kept up, to this day, by *ſlaves* bought from the ſame countries, viz. Georgia, Circaſſia, Abaſſa, and Mingrelia, and moſtly purchaſed at Conſtantinople, for their children, born in the country, are not admitted into the corps; indeed it is affirmed, and it is very remarkable, that they have but few children, and their families never extend beyond two generation. This is accounted for by their being greatly addicted to an unnatural vice.

The actual power reſides in the Mamaluks, and the bey who has moſt of them in his ſuite is conſequently the moſt powerful. As to the paſha ſent by the porte, he has at

different times had more or leſs influence, but is in general a mere cypher, obliged to ſubmit to the will of the beys, who diſmiſs him when they pleaſe. They have ſometimes entirely thrown off all appearance of ſubmiſſion to the porte; and at preſent, as well as generally, their obedience is only nominal, and the paſha is in reality a priſoner in the caſtle of Cairo, which is the place fixed for his reſidence.

The tribute which Egypt ought to ſend the porte is frequently withheld, or, if tranſmitted, it is diminiſhed by deductions for the reparation of canals, fortreſſes, &c. at the will of the beys. Yet a long proceſſion of mules and camels ſets out annually from Egypt, with the pretended revenue for the ſultan, which, inſtead of ſilver, conſiſts moſtly of bags of rice, and, not unfrequently, ſtones.

The janizaries and Arab ſoldiers in the ſervice of the porte are but little able to enforce its authority, as they are few in number, and moſtly compoſed of artizans and perſons unaccuſtomed to arms. The Mamaluks, on the contrary, muſt be allowed to be moſt excellent cavalry.

In the beautiful country and climate of Egypt, it is diſtreſſing to conſider how little the advantages of nature are cultivated, and how

how much its evils are augmented by the ignorance and unaccountably groſs ſuperſtition of its inhabitants.

From a ſurvey of Egypt I turn to the northern part of the empire, to contemplate the provinces of Walachia and Moldavia, which, like the laſt mentioned country, are rather attached to the empire by treaty than by abſolute ſubjection, and who retain at leaſt independence as to matters of internal regulation; their inhabitants are, however, more oppreſſed than perhaps any people in the empire; nor could they poſſibly bear ſuch exactions, were it not for the wonderful fertility of their ſoil.

Their waywodes (or princes as they are generally ſtill called) are Greeks, who purchaſe their offices for large ſums of money, the porte generally receiving about 80,000 pounds ſterling for every nomination, and who are obliged to maintain themſelves in their poſts, by continually feeing thoſe who can ſerve or hurt them at Conſtantinople; for beſides the complaints which frequently are made againſt them, other Greeks are continually caballing at the porte to get them removed, and to obtain their places. The waywodes muſt, beſides raiſing large ſums to defray all theſe expences, enrich themſelves, in order to live in affluence with a large train of dependents,

pendents, who follow them from Conſtantinople, and to ſecure a ſafe and ſplendid retreat to themſelves when recalled from their waywodſhips to their former homes, where, though the fear of puniſhment is ever hanging over them, and deſtroying their repoſe, they maintain within their own houſes a weak and oſtentatious magnificence. It is eaſy to conceive how much the miſerable ſubjects of their deſpotiſm, while in office, muſt ſuffer from the impoſitions neceſſary to anſwer ſuch calls of rapacity.

The boyars are obliged to furniſh money to the waywode, and they in return oppreſs the people by all kinds of exactions, excluſively of the public taxes, which go immediately into the waywode's purſe, and which are multiplied ad infinitum, and exacted with the utmoſt ſeverity; theſe taxes, which are not in proportion to the property of the people, aggravate them beyond deſcription; they murmur, but muſt ſubmit and pay.

Among the hardſhips of the Moldavians may be reckoned their being obliged to furniſh a ſupply of corn to Conſtantinople, at a certain price fixed when they firſt came under the Turkiſh yoke: this was originally eſtabliſhed as a favour to thoſe countries, but has now become an intolerable burthen, as

as the price now bears no proportion to the preſent value.

Another great cauſe of complaint is the paſſage through their country, or reſidence in it, of a Turkiſh army in time of war. The exceſſes which theſe undiſciplined hordes commit are beyond deſcription, plundering and laying waſte the country, and often deſtroying whole villages, and maſſacring their defenceleſs inhabitants; hence it is not unuſual for the inhabitants to flee with their moſt valuable effects to the woods and mountains for concealment, as ſoon as they hear of the approach of an army: I was myſelf a witneſs of the terror of the Moldavians for a ſimilar event. Being a priſoner, in 1778, at Galaz (when hoſtilities had taken place in ſome parts, between Ruſſia and the Turks, which had nearly ended in a war) I was awakened one night by the cries of women, and the noiſe of the preparations made by the whole town to flee, on a rumour (which proved groundleſs) of the approach of a Turkiſh army. I then learnt that every family was provided with a waggon, and one or more horſes, to eſcape in caſe of danger.

The Turkiſh ſoldiery, if they ſtay but a ſhort time in a place, cauſe ſo much havock, that the unfortunate Moldavians and Wa-

lachians, returning to their homes after theſe monſters have withdrawn, are for a conſiderable time unable to rebuild their houſes, and procure ſeed and other requiſites for the cultivation of their corn fields and vineyards, which the Turks have rooted up.

The following circumſtances will prove how much reaſon the Moldavians in particular have to prefer the dominion of Ruſſia to that of Turkey.

At the peace of Kainargi it was ſtipulated, that the waywode ſhould not be removed without the conſent of the court of Ruſſia, in order to deliver the people from the oppreſſion neceſſarily attendant on a frequent change of their rulers. The porte, however, in 1777, ſent to the waywode Gica a particular friend of his, who, pretending illneſs, requeſted Gica to pay him a viſit, under pretence of communicating to him affairs of ſecreſy; the attendants of the waywode were ſent out of the room, when a band of ruffians ruſhed into the apartment from a private door, and murdered this unhappy credulous man. A ſucceſſor was immediately appointed, without conſulting the court of Ruſſia, or its miniſter at Conſtantinople. This is the nation whoſe ſcrupulous obſervance of treaties is ſo much vaunted by ſome writers.

While

While Moldavia was in the hands of the Ruſſians, during the laſt war, Prince Potemkin treated the inhabitants with the utmoſt indulgence, and exempted them from all kind of taxes, ſo that they returned with great reluctance under the Turkiſh yoke. It is little conſolation to them to be governed by princes or governors of their own religion, for their ſituation, if not their inclination, makes them as rapacious as Turks. The contemptuous and humiliating treatment all ranks meet with from the Turks is impatiently borne by a race of people naturally haughty, and aſpiring for liberty and independence, and particularly the Boyars, who are treated by the Ruſſians as equals and as gentlemen, and, if they emigrate, are admitted into the civil or military ſervice.

If there were any deficiency of proof to eſtabliſh the miſerable debility of the Turkiſh government, with regard to its diſtant provinces, and the horrible devaſtation to which thoſe provinces are ſubject, we ſhould find it in the eulogiſt of Turkey, Mr. Peyſſonel. He was French conſul in the Crimea, in 1758, when a rebellion broke out, occaſioned by the extortions of the officers of the porte, relative to the *ichetirah*, or tranſporting of corn. The rebellious Tatars, to the number of eighty thouſand, pillaged and overrun,

overrun, in ſeven days, the province of Moldavia, carried off forty thouſand ſlaves, ſpread terror and deſolation on all ſides, and the porte had no other means of ſettling this diſturbance than by depoſing the reigning khan, Alim Guerrai, and placing in his room Krim Guerrai, the rebel chief. At this time, ſays Mr. Peyſſonel, we ſaw the plains of Kichela, covered, as far as the eye could reach, with male and female ſlaves of all ages, cattle, camels, horſes, ſheep, and all kinds of plunder, heaped together. The whole of this booty was taken from a Chriſtian province ſubject to the porte. Krim Guerrai, in return for his exaltation, endeavoured to cauſe the effects to be reſtored to their proprietors, and the priſoners to be ſet at liberty; but, notwithſtanding the vigorous and determined meaſures of this prince, he could only wreſt from the rapacious banditti under his command a ſmall part of their plunder. Of the ſlaves, many were ſecreted or ſold, and many dead from brutal treatment, ſo that only half the number of the priſoners returned to their country. This is the account of Peyſſonel, the friend of Krim Guerrai; but it is well known, that he himſelf had a part of the plunder, and that only ſuch were ſent back, whoſe age rendered them unfit for their purpoſes. I was informed, in Moldavia, from the

the regiſters, that there were above thirty thouſand ſouls, the flower of their youth, who never returned. Surely this picture of deſolating barbarity ſufficiently marks the character of the Tatar hordes; and if we add, that they were conſtantly making incurſions into Ruſſia, Poland, Circaſſia, &c. to carry off the inhabitants, plunder and burn the villages, it ſufficiently juſtifies the court of Ruſſia in taking poſſeſſion of this neſt of thieves and murderers, and reducing them to ſomething like ſocial order and ſubordination. Inſtead of being blamed, as the empreſs has been, by theſe Chriſtians, who always ſympathiſe with Turks, and by thoſe politicians who think the duration of their uſurped empire a deſirable object, ſhe ought to receive the thanks of all men, of whatever nation, and particularly of Chriſtians, who are not degraded by prejudices, or corrupted by the practice of ſimilar enormities. The whole reign of the Tatars has been an inſult to mankind, and a diſgrace to human nature, not inferior to that of the Ottoman ſultans. Was it to be expected that a power like Ruſſia ſhould ſuffer itſelf to be thus inſulted by a horde of ſavages, when ſhe could redreſs the grievance? and had ſhe not a *right* as ſovereign, as a Chriſtian, and as a friend to humanity, to protect her feeble neighbours, who

who had no other ſupport to look to, and whoſe plunder and depopulation ſtrengthen her enemy as well as theirs? She had a ſacred right, and the mouth is unholy which dares to arraign it.

The connection of the Tatar hordes with the Turks, both in origin and religion, induces me to review the ſtate of their moſt celebrated ſeat, the Crimea (or Krim) though it has now paſſed under the dominion of Ruſſia, and has been abandoned by a great part of its former inhabitants. To this I am the more prompted by the erroneous ideas which have been propagated in Europe relative to that meaſure, to the country in general, and to the nature of their ancient government, hitherto ſo little known. To explain all this, it may be neceſſary to preſent a ſketch of the Tatar modes of warfare, and their ſmall degree of civilization, and to notice the improved ſtate of manners and commerce which is ariſing under the foſtering care of Ruſſia.

The name of Tattar or Tatar, not Tartar, is common to a vaſt number of thoſe roving and uncultivated tribes, who inhabit the wide extent of country from the northern frontier of China to the borders of Hungary, and from among whom have ariſen, in darker ages, the conquerors and the founders of many

many mighty empires. The tribes on the north of the Euxine had, like many other countries bordering on the Turkiſh empire, been ſubjected to a kind of dependence; they yielded little in time of peace, and in war ſupplied only a predatory banditti, little leſs terrible to their friendly neighbours than to the hoſtile power.

In very early ages the empire of the Crimea (the ancient Cherſoneſus Taurica) aroſe out of the ruins of the ſtill more ancient and extenſive dominion of the khans of Kaptchak. It took its name from the town of Krim, of which little veſtiges now remain, and is at preſent called Eſki-Krim (or Old-Krim) but which was a place of great trade in the year 1237, when the Mongul Tatars eſtabliſhed their dominion in this peninſula. Theſe princes were wholly independent, until the Genoeſe, having eſtabliſhed themſelves there in the 15th century for the ſake of commerce, obtained ſuch an aſcendency as to depoſe or elect the native khans at pleaſure. Over the principal gate of Kaffa there ſtill exiſts a Genoeſe inſcription and the arms of the republic. The Turks having expelled the Genoeſe, began in like manner by reſpecting the independence of the khans, eſpecially as they had embraced the Mahomedan religion; but they ſoon aſſumed the

right of confirming their election, and finally, of nominating them to office. Under the hands of Turkey, the Black Sea, which had formerly been the ſcene of a very active commerce, was ſhut up by the narrow policy of the divan, and the ports of the Krim gradually loſt that ſplendor and magnificence now atteſted only by their ruins. No friend of humanity can do otherwiſe than rejoice that ſuch maſters have, by the events of war, been diſpoſſeſſed of this important country, and that it has fallen under the control of a power, whoſe more liberal and enlightened views tend to revive a decayed commerce, to poliſh barbarian ferocity, and to render a portion of the globe, which had been almoſt a deſert, again fertile and productive.

Immediately as the empreſs got poſſeſſion of the Krim, ſhe projected the recal of trade and manufactures to a ſpot ſo well ſituated for them; ſhe immediately, and at a great expence, formed new eſtabliſhments for that purpoſe, ſent a number of troops to protect her new dominions, and allowed the reigning khan to retire on a liberal penſion.

The following account of the former government of that country, which I had, in 1781, from Seid-Effendi, vizir to Shaheen Guerrai, the reigning khan, and which I found

found by other information to be perfectly accurate, I preſent as the more deſerving notice, as no juſt account of that government has hitherto appeared. To compare it with the ancient feudal governments, and to offer a number of conjectures which would ariſe from an inveſtigation of that ſubject, would be foreign to my preſent purpoſe, and a taſk I am not qualified to undertake, but it may furniſh matter for the ſpeculations of others.

The khan was always the eldeſt male of the *Guerrai* family, deſcended from *Gengis Khan*, except there was ſome natural incapacity which excluded him from the ſucceſſion, or that the country, which ſometimes happened, interfered, and elected another, but always one of the Guerrai family, and the eldeſt and neareſt to the right line of deſcent. Afterwards this family became very numerous, and it was difficult to determine who had the beſt claim, ſo that the khans were latterly wholly elective. Thoſe moſt concerned in the election were the beys and the murſas; but the general opinion of the nation was alſo conſidered, as the nomination of an unwarlike or unpopular khan would occaſion an oppoſition on the part of the people.

After the Turks became formidable to the Krim Tatars, the porte eſtabliſhed a right of approving the election, and afterwards of

appointing the khan ſolely. The beys and principal murſas (or myrſas) ſometimes wrote to Conſtantinople to ſolicit the ſovereignty for the prince whom they preferred, and ſometimes the candidates bribed the porte.

The khan retained his ſovereignty only during the pleaſure of the Ottoman ſultan, and annually a capugee-baſhi was ſent from Conſtantinople with a firman confirming him for the year to come. By the peace of Kainargi, in 1774, the Krim was declared independent, and the Tatars reſtored to their privilege of electing their own ſovereign.

If the khan was depoſed, it was by a firman (or hatti-ſherif) of the ſultan, brought from Conſtantinople by a capugee-baſhi. His depoſition was often the conſequence of complaints againſt him by the principal people of the Krim, or of diſſatisfaction on the part of the porte of his conduct in time of war, or tardineſs in ſupplying the capital with corn; but he was never put to death.

The laſt unfortunate khan, who reigned when I received this information, was an exception. He quitted Ruſſia, and retired to Conſtantinople, where he was at firſt received with great diſtinction, then exiled, and afterwards put to death.

The depoſed khans were ſometimes exiled

to a diſtant part of the empire, or one of the Greek iſlands, but generally the porte gave them a *chiftlik*, or kind of farm, conſiſting of a country-houſe and cultivated lands, between Conſtantinople and Adrianople, whither they carried with them their domeſtics, and ſuch as were attached to their fortunes. There are at preſent nearly three hundred princes of the family reſiding in thoſe parts, who ſometimes render the roads unſafe, as they or their people cannot entirely abandon their old cuſtom of plundering. They are the next heirs to the Ottoman throne, and the reigning family has often been nearly extinct. At preſent there are, beſides the ſultan, only two ſons, ſtill very young, of his late uncle Abd-ul-hamid. Selim himſelf has no children: he is much addicted to a vice which generally carries with it this puniſhment.

When the ſultan appointed a khan, he wrote to the four beys, informing them that he had named ſuch a prince for their ſovereign.

The khan was as deſpotic as the Ottoman ſultan in the execution of the law, which in common caſes was that of the koran; in extraordinary caſes, or where he did not chooſe to appeal to the law, there was no reſtraint on his power, except with reſpect to the beys families, as ſhall be hereafter men-

tioned, and in affairs which concerned the nation at large.

The khans had no land of their own, except a very little about Bagſhiſerrai.

All the ſons of the Guerrai family are ſtiled *ſultans*.

There was a council, or rather a ſtate *(état)* compoſed of the four eldeſt perſons of four families who have the title of bey (the ſame as the Arabic beg) or prince. The names of theſe families are Sherin, Barin (or Baron,) Manſur, and Sigevut.

The firſt family is very numerous; of the ſecond, two perſons only were living in 1782; of the Manſurs there are alſo many, but of the Sigevuts few. The Sherins, who are eſteemed the moſt noble, and to whom the ſovereignty would devolve, were the Guerrai family extinct, frequently marry daughters of the Guerrais, and ſometimes, though not often, out of the moſt conſiderable Myrſas families.

The khan was, by the conſtitution of the government, obliged to conſult them in matters of peace and war, and all matters which concerned the nation in general, and to confirm all matters of importance written by the khan to Conſtantinople, or any other courts, by their ſignature.

The khan could not put to death any one of the families of the beys, without permiſ-

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ſion from Conſtantinople; he could only impriſon them. Formerly they were judged by the other beys and the khan, and if the other beys were implicated in his crime, by the murſas, or body of landholders.

Neither the beys, nor any of their family, could ſerve the khan in any office whatever.

A bey could not ſell, or otherwiſe alienate the family lands and poſſeſſions, which were inherited, not by his children, but by his ſucceſſor in office or dignity. The money and moveable effects the beys could leave to whom they pleaſed, and it was in this manner that they provided for their children. All the individuals of the beys families were called murſas, except the perſon inveſted with the dignity of bey.

In criminal caſes, the beys as well as the murſas, on whoſe lands the crime was committed, ſeized the offender, and ſent him to the khan or other officer of juſtice. This is to be underſtood of capital offences; in caſes of leſs importance they might puniſh by beating.

There was another ſtate, compoſed of the murſas or proprietors of land, and who conſidered themſelves as a ſeparate claſs from the people; their ideas of diſtinction on this head exactly correſpond with thoſe re-

ceived in Europe, of *gentlemen* or *nobles*. The word murſa (in Perſian *mirſa*) ſignifies lord, or ſeigneur, and we ſhould tranſlate it *eſquire, lord of the manor*, or *leſſer baron*, while the beys are the *great barons* or *peers*.

The eldeſt ſons of the murſas inherited their father's lands, and not the eldeſt males of the family, as was the caſe with the beys. Of their money or other effects they diſpoſed as they pleaſed to their younger children. They had the ſame juriſdiction as the beys in caſes of offences committed on their lands, that is, beating or impriſoning, and ſending the offenders to the khan or other tribunals.

The khan could put to death a murſa, but he always, when the nature of the caſe admitted delay, judged the offender before the beys, or an aſſembly of the murſas, or ſuch of his friends who inſiſted on ſeeing juſtice done to him according to the koran.

In matters of national concern, or which might occaſion a general diſcontent, the khan aſſembled the *murſas* as well as the *four beys*; the latter acting always as a check on the great power of the khan, and reſtraining the power an union of the murſas ſometimes had rendered too dictating. In former times the beys and the murſas depoſed their ſovereign, when his conduct had occaſioned a general diſcontent; but this was conſidered as ſo

dangerous

dangerous a ſtep, that it was never recurred to, except in very urgent neceſſities.

The peaſants or country people, who formed the body of the nation, were free.

The peaſant, who farmed a piece of land for agriculture or paſture, paid to the bey or murſa, who was the owner, twenty per cent of the produce for rent.

If the land was his own, he paid only ten per cent. to the bey or murſa, in whoſe diſtrict it lay.

The peaſant diſpoſed of his property as he pleaſed; if he died inteſtate, the law of the koran decided the ſucceſſion.

When the khan raiſed an army for war, he ſent a ſummons to the beys and murſas to furniſh their quota, which was fixed in proportion to the number of people who dwelt on their poſſeſſions. Every bey or murſa commanded the body he brought into the field. The khan gives the ſoldiers neither pay nor proviſions; their officers or themſelves provided what was neceſſary till they paſſed their frontier, when they ſubſiſted on plunder, whether the country belonged to a friendly or an inimical power. Almoſt every Tatar had a horſe and arms of his own.

A part of the booty, which they always made whenever they paſſed their frontier, belonged to the khan, a part to their bey or murſa,

murſa, and the remainder to themſelves, which was generally the moſt conſiderable.

The beys nor the murſa were permitted to make war with one another; and the people were forbid to take a ſhare in their perſonal quarrels.

There was another claſs of the people, who dwelt in cities and towns, and who paid no rent to the beys or murſas for the ground their houſes ſtood on, or their gardens or fields, which belonged to themſelves, or they hired of other proprietors, as theſe lands or grounds belonged to the city or town; nor were they ſubject to be called out to war; they often, for the ſake of plunder, voluntarily joined the corps of ſome bey or murſa.

There were ſome other perſons in the Krim, who had the title of bey, but they did not belong to the *ſtate* or *état*, and were in effect only common murſas.

There was a claſs of people alſo called *courtiers*, *kapu-khalki*, people of the *porte* or gate, that is, the court, becauſe juſtice was anciently adminiſtered by the judge ſitting at his gate; they conſiſted of the vizir, khuznadar-baſhi, defterdar, akhtagibey, kapigi-baſhi, &c. The khan appointed any perſon he pleaſed to theſe offices, as murſas or their ſons, merchants, Turks, &c. and when they had an office, if they were of an inſignifi-

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cant family, they were called aga, and their ſons took the title of murſa. The beys and great murſas ſometimes gave their daughters in marriage to the courtiers if they were become perſons of conſequence, but, however, this was rare, and generally by the ſolicitation of the khan.

The great officers of the ſtate were

1. GALGA-SULTAN. He was governor of the city of Akmedſchit, and its diſtrict, where he always reſided. He was always of the Guerrai family, and had in his diſtrict power of life and death, as the khan himſelf. No perſon older than the reigning khan could be appointed to this office. He had a court, and officers of the ſame denomination as the khan, viz. a vizir, khaznadar, &c. It has been always underſtood by thoſe who have treated of the Krim, that galga-ſultan was the khan's eldeſt ſon; this is never the caſe.

2. NURUDDIN-SULTAN. He alſo could be of no other family but of the Guerrai. He had the ſame privileges as galga-ſultan, but could not put to death; he reſided always with the khan, but had no part in the adminiſtration of juſtice, or any other department, farther than giving his advice, or tranſacting for the khan in his name ſuch buſineſs as he entruſted him with. His office

ſeems

ſeems to have been a kind of occaſional lieutenant to the khan, always at hand.

3. OR-BEY (or ore-bey as it is pronounced) lived at Perekop, called Or. His privileges were the ſame as thoſe of galga-ſultan; except that he could not put to death; he was not always of the *Guerrai* family, but ſometimes a *Sherin*, in which caſe he had no *vizir*, but he had all the other officers of his court the ſame as a ſultan.

4. AK-KIRMAN-SERASKIR was always a ſultan, and had power of life and death. He reſided at *Akkirman*, before the Turks took poſſeſſion of *Beſarabi*; he was alſo governor of the *Nogai-Tatars*, before they emigrated from the plains to the north of Perekop to the Kuban; he had the ſame officers as *galga-ſultan*.

5. KUBAN-SERASKIR had the ſame power and privileges as galga-ſultan, being always a ſultan of the Guerrai family. Beſides, every tribe of the Kuban-Tatars had a ſeraſkir, who adminiſtered juſtice in the tribe, but was under *kuban-ſeraſkir*, and could not put to death.

Beſides theſe there were,

1. The MUFTI in the Krim, appointed by the khan, and who reſided with him at Bagchiſerrai, but there was no body of ulema to check

check the power of the government, as at Conſtantinople. When the Turks were in poſſeſſion of Caffa, they had a mufti there, but he never was conſulted by the Tatars, or ſuffered to meddle in their affairs.

2. A kadilaſkir (or kaziaſkir) in like manner appointed by, and reſiding with the khan.

3. Twenty-four kadis (or kazis) one in every conſiderable diſtrict, beſides kadis in the Kuban, where every kadi had a diſtrict of ſeveral villages or encampments of tents.

Thus this ſingular government ſeems originally to have been feudal, but was afterwards, when the Tatars became Mahomedans, modified by the adoption of the laws of the koran. The Tatars acknowledged the ſultan of Conſtantinople as kalif and head of their religion. They never could be perſuaded to leave off eating horſefleſh, which is forbidden by the Mahomedan law to Muſelmans. The Turkiſh muftis wiſely decided, that horſefleſh was forbidden to all other Mahomedans to eat, but not to the Tatars, as they had been accuſtomed to it, and that thereby it ceaſed to be a ſin.

The REVENUES of the reigning Khans were,

1ſt. TEN PER CENT. of the corn the Nogais grew.

2. The

2. The produce of the SALT LAKES—very little ſalt was the property of individuals—they rendered him about one hundred thouſand dollars a year, that is, about twelve thouſand five hundred pounds ſterling.

3. The DUTY on imports and exports, which uſually amounted to the ſame ſum of one hundred thouſand dollars, or twelve thouſand five hundred pounds ſterling.

4. SUBSIDIES, which the Ottoman *porte* paid to the *khan* in time of war, and frequently other ſums, to aſſiſt in armaments, and to keep the Tatars in good humour.

5. The ſums annually ſent by the Ottoman ſultan to defray the expences of Galga-ſultan's court, and to pay the officers of the khan's court, as vizir, khaſnader, &c. with a view to render them more dependent.

6. The pay of the *ſeimans*, a body of troops of about 1,600, who ſerved as guards to the khan, was always ſent from Conſtantinople.

The Turks, in return, could always rely on a body of auxiliary cavalry from the Krim and the Kuban.

The Chriſtians and Jews paid a capitation tax, as in Turkey, to the beys or murſas; but they were infinitely leſs vexed than in Turkey, enjoyed more protection, and were treated with leſs inſolence and indignity.

The

The revenue of Shaheen-Guerrai-Khan, in 1781, amounted to 900,000 dollars, without calculating the ſums uſually ſent from Conſtantinople; this ſum makes about £. 112,500 ſterling.

The number of inhabitants was then reduced to about 100,000 ſouls in the Krim, and 600,000 ſouls in the Kuban; two thirds of the inhabitants had emigrated to Turkey ſince the beginning of that khan's reign, which was the laſt. In the autumn of 1777, the Tatars of the Krim alone met the Ruſſian army, under Prince Proſorofsky, in the plains of Salguir, with forty thouſand men, all well mounted and armed. In 1782, the large city of Kaffa conſiſted only of 450 houſes inhabited.

It may not be inappoſite to ſay a few words on the reign of the laſt khan of the Tatars, and the final extinction of the Tatar dominion in the Krim.

In the treaty of peace of Kainargi, concluded in July 1774, the independence of the Krim was ſtipulated in theſe words. Art. III. "*All the Tatar people, thoſe of Crimea, of* "*Budgiac, of the Kuban, the Ediſſans, Geam-*"*bouiluks and Ediſchkuls, ſhall, without any* "*exception, be acknowledged by the two empires* "*as free nations, and entirely independent of any* "*foreign power, and ſhall be governed by their*

"*own*

" *own ſovereign of the race of Gingis-Khan,*
" *elected and raiſed to the throne by all the*
" *Tatar people; who ſhall govern them accord-*
" *ing to their ancient laws and uſages, render-*
" *ing no account whatever to any foreign power;*
" *it is for this reaſon that neither the court of*
" *Ruſſia nor the Ottoman porte ought not to*
" *meddle, under any pretext whatever, in the*
" *election of the ſaid khan, nor in their affairs,*
" *domeſtic, politic, civil, and interior, but, on*
" *the contrary, acknowledge and conſider the*
" *ſaid Tatar nation in its political and civil*
" *ſtate, on the ſame footing as other powers,*
" *which govern by themſelves, and are depen-*
" *dent on God alone. With reſpect to the cere-*
" *monies of religion, as the Tatars profeſs the*
" *ſame worſhip as the Muſelmans, they ſhall*
" *regulate themſelves with regard to his high-*
" *neſs, as grand kalif of Mahometaniſm, accord-*
" *ing to the precepts which their law preſcribes*
" *to them, without, however, any prejudice to*
" *the confirmation of their civil and religious*
" *liberty, &c.*"—" *Ruſſia engages to withdraw*
" *its troops, &c. and the ſublime porte to re-*
" *linquiſh all right whatever, which he might*
" *have to the fortreſſes, cities, habitations, &c.*
" *in Crimea, the Kuban, or in the iſland of Ta-*
" *man, nor to keep in any of theſe places, gar-*
" *riſons, nor other armed people, &c. &c.*"

In conſequence of this ſtipulation, *Shaheen Guerrai*

Guerrai was elected khan by the beys and murſas, with the approbation of the people, as it ſeemed, for no diſcontent appeared among them.

The new khan, however, did not long keep his popularity. He wiſhed to civilize his people, and introduce the European diſcipline among his troops. He would have ſucceeded, had he paid more reſpect to the deep rooted prejudices of the people. He began by entirely aboliſhing the old form of government; he raiſed new ſoldiers and paid them, and appointed murſas for their officers. They had no ſtanding army before, but every man was a ſoldier. He diminiſhed the rent paid by the people to the murſas for their land, and appropriated it to his own uſe, allowing ſuch murſas as would ſerve in the army handſome ſalaries. He affected too much the manner of the Chriſtians or Ruſſians, though he obſerved with punctuality all the ceremonies of his religion. His expences were thus increaſed beyond his income, and he could not, like his predeceſſors, apply for pecuniary aſſiſtance to the Ottoman Porte, which had ceaſed to pay the ſalaries of the officers of his court. He ſtruck a new coin at an enormous expence; the mint was conducted by a German. He farmed out the different branches of the revenue to people

who exacted the payment with a rigour hitherto unknown. He eſtabliſhed a corps of artillery, and endeavoured to form a marine; but want of revenue prevented him ſucceeding in any one undertaking.

The Turks ſaw with jealouſy the independence of the Tatars, and lamented being deprived, in all probability, of their aſſiſtance in any future war, as the khan declared his intention of remaining neutral, as the only means of making his people formidable, and maintaining his independence. The Turks laboured inceſſantly by their emiſſaries, who were moſtly religious enthuſiaſts, to ſtir up the people to rebellion. They ſucceeded in raiſing ſuch a ſpirit of diſcontent, that the khan, fearful of his perſonal ſafety, called in a body of Ruſſians, and placed ſmall corps in different parts of the country. The Turks had, previouſly to this, ſent a body of troops to Taman, and beheaded one of the khan's commanders.

I arrived at the Ruſſian fortreſs of Janikali, in October 1777, and was ſetting out for Bagſhirai, when news arrived that the Tatars had ſuddenly fallen on the diſperſed Ruſſians in every part of the Krim and the Kuban at the ſame time, and had cut them all off; the khan himſelf luckily eſcaped to the Ruſſian head-quarters. The Ottoman Porte,

Porte, at the ſame time, had appointed a new khan, and ſent him to the port now called Sebaſtopolis, with five ſhips of the line. A Ruſſian army ſoon entered the Crimea; the Tatars were defeated, and during the winter reduced again to obedience to their khan. The Ruſſians are accuſed of committing ſome cruelties on this occaſion. If they cannot be juſtified as Chriſtians for following the law of retaliation, they are, as men, ſomewhat excuſable.

The Tatars, though reduced to obedience, could not be kept in that ſtate by the few troops the khan could rely on; he was therefore obliged to have an auxiliary army from Ruſſia, and the porte made ſeveral attempts to excite a freſh rebellion. The empreſs, at laſt tired out by the continual alarms they occaſioned, and determined no longer to ſuffer her ſubjects to be expoſed to the calamities the incurſions of theſe barbarians occaſioned, ſeized on the Krim and Kuban in 1783. The khan retired to Kaluga, in Ruſſia Minor, where he was allowed a very large penſion by the empreſs, and treated in every reſpect as a ſovereign; but, unaccuſtomed to a quiet and inactive life, he quitted Ruſſia, and went to Conſtantinople, where at firſt he was received with great diſtinction, but was ſoon ſent into exile to a Greek iſland, and one day,

as he was in his bath, he was ſeized and ſtrangled, and his head ſent to Conſtantinople.

I beg the reader will excuſe a ſhort digreſſion reſpecting myſelf, as it may throw ſome light on the character or morals of the people I was among. The $\frac{10}{21}$th December, 1777, I ſailed from Janicali, in a ſmall veſſel, for Kaffa, (the road by land being unſafe) which had juſt been taken by the Ruſſians, under General Balmaine, by ſtorm, and many Turks, who were at Kaffa, had been put to the ſword by a Greek corps from Janicali, who alſo robbed my ſervant of all my baggage, to a very conſiderable amount, and which I never recovered. Inſtead of making the port of Kaffa, we were driven by a ſtorm along the coaſt, and after loſing our bowſprit and all our anchors, we were in great diſtreſs for water, being eighty perſons on board, all military men. We made ſeveral deſcents on the coaſt to procure water, but were always beaten off by the Tatars; at laſt we paſſed Belaklava, and lay to in the gulph of Gioslévé, oppoſite the port of Sebaſtopolis, where we ſaw the Turkiſh fleet at anchor. The maſter of a Turkiſh mercantile veſſel came out to us, and we bargained with him, for about fifty pounds ſterling, for a caſk of water, which he promiſed to bring us off in the

the night; but as ſoon as he got on ſhore, we obſerved one of the Turkiſh frigates looſening her topſails to come out. It was nearly night, and we put to ſea and bore away for the Danube, the only port we could reach with the wind we had, preferring to throw ourſelves on the mercy of the Turks to periſhing by thirſt. I was the only perſon in the veſſel who could navigate her out of ſight of land. The captain, who was a Greek, had become mad. I found two Turkiſh charts of the Black Sea, which differed in the latitude of the Danube a degree. I examined the coaſt of Anatolia, which I had ſurveyed that ſummer from Conſtantinople to Kitros, and by that judged which was the beſt.

We arrived ſafe off Sulina-mouth, but the wind not permitting us to enter, a Turkiſh boat came out to us; and here I cannot enough commend the humanity we experienced from the crews of ſeveral Turkiſh merchant veſſels. We had only a hawſer and a boat anchor to hold the ſhip. The water was very ſmooth. It was already night. They ſent out five large boats manned to tow us in, if there ſhould be any danger, and they remained with us all night. We got ſafe into the river in the morning.

The next day I ſet off for Galatz, intending to go by land to Ruſſia. In the river I found two new Turkiſh 50 gun ſhips, without their guns or crews. I had known the captains at Conſtantinople, and was received with kindneſs by them.

The 1ſt January, 1778, I went to the Greek governor, to pay him a complimentary viſit; I found a very cold reception from him; he was ſeated on his ſopha with a Turk, in appearance of ſome diſtinction, who immediately produced a warrant from the paſha of Ebrahil to cut off my head and thoſe of 26 perſons who were come with me from the veſſel. The executioner was ſtanding in the room, with a bag to put our heads in, and a heap of ſawduſt was laid in the court before the houſe to abſorb the blood. My Greek interpreter was ſo terrified, that he could utter no other word than *quel ſacco*, pointing to the bag in which his head was to be put. Luckily I was not intimidated; but I was obliged to ſpeak for myſelf as well as I could, and with great difficulty perſuaded the officer, who was ſiliktar (ſword-bearer) to the paſha, that I was an Engliſhman, and came with no ill intentions; that were I an enemy, in the ſituation we came into the Danube the cuſtom of all nations granted

granted us an aſylum. He then told me, we were accuſed of coming into the Danube with a deſign to burn the two Turkiſh ſhips of war. In ſhort my arguments, and a few thouſand dollars in Ruſſian bank notes, prevailed on him to go back to the paſha for freſh inſtructions, and to ſend to the captains of the Turkiſh ſhips of war, who engaged to anſwer with their heads that I was an Engliſhman, and a friend of the captain paſha's. It was a lucky circumſtance that they had ſeen me with the captain paſha, and knew that I really was an Engliſhman.

I afterwards learnt that the Greek governor, who had at firſt received me with great civility, was our accuſer.

We remained priſoners at large in the town three months, when an order from the captain paſha came to let us depart, and "*that we ſhould be ſo little moleſted, that if a* "*bird perched on the maſt top it ſhould be driven* "*away.*"

While I was in the quarantine at the Ruſſian frontier, in September 1778, there paſſed 75,000 Chriſtians, obliged by the Ruſſians to emigrate from the Crimea (35,769 males.) The Armenian women, who came from Kaffa, were more beautiful, and, I think, approached nearer that perfect form which the

Grecians have left us in their ſtatues, than the women of Tino. Theſe people were ſent to inhabit the country abandoned by the Nogai Tatars, near the weſt coaſt of the ſea of Azof (Palus Mæotis) but the winter coming on before the houſes built for them were ready, a great part of them had no other ſhelter from the cold than what was afforded them by holes dug in the ground, and covered with what they could procure; they were people who all came from comfortable homes, and the greateſt part periſhed; ſeven thouſand only were alive a few years ago. A colony from Italy to the banks of the Boryſthenes, in 1783, had no better fate, owing to the bad management of thoſe who were commiſſioned to provide for them, and not to the climate; nor have colonies of Germans been more fortunate in Ruſſia—but this is a digreſſion.

I ſhall here take the opportunity of correcting a few errors into which ſome writers of celebrity have fallen.

With reſpect to the title of ſultan, borne by the Gengiſkhan family, and to that of khan (written frequently by the French, who do not diſtinguiſh the ſound of an *m* from an *n* when not followed by a vowel, *kam* and *çham*, as they write Edimbourg, &c.) Baron de Tott has made ſome obſer-

vations which require correction. His errors, which are not entirely cleared up by Peyſſonel, ariſe from not having obſerved the different force which theſe words have in the different countries where they are uſed. They are both words of command, and (contrary to Tott's aſſertion) are uſed by the Turkiſh emperors to expreſs ſovereignty, as is evident from the Arabic inſcription on the Ottoman money: *Sultan, ebn ul ſultan, Abdulhamid khan, damé mulkhu. Sultan, ſon of a ſultan, Abdulhamid the khan, whoſe reign be perpetual.* Theſe terms, however, are uſed very differently in Perſia; *ſhah*, which among the Tatars is equivalent to *khan* or king, is the only title taken by the Perſian monarch: in that country *khan* anſwers to the Turkiſh *paſha*, and is therefore taken by the governors of provinces, whilſt *ſultan*, which there ſignifies ſimply commander, is a title given to a captain of horſe. In my time, a man was made *khan* or governor of Benderrik, and his ſon, who commanded a body of cavalry, was called *ſultan*. I ſpeak of the preſent acceptation of theſe words, not of their more ancient ſignification.

Tott is erroneous in ſtating, that the bey of the Sherins conſtantly repreſents the five other beys. In the *kingueſhés*, or extraordinary aſſemblies, as well as in all the public convocations,

convocations, the bey of the Sherins, though firſt in rank, repreſents only his own family; the beys of the other houſes are alſo preſent, and repreſent each their own family.

The *hiſtorical journal* of the affairs of the Crimea, which was kept at *Bagtſhiſerrai*, is probably a valuable document: Peyſſonel ſeems to doubt of its exiſtence, or at leaſt to ſuppoſe, that it is little more than a compilation from general traditions, made by ſome Tatar of learning; it is, however, certain that ſuch a journal was regularly kept there by a family, who have handed it down from father to ſon with the ſame regularity as a ſimilar journal is kept at the porte at Conſtantinople: the khans often referred to it.

The caverns found in different parts of the Crimea, particularly at Tepekirman, half a league from Bagtſhiſerrai, have given riſe to much curious ſpeculations: from their ſituation on the ſides of ſteep, and often perpendicular ſides of rocky mountains, as well as from the regularity of their ſtructure, it is evident that they have been excavated by human art, but whether as ſepulchral monuments, as fortreſſes, or as places of refuge for cattle in time of invaſion, or for whatever other uſe, is at the preſent day doubtful. The objection of Mr. Peſſyonel, who thinks it impoſſible for cattle to have climbed to ſuch

ſuch a height, is certainly erroneous as to its practicability, ſince the Tatars at preſent actually do put herds of goats every night into ſome of them, by means of ſteps cut in the rock, which, had he paſſed a night, as I did, in that beautifully romantic vale, he might have been an eye witneſs of; others, indeed, have no ſuch acceſs, and might ſerve as a refuge to the maſters of the flocks themſelves.

What has been ſaid ſufficiently illuſtrates the political ſtate of the Tatars. In their education, there was little to ſupply the mind with knowledge, and whatever marks of ſagacity are diſcoverable among them, are to be attributed to natural genius, and the effect of an active mode of life, which, even among ſavages, beſtows a ſharpneſs and accuracy of intellect. Their acquired information is very limited: reading and writing conſtitute their higheſt branches of education, and in the ſciences in general they are leſs informed even than the Turks themſelves. Like moſt barbarians, their own country is to them at once the pattern of excellence and the boundary of knowledge; and the chief officers of ſtate themſelves were ignorant of the geography or relative ſituation of every other country.

The Tatar mode of fighting has no reſemblance

ſemblance to European tactics; it is one continued ſcene of confuſion and tumult, though it gives occaſion to the diſplay of great agility, and no ſmall portion of a barbarous kind of ſkill. Alternately flying and advancing in detached parties, many kinds of conteſt are carried on at once; the ſabre, the pike, and fire arms, are all employed, and they fight alike on horſeback or on foot, though the former is their moſt common mode. The regularity and diſcipline of the modern European battles has greatly contributed to produce a correſpondent mildneſs towards the conquered; but in this deſultory warfare the paſſions of the individuals are let looſe, perſonal fury augments the ſavage horror of the ſcene, and the enemy is never ſpared, unleſs he be ſufficiently unhurt to become valuable as a ſlave.

It is not ſurprizing, that on the empreſs's obtaining poſſeſſion of the Krim, a great number of its Tatar inhabitants ſhould emigrate from their country. Beſides the religious prejudices of theſe people, their unſettled and turbulent habits rendered them little adapted to that induſtry and civilization, which it was her endeavour to introduce into her newly acquired dominions. Thoſe who choſe to leave the country, had leave

leave to ſell their lands and other property, which was protected by the Ruſſians. She did not act with them as the Turks and Tatars ever did to the inhabitants of the countries they conquered; thoſe who choſe to remain, were left in the quiet poſſeſſion of their property and their religion, and enjoyed every protection and privilege as a Ruſſian Chriſtian ſubject.

The Tatar hordes now no more ſwell the Turkiſh army, nor mark their road with ſmoking villages laid in aſhes, and murdered inhabitants; thoſe hordes, who penetrated even into Pruſſia and Sileſia, ravaged Poland, Hungary, and Ruſſia, deſtroying by fire and ſword every habitation, every living creature they could not carry off, tying their priſoners to their horſes tails, and thoſe priſoners were the flower of their youth, led away, never more to return from ſlavery and violation to their friends or their country; thoſe hordes are now either diſperſed among their brother ſavages in Aſia, or civilized by their conquerors.

CHAPTER IX.

The Political State of Greece.

THE political ſtate of Greece has long announced to the attentive obſerver that exploſion which late events ſeem to have rapidly promoted. Greece can no longer ſubmit to the Turkiſh yoke; ſhe pants for emancipation, and already aſpires to be ranked among the independent ſtates of Europe. The riſe, or rather the renovation of her power will form an important æra in European politics: to appreciate its probable conſequences we muſt conſider the paſt and preſent circumſtances of that famous country; we muſt recur to the eclipſe of her former ſplendor by the Turkiſh conqueſt, to the long night of barbariſm and oppreſſion in which ſhe has been whelmed, and to thoſe ſtruggles which of late years have ſhown that ſhe is about to awake to the aſſertion of her native rights.

It is not here my intention to trace the details of claſſic ſtory, to deſcribe thoſe heroic ages, when the ſplendor of genius and the illumination

illumination of ſcience ſeemed to be concentrated within the narrow boundaries of Greece, and by their irradiation to communicate animation and improvement to ſurrounding nations; it will be ſufficient for me to call to the remembrance of the ſcholar ſome of the brighteſt pages in the hiſtory of mankind; it will be ſufficient to cite the names of thoſe poets and orators, thoſe ſtateſmen and moraliſts, whoſe illuſtrious deeds and whoſe admirable precepts ſtill extort the applauſes of the univerſe. To Greece belonged an Homer and a Demoſthenes, a Phocion and an Ariſtides, a Socrates, a Plato, an Ariſtotle, a Phidias, and an Apelles; in ſhort, in whatever path the ardent and eccentric imagination of man has ſought for fame, in that the Grecian name ſtands eminently conſpicuous, if not arrogating to itſelf an unrivalled ſuperiority.

India and Egypt had for many preceding ages cultivated the arts; but theſe countries were only the cradle of knowledge; when tranſmitted to the genial climate of Greece, foſtered by her political freedom, and animated by her vivacity and enterprize, it quickly attained the ſublimeſt heights, and inveſted the human character with a dignity before unknown. By what gradations their ancient ſimplicity, temperance, modeſty, and

good faith ſunk away, and how the decay of their virtues involved the ruin of their genius, their hiſtory will ſhew: let the philanthropiſt, peruſing the inſtructive leſſon, weep over the fall of human greatneſs, or rather let him collect from the fatal example, new incitements to energy and perſeverance in the cauſe of private and public virtue.

Ancient Rome, the victorious rival of Greece in arms, caught from her captive the inſpiration of genius; but ſhe never reached a ſimilar degree of ſublimity; ſhe imitated, but never equalled, the poets, the orators, the hiſtorians, the artiſts of Greece, according to the ingenuous acknowledgment of the firſt of Latin poets:

" Excudent alii ſpirantia mollius æra,
" Credo equidem: vivos ducent de marmore vultus;
" Orabunt cauſas melius, cœlique meatus
" Deſcribent radio, &c.

Indeed no nation ever arrived ſo nearly at perfection in every branch of ſcience. The genius of the ancient Grecians ſeems to have been endowed with as preternatural a ſtrength as the bodies of Homer's heroes. Their poetical imagery was ſplendid and ſublime, their oratorical tropes bold and energetic, their ſpeculative philoſophy manly and comprehenſive. Of the effect of their paintings we can judge only from hiſtory, but their

their ſtatues have reached to the preſent times; they poſſeſs a dignity more than human; they ſeem the *ne plus ultra* of genius, taſte, and execution, and though often imitated defy the hand of the copyiſt.

Such a nation could not have fallen under the yoke of a Turkiſh conqueror, had ſhe not been prepared for that diſgrace by a long period of debaſement and ſuperſtition. When this laſt and moſt terrible cataſtrophe arrived, ſhe ſaw her cities and palaces laid in aſhes, and the magnificent monuments of her ancient glory levelled with the duſt by the rude ſtrokes of thoſe ferocious barbarians; ſhe ſaw her ſons, a race who had graced and dignified ſociety, ſlaughtered without diſtinction and without mercy, or ſubjected to a captivity ſtill worſe than ſlaughter; yet ſtill her weeping genius ſeemed to linger among the melancholy ruins, and reluctantly to leave them, to carry with her the faint remnants of learning and taſte into more fortunate regions, where ſhe ſowed the ſeeds of that civilization and ſcience which at the preſent day ſo eminently flouriſh in Europe.

Conquered Greece poliſhed Rome, but the conquerors were Romans. Conquered Greece did not poliſh Turkey, for the conquerors were Turks. The inſenſibility of theſe barbarians is aſtoniſhing: living amid the effulgence

gence of genius, they have not caught one ſpark; they gaze with unfeeling ſtupidity on the wonder and boaſt of art, on their glorious monuments, on their temples, and conclude they were built by genii, and then deſtroy them, to burn the marble for lime to make ſtucco for their own taſteleſs houſes, whence the fine arts are baniſhed; where ignorance, tyranny, ſuperſtition, and groſs ſenſuality only dwell in ſad and ſtupidly-ſolemn pomp, or iſſuing out with ſavage fury, lay waſte the country round, and imbrue their hands in the blood of the helpleſs, murdering without remorſe thoſe they have conquered. Thus the fineſt countries in the world are become deſerts; part inhabited by ſavage beaſts, and part by more ſavage men; the poor aborigines ſkulking in hiding places like the timid hare (which epithet the Turks give them in deriſion) while thoſe beaſts of prey roam abroad.

Every object moral and phyſical, the fair face of nature and the intellectual energies of the inhabitants, have alike been blaſted and defiled by the harpy-touch of Turkiſh tyranny. As an inſtance of thoſe changes which the country has undergone, we need only conſider the iſland of Cyprus, now an almoſt uninhabited deſert, which was, not only in ancient times, but when it was taken by

by the Turks from the Venetians, populous and exceedingly rich. The gentry lived like princes in ſplendor, and even the peaſants had each of them at leaſt a ſilver cup, ſpoon, knife, and fork. The number and excellency of its productions were wonderful. At preſent only a little cotton, ſome ſilk and wine, and a few drugs, are its produce, all to no great amount. Even the ſalines (or ſalt-works) which were ſo great a branch of revenue and commerce to the Venetians, have produced nothing ſince the Turks poſſeſſed it.

Of the defects of the Grecian character ſome are doubtleſs owing to their ancient corruptions; but moſt of them take their riſe in the humiliating ſtate of depreſſion in which they are held by the Turks. This degradation and ſervility of their ſituation has operated for centuries, and has conſequently produced an accumulated effect on the mind; but were this weight taken off, the elaſticity and vigour of the ſoul would have wide room for expanſion; and though it cannot be expected that they would at once riſe to the proud animation of their former heroes, they would doubtleſs diſplay energies of mind, which the iron hand of deſpotiſm has long kept dormant and inert. It is rather aſtoniſhing that they have re-

tained ſo much energy of character, and are not more abaſed, for like noble courſers they champ the bit, and ſpurn indignantly the yoke; when once freed from theſe, they will enter the courſe of glory. The truth of theſe obſervations will appear, whether we conſider the Greeks in their common character as one people, or whether we conſider them according to their local and peculiar diſtinctions.

When we view the Greeks in their more comprehenſive character as a nation, their ſuperiority over the Turks in knowledge is ſurpriſingly great; they poſſeſs a great degree of genius and invention, and are of ſo lively an imagination, that they cannot tell the ſame ſtory twice without varying the embelliſhments of circumſtance and diction; added to this, both men and women ſpeak much, and with wonderful volubility and boldneſs, and no people are ſuch natural orators; numbers of them ſpeak Italian, but all have an activity and ſprightlineſs which ſtrongly contraſts with the ſtupid and pompous gravity of the Turks; an European feels himſelf as it were at home with them, and amongſt creatures of his own ſpecies, for with Mahomedans there is a diſtance, a non-aſſimilation, a total difference of ideas, and the more he knows their language the more

more he perceives it; on the contrary, the more intimately he knows the Greeks, the more ſimilar does he find them in habits and manners to other Europeans: their bad reputation is more owing to the ſlander of the French (their mortal enemies) than to ſo great a degree of demerit. In general, they are an agreeable and a ſerviceable people, but they are much given to levity, immoderately ambitious, and fond of honourable diſtinctions; but this very ambition, now a weakneſs, when they have nobler objects to purſue will lead them to greatneſs.

From the account given by Tott (vol. i. p. 118) of the diſturbances excited by the patriarch *Kirilo*, it would appear that the Greeks have not yet entirely abandoned that ſpirit of ſuperſtition and bigotry, which was, perhaps, the main cauſe of their former downfall.

It muſt be obſerved, however, that theſe diſputes are not ſo much foſtered among themſelves, as they are owing to the efforts of the Latin church, which was the caſe in the inſtance alluded to, where the foundation of the conteſt was a bull of the pope, directed againſt the Greek church.

They bear the Turkiſh yoke with greater impatience than other Chriſtians (who have long ceaſed to ſtruggle againſt it) and poſſeſs a

ſpirit of enterprize which, however ridiculed by ſome authors, often prompts them to noble atchievements. Their ancient empire is freſh in their memory; it is the ſubject of their popular ſongs, and they ſpeak of it in common converſation as a recent event.

That they poſſeſs a firm and manly courage, notwithſtanding the inſinuations of their calumniators, has been too often teſtified to be in the leaſt doubtful; the inſtances which they have diſplayed in the Ruſſian ſervice have been truly ſtriking. They are paſſionate, and ſometimes given to aſſaſſination; but, except in Zante and Cephalonia, the ſtiletto is not ſo frequent with them as with the Italians, whom they in general reſemble, the beſt of them, if we add more energy, being very ſimilar in character to the Venetians, and the worſt to the Genoeſe.

The moſt obſervable difference in the Grecian character is between thoſe of Conſtantinople and their countrymen of the iſlands. The merchants and lower orders of the Conſtantinopolitan Greeks have indeed no very marked character; they are much the ſame as the trading Chriſtians in all parts of the empire, that is to ſay, as crafty and fraudulent as the Jews, but leſs ſo than the Armenians, who are the moſt ſubtle of all uſurers.

But

But there is (in a *ſuburb called* the Fenal) a race of Greeks who call themſelves nobles, and affect to deſpiſe thoſe of the iſlands; they are certain opulent families, from which are generally appointed the drogomans of the porte, and the waywodes of Walachia and Moldavia. They have kept theſe places amongſt them, as they are moſtly allied together, and keep up a conſtant connection with the officers of the porte. They are continually intriguing to get thoſe in office removed, and obtain their places; even children cabal againſt their fathers, and brothers againſt brothers. They are all people of very good education, and are polite, but haughty, vain, and ambitious to a moſt ridiculous degree, conſidering the contempt they are treated with by the Turks. As to their noble extraction, it is a matter of great uncertainty; moſt of them bear the names of thoſe families which were illuſtrious when the Turks took Conſtantinople, but they would find it difficult to prove their deſcent. They have in general all the vices of the Turks of the ſeraglio; treachery, ingratitude, cruelty, and intrigue, which ſtops at no means. While they are drogomans of the porte, they are obliged to behave with great caution and prudence, but when they

become waywodes, they are in nothing different from Turkiſh paſhas in tyranny; nor is it to be wondered at, when men are obliged to look up not only to tyrants, but to the very ſervants of tyrants, for honour and conſequence; to flatter their ignorance and ſtupidity, their foibles and their vices, and to tremble for their lives at their frowns, that cunning takes the place of wiſdom, vice of virtue, and treachery of fortitude. In ſuch a ſituation the mind muſt loſe its vigour, the heart its generoſity: the abaſement of man by ſuch cauſes was never more ſtrongly exemplified than in the inſtance of the Greeks of the Fenal; they do not weep over the ruins which they cannot reſtore, nor ſigh to rear others of equal magnificence.

Strange as is the infatuation which induces theſe Greeks to aim at the poſt of waywodes, it is perhaps no leſs aſtoniſhing than many examples which daily occur in other nations of the power of ambition. Though ſtyling themſelves noble, and affecting a ſuperiority over the other Greeks, they are the only part of their nation who have totally relinquiſhed the ancient Grecian ſpirit; they ſeem not anxious, as the iſlanders are, for liberty, but delight in their falſe magnificence, and in the petty intrigues of the ſeraglio; and their pride

pride is to appear in their dreſs like Turks; and yet the ſituation which they are thus eager to obtain is beſet with perils, and ſcarcely one who holds it eſcapes depoſition and puniſhment. No ſooner is a waywode appointed, than he ſets out in great ſtate for his government, attended by a crowd of relations and dependents, for all of whom, as well as for his own ſplendor, he muſt provide by oppreſſing the unhappy ſubjects of his tyranny. Meanwhile his countrymen at Conſtantinople are engaged in continual plots for his removal, and it becomes neceſſary for him to accumulate a large ſum to bribe the miniſters and others on his return, and to avert the perſecution, which continues for years afterward to hang over him.

Thoſe of Macedonia, &c. are robuſt, courageous, and ſomewhat ferocious; thoſe of Athens and Attica are ſtill remarkably witty and ſharp; all the iſlanders are lively and gay, fond of ſinging and dancing to an exceſs, affable, hoſpitable, and good natured; in ſhort, they are the beſt; thoſe of the Morea are much given to piracy; but it is not to be wondered at, conſidering the cruel treatment they have met with, and the ſtruggles they are continually making againſt the Turks. Albania, Epirus, and in general the mountaineers, are a very warlike, brave people, but

very ſavage, and make little ſcruple of killing and robbing travellers; a Turk cannot venture in their country alone; there is no man in the country but would make a merit of ſhooting him—and is this to be wondered at?

The Greeks of Zante and Cephalonia, ſubject to the Venetians, are famous for ſtabbing with knives.

In ſome iſlands the people are not handſome. In Metaline, the women are remarkable for very large breaſts. In Tino, the women are almoſt all beauties, and there the true antique head is to be found.

In general, the people of the iſlands have grand and noble features. From different faces you may put together, in walking through a market place, the heads of Apollo and of the fineſt ancient ſtatues.

It is ſcarcely poſſible for any perſon not to be miſtaken in judging of the conduct of the porte towards its provinces, by any analogy from the political operations of other European nations. Amongſt us, the unſucceſsful revolt of a whole province would indeed give birth to ſome additional rigour, and to ſome ſtriking example of puniſhment; but the ferocious Turk propoſes nothing ſhort of extermination, in order to free himſelf from the fear of future defection. It was

was thus that, when the inhabitants of the Morea, who, inſtigated by the deſire of liberty, had taken up arms in favour of the Ruſſians, returned again under their yoke, a deliberate propoſal was made in the divan to ſlaughter them in cold blood; nor was this the firſt time that the maſſacre of all the Greeks had been ſeriouſly debated; it was, however, in the preſent inſtance, ſucceſsfully oppoſed by Gazi Haſſan, both on motives of humanity and policy *.

It has been ſaid, that long poſſeſſion of a country gives an indiſputable right of dominion, and that the right of the Turks to their poſſeſſions has been acknowledged by all nations in their treaties. As to treaties between the Turks and other nations, who had no right to diſpoſe of the countries uſurped by the Turks, they cannot be binding to the Greeks, who never ſigned ſuch treaties, nor were conſulted, or conſented to their ſigning.

* The chief argument which he uſed, and which alone carried conviction to his hearers, was, *if we kill all the Greeks, we ſhall loſe all the capitation they pay.*

Even without ſuch a provocation, ſultan Muſtafa, predeceſſor and brother of Abdulhamid, on his acceſſion to the throne, propoſed to cut off all the Chriſtians in the empire, and was with difficulty perſuaded to deſiſt. Is this a nation which merits that Britain ſhould enter into a war for its defence?

When

When one nation conquers another, and they become incorporated, by having the ſame rights, the ſame religion, the ſame language, and by being blended together by inter-marriages, a long ſeries of years renders them one people. Who can in England diſtinguiſh the aborigines from the Romans, Saxons, Danes, Normans, and other foreigners? They are all Engliſhmen.

The Greeks were conquered by the Turks, but they were attacked (like all other nations they conquered) by them without provocation. It was not a war for injury or inſult, for jealouſy of power, or the ſupport of an ally, conteſts which ought to end when ſatisfaction or ſubmiſſion is obtained; it was a war, having for its aim conqueſt, and for its principle a right to the dominion of the whole earth; a war which aſſerted that all other ſovereigns were uſurpers, and that the depoſing and putting them to death was a ſacred duty. Do the laws of nations eſtabliſh that ſuch a conqueſt gives right of poſſeſſion? They, on the contrary, declare ſuch conqueſt uſurpation.

The conquered were never admitted by the Turks to the rights of citizens or fellow ſubjects, unleſs they abjured their religion and their country; they becames ſlaves, and as, according to their cowardly law, the Turks

Turks have a right at all times to put to death their priſoners, the conquered and their poſterity for ever are obliged annually to *redeem their heads*, by paying the price ſet on them: they are excluded from all offices in the ſtate. It is death for a conquered Greek to marry a Turkiſh woman, or even to cohabit with a common proſtitute of that nation; they are in every reſpect treated as enemies; they are ſtill called and diſtinguiſhed by the name of their nation, and a Turk is never called a Greek, though his family ſhould have been ſettled for generations in that country. The teſtimony of a Greek is not valid in a court of judicature, when contraſted with that of a Turk. They are diſtinguiſhed by a different dreſs; it is death to wear the ſame apparel as a Turk; even their houſes are painted of a different colour; in fine, they are in the ſame ſituation they were the day they were conquered; totally diſtinct as a nation; and they have, therefore, the ſame right now as they then had, to free themſelves from the barbarous uſurpers of their country, whoſe conduct to all the nations they have conquered merits the eternal execration of mankind.

In the war between Ruſſia and Turkey, which continued from 1769 to 1774, wherever the Ruſſians appeared the Greeks took up

up arms and joined them. The hiſtory of this war, and the part which the Greeks took in it, is too well known for it to be neceſſary that I ſhould enter here into any particulars. The progreſs that was made againſt the Turks was very conſiderable, and their fleet being deſtroyed at Chiſhmé, the capital might have been attacked by the victorious Ruſſians. Had the Ruſſian admiral been a man of any experience, or of an enterpriſing character, that war muſt have terminated in the expulſion of the Turks from Europe.

Nothing can place the Turks in a more deſpicable light, than the progreſs the Ruſſians did make, notwithſtanding the ſlowneſs of all their motions, their never profiting of any advantage, the opportunities they loſt of ſtriking deciſive blows, the want of plan or combination in every enterprize, and the unmilitary conduct in the execution; the bravery of their troops indeed, when there was a poſſibility of ſucceſs, always ſecured them victory. The Ruſſians and Greeks, to this day, make reproaches to each other of miſconduct; but as the accounts hitherto publiſhed are taken from the relation of Ruſſians, we may ſafely conclude that juſtice has not been done to the Greeks. In this laſt war, when they acted alone, they fought like true

true deſcendants of their heroic anceſtors in the little diverſion they made.

It was ſolemnly ſtipulated in the 17th article of the peace of Kainargi (ſigned $\frac{10}{21}$ July, 1774) that "*The empire of Ruſſia reſtores* "*to the ſublime porte all the iſlands of the* "*Archipelago, which are under its dependence;* "*and the ſublime porte, on its part, promiſes,* "*1ſt. To obſerve* SACREDLY, *with reſpect to* "*the inhabitants of theſe iſlands, the conditions* "*ſtipulated in the firſt article, concerning a ge-* "*neral amneſty and eternal oblivion of all crimes* "*whatever, committed or ſuſpected, to the pre-* "*judice of the ſublime porte. 2dly. That* "*neither the Chriſtian religion, nor its churches,* "*ſhall be expoſed to the ſmalleſt oppreſſion, and* "*that no hindrance ſhall be put to their con-* "*ſtruction or reparation; nor ſhall thoſe who* "*officiate in them be oppreſſed or inſulted. 3dly.* "*That no payment ſhall be exacted from theſe* "*iſlands of the annual taxes to which they* "*were ſubjected, viz. ſince the time which* "*they have been under the dependence of the* "*Ruſſian empire, and alſo, in conſideration of* "*the great loſſes which they have ſuffered dur-* "*ing the war, for the time of two years to* "*come, to count from the time of their reſtora-* "*tion to the ſublime porte. 4thly. To permit* "*thoſe families which would quit their country,* "*and eſtabliſh themſelves elſewhere, to depart* "*freely with their goods; and to the end that*

"*thoſe*

" *thoſe families may put their affairs in order,*
" *the term of one year is granted to them for*
" *this free emigration, counting from the day of*
" *the exchanging of the preſent treaty.*"

Notwithſtanding this ſolemn engagement, the Turks, almoſt as ſoon as the Ruſſians had evacuated their conqueſts, and, relying on the faith of treaties, had delivered up the inhabitants to their domination, fell upon their victims, unprepared to reſiſt them, and maſſacred an incredible number, particularly in the Morea, where their vengeance fell with all its weight. Whole diſtricts were left without a ſingle inhabitant, and this fine country is now almoſt a deſert. The Greeks upbraid the Ruſſians with abandoning them; the Ruſſians anſwer, they relied on the faith of treaties. They ought to have known, that the fetva of the mufti had often announced, that *no faith is to be kept with Chriſtians*; hiſtory furniſhed them with numerous inſtances of their putting in practice this precept; indeed I know of no inſtance when they have not, if it appeared to them that it was their intereſt ſo to do; and yet we find writers who vaunt the ſcrupulouſneſs of the Turks in obſerving their treaties; they ſhould always have added, *when it was their intereſt*, and their ſtatement would have been juſt.

So ardent was the wiſh of the Greeks to regain

regain their liberty and independence, that neither diſcouraged by the abandonment of the Ruſſians, nor deterred by the apprehenſion of again incurring the dreadful vengeance of the Turks, as ſoon as a freſh war broke out between thoſe powers they again took up arms.

A fleet was fitted out at Cronſtad, and ſailed for the Archipelago under the command of a brave, prudent, and experienced officer, Admiral Greig, an Engliſhman, who had ſerved in the former war, and greatly diſtinguiſhed himſelf under Count Orlow; who, from an officer in the guards, where he ſaw no other *honourable* ſervice than quelling a riot at a brandy ſhop, was raiſed to the ſupreme command of a fleet and an army, and entruſted with an expedition which required the greateſt experience and talents. The king of Sweden rendered to the empreſs the eſſential ſervice of detaining her fleet in the Baltic, by attacking it in that ſea, and thereby putting into her hand the naval ſuperiority which, by its abſence, would have paſſed into his. This ill-timed diverſion of the king of Sweden retarded the fate of Turkey, and the interference of other courts ſaved it for this time; at leaſt they obliged the empreſs to make peace; but that peace would have been but of a few months duration, had

not the death of Prince Potemkin and ſome other circumſtances intervened, which ſhall be ſpoken of in this place.

In the mean time the empreſs ſent manifeſtoes to all parts of Greece, as ſhe had done in the former war, inviting the inhabitants *to take up arms, and co-operate with her in expelling the enemies of Chriſtianity from the countries they had uſurped, and regaining them their ancient liberty and national independence.*

A Greek of the name of Sottiri was ſent to Epirus and Albania, to diſtribute manifeſtoes, and combine an inſurrection with the chiefs. An army was ſoon raiſed; their head-quarters were at Sulli. They marched againſt the paſha of Yánina (Janina) and completely defeated his army in a pitched battle, in which his ſon was killed, and deſpoiled of his rich armour, which they ſent to the empreſs.

They collected a ſum of money by voluntary ſubſcription of individuals, and fitted out at Trieſte an armament of twelve ſmall ſhips, under the command of Lambro Canziani, a Greek, with which they ſailed to the Archipelago. They were everywhere victorious, and the impreſſion was ſo great and alarming to the porte, that it had nearly drawn the whole Turkiſh navy out of the Black Sea, and left the capi-

tal expoſed to the attack of a formidable Ruſſian fleet, then in the ports of the Crim.

The empreſs had ſent a captain Pſaro to Sicily, to eſtabliſh magazines for the fleet coming out under Admiral Greig, and ſeveral other perſons, to furniſh the Greeks with money and ammunition, and to remove the difficulties the Venetians, ſtill unwilling to offend the porte, had thrown in their way, and the obſtructions they had put to their communication by means of their port Prevaſi, the neareſt to Sulli. In this ſtate of things the Greeks ſent three deputies to St. Peterſburgh, with complaints againſt the perſons commiſſioned to this ſervice by the empreſs. They preſented the rich armour of the paſha of Yanina's ſon to her imperial majeſty; but were prevented, by the intrigues of thoſe who feared an enquiry into their ſcandalous peculations, for ſeveral months from preſenting their petition, and explaining the buſineſs of their miſſion; at length they ſucceeded in obtaining a private audience of the empreſs, to which they were conducted by Mr. Zoubov, the favourite. They preſented a memorial in Greek, with a tranſlation in French, of which the following are exact copies:

Τῃ ὑψολότατῃ, ἐνδοξοτάτῃ, καὶ θεοσεβεςάτῃ
Αυτοκρατορισσῃ, καὶ Βασιλισσῃ πασῶν τῶν
Ρωσιῶν, καὶ τα ἑξ. καὶ τα ἑξ. καὶ τα ἑξ.

ΚΑΙ τέτο ἐ πρὸς ἕτερον τὶ εἰμὴ τὸ διὰ μάκρος χρόνε, ματέως δεηθέντες, τοῖς ὑπεργοῖς τῆς ὑμέτερας Αυτοκρατορικῆς Μεγαλειότητος προς ἀποκρισιν, ἀναφορᾶς ἂν προχρονε αυτοῖς προσεφέρομεν. ἐκ ἀπετισάμενοι δὲ, καὶ μάλα, ἐν ἐσχάτῃ ἀπελπισείᾳ φερόμενοι διανοῆντες τας φρικτὰς συμφορὰς, ἀς ἡ ταύτης βραδυτης προξενεισιαν τοῖς ἡμετεροις συμπατριοτες, οἱ γαρ ελκυσθεντες παρὰ τῶν προδήλων κλίσεων τῆς αυτὴς Αυτ. Μεγ. ἐφερον τα ὅπλα κατα τε κοινε ἐχθρᾶ τε Χριςιανικᾶ ὀνομάτος, ἀπεςηλαν ἓν νῦν ἡμᾶς προσφέρειν, τοῖς ποδοῖς τε ὑψηλᾶ αὐτῆς θρόνε ὡς σημεῖον καὶ δωρον τῆς ἡμῶν ευλάβειας, τὴν ζωὴν καὶ περιὐσιαν αυτῶν.

Ναι Βασιλησσα καὶ Κυρία· τῆτο ἐ πρὸς τί ἑτερον ἡμὴ ἀπολολόντες πάσαν ἐλπίδαν μιὰς ταχειας αποκρισεως, τολμῶμεν γόνυ κλίνοντες προσφέρειν τὴν ταπινὴν ἡμῶν, αναφορὰν, πρὸς τὰς πόδας τῆς αὐτὴς Αυτ. Μεγ. ὅπως τῆς εκ τῶν αδελφῶν ἡμῶν αἱματων ρυακας ξηρέυειν, οἳ ἤδη ἀναμφιβόλως ρέυσιν.

Ἕτερον Εν ιερὸν ὤφλημα ἡμῶν τὸ καὶ κύριον εἶδος τῆς ἡμῶν παραγγαιλίας, ὃν καὶ ἠρέθησε ἡμᾶς ἐν ταύτῃ τὴ τολμειρᾷ επιχειρήσει, εςὶν ὁπως ἐξαπατήσομεν, τὴν αὐτῆς Αυτ. Μεγ. ἐξ ὧν ἔτολμισαν απατεῖν (ὡς δε καὶ οἱ μεγισάνες αυτὴς) εγνωμεν γαρ, ὁτι ὁ ὑππευὺς Ψάρος ανὴρ βδελεροτατος εκ τῆ ἡμῶν ἐθνες, ἐνεκεν τῆς κραιπάλης αυτῆ, ἃς ἐξήλθεν καὶ εις ἂν εὑρισκέται. Ὁ γαρ δὲ ἐὰν μὴ πλανῶν, ανεπεσχειντως τῆς ὑπεργῆς αυτῆς πισὸν αυτοῖς ἑαυτὸν, ως ἄξιον μεγάλων κατορθυμάτων, ἃ ποτὲ εκ ἐποιησε. ὑτος ἐν καὶ ἐτι ἐγείρεται ὡς ἄρχων καὶ ὁδηγὸς, τῆ ἡμῶν ἔθνες,

καυχομενος

καύχομενος ὁτι ἐμένομεν τὴν παρȣ́σιαν αυτȣ̃ ἐπὶ τῆς ημῶν γῆς, ινα κυρήξομεν ἡμῖν αυτὸν ἀρχιςρατιγον. καυχήσεις ἁς μόνον γράφει ϗ ȣ̓κ ἐργαζέται. Θεωρισείαν ἡ αυτὴς Αυτ. Μεγ. ἐν τῇ ημῶν αναφορὰ τί ȣ̓τος ἔποιησε ἡμῖν, ἔγνωκαμεν γαρ ὁτι, αυτὸς λαβὼν ἀπείρȣς ποσοτήτας χρημάτων, φημήζει ὅτι ἔδαπανησε αυτὰ υπὲρ ημῶν. δυναμεθα πληροφορησαι τὴν αυτῆς Αυτ. Μεγ. ὁτι ȣ̓δε αυτὸς ȣ̓δέ τὶς ἀλλος οπȣ̃ εἰς ἡμᾶς ἀπελςάλθη εκ τῶν σῶν υπȣργῶν δέδωκε ἡμῖν Ἐν μόνον ρȣ́μπλιον. ἡ μικρὰ φλοτίγλια, ϗ ἔτερε ναῦς τȣ̃ Λάμπρȣ, κατεσκεύαςησαν ϗ ὄπλισθησαν διὰ τῆς τῶν ημῶν χρημάτων δαπάνης. εἰς μόνος εξ ημῶν ἔασας τὴν κρηνικὴν αυτȣ̃ κοίτην, ἔδαπανησε δέκα ϗ δύο χιλιάδας χρυσὰ νομήσματα ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων αυτȣ̃ χρημάτων, ὁπλίσας δύο ναὺς, ἐνεκεν τȣ́τȣ οἱ Οθωμανοι ἄπεκτειναν τὸν ἀδελφὸν ϗ τὴν μητέρα αυτȣ̃, τȣ̃ ἔλεηλατησαν τὰ ὑπαρχοντα ϗ τȣ̃ ἔφθειραν τȣ̃ αγρȣ̃ς.

Οὐκ ἔτησαμεν ποτὲ ϗ ȣ̓κ ἐτȣ̃μεν τȣ̃ς σȣ̃ς Θησαύρȣς, ȣ̓κ ἔτησαμεν εἰμὴ πυριον κόνιν ϗ σιδήριȣς σφέρας (α ȣδυναμεθα ὁνήζειν) ϗ ἐν τῷ οδιγεὶν ἡμᾶς εις τὴν μάχην.

Εξ ἐναντίας ἄπεςηλαν ημᾶς προσφερειν σοὶ τὴν ζωὴν ϗ τα κτήματα αυτῶν, ϗ ȣ̓κ ετεῖν τȣ̃ς σȣ̃ς Θησαύρȣς.

Νεύσον, ὦ κρατεὰ Βασιλιησσα, δόξα τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων πίςεως, νεύσον δεόμεθα αναγεινόσκειν τὴν ταπινὴν ημῶν αναφοράν. Ὁ Οὐρανὸς ἐφυλαξεν τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀπολύτροσιν πρὸς δόξαν τῆς σῆς Αυτ. Μεγ. ὑπὸ τὴν αυτῆς προςασίαν, προσδοκῶμεν λυτρόσαι, τὴν αὐτοκράτοριαν ἡμῶν χρωμένην, τὴν πατριαρχίαν ϗ ιερὰν Θρησκεῖαν, καταφρονιθίσαν ϗ καταπατιθήσαν εκ τῶν βεβήλων, ϗ βαρβάρων Οθωμανῶν· προσδόκωμεν σοι, λυτρόσαι τȣ̃ς τῶν Αθηναῖων, ϗ Λακαιδεμονίων ἀπογόνȣς, τȣ̃ τυρραννικȣ̃ ζυγȣ̃, τȣ́των τῶν ἀγρίων, ὑφ' ὧν ςενάζει, Εν Εθνος, ȣ̓ το πνεύμα ȣκ απεσβεςη, ȣ̓ ὁ ἱρως υπερπολεὶ τῆς ελευθεριας, ȣκ ἐδυνηθησαν γαρ αἱ σιδεραὶ αλισαι τῶν βαρβάρων αποσβεννειν, ἐχει δε προ τῶν αυτȣ̃ ὀμμάτων

τὴν εἰκόνα τῶν ἡρωικῶν πραξεων τῶν αυτε προπατορων ἕως νῦν.

Αι λάμπραὶ ἡμῶν ἡκοδομαὶ ἀναγινόσκειν ἡμῖν τὴν παλεὰν ἡμῶν μεγαλίοτητα· οἱ ἄπιροι λιμεναὶ, ἡ ἐυφυνὴ τῶν αγρῶν μας, ὁ Ουρανὸς ὁ ἀένναως γελῶν εφ' ἡμας, ἡ ακρα θερμότητα τὴν ἡ φύσις εμπρέει ἐ μόνον τοῖς νέοις αλλὰ, κὴ τοῖς πεβαρεμένοις γηραλέοις ημῶν, λεγει ημῖν ὅτι μας ἔχι προχειρη ὡς κὴ προς τας προγονες ἡμῶν.

Νεύσον ἐν Κυρία διδόναι ημῖν σὸν ευγκονὰ Κονσαντίνον διὰ ἄνακτα ἡμῶν, τᾶτο μόνον τὸ γένος ὅλον ημῶν ἐτεῖ δεομενον· (γενος γαρ τῶν ημῶν αυτοκρατορῶν απόσβεση) κὴ ἔσεται ὡς τᾶς προγονες αυτᾶ.

Ημεῖς ἀκ ἐσμέν εκ τῶν ἀπατιλῶν οἱ τίνες ετόλμησαν απατίσαι τὴν μεγαλοψηχότερην τῶν ἀνάκτων· ἡμεῖς εσμὲν οἱ ἀπελσαλμένοι τῶν λαῶν της Ελλαδος προμηθευμένοι απολυτε δυνάμεως, ὡς δὲ τοιᾶτοι προσπιπλόντες τοῖς ποσῖν αυτῆς ἦν μετὰ Θεὸν σωτῆρα ελπιζόμεν, ὠμνυόμεν δε ἴσεσθαι μέχρι τελευτέας ημῶν ἀναπνοῆς,

Οι τῆς ὑμετέρας Αυτοκρατωρικῆς Μεγαλιότητος πισότατοι δᾶλοι, κὴ τὰ εξ.

Πετρπολη,
Απριλιε, 1790.

Πανος Κιρη,
Χρίσος Λαζοτῖι,
Νικολαος Πάνκαλος.

Madame,

" Ce n'eſt, qu' après avoir ſolicité long-tems en vain, les miniſtres de VOTRE MAJESTE IMPERIALE, pour une reponſe au memoire, que nous avons eu l'honneur de leur preſenter, et pouſsès àu dernier déſéſpoir par la reflexion des malheurs affreux que ce retard, poura produire à nos compatriotes,

triotes, qui invités, par les manifeſtes de V. M. I. ont pris les armes, contre l'ennemi du nom Chrétien, et nous ont deputé pour porter l'offre de leurs vies et de leurs biens aux pieds de votre trône imperial: ce n'eſt qu' aprés avoir perdu tout éſperance d'avoir autrement une prompte reponſe pour arrêter les ruiſſeaux du ſang de nos fréres, qui ſans doute coulent dejà à cauſe de ce retard, que nous oſons proſternés à SES PIEDS preſenter à ELLE-MEME notre trés humble memoire.

Un autre devoir, également ſacré pour nous, et qui êtoit un objet principal de notre miſſion, nous porte à cette demarche hardie: de déſabuſer V. M. I. qui on oſe tromper, ainſi que ſes miniſtres: nous avons appris, avec indignation, que le chevalier Pſaro, homme abhorré de notre nation, de la crapule de la quelle il eſt ſorti *, et oû il ſeroit reſté, ſi, en trompant les miniſtres de V. M. I. avec une audace inouie, il ne s'êtoit pas fait valoir par la repreſéntation des explois qu'il n'a jamais faits, s'erige actuellement, en chef et conducteur de notre nation. S'il n'y auroit de mauvaiſes ſuites que pour lui, nous attendrions avec patience, qu'il ſe preſentât dans nos contrées.—— Fanfaronnade cependant, qu'il ne fera jamais que dans ſes ecrits. Comme, il a agi envers nous V. M. I. verra dans notre memoire. Nous entendons qu'il a pris de ſommes immenſes, qu'il pretend avoir depenſé pour nous: nous aſſurons V. M. I. que, ni lui, ni perſonne de VOS officiers

* This man had been a livery ſervant in Peterſburgh.

envoyés à nous, nous ont donné un ſeul rouble. La flotille et les autres armemens de Lambro ont été fait à nos fraix: un de nous a abandonné ſon foyer paiſible; a armè à ſes fraix deux vaiſſeaux; a depenſé 12,000 zechins pour des armemens, et les Turcs ont maſſacré ſa mère, ſon frere, ont raſé ſes poſſeſſions et deſolé ſes terres.

Nous n'avons jamais demandé Vos treſors: nous ne le les demandons pas actuellement: nous n'avons jamais demandé que de la poudre et des balles (que nous ne pouvons pas achêter) et d'être mênes en bataille. Nous ſommes venus pour *offrir*, nos vies et nos biens; pas pour *demander* des treſors.

Daignez O GRANDE IMPERATRICE! GLOIRE DE LA FOI GRECQUE! daignez lire notre memoire. Le ciel a reſervé notre delivrance pour le regne glorieux de V. M. I. C'eſt ſous Vos auſpices que nous éſperons de delivrer notre empire uſurpé, et notre patriarchat, et notre ſainte religion inſulteés, des mains des barbares Mahometans; de delivrer les deſcendants d'Athenes et de Lacedemon du joug tyrannique de ces ignorans ſauvages, ſous lequel gemit une nation dont le genie n'eſt pas êteint, que l'amour de la liberté inflame, que le joug de fer des barbares n'a pas avilie; qui a devant ſes yeux, toujours preſent, l'image de ſes anciens heros dont l'example anime ſes guerriers encore aujourdhui.

Nos ſuperbes ruines parlent à nos yeux de notre ancienne grandeur: nos ports innombrables, nos beaux païs; le ciel qui ſur nous ſourit toute l'année; l'ardeur de notre jeunneſſe, et de nos

decrepits

decrepits vieillards mêmes, nous diſent que la nature nous eſt auſſi propice qu'elle l'étoit à nos ancêtres. Donnez nous pous ſouverain Votre petit-fils CONSTANTIN, c'eſt le vœu de notre nation (la famille de nos empereurs eſt êteinte) et nous ſerons ce qu' êtoient nos premiers ayeux.

Nous ne ſommes pas de ces gens qui ont oſé tromper LA PLUS MAGNANIMES DE SOUVERAINES; nous ſommes les *Deputés*, munis de pleins pouvoirs et d'autres documens des peuples de la Grece; et comme tels, proſternés au pied du Trône, de CELLE, qui, aprés DIEU, nous regardons comme notre SAUVEUR, nous proteſtons d'être juſqu' à notre dernier ſoupir."

De V. M. I.
Le plus fideles et les plus devoués ſerviteurs,

St. Peterſbourg, April, 1790.

(L. S.) PANO KIRI.
(L. S.) CHRISTO LAZZOTTI.
(L. S.) NICCOLÓ PANGALO."

TRANSLATION.

Madam,

It was not until we had long ſolicited in vain Your Imperial Majeſty's miniſters for an anſwer to the memorial, which we had the honour of preſenting to them; it was not until, driven to the utmoſt deſpair by the reflection of the dreadful evils which this delay might produce to our countrymen, who (invited by the manifeſtoes of Your Imperial Majeſty) have taken arms againſt the enemy of the Chriſtian

tian name, and deputed us to lay the offer of their lives and their fortunes at the foot of Your imperial throne; it was not till we had loſt all hopes of otherwiſe obtaining a ſpeedy anſwer to ſtop thoſe ſtreams of the blood of our brethren, which doubtleſs flow already through this delay, that we have at length dared to proſtrate ourſelves at *Your* feet, and to preſent our humble memorial to Your Imperial Majeſty in perſon.

Another duty equally ſacred, and which was a principal object of our miſſion, induced us to take this daring ſtep: it was to undeceive Y. I. M. whom (as well as Your miniſters) there have been people audacious enough to miſlead. We have learned with indignation, that the chevalier Pſaro now erects himſelf into a chief and conductor of our people; a man abhorred by our nation, out of the dregs of which he roſe, and where he would have remained, if he had not with an unheard-of audaciouſneſs deceived Your Imperial Majeſty's miniſters, and aſſumed a reputation by attributing to himſelf exploits he never performed. If no ill conſequences would enſue but to himſelf, we ſhould patiently await his appearance in our country, a boaſt however which he never will perform but in his writings. How he has acted towards us Y. I. M. will ſee in our memorial. We hear that he has received immenſe ſums, which he pretends to have expended for us. We aſſure Y. I. M. that neither he, nor any of your officers ſent to us, ever paid us a ſingle rouble. The flotilla, and the other armaments of Lambro, were equipped at our own expence. One of us (deputies) abandoning his peaceful

ful home, fitted out two veſſels at his own expence, and expended in armaments 12,000 zechins, whilſt the Turks maſſacred his mother and his brother, levelled with the ground his poſſeſſions, and deſolated his lands.

We never aſked for Your treaſures; we do not aſk for them now; we only aſk for powder and balls (which we cannot purchaſe) and to be led to battle. We are come to *offer* our lives and fortunes, not to *aſk* for Your treaſures.

Deign, O Great Empreſs! Glory of the Greek faith! deign to read our memorial. Heaven has reſerved our deliverance for the glorious reign of Y. I. M. It is under Your auſpices that we hope to deliver from the hands of barbarous Mahomedans our empire, which they have uſurped, and our patriarchat and our holy religion, which they have inſulted; to free the deſcendants of Athens and Lacedemon from the tyrannic yoke of ignorant ſavages, under which groans a nation whoſe genius is not extinguiſhed; a nation which glows with the love of liberty; which the iron yoke of barbariſm has not vilified; which has conſtantly before its eyes the images of its ancient heroes, and whoſe example animates its warriors even to this day.

Our ſuperb ruins ſpeak to our eyes, and tell us of our ancient grandeur; our innumerable ports, our beautiful country, the heavens which ſmile on us all the year, the ardour of our youth, and even of our decrepid elders, tell us that nature is not leſs propitious to us than it was to our forefathers. Give us for a ſovereign Your grandſon CONSTANTINE: it is the wiſh of our nation (the family

family of our emperors is extinct *) and we ſhall become what our anceſtors were.

We are not perſons who have dared to impoſe on the *moſt magnanimous of ſovereigns:* we are the deputies of the people of Greece, furniſhed with full powers and other documents, and as ſuch proſtrated before the throne of HER, whom, next to GOD, we look on as our ſaviour; we declare that we ſhall be till our lateſt breath,

YOUR IMPERIAL MAJESTY'S

Moſt faithful and moſt devoted ſervants,

St. Peterſburgh, April, 1790.

(L.S.) PANO KIRI.
(L.S.) CHRISTO LAZZOTTI.
(L.S.) NICCOLO PANGOLO.

As theſe people are out of the reach of Turkiſh vengeance, I have not ſcrupled naming them.

THE

* In Europe we are apt to think that thoſe who bear the names of Comnenos, Paleologos, &c. are deſcendants of the imperial family: the Greeks, however, themſelves have no ſuch notions; they are either Chriſtian names given them at their baptiſm, or that they have taken afterwards, and they only deſcend to the ſecond generation. A man is called Nicolaos Papudopulo; the former is his name received in baptiſm, and the latter a ſurname, becauſe he was the ſon of a prieſt; his ſons take the ſurname of Nicolopulo (ſon of Nicolaos) added to their Chriſtian name, and their children the father's Chriſtian name as a ſurname. Thoſe of Fanar have, particularly lately, affected to keep great

THE empreſs received them very graciouſly, and promiſed them the aſſiſtance they aſked. They were then conducted to the apartments of her grandſons, and offering to kiſs the hand of the eldeſt grand duke, Alexander, he pointed to his brother Conſtantine, telling them, it was to him that they were to addreſs themſelves; they repreſented to him in Greek the object of their miſſion, and concluded by doing homage to him as their emperor (Βασιλευς των Ἡλλενων.) He anſwered them in the ſame language, *Go, and let every thing be according to your wiſhes.*

With this memorial they preſented *a plan of operation*, from which I ſhall extract only a few particulars:—They propoſed, after the empreſs had furniſhed them with cannon, and enabled them to augment the ſquadron under Lambro Canziani, and ſent them en-

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great names in their families, which were only Chriſtian names, or names which they have taken of themſelves, or were afterwards given them by their parents, relations, or friends. The ſame may be ſaid of ſome names in the Archipelago, particularly where the family has preſerved for ſome generations more property than their neighbours; but their names do not add to their reſpect among the other Greeks, who all know the origin of them, and have not the leaſt notion that there is any lineal deſcent to be traced of their ancient imperial or noble families, notwithſtanding the pretenſions often of ſome of them, who bear their names when they come to Europe.

gineers

gineers to conduct the ſiege of ſtrong places, to begin their firſt operations by marching from Sulli, where the congreſs was held, and whence they had a correſpondence with all Greece.—Their route was to be firſt to Livadia and to Athens, dividing into two corps. In their march they were to be joined at appointed places by troops from the Morea and Negroponte. To this iſland the fleet of Lambro was to ſail. They were then to proceed in one body to Theſſalia and to the city of Salonichi, where they would receive large reinforcements from Macedonia. The whole army being then aſſembled, they were to march to the plains of Adrianople, with (as they calculated) three hundred thouſand men, to meet the Ruſſians, and proceed to Conſtantinople, where they hoped the Ruſſian fleet would be arrived from the Crim; if not, they eſteemed their own force ſufficient to take that city, and drive the Turks out of Europe and their iſlands.

In this plan the eſtabliſhment and the diſpoſition of magazines, and retreats in caſes of diſaſter, were provided for. The force of the Turks in different parts, and the different movements to oppoſe them, were calculated. All their reſources, and the amount of the troops each place had engaged to furniſh, were plainly ſtated, as well as the means they

they had adopted to carry on a ſecret correſpondence with all parts of the country, both with reſpect to their own allies and the movements of the Turks. To enter more into particulars would not be juſtifiable in me.

The empreſs ſent them to the army in Moldavia, to Prince Potemkin, giving them 1,000 ducats for their journey thither. They left Peterſburgh the $\frac{13}{24}$ May 1790. In Auguſt they were ſent to Greece by the way of Vienna, and Major General Tamara with them, to ſuperintend the whole expedition, and furniſh them with the aſſiſtance they required.

It merits attention, that the king of Pruſſia had poſted an army of 150,000 men, in June 1790, on the frontier of Bohemia; that the convention of Reichenbach was ſigned the 27th of July. The ſentiments of the court of London reſpecting the war, and its probable interference in as ſerious a way as Pruſſia had done, were known at St. Peterſburgh. It is to theſe circumſtances we muſt attribute the ſlowneſs with which the projects of the Greeks were ſeconded. They were aſſured that they ſhould have every ſuccour they required, and much more: money was ſent, but not much of it diſburſed; they were enjoined to prepare every thing, but to undertake

take nothing, till the proper moment ſhould arrive for their acting, which, they were told, depended on many circumſtances, of which they were ignorant. Lambro in the mean-time acted by himſelf, but could undertake nothing of any conſequence. Things remained thus till after the campaign was ended, and Prince Potemkin came to St. Peterſburgh.

The fate of the armament commanded by the gallant Lambro deſerves to be mentioned.

The Greeks proved on this occaſion their love of liberty, their paſſion for glory, and a perſeverance in toils, obedience to diſcipline, and contempt of danger and death, worthy of the brighteſt pages of their hiſtory; they fought with, and conquered, very ſuperior numbers; and when at laſt they were attacked with an inequality of force, as great as Leonidas had to encounter, they fought till their whole fleet was ſunk, and a few only ſaved themſelves in boats.

Lambro had only reſources left to fit out one ſingle ſhip: the news of a peace arrived; but boiling with indignation at the neglect he had experienced from the Ruſſian agents, and thirſting for revenge, he ſailed notwithſtanding, and attacked and deſtroyed ſeveral Turkiſh veſſels: he was declared a pirate, and diſavowed by Ruſſia—but he was not intimidated

timidated—at length he was again overpowered; he diſdained to ſtrike; his veſſel ſunk under him, and he again eſcaped in his boat, and took refuge in the mountains of Albania.

The conduct of the Ruſſian agents to him was the moſt ſcandalous. The peculation of all thoſe entruſted at a diſtance with the empreſs's money was become ſo glaring and common, that they looked on it as their own property. Lambro was ſuffered to be impriſoned for debts contracted for his armaments, and was only releaſed by the contributions of his countrymen.

In the ſpring of 1791, an armament was prepared in England to ſail for the Baltic, to force the empreſs to make peace. The king of Pruſſia was ready to co-operate by land. Inſtead of the fleet, Mr. Fawkener arrived at Peterſburgh. It was ſtill undetermined by the empreſs, whether ſhe ſhould brave England and Pruſſia (though from the turn affairs had taken in England, and the arrival of another ambaſſador, ſhe was aſſured ſhe had little to fear from our fleet, and, conſequently, little from the Pruſſian army) or make peace with the Turks on the conditions ſhe had conſented to when ſhe was more ſeriouſly alarmed.

In this uncertainty a courier was kept ready to depart with inſtructions to General Tamara. The king's envoy was informed of this circumſtance, and would have learnt immediately the contents of the diſpatch, which would have made him acquainted with the empreſs's reſolution reſpecting the proſecution of the war, or conſenting to peace. The courier, however, was not diſpatched. The buſineſs was terminated with the king's joint envoys. Prince Potemkin departed for the army, and on his road learnt the victory gained by Repnin over the vizir's army, and the ſigning the preliminaries of peace. Secret orders had been ſent to Repnin, as ſoon as the empreſs had reſolved to conclude a peace, which he fortunately executed; and it is certain that he received a copy of the arrangement made with the king's miniſters, before he ſigned the preliminaries. Impediments were thrown in the way of the departure of the meſſenger diſpatched to Conſtantinople, ſo that he did not arrive till any interference of our ambaſſador could be of no effect.

It is plainly to be ſeen, that though the empreſs pretended ſhe had of her own accord (and before the arrangement with His Majeſty was known to her general) concluded a peace,

peace, the interference of His Majeſty in bringing about that event had a weighty effect.

When the news of the ſigning the preliminaries reached the Ruſſian fleet, it had beaten the Turks in the Black Sea, and was purſuing them into the channel of Conſtantinople, where they muſt inevitably have been deſtroyed. Had the Ruſſian admiral been a man of more experience, they might all have been taken in the engagement.

Thus ended a war, which, had it not been for the interference of Great Britain and Pruſſia, would have placed the empreſs's grandſon on the throne of Conſtantinople; and, had not circumſtances imperiouſly preſcribed to them the part they acted, we ſhould have had, in Ruſſia and Greece, allies which would, long ago, have enabled his majeſty and the emperor, in all human probability, to have humbled a foe, which now threatens all Europe with total ſubverſion, and even to become the inſtrument of emancipating Greece from the Turkiſh tyranny, not to become an independent people, but to be oppreſſed by a worſe tyranny, under the name of liberty.

The Suliotes ſtill maintain their independence: they were often attacked by the Turks, but were as often ſucceſsful; they

fought ſeventeen battles or ſkirmiſhes, the laſt of which had nearly been fatal to them, as appears by the following paper, communicated to me by a drogoman, now in the Britiſh ſervice, which will throw much light on the character of the inhabitants of Epirus; and it contains, beſides, very curious and intereſting matter. The authenticity of what he relates cannot be called in queſtion, as it very exactly agrees with every other account I have received.

In 1792, being in the French ſervice as interpreter, I was ſent from Salonico by the French conſul, Mr. Coſenery, on ſome buſineſs regarding the conſulſhip, to Ali Paſha, at Yanina, the capital of Epirus. I arrived there the 1ſt of May, and found the paſha making great preparations for war. I found alſo there the French conſul of Preveſa, Mr. de la Sala (a deſcendant of the Salas, who betrayed the Morea to the Turks, when in the poſſeſſion of the Venetians) and acting as commiſſary, not only to provide timber in Epirus for the French navy, but alſo for revolutionizing that country.

He communicated to me his commiſſion, inſinuating, that if I would aſſiſt him, I might expect great rewards. One day, when we were with Ali Paſha, our converſation turned upon the French revolution, which was always introduced

introduced with a view to excite him to throw off all obedience to the porte. The paſha ſaid to us—" *You will ſee that Ali Paſha, the* " *ſucceſſor of Piros (Pyrrhus) will ſurpaſs* " *him in every kind of enterprize.*"

The paſha continued to aſſemble troops without making known his intentions. In July, his army conſiſted of 20,000 good Turkiſh ſoldiers, who were the more formidable, as they were all Albanians. He then declared, that his deſign was to attack the Mahomedan town of Argirocaſtro, ſituated twelve leagues diſtant from Yanina, which would not be governed by a perſon he ſent for that purpoſe, nor anywiſe ſubmit to him. With this excuſe he wrote to Captain * Bogia and Captain Giavella, two of the moſt conſiderable of the chiefs of the Greek inhabitants of the mountain of Sulli, praying them to meet him with all their ſoldiers or companions, to aſſiſt in his expedition. His letter was in modern Greek, of which the following is a copy, which I inſert, that the learned reader may ſee how much, or how little, it differs from the ancient.

Φιλοιμα Καπιτὰν Μπόζια κ᾽ Καπιταν Τζαβελλα, ἐγὼ ὁ Ἀλὺ Ππασίας σὰς χαιρετὼ, κ᾽ σὰς φιλὼ τὰ ματία, ἐπειδὴ κ᾽ ἐγὼ ξεύρω πολλὰ καλὰ τὴν ανδραγαθείαν σας

* The Greeks call their chiefs captains.

κὴ ψαλλικαρίαν σας μὲ φαινέται ναχω μεγάλην χρειαν ἀπὸ λογέσας, λοιπὸν μὴ καμετε ἀλλέως ψαρακαλῶ, ἀλλ εὐθὺς ὁπὲ λαβέτε τὴν γραφὴν μὲν, νὰ μαζοξέτε ὁλασας τα ψαλλικάρια κὴ νὰ ελθέτε νὰ μὲ εὑρετε διανὰ ψαγω, να πολεμησω τὲς ἐχθρὲς μὲ. τετη ἴναι ἡ ὸρα κὴ ὁ καιρὲς ὁπε ἔχω χρειαν ἀπὸ λογεσας, κὴ μένω νὰ ειδῶ τὴν φιλιαν σας κὴ τὴν ἀγαπην ὁπὲ ἐχετε διὰ λογὲ μὲ· ὁ λεφεσας θελει ἴναι δυπλὸς απ' ὅσον δίδω εἰς τὲς Αρβανιτας δια τὶ κὴ ἡ ψαλλικαριάσας ξεύρω ψὼς ἴναι ψολλὰ μεγαλότερη ἀπὸ τὴν εδικὴν τες. λοιπον ἐγὼ δὲν ψάγω νὰ ψολεμήσω ψρὶν νὰ ἐλθετε ἐσεὶς, κὴ σὰς καρτερῶ ὁλλιγορα νὰ ἐλθετε, ταῦτα κὴ σὰς χαιρετῶ,

VERBAL TRANSLATION.

" *My friends, Captain Bogia and Captain Giavella, I, Ali Paſha, ſalute you, and kiſs your eyes, becauſe I well know your courage and heroic minds. It appears to me that I have great need of you, therefore I entreat you immediately, when you receive my letter, to aſſemble all your heroes, and come to meet me, that I may go to fight my enemies. This is the hour and the time that I have need of you. I expect to ſee your friendſhip, and the love which you have for me. Your pay ſhall be double that which I give to the Albanians, becauſe I know that your courage is greater than theirs; therefore I will not go to fight before you come, and I expect that you will come ſoon. This only, and I ſalute you.*"

I was preſent when the paſha's Greek ſecretary wrote this letter, and I took a copy of it,

it, it not appearing to him or to me as a matter of ſecrecy.

Ali Paſha is an Albanian of Tepé-dellen; he is a ſon of Veli Paſha, who governed a part of Albania; though a Mahomedan, he underſtands very little Turkiſh, and ſpeaks only Greek and the Albanian language, which is a mixture of Slavonian, Turkiſh, Greek, and a few old French words, but perfectly unintelligible to thoſe who underſtand all thoſe languages.

On receiving this flattering letter, the chiefs held a council with their men. Captain Bogia, and the majority of the ſoldiers, thought the paſha's propoſal was only a ſtratagem to get them into his power, and make himſelf maſter of their mountain. Captain Bogia, in conſequence, wrote to the paſha, that he received his letter with great reſpect and ſubmiſſion, and was himſelf ready to obey his orders; but as he could not perſuade his people to follow him, it was unneceſſary for him to go alone. Captain Giavella, either through avarice or ambition, was induced to comply with the paſha's requeſt, and went to his army, though only with ſeventy men. He was received with great marks of friendſhip. The paſha and his army marched four leagues on the road towards Argirocaſtro, and encamped; but he ſent an advanced

poſt, conſiſting of 400 men, under a buluk-baſhee, as far as the town, and the people making a ſortie, a ſkirmiſh enſued. Giavelli and his men were now perfectly convinced of the paſha's deſign, and laid aſide all ſuſpicion; but ſix days afterwards they were all ſeized unawares, as they were diſperſed in the Turkiſh camp, and put in heavy irons, except three, who, getting their arms, defended themſelves till they were ſlain. The men were ſent to Yanina, and impriſoned in the ſmall iſland which is in the Acheruſian Lake, on the banks of which Yanina ſtands; but Giavelli was kept in the camp. The paſha immediately turned his march towards Sulli, and arrived before the mountain the next day. The Suliotes, who are always on their guard, had notice of the paſha's approach, and of the fate of their countrymen, ſix hours before he arrived. They aſſembled, and gave the command in chief to Captain Bogia, whoſe abilities they knew.

The mountain of Sulli, or Caco-ſulli, ſo called on account of the ill the Turks have experienced from them, is ſituated eight leagues from Santa-maura (or Leucas) in the Ionian Sea, having Prevaſa (Nicopolis) to the ſouth-weſt, diſtant ten leagues; Yanina to the eaſt, twelve leagues; and ſouth-eaſt, Arta, diſtant eight leagues.

To

To the ſouth, this mountain joins the Chimæra mountains, which are inhabited alſo by independent Greek Chriſtians, allies of the Suliotes. On the eaſt, at the foot of the mountain, is a fine plain of about ſix ſquare leagues, which is very fertile; in it they have built four villages, for the purpoſe of cultivating the land; but in time of danger the inhabitants fly to the mountain. There being no water in the plain, they have ſunk ciſterns or reſervoirs to collect the rain.

The mountain is a natural ſtrong fortreſs. Three ſides are perpendicular precipices to the bottom. The top of the mountain they call Tripa, which ſignifies a cavity. There is only one narrow ſteep paſſage to aſcend to it, and it is defended by three towers, nearly a mile diſtant from each other, ſituated on eminences, where the road is moſt difficult. The aſcent is about three miles long. In the firſt mile there is a village called Kapha, which ſignifies top or ſummit.

On the ſide towards Chimæra there is a ſmall brook, formed by the melting of the ſnow of thoſe mountains, from which, in caſe of need, the inhabitants of Sulli get water, by letting down ſponges, as the ſides are not even enough to let down any kind of bucket or other veſſel; and this water cannot be cut off by

by the Turks, as it is defended by the heights of the mountains.

Captain Bogia ordered corn to be carried from the villages to the Tripa, for ſix months proviſions, as it is always kept in readineſs to be tranſported; then the four villages were evacuated; half of the inhabitants went to Kapha, and the others to Tripa, their laſt aſylum, which will contain ten thouſand men; then, having more time, he threw into the ciſterns hogs and lime, and other naſtineſs, to prevent the Turks uſing the water.

The paſhas encamped in the villages, and ſurrounded the mountain at a diſtance, to prevent their receiving aſſiſtance of troops from the Chimæriotes, or ammunition from St. Mara or Prevaſa, whence they are always ſupplied. The main body of the Turkiſh army in the villages was commanded in perſon by the paſha; the corps towards Chimæra by his ſon Mokhtar, paſha of Arta (of two tails) and Captain Prognio, who was a chief of the Paramathian Albaneſe; the ſide towards Prevaſa, was commanded by Mamed Bey and Oſman Bey his brother; that on the ſide of Arta, by Soliman Ciapar, another chief of the ſame Albanian town of Paramathia, a man of eighty-five years of age, tall, and of a fine gigantic ſtature, having no appearance of age but the ſnowy whiteneſs of his

his beard; he had with him eleven ſons from thirty to ſixty years of age, all tall and ſtrong like their father: their bodily ſtrength and perſonal courage cauſed them to be looked on as heroes, and gave them a remarkable ſuperiority among their countrymen: they went together, that if one fell the others might revenge his death; for among theſe people it is the cuſtom, that relations go to the war together to revenge each other's death. Thoſe who have the greateſt number of relations are the moſt powerful families, and the fathers of the principal families are their chiefs.

I will ſpeak a little on the ſubject of thoſe Paramathian Albaneſe. Their town is ſituated twelve leagues diſtant from Yanina; they poſſeſs a territory of twelve leagues in circumference, and can bring into the field 20,000 men. Their country is ſo mountainous and inacceſſible, that they have never been conquered by the Turks. How they became Mahomedans they do not know themſelves exactly; ſome of them ſay, that when the Turks firſt invaded theſe countries, they made peace, on condition of becoming Mahomedans, and procuring their independence. They ſpeak Greek, and know no other language; they look on the Turks and other Albanians as effeminate, and hold them in

the

the utmoſt contempt. They have no regular government; each family or relationſhip (clan) adminiſters juſtice among themſelves. The largeſt clans have the moſt influence in the country in all public or general matters. They are careful not to kill people of another kindred, as the relations revenge his death, and when once bloodſhed is thus begun, it goes on till one of the clans is extinct. They always carry their guns with them, whenever they go out of their houſes, and never quit them; even at home they are not without their piſtols in their girdles; at night they put them under their pillows, and lay their gun by them beſide. The ſame precautions are obſerved in all theſe parts, except the town of Yanina. There are amongſt the Paramathians, however, a conſiderable number of Greek Chriſtians, who live all in the ſame manner. Thoſe who are Mahomedans know little of their religion, or pay little regard to it; their women are not veiled; they drink wine, and intermarry with the Chriſtians. It is true, indeed, that they will not eat pork; but if the huſband and wife are of different religions, they make no ſcruple of boiling in the ſame pot a piece of pork and a piece of mutton.

All ſtrangers, Turks, Europeans, Greeks, or others, who happen to paſs on their terri-

tory, or are caught by them, are carried to their public market, and there ſold.

Being one day at Yanina, at the Greek archbiſhop's houſe, I ſaw a Piedmonteſe prieſt, who, travelling in theſe parts, had been ſeized by the Paramatheans, and ſold; his ſtory, as related to me by the prelate, is as follows: Soliman Ciapar being at his houſe one day on a viſit, told him, that he had bought a Frank for four piaſtres, but that he was good for nothing, and though he beat him daily, he could not make him do ſo much work as his bread was worth; he would therefore, he ſaid, when he got home, kill him as a uſeleſs beaſt. The archbiſhop offered to buy him for the four piaſtres he had coſt, and to pay the money immediately, if Ciapar would give ſecurity (for here no one truſts another). The bargain being ſettled, the Frank was ſent: he proved to be a man of learning, and the archbiſhop eſtabliſhed a ſchool under his direction at Yanina, for Greek children. When I was there, he gained fifty and ſixty piaſtres a month, and was ſo pleaſed with his ſituation and the kindneſs of the archbiſhop, that he had reſolved to remain in that country, and marry.

A ſtranger might travel into theſe mountains, and would be treated hoſpitably by the inhabitants, if, while he was in a neighbouring

bouring country, he put himſelf under the protection of a Paramathian, who would give ſecurity for his being brought back ſafe.

But to return to the paſha's expedition. The ſecond day after the army had encamped in the plains of Sulli, the paſha cauſed Captain Giavella to be brought before him, and told him, that if he would inform him how he could get poſſeſſion of the mountain, he would not only ſpare his life, but make him beluk-baſhee of the province. Giavelli anſwered, that if he would ſet him at liberty, he would go to the mountain, and engage his party, and at leaſt half the inhabitants, to ſubmit to him, and take up arms againſt Bogia; that by theſe means he could introduce the paſha's troops into the Tripa, when the other party would alſo be glad to make their peace without fighting. The paſha aſked him what ſecurity he would give for his performing his promiſes. Giavella anſwered, he would give him as an hoſtage his only ſon, a boy of twelve years of age, who was dearer to him than his own life, that if he deceived him he might put his ſon to death. Giavella accordingly called his ſon down from the mountain; but as ſoon as he got to the mountain himſelf, he wrote to the paſha as follows:

"*Ali*

" *Ali Paſha, I am glad I have deceived a traitor; I am here to defend my country againſt a thief. My ſon will be put to death, but I will deſperately revenge him before I fall myſelf. Some men, like you Turks, will ſay I am a cruel father to ſacrifice my ſon for my own ſafety. I anſwer, if you take the mountain, my ſon would have been killed, with all the reſt of my family and my countrymen; then I could not have revenged his death. If we are victorious, I may have other children, my wife is young. If my ſon, young as he is, is not willing to be ſacrificed for his country, he is not worthy to live, or to be owned by me as my ſon. Advance, traitor, I am impatient to be revenged. I am your ſworn enemy, Captain Giavella.*"

The Greek original was:

Αλι Πασια, χαιρομαι οπῦ εγελασα ἐναν δολιον, ειμαι δῶ να διαφενδευσω τὴν πατριδα μὲ εναντιον εις εναν κλεπτην. ὁ γος μὲ θελει αποθανει εγὼ ὁμως απελπισως θελω τον εκδικεισω πριν να ἀποθανω. καποι Τυρκοι καθως εσενα θελεν ειπῦν ὅτι ειμαι ασπλαχνος πατερας μετο να θυσιασω, τὸν γον μὲ διὰ τὸν εδικον μὲ λιτρομον αποκρινομαι, ὅτι αν εσυ παρεις το βενὸν θελης σκοτοσης τον γον μὲ με το επιλιπον της φαμελειας μὲ ϰ̀ τες συνπατριοτες μὲ, τοτες δεν θα μπορεισω να εκδικησω τον θανατον τε αμή. αν νικησωμεν θελει ἐχω ἀλλα πεδια ἡ γενεκα μὲ ἦναι νεα. εαν ὁ γος μὲ νεος καθὼς ἦναι δεν μενει ευχαριϛήμενος να θυσιασὴ δια τὴν πατριδα τε, αυτὸς δεν ἦναι ἄξιος να ζηση ϰ̀ να εγνωριζεται ὡς γος μὲ. προχορησε ἀπισε ειμαι ανυπομονος να εκδικηθω.

Εγὼ ὁ ομοσμενος εχθρος σῦ,

Καπιταν Τζιαβελλας.

The

The paſha did not think proper in his rage to put the hoſtage immediately to death, but ſent him to Yanina, to his ſon Velim-bey, who governed in his abſence. I was preſent when the boy was brought before him: he anſwered the queſtion put to him with a courage and audaciouſneſs that aſtoniſhed every one. Velim-bey told him, he only waited the paſha's orders to roaſt him alive. I don't fear you, the boy anſwered; my father will do the ſame to your father or your brother if he takes them. He was put in a dark priſon, and fed on bread and water.

The paſha attacked the village of Kapha, and was repulſed three different times with great loſs, but Captain Bogia conſidering the diſparity of numbers, as the Suliotes had only 900 men in the Tripa, reſolved to abandon this poſt, which the Albaneſe took poſſeſſion of the next time they attacked it, though with conſiderable loſs, the Seliotes firing at them from among the rocks in ſafety.

The paſha's troops, ſuffering very much through want of water, which was brought to them ſix leagues on horſes, as all thoſe who attempted to fetch water from the brook under the Sulli mountain were killed by ſtones the women rolled down on them, or ſhot by the men, began to mutiny; the paſha therefore

fore determined to ſtorm the Tripa the next day, and having aſſembled the principal officers, and choſen 800 Albanians, he expoſed all his treaſure in his tent, which conſiſted of Venetian ducats, and told them, it ſhould all be diſtributed among them if they took Tripa; and that, beſides, they ſhould have all the immenſe riches which it was known were there. The next day the 800 Albanians, having at their head Mehmetember, and in the main body two ſons of Soliman Chapar, and in the rear Captain Brogno, marched to the aſſault, and drawing their ſabres, declared they would not ſheathe them till they were victorious.

Captain Bogia left 400 men to garriſon Tripa, and ſent four hundred to lie in ambuſcade in the foreſt on each ſide of the road, with orders not to attack till the ſignal agreed on was made from the ſecond tower, in which he ſhut himſelf up with ſixty men, and from whence, by means of ſignals, he commanded the movements. Giavella went with the troops into the foreſt like a common ſoldier, the better to take his meditated revenge. The ambuſcade was commanded by Demetrius, Bogia's ſon.

The head of the Albanian column advanced without moleſtation as far as the ſecond tower, which they ſurrounded, and ſum-

moned Bogia to ſurrender. He replied, he could not truſt himſelf to them, but would ſubmit to Captain Brogno when he arrived; they therefore marched further up towards Tripa, leaving him, as they thought, a priſoner. The paſha's army, ſeeing the Albaneſe had advanced without reſiſtance to the top of the mountain, and fearing to be deprived of a ſhare of the plunder of Tripa, left their tents, and ran up the mountain with ſhouts of victory. When Bogia ſaw that the enemy, in number about 4,000, had advanced to the third tower, which was near the Tripa, he rang a bell, the ſignal for a general attack, which was a general ſlaughter: the ambuſcade prevented any returning. They were in every part expoſed to the fire of the Suliotes, who were covered by the rocks or the trees, and from the ſecond tower Bogia made great havoc. The women from the heights rolled down great ſtones, which for that purpoſe are always piled up. The enemy defended themſelves, when the Suliotes came out to meet them, with great obſtinacy; they were, however, all killed, except 140, who ſurrendered themſelves priſoners. Among them was a ſon of Soliman Chappa, and many officers. The Suliotes had fifty-ſeven killed and twenty-ſeven wounded. Giavella was among the ſlain. After ſhooting from the ambuſcade a great

number

number of the enemy, he ſallied out with ſome of his friends, to avenge the ſuppoſed death of his ſon, and to fight till all the enemy were killed, or he himſelf fell. After making a great havoc among the enemy, into the thickeſt of whoſe ranks he had ran forward with deſperate valour, he fell, covered with wounds, and ſurrounded by heaps of ſlain.

The bodies being thrown down from the rocks into the Turkiſh camp, ſtruck the remainder of the army with ſuch a panic that they fled with great precipitation towards Yanina, and abandoned the paſha. Bogia profited of their diſorder to ſend 200 men, who, falling on the rear, cut off great numbers. The paſha himſelf eſcaped with difficulty, and killed two horſes before he got back to Yanina. All the baggage, ammunition, arms, proviſions, and the paſha's treaſure, fell into the hands of the Suliotes, beſides four large cannon, which they drew up to the Tripa, and which were a great acquiſition to them.

The other corps, towards Prevaſa, Arta, and Chimæra, followed the example of the main body, and reached Yanina in great haſte. So great indeed was their panic, that none of them ſtopt till they got within the

walls of the city, thinking they were ſtill purſued by the Suliotes.

In the mean time, the communication being opened with the Chimæriotes, the Sulian army increaſed in two days ſo much, that they found themſelves ſtrong enough to offer the paſha battle in the open plains. They marched to an eſtate of the paſha's near Yanina, and took poſſeſſion of it, whence they ſent him a letter, threatening to take him priſoner in his haram. They purſued the Paramathians into their country, where they cut down the trees, and drove away vaſt herds of cattle and flocks of ſheep to Sulli.

The paſha, apprehenſive for the ſafety of his capital, ſent a biſhop to propoſe peace to the Suliotes. It was concluded on the following conditions:

1ſt. That the paſha cedes to the Suliotes all the territory as far as Dervigiana (ſix leagues from Yanina) incluſively.

2. That all the Suliotes, who were priſoners, ſhould be ſet at liberty. (Then Giavella's ſon returned ſafe to Sulli.)

3. The paſha ſhould pay 100,000 piaſtres as a ranſom for the priſoners the Suliotes had made.

With the Paramathians they concluded a ſeparate

ſeparate peace, as they are not dependent on the paſha.

The conditions were, that they ſhould in future be allies, and that they ſhould on all occaſions ſuccour the Suliotes, both with men, arms, and proviſions, when they were at war.

Returned home to their mountain, the Suliotes divided the booty, and the 100,000 piaſtres, into five parts: one was deſtined to the repair of churches, which the Turks had damaged, and to build a new one on the Tripa, dedicated to the holy virgin; the ſecond part was put into the public box for the ſervice of the community; the third was equally divided among all the inhabitants, without diſtinction of rank or age; the two other parts were diſtributed to the families of thoſe who had loſt men in battle.

This peace was ſoon broken by the paſha, who was twice afterwards defeated, and the Suliotes gained ſtill greater honour.

The writer of this journal further ſays, that in this country there are ten Greeks to one Turk; that the Sulian army always conſiſts of about 20,000 men, including their neareſt neighbours on the Chimæra mountains. He points out how eaſy it would have been for them to have put in effect

what their chiefs had concerted with the Ruſſians. But I avoid entering into particulars, as I might give information to thoſe who would make a bad uſe of it.

It was afterwards diſcovered, that the French conſul, Mr. de la Salas, had adviſed the paſha to get poſſeſſion of Sulli and Chimæra, as then he would have nothing to fear from the porte, if he threw off all obedience; and that the French could then ſupply him with artillery and ammunition, &c. Mr. de la Sala was one day ſhot dead in the ſtreet at Prevaſa by a captain of Lambro's fleet.

CHAPTER X.

The Turkiſh Empire conſidered, with regard to its Foreign Relations.

THE preceding pages have ſhown the internal ſituation of the Turkiſh empire; they have traced the progreſs of a power founded in violence and rapine, growing up in tyranny and injuſtice, and ultimately verging to corruption and decay. But it is not enough to expoſe the defects of internal conſtitution and adminiſtration; to the politician it muſt be matter of ſerious enquiry to learn what are the foreign relations to which theſe domeſtic arrangements give birth; what rank in the ſcale of political importance ſuch an empire has obtained; and how its exiſtence has affected, and its approaching annihilation will affect the intereſts of other ſtates. This view of the ſubject muſt, however, be taken with great caution.

In the ſyſtem of Europe, great and important changes have taken place, and the balance of power, once a ſubject of ſo much

contention and jealouſy, has received, and is daily receiving, ſuch ſhocks as ſeem to threaten its total ſubverſion.

In the midſt of this chaos we may ſtill, however, perceive the outlines of two grand combinations of intereſts dividing Europe by their mutual oppoſition. At the head of theſe confederacies may be placed the two ancient rivals in opulence and glory, Great-Britain and France; and however we may be inclined, with philoſophers, to lament that there exiſt irreconcileable intereſts, or political prejudices, which ſow eternal diſcord between nations, on account of their vicinity and power, it muſt be reluctantly acknowledged, that ſuch intereſts and ſuch prejudices not only do exiſt, but are likely to become ſtill ſtronger on the part of the French republicans, who, while they preach univerſal liberty, fraternity, and toleration to all mankind, act with a ſpirit of inveterate hatred, deſpotiſm, and inſufferance, which the narroweſt prejudices, and the deepeſt depravity of human nature could only produce.

It may be obſerved, that theſe two powers, as well as moſt of thoſe that rank in the firſt claſs, have nearly the ſame relationſhip of intereſts as heretofore; but the inferior ſtates are moſtly thrown from their balance, many of them either totally or partially annihilated,

lated, and ſeveral induced to form alliances diametrically oppoſite to their former principles of policy.

In order to explain the connection of Turkiſh politics with the general ſyſtem of Europe, it will be neceſſary to take into conſideration the particular intereſts of the different powers, and to ſhow their relation to the preſent or any future ſtate of that empire. Previouſly to this, however, a general ſketch of the preſent ſituation of things may tend to elucidate our further diſquiſitions.

The attachment of France to Turkey is rationally founded on the great commercial advantages which ſhe enjoys from that nation; on the uſe ſhe makes of the porte to form a diverſion in her favour, whenever the ſituation of her affairs on the continent requires it; and on her particular jealouſy of Ruſſia, which, by obtaining poſſeſſion of the paſſage from the Black Sea, might ſend a naval force into the Mediterranean, to the evident diminution of the French power and commerce. The local ſituation of the poſſeſſions of the houſe of Auſtria has ever made it an object of jealouſy to France; ſhe has, therefore, laboured to cruſh, or at leaſt to curb that power, and finds an additional bond of friendſhip with the Turks in their hoſtility to the emperor.

emperor. Much light is thrown on this ſubject by the papers printed at Paris ſince the revolution, entitled *Politique de tous les Cabinets de l'Europe pendant les Regnes de Louis XV. et XVI.* It there plainly appears (did we want proofs to convince us) that France conſiders Spain, Pruſſia, and Turkey, as its beſt and moſt natural allies; and that whenever it was connected in bonds of amity with Auſtria, it never conſidered that alliance otherwiſe than as a temporary convenience, and ſecretly entertained ſentiments hoſtile to the proſperity of that houſe; that it regarded the preſervation of the Turks as a matter infinitely more important to her than Poland or Sweden; that its jealouſy and hatred to Ruſſia, even when it courted her friendſhip, and concluded a treaty of commerce with her, could only be equalled by its hatred and its jealouſy of Great Britain. We have no reaſon to believe, that the republic thinks differently.

France then being by ſyſtem the avowed or ſecret enemy of the two imperial courts, it is to her that the powers which have to dread either of thoſe courts will naturally look for ſupport.

Pruſſia, whoſe views of aggrandizement depend in a great meaſure on the ruin of the houſe of Auſtria; and Sweden and Denmark,

mark, who both look with envy or apprehenſion on the ſtill growing power of the Ruſſian empire, muſt be induced by ſuch motives to attach themſelves, when they dare, to France, and of conſequence muſt be inclined to ſupport the Ottoman power.

It is by other views of policy that the nations in the ſouth of Europe are directed in forming their alliances with France. Moſt of the Italian ſtates, by their comparative inſignificance, are rendered neceſſarily dependent, and by their ſituation muſt be led, either through fear or policy, to court the protection of that power, while Spain, ever jealous of the Britiſh naval ſuperiority, ever apprehenſive for the fate of her colonies, ſees in France alone an ally ſufficiently powerful to diſpel her fears and to defend her intereſts.

The reaſons alledged for the connection of different nations with France will, in their converſe, point out the motives for alliance with Britain. Among the ſecondary powers attached to us are Portugal and Naples; the one by long commercial habits, and a fear of its more potent and dangerous neighbour, Spain; the other, by a like apprehenſion of the French enmity, ſecret or avowed.

On the ſide of Auſtria we ſee an ancient ally

ally again united to us by a recent treaty, and by a ſimilarity of intereſt, which muſt continue as long as the ſecret or avowed connection ſubſiſts between France, Pruſſia, and Turkey.

Ruſſia, which has riſen to its preſent importance, even more by the policy of its monarchs than by the greatneſs of its population or territory, vaſt as they are, may in ſome meaſure be conſidered as removed, by its northern ſituation, ſo far from the ſphere of European politics, that it may occaſionally, and at its option, either enter into them, or preſerve a neutrality, as beſt ſuits its purpoſe; an advantage which no other ſtate poſſeſſes, and of which the empreſs is perfectly aware, having frequently avoided taking part in thoſe very conteſts which tended to promote her intereſts. Though Ruſſia has not long been raiſed to the ſituation ſhe now occupies, her army is the moſt formidable, and has many advantages over every other military eſtabliſhment in Europe: beſides a great naval force in the Baltic, ſhe has obtained a complete ſuperiority over the Turkiſh fleet in the Black Sea, both by the number and excellence of her ſhips, and the ſkill and courage of her ſailors, ſo that ſhe can open to herſelf a paſſage into the Mediterranean, and is now poſſeſſed of all the means, ſo long and

and ſo perſeveringly purſued from the time Peter the Firſt took Aſoph to this day, of annihilating the monſtrous and unwieldy deſpotiſm of the Ottoman ſceptre in Europe. The empreſs has alſo conceived the vaſt and generous deſign of delivering Greece from its bondage, and of eſtabliſhing it under a prince of its own religion, as a free and independent nation. It was not long ago the policy of the Britiſh cabinet to counteract theſe ſchemes of the empreſs (with what reaſon we will not now conſider); but a conviction of the ſimilarity of her intereſts with our own now prevails; the Turkiſh clauſe (in all preceding treaties) was given up in the treaty of 1795, and a war between Ruſſia and Turkey now becomes a caſus fœderis with Great Britain, and ſhe is juſtly conſidered as our moſt valuable and moſt natural ally.

If this general ſketch of this ſyſtem of Europe be juſt, it will afford a clue to the motives which have actuated, and are likely to actuate the conduct of different powers in their individual relations.

To return to FRANCE.—This nation, ever verſed in intrigue and fertile in politicians, has appeared under all circumſtances to be beſt inſtructed with regard to the real ſtate of Turkey, and has ſhown a conviction of the weakneſs of its ally, at the very time when

when it was moſt neceſſary to ſupport its importance. Thus it was, that when the Count de Vergennes (who by a long reſidence at the porte as ambaſſador, had obtained a thorough knowledge of the reſources of the empire) was directed by the Duke de Choiſeul to excite the Turks to war againſt Ruſſia, he ſtated the moſt forcible reaſons for an oppoſite line of conduct. Theſe reaſons, which were concluſive with the miniſter, were founded on the real weakneſs of the Ottoman empire, and the falſe ideas of its ſtrength entertained by ſeveral courts in Europe, which it would have been ſo impolitic in France to have removed, by ſuffering the Turks to engage in a war deſtructive of their reputation. The ſame Count de Vergennes, when he became miniſter, inſtructed Monſieur de St. Prieſt, to uſe every argument which might induce the Turks rather to yield to the demands of Ruſſia than to engage in a war.

The arrangement of the diſpute with Ruſſia in 1778 was attended with ſome ſingular circumſtances. The Turks had, contrary to the treaty of Kainargi, appoined a new khan of the Crim, and ſent him with a fleet of ſhips of war, in the latter end of 1777, to the port now called Sebaſtopolis, to ſupport the Tatars, whom they had before excited to

rebel againſt their lawful khan, Shaheen-Guerrai. On theſe grounds a war had nearly broken out, when the porte, after holding a ſecret divan, ſuddenly reſolved on peace, and notified their determination to Mr. Stachief, the Ruſſian envoy. He applied to the Engliſh ambaſſador, Sir Robert Ainſlie, to aſſiſt at the conference to be held, and act as mediator at the ſigning of the accommodation. Sir Robert, however (doubtleſs for good reaſons) refuſed, and Monſieur de St. Prieſt was ſent for, who readily accepted the office, and France appeared, on no other ground than the refuſal of our ambaſſador, as mediatrix. From this time Monſieur Stachief was ſo much governed by the French ambaſſador, that his court thought it neceſſary to recal him, as the empreſs by his conduct plainly perceived the tendency of the French councils to ſupport Turkey.

In 1783, when Ruſſia found it abſolutely neceſſary for her own ſafety, and the tranquillity of her ſubjects, who were continually expoſed to the incurſions of the Tatars, to take poſſeſſion of the Crim, and annex it to the empire, the French ſtill perſuaded the Turks to yield for the time to neceſſity, and rather to give up the Crim than run the riſk of loſing Conſtantinople itſelf.

The late emperor Joſeph had formed with the

the empreſs the plan of expelling the Turks from Europe, and had obtained, as he thought, the acquieſcence of France; but that artful power unwilling to hazard, and at that moment unable to ſupport an open conteſt in favour of the Turks, employed all its engines in ſecret manœuvres for their cauſe.

The imperial courts diſcovered theſe deſigns, but not before France had prevailed on Sweden to declare war againſt Ruſſia, after the porte had imprudently, and contrary to their advice, done it, and had by means of M. de Choiſeul-Gouffier negociated a ſubſidy from Turkey to the Swediſh monarch. The part too which they took, not only in acquieſcing, but in urging Great Britain and Pruſſia to oppoſe the progreſs of Ruſſia, and ſupport the king of Sweden in that war, was well known to the two imperial courts.

Since that time Auſtria and Ruſſia (other circumſtances having intervened) turned their views to an alliance with his Britannic Majeſty, and which has ſtill been ſtrengthened by the declaration or triple alliance ſigned in September 1795. Towards them, therefore, France muſt retain an hoſtile diſpoſition, while her connections with Spain, Pruſſia, Sweden, and Turkey, reſult from mutual and natural intereſts, as that with other ſtates does

does from motives of dependence and ſelf-preſervation.

SPAIN, notwithſtanding the extent of her territories, and the immenſity of her reſources if well managed, ſeems to have been degraded almoſt to the rank of a ſecondary power. Her colonial poſſeſſions, the ſource of her apparent ſplendor and of her political degeneracy, have become an object of ſo much apprehenſion to her, that, unable to rely on her own force for their preſervation, ſhe muſt court the alliance of a more powerful neighbour. Of the two chief naval powers, Britain excites the greater jealouſy, as pretending to the command of the ſea, and appearing ever intent on the extenſion of her commerce and foreign poſſeſſions. This antipathy is heightened, on the one hand, by the reſentment with which Spain views on her own coaſt the Britiſh fortreſs of Gibraltar, as, on the other, her attachment to France has been cheriſhed by intimacy, and by the mutual intereſt which they have, to keep the northern powers out of the Mediterranean.

Of the influence of political opinions (whether monarchical or republican) in conſolidating the union of the different parties, I forbear at preſent to ſpeak, becauſe the principles which are here laid down as the

baſis of ſuch union apply to the countries under whatever form of government they exiſt. So long as different nations retain the ſame relations, commercial and political, which they now bear to each other, ſo long will the general outlines of the ſyſtem of Europe, and its grand diviſions of intereſt, remain nearly as they are here repreſented. Opinion may, in ſome inſtances, be a motive more forcible than the permanent diſtinctions of intereſt, as in the caſe of the late war between Spain and France for the re-eſtabliſhment of monarchy; but theſe cauſes are merely temporary, and however the diſpute may terminate, recurrence will ever be had to thoſe principles, which, being founded on local and eſſential diſtinctions, have the greateſt poſſible degree of permanency. The French republic have proved, that they have the ſame notions with reſpect to the alliance with Spain as the monarchy had; (the family compact was framed entirely by intereſt;) they look on it as "*the* "*moſt eſſential as well as the moſt natural* "*which France can form.*" Were monarchy to be re-eſtabliſhed in France, ſhould we have made an ally of Louis XVIII. or a friend of one ſingle emigrant?

PRUSSIA, which has been led forward to its preſent eminence by a train of fortunate

events, muſt chooſe that ally which will beſt enable it, not only to preſerve its ſituation, but purſue its never-ceaſing projects of aggrandizement: it has, perhaps, ſometimes to chooſe between France and Ruſſia; but it cannot rely on the latter; tranſitory events may unite their intereſts for a moment, perſonal predilection of ſovereigns may influence the option for a time, but no ſolid alliance can be formed: the partition of Poland has ſown the ſeeds of diſcord, which, ſome day or other, will ripen. With France no ſuch circumſtances exiſt; it is the country which can procure to Pruſſia more advantages than any other, and in return receive more from it. From Ruſſia and from England it has drawn occaſional means of aggrandizement, but it has always, even in the moment of receiving their aſſiſtance, looked on them with a ſuſpicious eye. Should Pruſſia be ſeriouſly allied with Ruſſia, Auſtria muſt be leagued with France; and ſhould then a quarrel take place between the two former, Pruſſia might not have it in its power to break the Auſtrian alliance, and join France in the moment of diſtreſs. It is not probable this wily cabinet will throw itſelf into the hands of a power, on which, from many circumſtances, it can never for any length of time rely. The aggrandize-

ment of Pruſſia muſt be at the expence of the Houſe of Auſtria, and the ſyſtem of the cabinet of St. Peterſburgh never will be to ruin that houſe.

Pruſſia will temporize with the empreſs, but its preſent and future ſyſtem undoubtedly will be an alliance with France; for if Ruſſia at any time be ill-diſpoſed to it, it has no other reſource to rely on. The jealouſy of Auſtria, at this moment, muſt be excited to the higheſt degree, by the concurrence of Pruſſia with France in endeavouring to annihilate the Germanic confederacy. This conduct muſt leave Pruſſia without any other ſupport but the directory, and, however matters terminate, will leave a deep rooted enmity in every part of Europe, which may ultimately have fatal conſequences, and renew a combination againſt a country which has loſt its tutelar genius. To preſerve his dominions from his powerful neighbours required all the talents of the great Frederic, and even he with difficulty was able to ſave it from deſtruction. Such talents are not again to be expected in a ſovereign. That both France and Pruſſia conſider themſelves as *the moſt* natural allies is obvious; that they conſidered themſelves ſo, even while other alliances exiſted, is equally obvious. We need only to look to what has, in the latter part of this

this century, happened between France and Auſtria—between Ruſſia, Auſtria, and Pruſſia—to be convinced that natural alliances will ultimately prevail over temporary ſyſtems. It would be ſuperfluous to enter into details ſo well known. If the king of Pruſſia joined Auſtria in the preſent war, it was to ſecure the friendſhip of the monarchy, which he then thought would be reſtored; when he ceaſed to think that event practicable, he as readily allied himſelf with the republic; his object was the ſame, an alliance with *France*. Pruſſia by this conduct prolonged the miſeries of humanity; for ſhe cauſed a campaign to fail, which would have ended them, and turned a defenſive war in France to an offenſive war out of it, which has nearly ruined Europe. What is the fruit ſhe has reaped? In this one campaign ſhe loſt the conſequence which forty years of ſucceſs had given her. The ſeeds of democracy and rebellion are ſown in Pruſſia; moſt of the literati ſpread them broadly, not to ſay a very great portion of the officers of the army, and there is not a country in Europe more ripe for revolution. The treaſures which the great Frederic left behind, and, what is ſtill a much greater loſs, that ſpirit in the army, that emulation of glory, that devotedneſs to their ſovereign's

cauſe, which, more than its diſcipline, made it ſo formidable, have totally diſappeared.

In 1791, the king of Pruſſia had a ſtanding army of above 200,000 men ready to act; the people ſatisfied with their government, and attached to their king; the army had ſtill the warlike ſpirit which the great Frederic had breathed into it, and the treaſures he left were not yet diſſipated; he had ſupplanted the empreſs in her influence in Poland, which was become formidable.

SWEDEN would ſcarcely be eſteemed of any conſequence in Europe, did not its local ſituation enable it to make a diverſion in favour of Turkey, by a war with Ruſſia; to France it, therefore, has always appeared in the light of an uſeful ally, and has ever been aſſiſted by her with ſubſidies, and ſupported with all her intereſt; but, ſince its decline, the ſervices it is able to render are thought inadequate to its burthen, and the old connection is ſupported, rather to prevent its forming new ones, than from the real aſſiſtance it can afford.

If Sweden would purſue a line of ſtrict neutrality, Ruſſia has little temptation to diſmember it any further; but another war would, moſt probably, make the Gulph of Bothnia the frontier. It is to be hoped that

Sweden

Sweden now knows her real intereſt, which is, to be well with Ruſſia, and to ſuffer patiently what ſhe cannot avoid. Such a ſituation is humiliating; but has ſhe reſources in herſelf to riſe above it? Certainly not, and that ſhe has not is her own fault; a worſe ſituation muſt follow from a contrary conduct; and it is doubtful whether France and Pruſſia united could, were they to turn all their force to ſupport her, ſave her from the talons of the Ruſſian eagle.

However humiliating this ſtate of dependence may be to the country, it is, undoubtedly, the only ſecurity of the *crown* of Sweden. The people have received, by their connections with the French, during the minority of the preſent king particularly, ſuch an augmentation of their former republican notions, that they are become, perhaps, more fanatic than many of the provinces of France. In the winter of 1795, the theatre at Norköping was ſhut up; the people obliged the muſic to play *ça-ira*, of which they have an excellent Swediſh tranſlation (by one of the profeſſors of their univerſity) which they all ſung in chorus.

It may not here be an improper digreſſion, to take a ſlight view of the conduct of the late king of Sweden, in declaring war againſt Ruſſia, at a time when the empreſs

fully relied on his neutrality, and had every reaſon ſo to do, conſidering the intereſt of Sweden itſelf. That monarch, impelled by the common infatuation of ambitious princes, was eager to act a diſtinguiſhed part on the theatre of Europe, and to imitate the quixotiſm of his illuſtrious predeceſſor, Charles XII. He ſeized the moment which appeared moſt favourable to his projects, when the armies of the empreſs were drawn down towards the ſouth, to oppoſe the Turks; but this very circumſtance made his aggreſſion ſo glaring, even to his own ſubjects, that the war was univerſally reprobated, and the Swediſh and Finland armies actually proteſted againſt it. So fully indeed had the empreſs relied on his neutrality, that the frontiers of her empire, on that ſide, were left without a force ſufficient for their defence; and it afterwards appeared that the king, could he have relied on the fidelity of his armies, might have marched without oppoſition to St. Peterſburgh, and made himſelf maſter of the imperial reſidence by *a coup de main.* Luckily for his country he only alarmed the empreſs, and the report of the cannon of his fleet only ſhook the windows of her palace. Had he effected his plan, whoever knows the empreſs, knows ſhe would never have laid down her arms till ſhe had taken ample vengeance.

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The inconſiderate ambition of the king of Sweden appeared in the eagerneſs with which he attacked the Ruſſian ſquadron on its way to the Mediterranean; had he ſuffered it to proceed to its deſtination, the Swediſh fleet would have remained miſtreſs of the Baltic.

It was in May 1788, that the Swediſh fleet ſailed from Carlſcrona with ſealed orders, to be opened in the latitude of Gothland, to act offenſively againſt Ruſſia; but the king's declaration of his motives for hoſtility, though dated on the 21ſt of July in the ſame year, was not publiſhed till Auguſt. Theſe proceedings, contrary as they were in themſelves to the maxims which are generally acknowledged among civilized ſtates as the law of nations, were grounded upon reaſons equally nugatory and unjuſt. They are conceived in the following terms: "*The declaration of war* "*made by the ſublime Ottoman Porte againſt* "*Ruſſia was a new motive for the latter to re-*"*double its efforts in ſowing confuſion and trou-*"*ble in the boſom of Sweden, which, united by* "*an ancient and permanent treaty with the Ot-*"*toman Porte, concluded in* 1739, *and obliged* "*by that treaty not to abandon ſo ancient an* "*ally, appeared formidable to Ruſſia, &c.*"

"*His majeſty, never deviating from his pa-*"*cific inclinations, is ſtill deſirous of peace, pro-*"*vided that the empreſs ſhall offer him an ho-*"*nourable*

" *nourable one, and that the king ſhall be aſſured* " *of procuring for the Ottoman Porte a firm* " *and permanent peace.*"

The treaty of 1739, by which the king pretended that he was bound to the Turks, was not offenſive, but defenſive; and even this was declared null and void by the firſt article of the treaty of Abo, concluded with Ruſſia in 1743, and the porte was, at that time, officially informed of its abolition and non-exiſtence.

The late king of Sweden, guided by the ſame motives as the king of Pruſſia, was preparing to take an active part againſt the French republic, to ſecure the friendſhip of the re-inſtated monarchy. After his death, the regent, looking on the republican government as permanently fixed, purſued a different conduct, but having the ſame view as his brother, an alliance with France.

The conduct of Sweden during the regency has been more hoſtile to the allies than is conſiſtent with the neutrality it profeſſed; and had the allies liſtened to the inſinuations of the empreſs, it would have been ſeverely puniſhed for its partiality. Had a war with Sweden in theſe circumſtances taken place, in vain would Sweden have relied on the co-operation of the Daniſh fleet; the empreſs might either have prevented

ed the junction, or, with a little aſſiſtance, if not alone, have cruſhed their combined force. The iſland of Bornholm lies ready for her to ſeize upon; and though at preſent it can boaſt no harbour, that defect might be eaſily remedied. From ſuch a ſtation the Ruſſian fleet would be able to go to ſea ſix weeks earlier than the Swediſh from Carlſcrona, and conſequently prevent their junction.

The Engliſh politician may object, that it is the intereſt of this country to prevent Sweden being ſwallowed up by Ruſſia: be that as it may, neither this country nor France can ſerve Sweden more eſſentially, than by endeavouring to keep it well with Ruſſia. Notwithſtanding the ſupport of the moſt powerful allies, the ruin of Sweden muſt be ultimately the reſult of a conteſt with its powerful neighbour.

DENMARK, we have ſeen, in the preſent war, which has involved the intereſts of all Europe, purſuing the ſame path of neutrality with Sweden, and united to it by a treaty; we have ſeen their combined fleets parading the Baltic and the North Sea, and profeſſedly directed by the ſame views, not of neutrality only, but almoſt an open eſpouſal of the French intereſt, in defiance of the allied powers, whoſe reſentment they would have felt, had, as I have already mentioned, his

Britannic

Britannic Majeſty not had more forbearance than the empreſs. It would have been eaſy to have detached a ſquadron from our fleet to have joined that of the empreſs, and put at once an end to the diſpute, by annihilating the united Daniſh and Swediſh navies. If they have eſcaped, the danger they have run ought to make them more prudent in future.

The conduct of Denmark to the empreſs has been very ungrateful as well as imprudent.

Sleſwick, which in 1762 threatened to draw upon Denmark the vengeance of the Ruſſian arms, in 1776 was, at the inſtance of the empreſs, guaranteed to that country by the two imperial courts, and ſince, this guarantee has become ſtill ſtronger by the acceſſion of his Britannic Majeſty to it, in the triple alliance of 1795. On this ſubject ſhe is, therefore, perfectly eaſy; but the local ſituation and the relative weakneſs of that kingdom muſt make it ever dependent on Great Britain and Ruſſia. The alliance with Sweden can be but a temporary arrangement, however ardently the court of Copenhagen may wiſh to make it permanent, through the ſupport of France. Small ſtates muſt, in external relations, be dependent on greater: an equality of power among ſovereigns is

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as viſionary as among individuals. Has this levelling mania ſeized the kings of Denmark and Sweden as well as their ſubjects?

SARDINIA deſerves particular conſideration, as its importance ſeems to have been falſely eſtimated. To ſecure the paſſes of Italy againſt the inroads of the French was indeed a point of the utmoſt importance; but the ability of the court of Turin to ſecond ſuch views has long ceaſed, and its intereſts ſeem at preſent to take a contrary direction. The queſtion is no longer whether Savoy ſhall be preſerved; that country was diſaffected long before the French revolution; it was governed with a rod of iron; the nobility and the peaſantry were alike diſſatisfied, and it was a general complaint, that the name of Savoyard was an inſurmountable bar to promotion in every department of the ſtate: ſuch was its ſituation when it was attacked by France; and beſides this internal diſaffection, it had other cauſes of weakneſs, ariſing from preceding political events.

During the long conteſts between France and the Houſe of Auſtria (the former wiſhing to gain admiſſion into Italy, the latter to prevent it) the alliance of Sardinia was courted, as poſſeſſing the command of ſo ſtrong a barrier. Hence aroſe the import-

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ance of the court of Turin, which, in changing allies as opportunity preſented itſelf, gained ſomething by every treaty, and was enabled, by ſubſidies, to diſcipline and keep on foot a formidable force; but when the French reſigned all pretenſions to the Milaneſe and the grand duchy of Tuſcany, the king of Sardinia, who no longer found himſelf courted by contending parties, neglected that military force, which he had neither motive nor ability to ſupport, and ſunk by degrees into a ſtate of comparative inſignificance. From this he was for a ſhort time called, and enabled to act a more diſtinguiſhed part, by the alliance of Auſtria and the ſubſidies of Britain; but theſe proving inſufficient, the paſſes of Italy have fallen into the hands of the French. It is to be expected that Sardinia will always remain an ally, if not become a province of France, on whom it is now entirely dependent. In fact, it always was a ſecret enemy to Auſtria, and never favoured its cauſe, but temporarily for the ſake of aggrandizement, and the aggrandizement it moſt coveted was at the expence of that houſe.

NAPLES is capable of poſſeſſing a conſiderable marine, and might become a naval power of no ſmall importance in the Mediterranean. The reaſons which influence

Spain

Spain to take part with France, have no weight with the Neapolitan court; it has no colonies to loſe, no jealouſy of our trade, or of our influence in the Mediterranean. (The former ſituation of Naples, under the immediate influence of Spain, has no relation to its preſent, or to its true intereſt.) To it Great Britain muſt appear as a valuable ally. France has long been its ſecret enemy, and has uſed every exertion to prevent it from becoming a naval power. It muſt ever remain in a ſtate of dependence and ſubjection, if England and its allies are excluded from the Mediterranean. Every augmentation of naval force in that quarter, which can cope with the fleets of France and Spain, muſt therefore be a deſireable object to Naples, as on that alone her ſafety and proſperity depend. No country has ſo much to loſe by the eſtabliſhment of French influence in Italy as Naples.

AUSTRIA, the ancient, and (at leaſt at preſent) the moſt natural ally, after Ruſſia, to Great Britain, the natural protector of Germany and Italy, and the natural balance againſt France, has evinced her exertions in the preſent war, her firmneſs in ſupport of the common intereſts ſhe has with this country. The ſupport which ſhe derived from the finances of Great Britain was, indeed,

deed, neceſſary for her to make ſuch exertions. Her armies were brave, well diſciplined, and numerous; her reſources in men inexhauſtible; but her treaſury was inadequate, and ſhe entered upon a diſaſtrous conteſt under circumſtances peculiarly diſadvantageous. Pruſſia, without being the friend, acted on this occaſion as the ally of Auſtria. If any cauſe was of ſufficient magnitude to have ſilenced their jealouſies and conſolidated their plans, ſurely it was that in which they were embarked, by an intereſt hitherto unknown in the annals of hiſtory, a general intereſt, which cruſhed all individual intereſts of nations, and which appealed no leſs to the paſſions of monarchs than to the policy of all civilized ſtates. The ſequel, alas! is too well known. The French have ſucceeded in diſſolving the alliance, by convincing the king of Pruſſia that their government was unſhakeable; they recurred to their old policy, *divide et impera.*

Pruſſia has entered into their project of ſeparating the members of the Germanic body; the French monarchy guaranteed their union; but the aim of both was the ſame, the humiliation of the Houſe of Auſtria. This they in part effected by the peace of Weſtphalia, the war preceding which, borrowing the pretext of religion, was in effect a war

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of policy; nor have they ſince that period neglected this grand object, either in the open exertions of war or the more ſubtle efforts of intrigue; hence it is, that we ſhall ever find the Turks in all their conteſts with the emperor, however unjuſt, ſtrengthened by the aid and aſſiſted by the councils of France; and hence it is, on the other hand, that the Houſe of Auſtria muſt look with confidence to the ſteady ſupport of Great Britain. Indeed we may not only with juſtice contend for the preſervation of the emperor's preſent poſſeſſions, but favour their extenſion, for the purpoſe of ſtrengthening him on the coaſt of the Adriatic and in European Turkey, a part of which more naturally belongs to him than to Ruſſia or the Greeks, were the Turks driven out of Europe.

RUSSIA, the moſt powerful, the moſt natural, and the moſt uſeful of our allies, has ſo intimate a connection of intereſts with us, that the ſoundeſt policy muſt dictate to us an union of deſign and a co-operation in action. Her commerce with Great Britain is of the utmoſt conſequence to her, as it produces a clear annual balance in her favour, from a million to a million and a half ſterling. In the courſe of laſt year there entered into the port of St. Peterſburgh alone 533 Britiſh ſhips, which carried thence Ruſſian products

to the value of £. 2,400,000 ſterling; at the ſame time, the greateſt number of veſſels employed by any other nation was eighty-ſix (Daniſh ſhips) and the greateſt value exported was £. 80,000 ſterling by the Portugueſe. Yet is the Ruſſian trade of great importance to England, as ſhe thence draws moſt of her naval ſtores, and employs therein ſeveral hundred veſſels, and many thouſand ſeamen. Since the empreſs has added to her dominions the reſt of thoſe countries where hemp is produced, we are more dependent on her than heretofore; yet not ſo much, perhaps, as the Ruſſian miniſtry imagine, for reaſons which it is eaſy to point out, but which it would be foreign to the purpoſe of this treatiſe to ſpecify. When the trade of France to Ruſſia is put in compariſon with this, it will be found very inconſiderable indeed. The year after their treaty of commerce, in which they had all the advantages they could wiſh, the French took from Ruſſia exports only to the amount of £. 50,000 ſterling. They have full liberty to extend their commerce to the Ruſſian ports in the Black Sea, but it has been hitherto too inconſiderable to deſerve notice, or to be put in compariſon with the loſs of trade they would ſuſtain were the Turks driven out of Europe. Trifling however as their exports

ports are, their imports are very conſiderable, not only in articles which come direct from France by ſea, but rich ſtuffs and jewels, and other articles of luxury, which go either by land, or to the German ports in the Baltic, and thence find their way into Ruſſia, a conſiderable part of which are ſmuggled.

Ruſſia is not our rival on the ſeas, nor we her's on the continent; ſhe ſtands in need of our aſſiſtance at ſea, and we of her's by land; her intereſt dictates to her the ſame alliances as our intereſt dictates to us; we are rivals in nothing; the proſperity of the one country is the increaſe of ſtrength in the other; with her alliance we can protect our friends on the continent, or humiliate our enemies; with our alliance her fleets may ſail in ſafety to all parts of the globe, and chaſtiſe thoſe who have provoked her. Even in the trade between the two countries there is no rivalſhip; her products, partly manufactured and partly raw, brought by a long land carriage from diſtant provinces to her ports (which is in itſelf a beneficial branch of commerce) find in our merchants the *only* purchaſers; they tranſport them to our ports in our own ſhips: neither in this is there any rivalſhip, for Ruſſia has no mercantile navy; but to compenſate that circumſtance the balance of trade is immenſely in her favour. In

ſhort, there is no ſingle point in which we can be rivals, except it be, which ſhould be more arduous in cultivating the ties of friendſhip.

It is the intereſt of this country, as muſt appear from what has been ſaid, that the empreſs ſhould keep Sweden and Denmark in awe, as well as the Pruſſian ports, to prevent them from ſupplying France with naval ſtores, &c. in time of war. On the other hand, our intereſt requires that ſhe ſhould have the command in the Black Sea, in order not only to open its ports to us, but to ſend us ſuccours into the Mediterranean, to oppoſe the formidable combination of France and Spain. Indeed it is difficult to conceive, amid the variety and diſcordance of political intereſts, the exiſtence of two great powers, between which there are ſo many mutual dependencies and ſo few cauſes of jealouſy.

The empreſs of Ruſſia has been accuſed of inconſtancy in her alliances, of inconſiſtency in her politics, and of only having had in view to profit by the circumſtances of the day. It muſt, however, *now* be obvious, that though ſhe uſed different means to accompliſh her ends, ſhe never deviated from the ſyſtem ſhe adopted the firſt year of her reign, and that, if ſhe changed her friends, it

it was becauſe ſhe thought that ſhe could no longer depend on them.

In every political connection ſhe formed, ſhe had conſtantly in view the expulſion of the Turks from Europe, and the reſtoration of the Greek empire. As long as the power ſhe had allied herſelf with ſeemed to favour theſe projects, ſhe was ſteady in her attachment to it; the inſtant it diſcovered jealouſy of, or oppoſition to them, ſhe ſacrificed every other conſideration, and became its ſecret enemy. Nor has the preſent empreſs alone had in view the accompliſhing this vaſt deſign; Peter the Great firſt conceived the idea of its being ſome day practicable, and the cabinet of St. Peterſburgh have never loſt ſight of it during the ſucceeding reigns, to this day.

The empreſs declared unequivocally her intentions, in her manifeſtoes to the Greeks, during the war which took place with the Turks ſoon after her acceſſion to the throne, in conſequence of her interference in the affairs of Poland, which was only a preliminary ſtep to ſubjugating the Turks. It was neceſſary to ſecure to herſelf the reſources for her armies, which Poland afforded. Subſequent accidents have indeed annihilated the government and independence of that country.

The ardour with which his Britannic Majeſty eſpouſed the cauſe of the empreſs in that war, by the aſſiſtance afforded her fleet, and in forcing France and Spain to conſent to its entrance into the Mediterranean, by a poſitive declaration that a refuſal would be conſidered by His Majeſty as an act of hoſtility to him, attached her ſo zealouſly to the cauſe of Great Britain, and fixed in her mind a predilection, not only for its government but for individuals, that nothing could ſhake it but an oppoſition to her favourite meaſures, which ſhe conſidered as her deareſt intereſts, and which were to crown her reign with eternal glory.

Her devotedneſs to Great Britain excited in the cabinet of Verſailles the higheſt jealouſy, and it laboured inceſſantly, by every means, to weaken the connexion. It would be an endleſs taſk to recite all the manœuvres of the French, till they unluckily ſucceeded: they repreſented our trade with Ruſſia as a monopoly, ruinous and inſulting to its ſubjects; they excited doubts of the ſincerity of our attachment to Ruſſia, and of our hearty co-operation in her favourite ſchemes; they inſinuated that our views were only to keep her navy in ſuch a ſtate of dependence as not to be able to act without our concurrence, and to proceed in its ſucceſſes only as far as

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we choſe to permit it; at length they formed, at an enormous expence, a party in the empreſs's cabinet to counteract us.

The empreſs's ſecond grandſon was born in January 1779. He was named Conſtantine. Greek women were given him for nurſes, and he ſucked in with his milk the Greek language, in which he afterwards was perfected by learned Greek teachers; in ſhort, his whole education was ſuch as to fit him for the throne of Conſtantinople, and nobody then doubted the empreſs's deſign.

In this ſame year (1779) the empreſs had determined on giving his Britannic Majeſty an *effective* aſſiſtance againſt his rebellious ſubjects in America, ſupported by the *crown of France*. Prince Potemkin, who to the laſt day of his life affirmed that the ſucceſs of the enterprize againſt Turkey depended on the alliance with Great Britain, had the ſole management of this buſineſs, and without the concurrence of Count Panin, the miniſter for foreign affairs, and the partiſan of the French, who, ſuſpecting, or having ſome information of what was going on, employed a Mademoiſelle Guibal, governeſs to one of Potemkin's nieces, to ſteal the papers from under the prince's pillow, and after ſeeing the contents, to replace them ſo carefully that it was ſometime afterwards before he diſcovered how

he was betrayed. Count Panin found means to retard the ſigning of the inſtrument already drawn up, and produced another project, which flattered the empreſs's vanity more, the *armed neutrality*, which was firſt conceived by the late king of Pruſſia. This Potemkin oppoſed with all his might; the argument he uſed was, that if the other neutral nations, who had good veſſels and experienced ſailors, were to enjoy the ſame privilege as the Ruſſians had by the treaty with Great Britain, of carrying hemp, &c. to France in time of war, Ruſſian ſhips would never be employed; but that a contrary conduct would create a Ruſſian mercantile navy, which then did not exiſt. He was over-ruled. No argument could withſtand the aſſurance Count Panin gave, that the French entered heartily into the project of the empreſs with reſpect to the Turks (whom, unable any longer to defend, they had abandoned) and that the Britiſh court never would conſent to it. The conduct of the prince on this occaſion was not candid: when he could not carry his point, he ranged himſelf with his adverſaries, and received from the empreſs a preſent for his ſhare of the labour in bringing about the armed neutrality (as was mentioned in the ukaſe.) He did not communicate it to Sir James Harris (who had conducted the negotiation

tiation in the moſt able manner) till it was ſigned, and a ſyſtem adopted highly inimical to the intereſts of Great Britain. The empreſs ſoon after went to Mohilov to meet the emperor Joſeph, whom Mr. de Vergennes had perſuaded, that his court had given up the cauſe of the Turks, and he led the empreſs into her error, which Prince Potemkin lamented to the day of his death.

The empreſs, and particularly Potemkin, were very anxious to obtain from His Majeſty a ceſſion of the iſland of Minorca, which was intended as a ſtation for her fleet, and a rendezvous for the Greeks. Soon after the propoſal was made it was taken from us. The empreſs might have aſked it of the king of France, had it been taken in his name, to prove the ſincerity of his friendſhip. The time it was attacked, and the circumſtance that it was ſo, and in the name of the king of Spain, ſhows that the court of France had good information from Peterſburgh.

The conduct of Mr. de Vergennes (one of the moſt indefatigable and univerſally intriguing miniſters, as well as moſt perfidious, that ever preſided in a cabinet) ſhould have opened the eyes of our coalition miniſters in 1783. After he had ſounded them, and found that they would not aſſiſt the Turks nor the Ruſſians, he not only promiſed to the emperor

emperor the opening of the Scheld, but the exchange of the Netherlands for Bavaria; and the empreſs was ſo hearty in his cauſe, that ſhe ordered her miniſter at Frankfort to make a formal propoſal of this exchange to the Duke of Deux Ponts. Had we then rightly underſtood our intereſt with reſpect to Turkey, we ſhould have joined in the league with the two imperial courts to effectuate this exchange. The offer would have been eagerly accepted; we ſhould have completely duped the court of Verſailles, whoſe inability to act was perfectly well known at Vienna and Peterſburgh; and Mr. de Vergennes well knew, that if Pruſſia, Great Britain, and Holland, oppoſed the exchange, it would not take place, notwithſtanding the ſerious face he might put on in the comedy he was then acting; he was not only eaſy on that head, but he had the ſatisfaction to widen the breach between his Britannic Majeſty and the two imperial courts. The king of Pruſſia ſaw into the true views of the French court, and was under no apprehenſion of offending it ultimately, while he was purſuing with all his might his own intereſt, in preventing the very conſiderable augmentation of power which would have accrued to the Houſe of Auſtria.

I have ſince learnt that the empreſs even then

then began to conceive ſuſpicions of the ſincerity of the profeſſions of France, and never could be perſuaded by the emperor, that, though their finances were in the worſt ſtate poſſible, they might not have lent an army to him to prevent the Dutch oppoſing the opening of the Scheld.

The empreſs, with great dexterity, on this occaſion became a guarantee to the treaty of Weſtphalia, and by it acquired a right to interfere in the internal affairs of the Germanic empire.

From that period to the ever-memorable Ruſſian armament in England, the cabinet of St. Peterſburgh acted in the moſt unfriendly manner to us. France had concluded a treaty of commerce with Ruſſia, from which great advantages were expected; but it proved that all the encouragement given to it could not increaſe it; on the contrary, the trade of Great Britain, oppreſſed in the moſt unjuſt manner, was conſiderably augmented. The alliance between the two imperial courts and France, and the great partiality ſhown to the latter; the apprehenſion of the Turks being driven out of Europe under circumſtances highly dangerous to this country, and ſuch an arrangement for a partition being made as would have greatly increaſed the power of France, and made the bonds of amity, thus nearer

nearer drawn together, durable, were ſufficient reaſons with His Majeſty's miniſters to take that meaſure. The dignity as well as the intereſt of the country required it at that particular period, though that was not the caſe before, nor has it been ſince; and it muſt appear evident, that we cannot *now* reaſon on the principles we did *then*, and that we now muſt clearly ſee our intereſt both with reſpect to Ruſſia and Turkey. After the fleet was fitted out, and the object declared, it became the dignity of the nation to have let it ſail, and if Mr. Fawkener was to be ſent, he ſhould have gone with it.

The friends of Mr. Fox pride themſelves much in having prevented the fleet's ſailing; but let them be ever ſilent on the partition of Poland, for their meaſures undoubtedly occaſioned it *. What might have been the event of ſuch a war it is difficult to foreſee; much conjecture may be made; I will only mention one circumſtance, the naming of which is alarming, however it may be treated as romantic: the empreſs had firmly reſolved to attempt to ſend an army through Bochara and Caſhmeir, to place the Mogul on the

* Since this was written, the empreſs is dead, and I have no ſcruple now of declaring, that that unfortunate monarch accuſes them of it; and if they doubt of it, there are thoſe in England who can produce proofs of it.

throne

throne of India, and drive the Britiſh out of their poſſeſſions, and there were then in Ruſſia Frenchmen, who had been ſent into thoſe parts by Mr. de Vergennes, and who offered to conduct the army. If Mr. Fox's friend, Mr. Adair, had the intereſt of his country at heart, and not the removal of Mr. Pitt, why did he make no advantage of the ardent deſire Prince Potemkin then had of ſeeing his court allied with Great Britain? In ſpeaking with me about Mr. Adair, he expreſſed this deſire in the ſtrongeſt terms. The empreſs then knew the treachery of France. She made the diſcovery in the autumn of 1788, by the intrigues of the French at Stockholm (where ſhe always had a ſtrong party) and this was proved to her in a ſtill ſtronger manner by the diſcovery that was made of the part which the Count de Choiſeul-Gouffier had in the negotiating a ſubſidy from the porte to Sweden; yet the empreſs was too high ſpirited to confeſs ſhe had been duped, though ſhe wiſhed ſecretly to change her alliance with France for one with this country. This fortunate event has at length taken place, and with no degrading circumſtances to the country. His Britannic Majeſty has given up the Turkiſh clauſe, and a war with Turkey is become a *caſus fœderis*, a condition without which ſhe never would ſign any

treaty

treaty with any power. That His Majeſty's preſent miniſtry ſaw the real intereſt of the Britiſh and the Ruſſian empires, when that clauſe, *ſine quâ non*, of the treaty was given up, I hope muſt appear evidently, as well as that their conduct has been uniformly guided by the true intereſt of their country, which they followed as it varied, and neither loſt ſight of that nor of its honour, an object ſurely every true Briton conſiders as dear.

To enter into a longer detail of circumſtances to prove what is here advanced would be ſuperfluous, as it muſt appear ſo very conſpicuous to every one, except to thoſe whom no arguments can convince, and who pronounce declamatory ſentences inſtead of inveſtigating facts. If thoſe who oppoſed the vigorous and once neceſſary meaſures of this country will pleaſe to talk of inconſiſtency, I am ready to meet them on that ground, and perhaps I may be able to prove more than inconſiſtency on their part.

Of later events I ſhall not now ſpeak: the ſituation I have been in might involve me in a cenſure of breach of confidence.

How far the king of Pruſſia had an underſtanding in this buſineſs with the French court I have no documents to prove; but that he did ſecond its views admirably well, both with reſpect to Auſtria and Turkey, facts

facts prove. His conduct towards others needs no animadverſion: he firſt encouraged the Poles to form their new conſtitution; then he made it a crime in them to have formed it; and laſtly, he joined with the empreſs to overſet it. The empreſs accuſes him of being the firſt to inſiſt on the final partition as a *ſine qua non*, and as the price of his co-operation againſt France; a circumſtance not then known to his Britannic Majeſty's miniſters. The empreſs knew too well their ſentiments to riſk the communication of ſuch a tranſaction. How completely the court of Berlin has duped all thoſe who have been connected with it (France only excepted) not only in its engagements to his Britannic Majeſty and to the empreſs, on this occaſion, but in every other, is ſo ſtriking, that it ought by this time to have convinced the courts of London and Peterſburgh of the imperious neceſſity of cementing, by every poſſible tie, the preſent connection with the Houſe of Auſtria, and making its intereſt their own. A deviation from ſuch a conduct by either of the powers muſt obviouſly be the ruin of Europe.

Ruſſia, however, in the eyes of the body politic of Europe, is a new power; they ſtill ſeem to regard her only as a huge unformed maſs,

maſs, giving a rude ſhock to the countries which her frontier touches; they do not yet ſeem to perceive her ſliding into every tranſaction on the continent of Europe, and planning in the dark, and with unremitting perſeverance purſuing projects which are to ripen at once, and to aſtoniſh by their effect, not on her neighbours, not in our days only, but on the moſt remote regions of the globe, and in future ages. Something of this lately flaſhed on them like lightning; they perceived that the preſent empreſs had become, they ſcarcely knew how, a party in the treaty of Weſtphalia, concluded before Ruſſia politically exiſted, and that her guarantee entitles her to interfere in the affairs of the German empire. The flaſh, which afforded a tranſitory view, dazzled the eyes of ſome, and they ſeem now more blind.

The means of this ſovereign are vaſt and incalculable, and her will can employ them without oppoſition: her financial reſources, ſo far from being exhauſted, are not touched *; a population of more than thirty millions, of whom not one half has been called on to contribute to the exigencies of

* I do not ſpeak of preſent temporary embarraſſment, but of real reſources, which have not yet been recurred to, and of which I ſhall treat on another occaſion.

the

the ſtate; a peaſantry looking on the monarch as a divinity, and ſtiling him *God of the earth* (zemnoi bog); ignorant of any government but a deſpotic ſceptre, and of any condition but vaſſalage; happily deprived of all means of evil information, and ſecured from rebellion by the want of communication and the diſtance of places: a ſoldiery content with rye-biſcuit and water, blindly obedient to diſcipline, and ſuffering privation and hardſhip with a patience unknown to other nations; active, and peculiarly docile, they are eaſily taught the uſe of arms; the habit of conquering inſpires them with contempt of their enemies, and raiſes a courage naturally inherent in robuſt conſtitutions, if not to heroiſm, to actions worthy of heroes. If tactics have been lately neglected, it has been owing to the unſkilfulneſs of their officers, of late promoted almoſt entirely by favour, and ſerving only to obtain rank and then retire; but this may be eaſily reſtored by a commander in chief, or a ſovereign, poſſeſſed of much leſs military capacity than a Frederic: a nobility unable to offer the leaſt oppoſition to the crown, depending on it for every honourable diſtinction of rank, civil or military, conferred, but not inherited; without which neither birth nor fortune give conſideration, and which he who be-

ſtows can take away, while they who ſuffer muſt bleſs his name: not united by any common tie as a collective body, their intereſts are merely thoſe of individuals.

There is no law but the "*expreſs com-*" "*mand*" of the monarch, who can debaſe the higheſt ſubject to the condition of a ſlave, or raiſe the loweſt to the firſt dignity of the empire; but this autocratic ſceptre exerciſes no deſpotiſm over the ſubject inſulting to mankind. The Ruſſian monarch is not, like the ſtupid Ottoman, ſeated on a throne involved in black clouds of ignorance, ſupported by cruelty on one hand, and by ſuperſtition on the other, at whoſe feet ſits Terror, and below Terror, Death. No ſovereign in Europe is poſſeſſed of more information, has more judgment to digeſt it, or in whom the reſult is more conſummate wiſdom. So far from the reign of the empreſs being a reign of terror, its fault is, too much lenity to her ſubjects, particularly to the great. No princes have received a better education than her ſon and grand-children, and the court which ſurrounds them is as brilliant and poliſhed in manners as any in Europe.

The gloomy melancholy and ſolemn ſtupidity of the Turks is as little obſervable on the countenance of a Ruſſian, as the murderous ferocity and enthuſiaſtic fury which diſtorts

diſtorts the cadaverous phyſiognomy of the French brotherhood; there is a ſmile diffuſed over the face of the whole country. I appeal to all thoſe who have travelled in Ruſſia, whether they ever ſaw more hilarity in any part of the world. I do not mean to recommend for imitation ſuch a ſtate of things to make men happy; thoſe who have been removed from it cannot go back again; but I affirm, that the whole maſs of the people appear to be more happy (and it is a hard thing to make a man laugh when he is not pleaſed) than any I have ſeen in three parts of the globe. There is no medium in liberty with reſpect to the happineſs of the people; to be happy a nation muſt be perfectly free or perfectly paſſive. Perfect liberty excludes licentiouſneſs: a people cannot be ſaid to be free where there exiſts a power to annoy with impunity either them or their magiſtrates; a little liberty, "like "*a little learning, is a dangerous thing*," becauſe it is not underſtood. Liberty has been no where underſtood (no not in Athens) but in this happy iſland. Here our government is founded on reaſon, and reaſon will ſupport, or, if any part of it goes to decay, amend it; it is the glory of the human underſtanding; it is the pride of the moſt enlightened people on earth, whoſe happineſs is its ob-

ject, and it will ſtand for ever, if it have only reaſon to combat.

After having conſidered the external ſituation of TURKEY in various points of view, in each of which it ſeems little to deſerve the approbation of the enlightened, or the ſupport of the politician, we come to obſerve it as a member of this grand confederation of the nations of Europe, whoſe intereſts and political connections I have curſorily paſſed in review.

Its dominion was founded in blood; it is upheld by ſyſtematic terror and oppreſſion, and the tyrants themſelves, enervated by the licentiouſneſs of their rapacity, and loſt in the groſs ignorance of habitual deſpotiſm, are as weak and ignorant at home, as they muſt appear abroad contemptible and inſignificant. Intereſted views, it is true, have cauſed their alliance to be courted by France, but it is by no means improbable that that country, when it finds itſelf unable to defend its ally, may, with its uſual verſatility, readily join in their deſtruction. Great Britain can only anticipate ſuch an event by cultivating the friendſhip of Ruſſia and of the Grecian ſtate, which muſt ariſe from the ruins of the Turkiſh power. Strengthened by ſuch an alliance, we ſhould maintain that aſcendancy in the Mediterranean, of which

which the union of France and Spain threatens to deprive us.

That Turkey muſt very ſoon be overwhelmed by the empreſs, appears from a compariſon of her financial reſources, her army and her marine, with thoſe of the Ottoman power. Conſtantinople itſelf cannot be conſidered as a tenable poſt; and when the diſaffection of the enſlaved Greeks is taken into the account, little doubt can be entertained, that the followers of Mahomet will be entirely driven from the countries in Europe which they have uſurped, whether England conſent or not.

How they came to decide on the late war appears very enigmatical. That their French counſellors were better informed than to have recommended ſuch a ſtep is certain. It has been attributed to the advice of the Engliſh ambaſſador; but this has been contradicted, both by his ſolemn denial and by the expreſs declaration of his court, that no ſuch inſtructions were given him. Among the Turks themſelves it was regarded, by every man of information, as raſh and impolitic; and the great captain-paſha, Gazi-Haſſan, was in the higheſt degree offended at the proceeding. The declaration of war took place while he was abſent in Egypt. His plan was, to ſubjugate the rebellious or diſ-

affected provinces, which he wiſely conſidered as a neceſſary preliminary to the engaging in any foreign conteſt. He began with Egypt. The vizir Yuſuf, and his party in the divan, hurried on the declaration of hoſtilities, when it was too late in the ſeaſon for any hoſtile movement to be made, except the inſignificant and ill-combined attack on Kilburn, unprepared as the Turks were. In the winter, when the Bog was frozen over, the garriſon of Ochakof ſurpriſed a Ruſſian village on its banks, and murdered all its defenceleſs inhabitants, conſiſting of above a thouſand ſouls, *not one* of whom was ſpared. This wanton piece of cruelty coſt them dear at the capture of that place. The Ruſſian army, which went in the ſpring to beſiege it, was led through the village in aſhes, and the ſtreets ſtill ſtained with the blood of its harmleſs inhabitants. I mention this circumſtance, becauſe I was a witneſs of it, and becauſe the Ruſſians have been accuſed of cruelty, unjuſtly *at leaſt with reſpect to the Turks.* Had Great Britain and Pruſſia not interfered, the empreſs would not have made peace. How far that interference was politic, *conſidering the ſituation we then ſtood in with the empreſs*, has been already explained; but I think it muſt be ſufficiently obvious, that the exiſtence of the Turkiſh

Turkiſh power in Europe can *now* no longer be conſidered as propitious, either to the particular intereſts of this country, or to the general advantage of mankind.

In the conduct of the war, a very ſhort time would have led the emperor to the gates of Conſtantinople, had he boldly purſued a plan of offenſive operation; but Joſeph, influenced by the irreſolution of his character, acted ſolely on the defenſive until he had loſt the opportunity of cruſhing his enemies, and was himſelf involved in the troubles of his Hungarian dominions.

Humanity itſelf is diſgraced by the prolongation of Turkiſh deſpotiſm, and juſtice with an imperious voice demands the liberation of the oppreſſed Grecians, and their re-eſtabliſhment in the ſeat of their heroic anceſtors. But it is not only on the removal of exiſting evils that we have to ſpeculate; we may contemplate with proud exultation the ſubſtitution of a new ſyſtem of things, founded on principles more equally juſt and liberal. Who can look forward without animation to the reviväl of learning, of arts and arms, in Greece, when the iron yoke, under which ſhe now bows, ſhall be broken? A Grecian ſtate, the free and independent ally of Britain and Ruſſia, will form a con-

necting link in the ſocial bond of commerce; will be fitted, by the favourableneſs of its ſituation and the genius of its inhabitants, for bold and ſucceſsful enterprize; and, in fine, will quickly attain a proud pre-eminence among nations. Britain is particularly intereſted in cheriſhing theſe hopes: her trade with Turkey is trifling and inſignificant; with Greece ſhe will ſtand in the relation of a favoured ally, and her commercial connections will conſequently be more intimate and extenſive. The free navigation of the Mediterranean, a point which this country has ſo long laboured to ſecure, will be firmly eſtabliſhed by a confederacy of naval powers, able to reſiſt the domineering ſpirit of France and Spain. How high this object has ever ranked among the views of Engliſh politicians may be inferred from their anxiety in acquiring, and pertinacity in maintaining Gibraltar, Minorca, and various other ſtations in that ſea; but in the event to which we allude, the whole Archipelago will be friendly to us, and the ſupport of our trade will be aſſured, not only by Ruſſia, but Greece itſelf, which was ever a prolific nurſery of ſeamen, and which at preſent ſupplies reluctantly the greater part of the Turkiſh marine forces.

Nor is it only to the Mediterranean that we

we may look for an extenſion of our commerce: the coaſts of the Black Sea preſent a mine of wealth, hitherto untried by the Britiſh adventurer, but from which we may derive the moſt ſolid advantages, when thoſe countries are in the hands of free and independent ſtates, our friends and allies. The French had, previouſly to the preſent war, a conſiderable trade in this ſea, by their veſſels ſailing under Ruſſian or Turkiſh colours; and this they will again enjoy on the return of peace, through the favour of their Turkiſh allies.

The concluſion then, which is moſt obvious from a view of Turkey, both in its actual ſtate, and as it preſents itſelf to the eye of ſpeculation, is, that the ſubverſion of its deſpotiſm (an event which muſt inevitably ſoon arrive, and which it requires not the gift of prophecy to foreſee) will be productive of the moſt beneficial effect, in ſubſtituting an active and commercial power, for one immerſed in ſloth and barbariſm. In theſe deductions, Britain finds herſelf particularly intereſted, from the great advantages, commercial and political, which ſuch an event holds out to her, and which, if ſhe does not embrace, her influence and weight in the Mediterranean, and, perhaps, in the ſcale of Europe, muſt ſpeedily ſink.

Turning

Turning our views again to the ſide of Italy, we ſhall there perceive new reaſons, which dictate to Britain the neceſſity of allying herſelf moſt intimately with Ruſſia, in accompliſhing the liberation of Greece. The influence of France muſt here be almoſt univerſally predominant, and in the maritime ſtates ſhe will find a moſt prolific nurſery of ſeamen. She has however foreſeen, that the entrance of a Ruſſian fleet into the Mediterranean will prove a moſt ſerious obſtacle to the aggrandizement of her power, and has therefore endeavoured to prevent the progreſs of the Ruſſian arms. The only hope that Britain can entertain in that, as in every other quarter, muſt be founded on her naval ſuperiority; and this the co-operation of a Greek and Ruſſian fleet promiſes moſt effectually to maintain. Late events have, indeed, made the danger of the French uſurpations in Italy more evident and more alarming; it appears that they aim not merely at extending their influence but their empire; their conqueſts have been vaſt and rapid, and reſemble in every feature thoſe made by their allies the Turks; ſcarcely leſs ſtriking is the terror which awaits on their name, than the devaſtation which follows their ſword; Genoa may be conſidered as theirs; and even for

Venice

Venice itſelf no vain apprehenſions may be entertained. What an acceſſion of power is here to be acquired! By what bounds can we pretend to limit their progreſs?

If they ſucceed in Italy, they will change their politics with reſpect to Turkey. They are perfectly acquainted with the ſtate of Greece, and the diſpoſitions of its inhabitants. Turkey can be of no more uſe to them; they will therefore erect Greece into a republic under their protection, and derive from it infinitely more advantages than from the porte, which is unable any longer to make a diverſion in their favour, without haſtening the epocha of its own deſtruction. Ruſſia never can ſubmit to ſee ſuch a ſtate of things. Had the empreſs never before turned her thoughts to the liberating of Greece, as an object of glory, ſhe muſt now do it from motives of ſelf defence, and an intereſt ſhe had not before.

The vaſt increaſe of power the French will acquire, particularly in the number of ſailors, and the excellent ports of the Archipelago, will enable them to annihilate at their pleaſure the Ruſſian fleet and its eſtabliſhments in the ports of the Black Sea, and ſhut them for ever out of the Mediterranean. All the fair views of proſperity in the ſouthern provinces, as well Ruſſian

as

as Poliſh, will vaniſh and Ruſſia muſt depend ſolely on the pleaſure of France for the exportation of its products.

Such a ſtate of humiliation, neither the high mind of the empreſs nor the country at large will ever brook; it would be injuſtice to themſelves, cruelty to the Greeks, and ruin to all Europe. Much more even might be ſaid of the deſtructive conſequence of ſuffering the French to intermeddle with the Greeks, and of not immediately ſeizing the opportunity of making them a free and independent nation.

POSTSCRIPT.

THESE papers, as I have ſaid, were written nearly two years ago, though all the political part was not meant for the preſs; circumſtances have occurred, which permit more of them being laid before the public than was at firſt intended.

A great event has ſince happened; the empreſs of Ruſſia is no more! and conſiderable changes have taken place in the ſituation of ſeveral countries in Europe, but far from

weakening, they greatly ſtrengthen theſe arguments, and elucidate their deductions.

Hiſtories and anecdotes have appeared of the life of that great princeſs, and the revolution which placed her on the throne. It is time that the voice of truth be heard. That contemporary ſycophants and vile hirelings ſhould have vindicated one of the moſt horrid tranſactions that ſtain the pages of hiſtory is not altogether to be wondered at; but indignation is raiſed in the breaſt of every honeſt man, to ſee that after the death of the empreſs there exiſt beings contemptible enough to traduce the memory of an unfortunate prince, a victim to the undeſigning openneſs and integrity of his heart; a prince, whoſe anſwer to the precautions which were recommended to him by the late king of Pruſſia, was, "*I do good to all the world, and* "*with that what have I to fear?*" a prince who was the benefactor of his country, and whoſe laws (thoſe very laws which were brought in accuſation againſt him as crimes!) have been religiouſly obſerved as models of wiſdom and humanity, and without which the reign of the empreſs would have been leſs glorious, and her people leſs happy. That a Frenchman, that a Rulhiere, ſhould abuſe him, we need not be ſurpriſed: "*Peter* "*the third was a friend to the Engliſh, and he* "*diſ-*

" *diſcouraged the uſe of the French language at* " *his court.* But can any man believe that this *vindication* of the dethroning Peter the third was the book which withſtood the temptation of Catharine's gold, and the menace of the Baſtille? Whoever has been in Ruſſia knows (or might have known) the facts, and can contradict this ridiculous miſrepreſentation of them—the tranſaction is but thirty-ſeven years old.

Many powerful intereſts were combined to bury in oblivion this horrid event; but let ſovereigns and individuals learn, that TRUTH *will one day appear.* The emperor owes a duty to a father, to a ſovereign, to his own ſecurity, and to that of other princes; the Ruſſian nation owes to its own character the juſtification of the memory of their injured monarch, in whoſe cataſtrophe they were not implicated. The weight of the guilt will fall on a few; the lapſe of time does not diminiſh or change the nature of the crime.

The reign of the empreſs was a ſeries of ſucceſſes; it was as glorious as fortunate. She extended the frontier of her empire, and augmented its force, by a great acquiſition of territory and population; ſhe created a powerful navy, and eſtabliſhed a complete ſovereignty in the Black Sea; ſhe obtained both by ſea and land ſuch a decided ſuperiority over

over the Turks, that in the very next ſpring ſhe could with eaſe have driven them into Aſia. The dreadful revolution which has ſhaken the governments of Europe to their very foundations did not affect her; in the general madneſs her ſubjects remained uncontaminated, and by her poſition and undiminiſhed ſtrength ſhe became the arbitreſs of the whole continent. The document was drawn out, the ſigning of which would have decided the conteſt; would have crowned her reign with ſolid and eternal glory, and have blotted out every ſpot in it; would have made a people, who ſcarcely more than a century ago were reckoned among the barbarous hordes of Tatars, the liberators of the civilized world, the reſtorers of order, of juſtice, of the government of laws, of the independence of nations, the protectors of property, of innocence, of religion, of morality, and of the dignity of mankind; the pen was in her hand, when——myſterious Heaven!—ſhe died *.

The private character of the empreſs and her domeſtic conduct are foreign to the ſub-

* That day or the next ſhe was to have ſigned the document for furniſhing 65,000 men immediately, which would have been only the beginning of her co-operation; ſhe would, in all human probability, have been as ſucceſsful againſt the Jacobins as ſhe was againſt the leſs ſavage Tatars.

ject

ject of papers wholly political. As a ſovereign, ſhe will make a great figure in hiſtory. Her information proceeded from an extenſive and minute acquaintance with the preſent and paſt ſtate of nations, their actual and relative ſituations, and with the perſonal character and private intereſts of ſovereigns and individuals; ſhe was indefatigable in gaining intelligence and making partizans, and ſpared neither money nor means to ſucceed; ſhe was aſtoniſhingly rich in reſources; ſhe had wonderful talents to combine and deduce, ſo as to foreſee with certainty future events, or be prepared for ſuch as mere accident produces; it was thence that ſhe was enabled to profit by every fault or misfortune of other ſtates, as well as of what inevitably followed in the common courſe of things; ſhe was never duped, but when, through complaiſance or confidence, ſhe had relied on the knowledge of others; her projects were always vaſt, their object, her own glory; her perſeverance was inexorable; oppoſition or difficulty only excited greater exertions of talent; ſhe never gave up one ſingle purſuit when it was known to the world that ſhe had determined to follow it, unleſs it could appear that ſhe ceded from motives of generoſity, and not from compulſion or invincible obſtacle; ſucceſs never dazzled, nor danger

or

or embarraſſment oppreſſed her; on all occaſions ſhe had equal firmneſs, courage, and preſence of mind; ſhe was always great; even in the ſmalleſt actions ſhe was a ſovereign; ſudden impreſſions excited ſometimes in her violent anger, as it were by ſurpriſe, though never in public; but ſhe commanded her paſſions in an inſtant, and put on her habitual ſmile. She was remarkably temperate, applied indefatigably to buſineſs, and was of a healthy conſtitution of body. She could temporiſe, and uſe every art of political intrigue, but ſhe had too high notions of the dignity of a ſovereign to debaſe herſelf, or proſtitute publicly her word, ſo that whenever her honour was openly concerned in fulfilling an engagement ſhe might be relied on. When the gratification of her perſonal enmity or eſteem coincided with her politics it was ſhown, when not, ſilenced.

She uniformly purſued one line of politics, and ſhe never would have changed her alliance with Great Britain, had we underſtood them, or our own intereſt, ſooner. We need not ſay how unjuſtifiable her conduct has been towards Poland; but it cannot be denied, that the whole blame does not lie on her. As to the Crim, ſhe muſt have the approbation of all thoſe who do not approve a ſyſtem of rapine, and plunder, and barbarous

rage wreaked on poor defenceleſs cottagers, whoſe ſons, and wives, and daughters, were conſtantly expoſed to be carried into ſlavery from all the neighbouring countries.

It is only in foreign politics that ſhe appears great, and becauſe there only ſhe governed alone; there her miniſters were literally her ſecretaries; ſhe heard their advice ſometimes, and ſometimes took ideas from them, but ſhe alone judged and decided, and no one dared propoſe a meaſure till they had firſt diſcovered her ſentiments on it; to do this was the great art of keeping in favour.

As to the internal government of the empire, it was left to the great officers. The preſidents of colleges and the governors of provinces were ſovereigns, and they inordinately abuſed their power with impunity; hence a moſt ſcandalous negligence and corruption in the management of affairs in every department, and a general relaxation of government from Peterſburgh to Kamchatka. The empreſs rewarded with great munificence; but merit, unleſs it was very conſpicuous to the world, had but a little ſhare of it; every thing was given to favour, and what is given to favour is taken from merit: one good, however, reſulted to *her*, perſonally, from the impunity which thoſe in office enjoyed; ſhe was ſure of their attachment to her

her government, as the more they abuſed their power, the more they dreaded a ſucceſſor. She knew their conduct, but was deaf, and almoſt inacceſſible to complaint.

Her code of legiſlation did not contain *laws*, but *forms* of judicature; the inſtitution of general governments was a new burthen on the people of fifty millions of roubles more than the ancient ſimple regulations, a ſum equal to three fourths of the whole revenue of the empire; the increaſe of vexation was ſtill greater.

Her finances were ill underſtood, and worſe managed; ſhe got into embarraſſments when ſhe had incalculable reſources, and the means uſed to remedy them were childiſh.

Years had not impaired her talents, nor cooled the ardor of her ambition; it ſeemed, on the contrary, to increaſe, as other paſſions gradually ſubſided.

She had, in ſhort, a capacity equal to the government of a vaſt empire, and to give it in the world that conſequence which its natural ſtrength entitled it to. Had ſhe paid the ſame attention to its internal, as ſhe did to its political adminiſtration, her reign would have been as productive of happineſs to her people as it was of glory to herſelf.

The empreſs was at length on the eve of accompliſhing her great deſign; the Turks

were left alone, without any ſupport; all the powers in Europe were engaged in the great conteſt, except the kings of Pruſſia and Sweden. It was not in the power of the latter to make any diverſion. The French had paid to the court of Stockholm a conſiderable ſum of money to enable them to fit out their fleet, but ſo low were their finances, that it was all immediately employed, except a few thouſand rix-dollars, for more preſſing exigencies of the ſtate. The empreſs had a fleet in the Baltic, infinitely ſuperior to the combined fleets of Sweden and Denmark; ſhe wiſhed, as has been ſaid, to annihilate them; with our concurrence or conſent it would have been but a ſingle blow. As to the land forces of Sweden, they were then not in a condition to make the empreſs uneaſy; the alarm they had occaſioned in the laſt war had put her on her guard. She was, however, at the ſame time endeavouring, by a marriage of her grand-daughter with the young king of Sweden, to conciliate the intereſts of the two countries: though ſhe had no apprehenſion on that ſide, yet ſhe wiſhed rather to avoid a quarrel, and required only a ſtrict neutrality on the part of Sweden. As to Pruſſia alone, in the ſtate it was with reſpect to the newly acquired provinces in Poland, and trembling at the reſentment of the empreſs, it certainly

certainly underſtood its intereſts too well to quarrel with her. The empreſs, in a war with the king of Pruſſia, would have found infinite reſources in Poland; the king, an enemy in every ſubject he had acquired; almoſt every Pole would have taken the field againſt him, ſo much were they irritated at his paſt conduct. The king of Pruſſia had alſo intereſts in Germany to look after, which concerned him nearer; and certain it is, that he paid the moſt ſubmiſſive court to the empreſs, who on her ſide was perfectly unapprehenſive of any oppoſition from him; all that he might have tried to effect would have been, to obtain ſome little indemnification as the price of his complaiſance in acquieſcing in her projects.

She was now in poſſeſſion of every reſource ſhe required of Poland for her army, in acting againſt the Turks on the European continent. The government of the acquired provinces was ſo firmly ſettled, that ſhe had no apprehenſion of diſturbances; her army was ſo formidable, that ſhe could have marched beyond her frontiers at leaſt three hundred thouſand effective men; and ſhe had raiſed 150,000 men to recruit it Her fleet in the Black Sea was much ſuperior to the whole Turkiſh navy, and there was a flotilla of ſmall veſſels built for the purpoſe of landing troops in

three feet water, which could have conducted, in three days, ſixty thouſand men within a few miles of the capital of the Turkiſh empire. The firſt blow would have been the deſtruction of the Ottoman fleet in its own port, and the attack of Conſtantinople by land at the ſame time. All this might have been done early laſt ſpring.

A great army had paſſed Derbent; an arrangement would have immediately taken place with the Perſian khans, in whoſe quarrels, without any apparent intereſt, ſhe had intermeddled; and this army would have fallen on the Turkiſh Aſiatic provinces, the conſequence of which would have been, that all the Aſiatic troops, which compoſe the garriſons of their fortreſſes in Europe, would have quitted them, and fled to ſuccour their own country, and have left the road to Conſtantinople defenceleſs.

It was a project of Prince Potemkin, in the laſt war, to have carried the war into Aſia, and he began by taking Anapá. Had that prince not died, the war was on the point of breaking out again. I ſpeak of this from a knowledge of the facts.

Nor would the ſending an army of ſixty-five thouſand men to attack the French in Alſace have prevented her marching another army againſt the Turks. If ſhe had any ap-

prehenſions of the king of Pruſſia ſiding with the French, this meaſure would have put it in her power to have acted more offenſively againſt him. However it may have been conſtrued by ſome, this meaſure was a ſure indication of her intention of attacking the Turks in the ſpring; for as long as ſhe was not certain of meeting no oppoſition to that meaſure, ſhe conſtantly declined taking an active part by land againſt the French.

In ſhort, every preparation was made, and every obſtacle removed; we did not want the publication of a manifeſto to be informed of her intentions; and indeed the intentions of ſovereigns are better known by the ſtate and movements of their armies, or the preparations for their movements, by a knowledge of their intereſts, and the difficulties they have to encounter in the execution of their projects, than by manifeſtoes, or by the language of their courtiers.

It is worthy of recording, that the empreſs declared, that though His Majeſty and the Emperor of Germany made peace with the French, ſhe never would, nor acknowledge the French republic, or any ſtate that had rebelled againſt its ſovereign. She never would acknowledge America to the laſt, though ſhe permitted ſhips coming from America, under American colours, to enter her ports, and

trade on the ſame footing as other nations having no treaty.

The preſident of the congreſs, not knowing this circumſtance, appointed a conſul, in 1795, to reſide in St. Peterſburgh; on his arrival he requeſted an audience of the vice-chancellor, to deliver his credentials; but the next day he was told, the empreſs did not know of any ſuch power as the United States of America.

Since it has appeared, that His Majeſty's conſenting to at leaſt, if not co-operating with the empreſs's projects againſt Turkey, was the *ſine qua non* of *an alliance with her*, and of her *taking an active part in the war againſt France*, the public has ſhown great anxiety to learn why ſhe did not come forward immediately after ſigning the treaty in February 1795, in which a war with Turkey is a *caſus fœderis*, and what meaſures had removed the impediment, which kept her back two years, and induced her to come forwards at laſt; but theſe events are too recent to be ſpoken of.

Whilſt I am writing this Poſtſcript, another great event has taken place.

The emperor of Germany has made peace; the emperor of Ruſſia has loſt a glorious opportunity to immortalize his name; it might have been ſaid to him:

Sire,

Sire,

You have aſcended the throne of the greateſt empire in the world, under ſuch auſpices as never attended any monarch before you.

A glory is reſerved for you, Sire, ſuch as never yet ſhone round the throne of any ſovereign on earth.

You may be the beneſactor, not of Ruſſia only, but of all Europe.—Hiſtory ſhall ſay, Alexander conquered a world, Paul ſaved a world.

You have begun your reign by acts which beſpeak your wiſdom, your juſtice, your humanity— YOU HEAR EVERY ONE *.

You have felt with indignation the unneceſſitated apoſtacy of the court of Berlin; its alliance with regicides to diſmember the German empire.

You are called on, Sire, to cruſh with the irreſiſtible weight of your armies the enemies of religion, morality, and ſocial order.

Peace with them will be more dangerous than war. Their doctrines will have freer courſe; and their doctrines have done more than their armies. They have ſubverted the order, and confounded even the names of things. Virtues

* Every perſon in the empire may now write to their ſovereign, and if they receive no anſwer, may addreſs themſelves perſonally to him.

have

have the appellations of vices, and vices the appellations of virtues.

Can Ruſſia, in all its extended provinces, when every foreign contact will be poiſon; when every breath, except from the frozen ocean, will be full of miaſma, eſcape the contagion? None will eſcape but the elder brethren of Jacobiniſm, the Turks, whoſe equally monſtrous, though leſs dangerous tyranny, has for ſo many centuries inſulted mankind, trodden underfoot the laws of nations, and blaſphemed Chriſtianity; who, unprovoked, attacked, conquered, and ſlaughtered nations without number, murdered their ſovereigns, and ſpilt every drop of royal blood, maſſacred their prieſts at the altar, extirpated nobility, plundered the opulent, and bound the wretched remains of the people in fetters of perpetual and hereditary ſlavery. They alone, till the reign of Jacobiniſm had made property a crime, the violation of property a legal reſource of government, and the lives and poſſeſſions of men the right of tyranny; they alone had hitherto confounded the hereditary ranks among mankind; had depreſſed genius, learning, and the Chriſtian religion, and governed their barbarous empire by ſlaves and aſſaſſins. Like the Jacobins, they taught Chriſtian children to fight againſt their fathers and their father's God;*

* See the inſtitution of the Janizaries, who were originally Chriſtian children.

they

they too hold it lawful to murder priſoners in cold blood; they too poſſeſs a claim to every country in the univerſe, and a ſacred right to ſubject all people to their law; they too hold all other ſovereigns as uſurpers, and dethroning them as the higheſt merit. But ſtill the Turks have a religion, and though it permits them numberleſs enormities to their own ſect, and all enormities to others, they acknowledge a God, and many moral duties. Not the contagion of their doctrine was to be feared, but their cruel ſword, which once threatened the conqueſt of the univerſe, and the extinction of all virtue, dignity, and ſcience in the world; yet was not this firſt monſter ſo tremendous, in the inſolence of his power, as an enemy, as is this ſecond monſter, in the inſolence of his ſucceſſes, as a brother.

To you, Sire, kings lift up their hands, and bow their anointed heads; to you, Sire, the prieſts of God, to you orphans of murdered nobles, to you violated virgins, deſpoiled poſſeſſors, enſlaved nations ſtretch out their arms, and implore your aid; the ſpirits of martyred royalty call to you from above for vengeance.

The noble project of your glorious anceſtor, Peter the Great, was nearly conſummated when you mounted his throne; it was reſerved for his nephew to accompliſh the liberating of a Chriſtian people from the moſt infamous bondage. It is worthy of the juſtice and humanity which

mark

mark the beginning of a reign, on which more true glory awaits than ever was reſerved for any ſovereign in the records of hiſtory.

This might with truth have been ſaid to him.

In Auguſt 1796, Pruſſia concluded with the French ſecret articles for the diſmemberment of Germany. The late king of Pruſſia had aſſured the empreſs, "*on his word of* "*honour*," and "*on the word of a ſovereign*," that no ſuch articles exiſted. On the acceſſion of his preſent imperial majeſty to the throne of Ruſſia, the king ſent Count de Brühl to compliment the emperor on the occaſion. This nobleman had the honour of being perſonally known to his imperial majeſty, and, it was believed, was much eſteemed by him.

The court of Berlin, ſoon imagining that the emperor Paul was blindly attached to its intereſts, ventured to give a copy of theſe articles. That ſubtle cabinet was for once miſtaken. The emperor felt the indignity of the action, and, himſelf a man of honour, and a monarch reſpectful of the ſacredneſs of a ſovereign's word, he anſwered the communication as became the nephew of Peter the Great. Pruſſia ſubmitted, and the project was abandoned. Ruſſia was actually preparing to aſſiſt Auſtria effectually, when

Auſtria

Auſtria made peace with France! I ſhall make no comment on this event, which no one had reaſon to expect. The emperor of Ruſſia was greatly and juſtly offended. If he have any predilection for Pruſſia, certain it is that he is incapable of entering into meaſures iniquitous in themſelves and baneful in their conſequences, tending to the diſmemberment of Germany; and the only obſtacle which now ſeems to prevent his ſtepping forward with that vaſt weight of power he commands, is the uncertainty of the political ſyſtem adopted by the young king of Pruſſia. While the old miniſters continue in office, can it be preſumed that their ſyſtem is not that which the king approves? Is it to be expected that a young prince has energy of mind, and knowledge of affairs ſufficient, by his arguments, to convert or to over-rule the opinions of a whole cabinet? We muſt judge of the ſyſtem of a prince by the known ſyſtem of his miniſters in office.

If, however, becauſe the emperor has made peace, we make peace, and ſuch a peace as the bloated inſolence of the enemy dictates to us, we ſhall be ſhut out of every port, from the Elbe to the coaſt of Africa; we ſhall ſoon be driven out of India. France, and its allies, will ſoon have a naval power ſuperior to that of Great Britain, and, *qui mare teneat*

eum

eum neceſſe rèrum potirí. Cic. Without our trade how is our navy to exiſt? how are our funds to be raiſed? If we diſband our armies, we ſhall be attacked unprepared; if we do not, what œconomy will there be in a peace?

It now remains, therefore, to be ſeen, whether the love of our country and of liberty, which fired the breaſts of our anceſtors, and led them on to thoſe glorious exertions which procured us our happy and *free conſtitution*, be tranſmitted to their deſcendants; and whether we will ſpill our blood to defend what they ſpilt their blood to purchaſe for us. It remains to be ſeen whether we are ſtill free Britons, or humiliated ſlaves, ready to receive with open arms the deathful hug of French fraternity, and ſubmit to the deſpotic five-handed ſceptre of French liberty.

February 1798.

CHAPTER XI.

Of the Britiſh Trade with Turkey.

FORMERLY the trade to Turkey was of conſiderable importance to this country, but of late years it had been languiſhing, and at laſt dwindled into a ſtate of inſignificancy, when the preſent war entirely put a ſtop to all communication with the ports of the Levant.

As this trade will be again opened when a peace takes place, an inveſtigation of the cauſes of its decline, and the means to give it its ancient extenſion, may not, in the mean time, be unimportant to the government and to the merchants of this country.

The cauſes of its gradual decline are, 1ſt, the rivalſhip of other European nations; 2dly, the diminution of the conſumption of our manufactures in Turkey, by the impoveriſhed ſtate of the country; 3dly, ſome branches of trade being got into other channels; and 4thly, the monopoly of the Levant company in London.

With reſpect to the rivalſhip of other nations, that cauſe will be conſidered when I ſpeak

ſpeak of the Levant company. As to the impoveriſhed ſtate of Turkey, it muſt affect the trade of other European nations as well as our own; if we are not, therefore, to expect to ſee it again in that flouriſhing ſtate it was in, when there were forty Engliſh houſes of trade at Aleppo (at preſent there is but one) we may expect to have the ſame *proportion* of it as we then had; and if we acquire only this, our trade to the Levant will ſtill be a national object. Some branches of trade are got into other channels; this regards principally certain imports from Turkey, and particularly of ſilk from Aleppo, whence formerly larger quantities of Perſian ſilk came, which is not now brought thither, but the Eaſt India Company ſupply our market cheaper and more abundantly. Conſiderable quantities of cotton and drugs come from Holland and from Italy, which formerly came direct. This will alſo be accounted for in the next conſideration, the monopoly of the Levant company.

It is often neceſſary, and it is juſt, where merchants undertake to open to the country a new branch of trade, and where the expence and riſk is great, to grant them excluſive privileges, or monopolies, for a certain limited time, to prevent others from reaping the harveſt they had ſown, and to ſecure

ſecure their laudable induſtry as far as poſſible from riſk; but when that riſk exiſts no more, and when they have reaped their harveſt over and over again, and have had a full compenſation for their riſk, their induſtry, and their expence, the country at large has a right to a participation of the trade. There may, indeed, ſometimes exiſt circumſtances of a peculiar nature, which give them a claim to a longer indulgence in their monopoly, particularly where that monopoly is not injurious, but, on the contrary, beneficial to the country in general (and ſuch is the caſe of the Eaſt India company;) but in a trade where the merchants have no *common ſtock*, and can urge none of the above reaſons in defence of their monopoly; where they cannot prove that *any particular loſs* would accrue to them by aboliſhing it; where it has operated as a reſtraint on the trade, confining it to narrow bounds, and giving a decided ſuperiority to their rivals of other nations, to the almoſt total excluſion of the products and manufactures of their country from that to which their privilege excluſively permits them to trade, ought in common ſenſe ſuch a monopoly to exiſt? The Levant company is truly become the *dog in the manger*; it does not operate ſo much to

the profit of the company, as to the loſs of the country.

This monopoly is of a ſingular nature: it has none of the advantages of a common ſtock, in which many individuals riſk ſmall ſums, but which in the aggregate amount to a larger capital than any one merchant or ſet of merchants poſſeſs, or would chooſe to riſk; a common ſtock to which any one may contribute, and which thereby, ſtrictly ſpeaking, ceaſes to be a monopoly; it is a privilege granted to *certain perſons only* to trade to Turkey, each with his own capital, and for his own particular account and riſk, without any aſſignable reaſon why they ſhould be preferred to others his majeſty's ſubjects; it has all the diſadvantages of other monopolies; it has not one of their advantages.

In ſpeaking thus freely of the company, I ſolemnly declare that I have no private motive, no rancour againſt any individual, and have no motive for writing on this ſubject but the advantage of the country. The few members of the company with whom I am acquainted I perſonally reſpect and highly eſteem: on this ſubject they muſt differ with me; they are bound by oath to ſupport the intereſts of their body.

The trade of every other nation to Turkey

is

is free, and they have experienced the advantage of being liberated from the fetters of excluſive privileges. Let every obſtacle be removed in this country to an equally free commerce, and the ſuperior induſtry, ſkill, and riches of our manufacturers, our traders, and our navigators, will again reſtore to us our loſt Turkey trade.

It may be ſaid, that at preſent the Levant company is not a monopoly, as any one, by paying twenty pounds, may become a member of it. When the trade was already ruined, it was imagined that this regulation was equivalent to laying the trade open (a proof that government have thought it neceſſary to aboliſh the monopoly) but the bye-laws of the company, and the power to enforce them, were permitted to exiſt, and theſe ſo fetter the trade to *new adventurers*, that few have found their account in purſuing it, and the trade ſtill remains a monopoly in favor of the old houſes.

It will be neceſſary to paſs in review theſe bye-laws, which have operated ſo injurioufly to the trade in general, and to ſhow how they have gradually effected the ruin of the trade, and the introduction of rivals, who have gotten poſſeſſion of what we have loſt.

By one of the bye-laws, for inſtance, it was enacted, that all merchandize brought

from Turkey, and imported into England, ſhould be the produce of goods exported from England to Turkey. The following are the words of the bye-law:

"That upon entering goods received in "*England* from *Turkey* or *Egypt*, every mem- "ber ſhall in like manner ſubſcribe the fol- "lowing affirmation; *videlicet:*

"*I affirm, by the oath I have taken to the* "*Levant company, that the goods above men-* "*tioned are for account of myſelf, or others* "*free of the ſaid company, or of ſuch as now* "*have their licence to trade, and are beyond* "*the ſeas; and that the ſaid goods, nor any* "*part of them, are not, to the beſt of my* "*knowledge, the produce of gold or ſilver,* "*either in coin or bullion, ſent into Turkey;* "*but that the ſaid goods are purchaſed by* "*merchandize, or monies ariſing or to ariſe* "*from the ſale of merchandize ſent into Turkey* "*or Egypt, from Europe, or from the Britiſh* "*ſettlements in America, on account of freemen* "*of the Levant company, or ſuch as have their* "*licence to trade, and of which regular entries* "*have been made with the company, or are* "*purchaſed by freight received in Turkey or* "*Egypt, by ſhips navigated according to law,* "*which freight is entirely the property of* "*members of the company, or ſuch as have* "*their licence to trade.*"

And every merchant or factor in Turkey or

or Egypt is required to make a ſimilar affidavit, on exporting goods from Turkey for England, and to give, on oath, an exact account of every kind of tranſaction or buſineſs, direct or indirect, ſo that all his affairs become known.

The object of this law is evidently to encourage the exportation of cloth; and when we had no rivals, it produced no bad effects; but it ſoon produced rivals, *and it continued in force till they had nearly got poſſeſſion of the whole cloth trade.* Such a law, indeed, was ſufficient to ruin any trade. One houſe may deal in exports, another in imports; one may combine its Italian with its Turkey trade; another may ſend veſſels for the carrying trade; but if every individual houſe be obliged to keep an exact regiſter on oath, and under a penalty of 20 per cent, called "*a broke*," of all its exports and imports, and to balance them exactly, how is ſuch a trade to proſper, where the profits are reduced by the rivalſhip of foreign nations? This bye-law at length, when it had produced the full effect of its ill tendency, was repealed; but the trade was not revived; ſo difficult is it to turn back commerce from channels into which it has run.

It will be aſked then, what are the reſtraints which now lie on the trade?

The ſubjection to the control of the company; the neceſſity of making entries with it of all their tranſactions on oath, and not being able to be concerned in anywiſe with others not free of the company, or foreigners; the power in the company, for the leaſt violation of their rules, to inflict a penalty of 20 per cent.; the idea of reſtraint, and the apprehenſion of violating a ſolemn oath, have made many determine to trade with Turkey through foreign and circuitous channels, without becoming free of the company; witneſs the very large quantities of cottons and drugs, &c. which come from Holland and Italy, as the cuſtom-houſe books prove. This was the caſe till our trade to Holland and the Mediterranean was ſtopped by the war, and in that ſame ſituation we ſhall be when a peace takes place.

The drugs, &c. which are imported from Italy, were carried thither from Turkey; they had already given a profit to the Italian merchant in Turkey, to the importer, and to the purchaſer in Italy, who cleans, aſſorts, repacks, and often adulterates them; to the commiſſioner, who purchaſes them for his correſpondent in England; to which add charges, and intereſt of money for ſo long a diſburſement, which the different people through whoſe hands the merchandize has gone

gone have all calculated, as well as their profits, double freights, and loading and unloading, &c. &c.

Cottons are imported from Holland, becauſe the company cannot import themſelves enough for the conſumption; and the reaſon why they do not is, becauſe the old members, who are under no apprehenſions of the bye-laws, *find other articles enough to employ their whole capital, and beyond that the trade cannot increaſe.* This is the reaſon, as will be ſeen hereafter more fully, why the trade in exports as well as imports is confined within ſuch narrow bounds.

The Britiſh merchants in Italy and other foreign countries, not being members of the company (and to become free of the company they muſt come to England) cannot trade with Britiſh houſes in Turkey, and theſe, if they will trade to Italy, muſt trade with foreigners: thus all combinations of the trades are prevented. Engliſh veſſels in the Mediterranean might often make a voyage to Turkey, inſtead of lying in an Italian port, and return time enough to take in their cargoes for England.

The great preference given to Britiſh veſſels in the Mediterranean would aſſure them an employment whenever they want freights. This carrying or caravan trade is ſo exten-

ſive, that beſides the French, the little ſtate of Raguſa has no leſs than 400 veſſels in it.

Were the *maſters of ſhips, their owners,* and the Engliſh *merchants in Italy* and Turkey, under no reſtraint in regard to the Levant company, people would riſk more readily the ſending their veſſels to the Mediterranean to get employment in this carrying buſineſs, and their ſpeculation in trade being free, they would find means to employ their veſſels in the intervals of their being without freights; the maſters, owners, and correſpondents might combine their *own ſpeculations* in merchandize with their carrying buſineſs, and thus keep them conſtantly employed. It is the want of theſe reſources to our ſhips, that prevents Engliſh owners from ſending their ſhips into the Mediterranean to ſeek freights, and prevent the few which do go thither from profiting ſo much by it as thoſe of other nations, whoſe houſes of trade are nearer.

Had the Turkey trade in England never been a monopoly, the French would never have got poſſeſſion of almoſt all the cloth trade, and the laying it open will be the only means of our coming in again for any conſiderable ſhare of it. There is a greater demand in Turkey for the light Languedoc cloths, than for any other ſort. The Turks clothe their ſervants twice a year,

year, and the French cloth, made into looſe garments (which laſt much longer than the tight European dreſs) is ſtrong enough for their purpoſe, and its cheapneſs makes its preferable; poorer people, who form the great body of conſumers, buy it alſo for œconomical reaſons. Engliſh broad cloth, called mahoot (of a light quality, made purpoſely for the Turkey market) is only worn by thoſe in eaſier circumſtances. Conſiderable quantities of cloth have alſo of late years come to Turkey *from Germany*.

It is the opinion of many people well acquainted with theſe matters, that the Engliſh manufactories might make the ſame ſort of cloth as the Languedoc, and as cheap as the French; but as long as the Levant company exiſts, who is to undertake it? Were the trade laid entirely open, it is probable that all kinds of Engliſh manufacturers would ſend people (called riders) to Turkey to ſeek for commiſſions, as they do to all parts of Europe. This practice, *though not very agreeable to Engliſh merchants* (which however may not be the caſe in Turkey, as they may find the mediation of merchants neceſſary) would greatly increaſe the vent of Engliſh commodities, and theſe induſtrious people might poſſibly be the means of our regaining the cloth trade.

The few merchants who are in the true ſecret of the Levant trade, can employ in it their WHOLE CAPITAL *advantageouſly, and therefore do not ſeek for new branches, or how to recover old ones which are loſt.*—This is the great ſecret.

The French do not get their wool cheaper than we do; the price of labour may be leſs; but will not ſuperior ſkill and induſtry, with larger capitals, compenſate this ſingle circumſtance againſt us? Experience in other articles ſhews it, as in the manufactures of Mancheſter, Sheffield, and Birmingham.

It is very worthy of attention, that the French cannot make ſo cheap as we can the ſame kinds of cloth, which our people bring to the Turkey market; it is not that they cannot make them *ſo fine*, for they make in France much finer cloth than that kind of broad cloth made in England purpoſely for the Turkey market. There is alſo a coarſe ſtrong cloth brought to Turkey from England, called *londras*; theſe the French cannot *make ſo cheap* neither; nor are their *ſhalloons ſo cheap*. In ſhort, there is no ſort of woollen ſtuff made in the two countries, of the ſame quality, which the Engliſh do not ſell cheaper than the French. The fact ſeems to be, that the French invented a kind of cloth more proper for the general conſumption

conſumption of Turkey than that which the Engliſh had brought thither, and the Engliſh never attempted to follow their example, but continued carrying to the market a ſort of cloth, which at laſt got almoſt out of uſe. *Whenever the Engliſh ſhall have made and brought to Turkey the ſame kind of cloth as the French, and cannot afford it ſo cheap, then with certainty we may conclude that the French have an advantage over us*; but till then it ought to be doubted, and certainly it merits the trial; but a fair trial never can be made till the Levant trade is entirely free.

But even ſuppoſing that we cannot regain the cloth trade, there are very many other objects worth attending to, and *which may be of greater national advantage.*

The Mancheſter ſtuffs would find a great vent in all parts of Turkey. The manufactories of Aleppo and Damaſcus are almoſt ruined, and if the Mancheſter people were to imitate the Turkiſh patterns of their ſtuffs, they could certainly afford them cheaper. Imitations of the Surat and Bengal goods of ſilk and cotton, which are enormouſly dear, would find alſo a ready ſale in Turkey, and cotton velvets, velverets, &c. Birmingham and Sheffield wares would be articles of importance. The Turks, both in Europe

Europe and Aſia, have a great partiality for all theſe kinds of Engliſh manufactures, and in general the epithet Engliſh is ſynonimous with excellent.

Theſe articles at preſent are not attended to; but the maſters of ſhips, who bring out their *little ventures* to Turkey in a contraband manner, in theſe kind of things, make great profits; they can, however, bring only ſmall quantities, leſt the Levant company ſhould take umbrage at it. A few of theſe goods alſo find their way to Turkey from Italy, but greatly enhanced in their price from the many hands they go through, and therefore this channel does not afford a great vent for them. Linen may likewiſe be an article of exportation for Turkey. The Turks wear linen of a hard twiſted thread, very open and unbleached, which comes moſtly from Egypt, and is exceedingly dear, but is the moſt pleaſant kind to wear in hot weather. No European nation has yet undertaken to imitate it, but it is probable it might be made in Ireland infinitely cheaper than in Egypt: if this was the caſe, it would be of great importance. The German linens begin to be ſold in conſiderable quantities in Turkey, but they never will ſupply the place of the Egyptian, on account of their quality. Vaſt quantities of the above mentioned articles come

come from Venice and Germany, where they are dearer, and of worſe quality, than thoſe manufactured in England.

Were I to enter into an enumeration of all the Engliſh manufactures that would find a vent in Turkey, and particularly in the interior parts of Aſia, and point out the different ports to which they might be ſent, the detail would be too long for a general repreſentation; but collectively it muſt be very obvious to every perſon acquainted but generally with the trade of Turkey, that our exportations to that country muſt become of great importance in a few years, were the monopoly removed, and the agents of the manufacturers ſent to travel through the country, and get certain information of the ſtate of its trade and manufactories.

Salt fiſh, could the Newfoundland ſhips, &c. go directly to Turkey as they go to Italy, would be a very important branch.

The Eaſt India company could ſupply the Turkey market with muſlins much cheaper than they are brought by the way of Baſſora, of Gidda, and Suez, which trade is entirely in the hands of their ſervants: the trial has been ſucceſsfully made; but the company have other articles enough in which to inveſt their whole capitals. Other nations now bring large quantities of muſlins to Turkey.

Turkey. The Britiſh muſlins alſo ſell to conſiderable profit.

Let all this be mere ſuppoſition, is not the object of importance enough to give it a fair trial? and does not common ſenſe ſay, that a trade freed from obſtacles muſt flouriſh more than when clogged with the moſt unſupportable ſhackles? May it not be aſked, what juſt right have the members of the Levant company to lay reſtraints on this trade by their bye-laws? I have heard this ſubject diſcuſſed in Turkey, where people certainly underſtand the trade of the country better than in England, and I never heard one plauſible reaſon alledged in favour of the company. Sophiſtical arguments may be produced in London, which may appear plauſible to thoſe who are not informed of the real ſtate of matters in Turkey.

To ſhow what little efforts have been made by the company to extend the trade, and how little they deviate from the footſteps of their forefathers, I will cite two ſtriking inſtances:

Mr. John Humphrys, of Conſtantinople, was the firſt, who, a few years ago, imagined that Engliſh ſhalloons might be ſold in Conſtantinople, and they ſoon became a very important article for exportation to Turkey. The French have not been able to make them ſo cheap.

Mr.

Mr. Peter Took, of Conſtantinople, only about twenty years ago, diſcovered that he might buy raw ſilk in Bruſa (the hills behind which are viſible from their houſes in Conſtantinople) from the firſt hands, and thus make his returns direct to England. Before that period, from the firſt exiſtence of the company, the merchants of Conſtantinople had always ſent their money to Smyrna to be inveſted in ſilk, which the Turks and Jews of Smyrna bought at Bruſa.

There is a great demand in Turkey for Staffordſhire earthen-ware, which would become a very important article of commerce.

Perhaps the greateſt importation of Britiſh articles in Turkey would be by foreigners, or natives of the Turkiſh provinces, as is the caſe in many branches of our commerce, where ſuch reſtraints on foreigners do not exiſt; for inſtance, every one knows that not one-tenth part of our exports to Ruſſia are on account of the Ruſſia company in London, or the Britiſh factory in Ruſſia. Theſe articles are ſent to Ruſſia for account of foreigners ſettled in Ruſſia, or Ruſſians, and ſome part for account of our manufacturers. With reſpect to Germany this is ſtill more the caſe.

The Levant company exact a duty on all merchandize exported to and imported from Turkey,

Turkey, beſides a conſulage in the ports of Turkey on all the exports and imports in Britiſh veſſels. This conſulage is a very heavy burthen on our trade, and particularly when it is conſidered that ſome other nations *pay none.* The following are the words of the company's bye-law:

" *At a general court, &c. the following* " *orders were eſtabliſhed as proper and expe-* " *dient for the* SUPPORT OF THE COMPANY'S " AFFAIRS, *and for the government of the* " *trade; and they were confirmed at a general* " *court, held 3d of March* 1775.

" *It was reſolved and ordered, That all* " *goods exported from Turkey or Egypt for* " *Great Britain ſhall pay three conſulages and* " *one-half, or ſeven in the hundred, according* " *to the rates of the company's tarif, in ſuch* " *ſpecies of the grand ſeignior's coin as his of-* " *ficers receive for cuſtoms; which conſulage* " *ſhall be paid, one-half in thirty days, and the* " *other half in ſixty days after the departure of* " *the ſhip, &c.; and the company's treaſurers* " *are not to take any notes or obligations for the* " *payments of conſulages, but they are to inſiſt* " *upon being paid in money when it is due.*

" *That all goods imported, &c. into Great* " *Britain, ſhall pay one impoſition according to* " *the company's rates, &c. except cotton and* " *emery ſtones, &c.*

" *That*

"*That all goods imported into Turkey or* "*Egypt, from Leghorn, or any other Port or* "*Ports of Chriſtendom,* BY BRITISH SUB- "JECTS OR BRITISH SHIPS, FOR ACCOUNT "OF FOREIGNERS, *ſhall pay a conſulage of* "TWO *in the hundred, &c.*"

"*That all goods exported from Conſtantino-* "*ple, Smyrna, and Aleppo, to Leghorn, or any* "*other foreign port or ports of Chriſtendom, by* "*Britiſh ſubjects,* ON FOREIGN SHIPS, *on ac-* "*count of Britiſh ſubjects, ſhall pay a conſulage* "*of* ONE *in the hundred, &c.*

"*That all goods imported into Turkey or* "*Egypt, by ſtrangers, upon Britiſh ſhips, from* "*any foreign port, &c. ſhall pay two in the hun-* "*dred, &c. and in like manner exported,* TWO "*in the hundred, &c.*" and ſeveral other regulations for the paying of conſulage, of leſſer importance, which I omit for brevity.

"*April 29th,* 1785. *It is reſolved and or-* "*dered, &c.*

"*That all goods, excepting raw ſilk, mohair* "*yarn, and drugs, exported from Turkey and* "*Egypt, in the time of the plague, to Malta,* "*Ancona, Venice, Meſſina, Leghorn, Genoa, or* "*Marſeilles, for the purpoſe of performing qua-* "*rantine, and which are to be re-ſhipped on the* "*ſame ſhip for Great Britain or Ireland, ſhall* "*pay a conſulage of two in the hundred only.*"

Beſides this revenue, the company have for many years received an aſſiſtance from government of five thouſand pounds a year. All theſe ſums are expended for paying a part of the ſalary of the ambaſſadors at Conſtantinople, the conſuls at the ſeveral ports in Turkey, the chancellors and drogomans (or interpreters) and for defraying of the expences attending viſits from the ambaſſador to the porte, and of the conſuls to paſhas, beſides extraordinary preſents made at the firſt audience of a new ambaſſador and of a conſul; for paying *avanias* (or money extorted by falſe accuſations) and public entries of conſuls, which were formerly very coſtly; and finally, for the expences of the company and its officers at home.

Were our trade put on the ſame footing as the Ruſſian, a very little (perhaps five hundred pounds) more than the five thouſand pounds government now pays, would ſuffice for all the expences which then would be neceſſary. The Ruſſian trade to Turkey is free to every one; there is no tax on it, either under the appellation of conſulſhip or otherwiſe; no fee is taken at any ambaſſador's, conſul's, or chancellor's office, for documents neceſſary for the diſpatch of trade; no preſents are made by conſuls to paſhas or other officers; no avania is ſubmitted to.

A conſul

A conſul at Smyrna only is neceſſary. Vice-conſuls in the other ports would anſwer every purpoſe for the protection of trade; and there would be found merchants enow, who would be glad of the office without pay, for the honour of it, which in Turkey is conſiderable. There is at this day no neceſſity for conſuls living in ſuch great ſtate as they did a few years ago. The foreign miniſters at Conſtantinople have very conſiderably retrenched their expences.

The power of an ambaſſador and of a conſul in Turkey is very great; it extends even to life and death. By one of the articles of the *capitulations* (or treaty with the porte) it is ſtipulated, that in all criminal caſes wherein ſubjects of the porte are not concerned, ambaſſadors or conſuls ſhall puniſh the criminal according to the laws of their country. In the Dutch capitulations this is expreſſed ſtill ſtronger. As crimes committed in a ſtate are crimes immediately againſt that ſtate, the cognizance of them belongs to it alone. The ſultan delegates his power to the ambaſſadors and conſuls; and if in puniſhing the criminal they exceed the rule preſcribed by the laws of their own country, they are only anſwerable for their conduct to the ſultan; but the ſultan takes no cognizance of it, therefore they are without control, and their

power is deſpotic. It is indeed true, that they generally ſend ſuch offenders home to their country; there have, however, with other nations, been examples where an European has killed a ſubject of the porte, and juſtice being demanded, the ambaſſador or conſul has put the criminal to death. Should it happen that an Engliſhman killed a Turk, it would certainly be better that the ambaſſador or conſul cauſed him to be hanged, than to deliver him up to the Turks, for juſtice being demanded, there is no other alternative; if he eſcaped, the conſequence might be a general maſſacre; we have lately had an example at Smyrna exactly of this nature, which coſt the lives of many hundreds, and cauſed the European quarter to be reduced to aſhes. There is no poſſibility of ſending the criminal home if the populace demand juſtice.

The company have given alſo another power to the ambaſſadors and conſuls over merchants, which free traders may not approve of. Their bye-law is, "*If any factor* "*or factors ſhall have any dealings with any* "*perſon* battulated *by the lord ambaſſador, or* "*the conſul of any of the* Scales *(ports,* Scala "*Italian) in Turkey, with the advice of the re-* "*ſpective factories, ſuch factor or factors ſhall* "*pay a fine for every offence to the amount of*

" *three conſulages upon the value of the tranſ-*
" *action by or with ſuch* battulated *perſon,*
" *without appeal, &c.*" *Battulation* with them ſignifies interdiction of all commerce with the perſon *battulated.* The intention was to prevent the factors or merchants having dealings with litigious perſons of the country; but this power has been abuſed.

The ambaſſador formerly had a conſiderable revenue from protections granted to ſubjects of the porte; but this protection having been totally diſregarded by the preſent ſultan, both that income and that ſource of conſtant litigation with the porte are done away. It were to be wiſhed that this privilege was wholly aboliſhed. The French ſeveral times propoſed giving it up, and at a time when it was reſpected, and lucrative to their ambaſſadors.

The French alſo, on the repreſentation of their ambaſſador, M. de St. Prieſte, laid the Levant trade open; the conſequence was, that immenſe quantities of French goods were carried to Turkey by ſubjects of the porte; but the company at Marſeilles found means to get their excluſive privilege renewed; they had ſuffered, but the country had gained. At preſent every one has liberty to trade, and ſince our fleet has left the Mediterranean, their commerce is revived, and, except the trade to Great Britain be equally

free when a peace takes place, we ſhall have little chance of being able to rival them; but we muſt not wait till that period to lay our trade open; it muſt be done immediately.

As all communication with the Levant by ſea is cut off, there remains no reſource to our merchants, but to carry on their trade through Ruſſia; and though this be a circuitous way, it is by far not ſo expenſive as might be imagined. The freights to the Baltic are very low, as half the ſhips go out empty. The carriage from Riga to Cherſon, or Niccolai on the Bog, is moſtly by water, and the land carriage in Ruſſia is not one fourth of the price it is in Germany. The expence on cloth would be trifling, and on cheap and bulky goods even would not be equal to the enormous price of inſurance paid for armed ſhips, which *run the voyage* at preſent, and which is not equal to the riſk; it is indeed ſo great, that government ſhould, perhaps, interfere. At Cherſon there are good veſſels to be found, which in three days may carry the goods to Conſtantinople at a reaſonable freight.

But in order to open ſuch a communication, liberty muſt be obtained of the emperor of Ruſſia to ſend merchandize in *tranſito* (without paying duty) acroſs Ruſſia; and there is no doubt but that ſovereign, who has ſtudied

Adam

Adam Smith's book on the Wealth of Nations, and who is perfectly acquainted with the principles of commerce and navigation, would ſee the very great advantage which would accrue to Ruſſia by ſuch a trade, both on account of the ſums which would remain in the country for expences of carriage, the employment of a number of people, and alſo the encouragement it would be to the Ruſſian navigation in the Black Sea; but he never would *grant* ſuch a privilege to a part of the Britiſh nation excluſively, and ſhut out from it the Ruſſia merchants, who carry on a branch of commerce ſo advantageous to his empire, nor exclude his own ſubjects from it. Before this can be done, the Turkey company muſt be aboliſhed.

At preſent a few goods, I am informed, have been ſent to Hamburgh, thence to Vienna, and down the Danube, where they are ſhipped for Conſtantinople. The freight to Hamburgh is dearer than it is to Riga; the charges acroſs Germany ten times as much as acroſs Ruſſia. At the mouth of the Danube there are only bad Turkiſh or Greek veſſels to be freighted, on which no regular inſurance can be made. At Cherſon there are ſome hundreds of veſſels, among which many equal thoſe to be found in the ports of other

ſeas; and a reaſonable inſurance may be made by ſafe underwriters; but the route through Germany does not neceſſitate an abolition of the Levant company.

Reſpecting the Inefficacy of the Quarantine Regulations in GREAT BRITAIN.

IT may be ſaid, if every kind of veſſel have leave to go to the Levant, we ſhall run a greater riſk of having the plague imported, than while the company exiſts. "In the latter caſe there are fewer veſſels, and thoſe veſſels belonging to the company, who having an intereſt that they perform the voyages preſcribed to them, it can always be known where they have been, and under what circumſtances, and ſuch veſſels being addreſſed to factors in Turkey, members of the company, and under its direction and the control of the conſuls, they cannot in an irregular manner leave Turkey without their deſtination being known, and with atteſtations from the conſuls, ſhowing the ſtate of the health of the port of the Levant they ſailed from."

In

In anſwer to this it may be obſerved, that in the ports of the Mediterranean, not only veſſels of the country, but of all other nations, arrive without any previous notice to perform quarantine, and the length of their quarantine is regulated by the bills of health which they bring, and the knowledge which the officers of the health offices have of the ſtate of the plague in every part of Turkey.

Can it be ſuppoſed that veſſels can arrive in the ports of Great Britain, without its being known whence they came? The regulations of the quarantine and the cuſtom-houſe, as they now exiſt, are ſufficient to put this beyond doubt; beſides, free veſſels muſt bring from the Levant the ſame papers, ſhowing the ſtate of the country with reſpect to health, as are now required of the company's ſhips; the riſk will not therefore be augmented by laying the trade open.

But it may be neceſſary to examine a little more narrowly how far our quarantine regulations ſecure us at preſent from the plague. After all that has been ſaid by Dr. Ruſſel, it may appear indeed ſuperfluous to touch this ſubject again, but ſince his excellent treatiſe has produced no amelioration of theſe regulations, his arguments cannot be

too

too much enforced *. I affirm, not only from my own knowledge of the nature of lazarettos, but from the opinion of officers of the health offices at Malta, Leghorn, and Marſeilles, whom I conſulted on the ſubject, THAT OUR QUARANTINE REGULATIONS ARE WHOLLY INEFFECTUAL, AND THAT WE ARE CONSTANTLY EXPOSED TO THE DANGER OF HAVING THE PLAGUE IMPORTED FROM TURKEY, BY EVERY VESSEL WHICH COMES DIRECTLY FROM THAT COUNTRY,

1ſt. It is beyond all doubt eſtabliſhed, that the miaſm, effluvia, or whatever it may be called, which produces the plague, may remain in an active ſtate, ſo as to occaſion infection, for a much longer time than is required for a veſſel to load in Turkey, make her voyage, and perform quarantine in Great Britain.

2. It is equally certain that theſe fomites, or the impregnation of ſubſtances with peſtilential miaſmata, cannot be deſtroyed but by

* Dr. Miltzer, a phyſician of Moſcow, has written in German a large book on the plague, which contains a great number of caſes which came under his obſervation; but as they all tend to ſupport a ſyſtem he has adopted, it is to be feared that the power of prepoſſeſſion in favour of his ſyſtem has often miſled his judgment.

airing

airing a certain time, by fumigating, by waſhing, by moiſtening with ſuch liquors as are anti-peſtilential, or by expoſing to a ſevere cold. Some of theſe deſtroy the miaſm in a ſhort time, ſome require a longer.

3. It appears from Dr. Ruſſel's remarks (and he has been delicate on this ſubject too) that notwithſtanding all the fidelity and diligence of conſuls, infected goods may be ſhipped for Britain, and the ſhip which carries them have a *fair bill of health.*

Now as merchandize performing quarantine in Britain and in Holland (where the regulations are ſtill worſe) are never opened and properly aired, it follows that ſuch quarantines are not ſufficient to deſtroy the fomites; nor are theſe quarantines ſafe with regard to other circumſtances; for communication with thoſe who ſupply the paſſengers and ſhip's crew with proviſions, &c. is not ſufficiently guarded, and the paſſengers and the crew, though they were not infected in Turkey, are liable every day, by touching the cargo or their effects, to catch the plague, and to communicate it to others; nor is ſmuggling impoſſible as the lazarettos now are eſtabliſhed.

It does not appear that the laws of this country will permit ſuch a police to be obſerved

ſerved in lazarettos as is indiſpenſably neceſſary to ſecure the country from the plague.

The officers of health have, in the Mediterranean, a power of putting to death immediately all thoſe who violate the laws of the quarantine in ſuch a manner as that contagion may be communicated, and their power is independent of the civil magiſtrate or any other authority. For the moſt trifling thing ſmuggled, or endeavoured to be ſmuggled, out of the lazaretto, the offenders are ſhot dead the inſtant they are detected. A perſon eſcaping from the lazaretto, were it one hour before the expiration of the quarantine, is equally puniſhed with immediate death, &c. &c. &c. *

There are neither proper places, nor buildings, nor regulations, for performing quarantine in ſafety in Great Britain, nor is the nature of quarantine underſtood in our lazarettos.

It may be aſked, how have we eſcaped the plague ſince the year 1666, when the laſt plague in London entirely ceaſed. I anſwer, chiefly by not admitting ſhips with foul bills

* The humane Leopold, when Grand Duke of Tuſcany, though he would not ſuffer a murderer to be put to death, did not alter the quarantine laws.

of

of health from the Levant, and obliging them to perform quarantine in the Mediterranean ſince that regulation took place, and by God's mercy only that veſſels with clean bills of health have not brought it.

What are we to do to be more ſecure in future, will then be aſked. The anſwer is very ſhort and obvious; to oblige all veſſels coming from the Levant, whether with *fair* or with *foul bills of health*, to perform quarantine in Malta, in Leghorn, or in Marſeilles, &c. and then with the proper atteſtations of the health officers, ſigned alſo by His Majeſty's conſuls in other ports, to admit them into Great Britain without performing a ſecond and uſeleſs quarantine.

Trade would gain by this regulation, and we ſhould be under no apprehenſion of the plague. The charges are ſmall in the Mediterranean, and not more for us than for our rivals in trade.

Malta is by far the beſt port to perform quarantine in; the regulations are even more to be relied on than at Leghorn, as they are in ſome reſpects more ſcrupulous; it lies more in the road of veſſels coming home from any part of Turkey. It is true that maſters of veſſels, for many private reaſons, which do not benefit their owners or the freighters, prefer

prefer Leghorn; but it is conſiderably out of the track of their voyage.

With reſpect to Holland, moſt certainly, Turkey goods, and cottons in particular, ought not to be admitted thence till they have been well aired; nor need we ever have imported ſuch vaſt quantities, or any quantity at all from Holland or any other place, had the Turkey trade been free in Britain.

APPENDIX.

MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS.

THESE fragments are extracts and tranſlations from original documents; they will ſerve to elucidate and confirm ſome paſſages in the preceding pages.

Of EGYPT.

THE French have it in their power either to ſeize Egypt, or to make ſuch an alliance with the begs as will open to them a communication with India.

The begs would eagerly embrace any offer which would ſecure to them a perfect independence of the Ottoman porte; or they would even become tributary to any other ſovereign or ſtate, who would maintain them in their ſeparate governments, and protect the one againſt the other, and the whole country againſt the Turks.

Had not the domeſtic affairs of France engaged all the attention of that cabinet, the effects of M. de Truguet's miſſion to Cairo would, long ago, have been viſible.

Were the Turks driven out of Europe, their force would be more concentrated; they would be ſtronger, and more able than they are now, to reduce to obedience thoſe provinces, which at preſent are either in a ſtate of open rebellion or virtual independence, and from which the porte draws neither troops nor money; they would then be able to reduce Egypt, and to defend it againſt the French. In

ſuch

ſuch a ſtate of affairs, the French would eaſily obtain from the Turks a communication through Egypt to India, which then would be attended with leſs riſk, though not with much leſs expence than it now is. It is not, however, probable that the porte would, ſo readily as the begs, permit troops to be ſent acroſs Egypt *.

Volney ſays, that memorials have been laid before the French cabinet, on the expediency of obtaining poſſeſſion of Egypt. Theſe memorials are now no ſecret.

The principal force of Egypt conſiſts in 8,000 horſe; the janizaries are not to be eſtimated as ſoldiers. There are not four cannons to defend the Pharos of Alexandria, which, according to the regulations, ſhould be garriſoned by 500 janizaries, but there are never half the number. A ſingle frigate might beat down theſe fortifications. The greateſt difficulty a foreign army would have to encounter in keeping poſſeſſion of Alexandria, is the want of water; this city has none but what is brought in canals to their ciſterns when the Nile overflows; it would, therefore, be neceſſary to make a conqueſt of the country, at leaſt as far as the river.

The revenues of the begs conſiſt in a tax on land and the cuſtoms, which produce about two millions ſterling, of which the porte receives very little. Uncertain revenues are extortions under various pretexts, and theſe are not inconſiderable.

Suez is a moſt miſerable and defenceleſs place; it has no

* Aboliſhing the Levant company in England, and ſupplying, by means of the Eaſt India company, all parts of the Turkiſh empire with India goods (as ſome of the foreign India companies do in part) would put an end to the clandeſtine trade of the company's ſervants, and to the commercial ſpeculations of the French, except ſo far as regard their own conſumption; becauſe the Engliſh Eaſt India company is able to ſend from London, and ſell in Turkey, theſe goods at a cheaper rate than they can be brought by the Red Sea or the Perſian Gulph, which always muſt be attended with much expence and conſiderable riſk.

When Great Britain is at war with France, this communication may eaſily be ſtopped, and the neceſſary ſteps may be taken during a peace. The extraordinary expence would not be great.

water

water nearer than ten miles, and that is very brackiſh, and drawn from a well. No ſhips can approach Suez nearer than three miles.

Egypt produces a conſiderable quantity of ſugar of a very good grain. Were that country under a better government, it might ſupply Europe with a great quantity. The ſugar cane grows alſo very well in Candia and in Sicily, where, if the inhabitants were more induſtrious, or were there enterpriſing people of capital among them, this would become a product of great conſequence. The ſame may be ſaid of a great part of the coaſt of Barbary.

There is a coffee tree growing in the open air at Malta, in the garden of the French miniſter, and the fruit ripens perfectly. The French have tried the experiment in Candia, and it ſucceeded; probably it would grow in Sicily. It is thought that it would become more hardy, and ripen earlier, were it engrafted on other trees or ſhrubs, and that it might be naturalized to climates leſs warm than thoſe in which it is now produced in the greateſt perfection. We know that re-production has made many plants reſiſt a colder climate better than when the parent plant was firſt imported. There can be no doubt of the coffee tree's growing in Egypt. Egypt alſo produces excellent flax and hemp.

Indigo has been cultivated with ſucceſs on the eaſtern coaſt of the Adriatic, near Zante, till the planter, it is not known by whom or for what reaſon, was aſſaſſinated. Were the French poſſeſſed of Egypt, they might abandon their Weſt India iſlands.

The French court, a very few years ago, paid much attention to theſe ſpeculations.

1ſt. *Reſpecting* PERSIA.

THE internal diſorders of Perſia are favourable to Great Britain, and to aſſiſt any party, ſo that it ſhould gain a preponderance, which might end in a ſubjugation of the whole

country, is acting contrary to the Engliſh intereſt. The weakneſs of Perſia is the ſecurity of India.

The Agwans (or Afgans) and Abdali, being of the ſect of Omar, are enemies to the other Perſians, who are followers of Ali; they are now diſtinct nations, and have their own independent ſovereigns. They are not concerned in the civil wars in Perſia. They are powerful enough to impede the marching of a Ruſſian army through Bochara to India, or the Perſians from croſſing the Indus. They themſelves may, however, be dangerous, acting in concert with any Indian power. England ſhould avoid quarrelling with them; but prevent, as much as poſſible, their having any connection with India, or receiving artillery from any quarter.

While Great Britain is firmly allied with Ruſſia, ſhe need not fear either the Perſians, Afgans, or Abdali. A diverſion made by Ruſſia would prevent, at all times, their ſending an army to India, or meddling with the diſputes in that country.

A war with theſe Aſiatic nations ſhould be a *caſus fœderis* in the treaty with Ruſſia. At preſent it is an exception.

2d. *Reſpecting* PERSIA.

THERE are three Perſian ambaſſadors in Ruſſia: one from the khan of Ghilan, one from the khan of Derbent, and one from Jafeer, khan of Iſpahan.

Theſe two laſt came to Kremenchuk, in the ſummer of 1787, after the departure of the empreſs, and had a pompous public audience of Prince Potemkin. The miniſter of the khan of Derbent was exceedingly well received by the prince; but the other, not conforming entirely to an etiquette, which he thought was to be obſerved only in an audience of the empreſs herſelf, was received, and afterwards treated with great coolneſs. The miniſter from the khan of Ghilan did not obtain permiſſion from the prince to come

to

to him, or to go to Peterſburgh, till a little time before his death, when he ſent for him to Yaſſy; but on the road, hearing of the prince's death, he ſtopt, and obtained leave of the empreſs to go to Peterſburgh.

The object of the miſſion of all theſe miniſters was, to ſolicit the aſſiſtance of the empreſs for the party of their maſters, *on her own conditions*. Probably the prince kept them in ſuſpenſe till he ſaw which party would prevail. That of Derbent will be always of importance on account of the paſs it commands, and which is the only one on that ſide of the Caſpian by land.

Almoſt every governor of a province in Perſia has ſet up for himſelf, and refuſes to take part in the quarrel, which has greatly leſſened the power of the two great competitors, Mahomed Khan (ſon of Haſſan Khan) of Mazanderan, and Jafeer Khan, in the ſouth, and who reſides at Iſpahan. Mahamud Khan is of the race of the ancient family of the Shahs, but was made an eunuch by the late Karim Khan, regent of Perſia.

Since the death of Achmet Shah, of the Afgans, the country is much weakened by the partition he made of it among his three ſons. Prince Naſſau and Mr. de St. Genie propoſed to gain over the Afgans to the intereſt of Ruſſia, in 1791, during the diſpute with Great Britain, and they propoſed to the empreſs to ſend an army through Bochara to the north of India.

They want artillery very much in Perſia, and the Ruſſians refuſe ſelling them any at Aſtrakan.

Tibet Shah, of the Abdali, near Bochara, aſked a train of artillery of the Engliſh Eaſt India company, about the time that Count Ferrieres was ſent into Perſia by Mr. de Vergennes. He intended to employ it againſt the Bocharians, who, doubtleſs, would have been aſſiſted by Ruſſia. He offered to the Engliſh a body of 25,000 cavalry to act againſt the Mahrattas. This cavalry is excellent, and 15,000 beat near 200,000 Mahrattas in a pitched battle ſome years ago.

The French offered, by Mr. de Ferrieres, a large train

of artillery to Jafir, khan of Iſpahan, to ſecure his friendſhip. A ſmall French fleet did actually come up the Perſian gulf, in June 1781, with a conſiderable number of cannon on board, but Ferrieres, for want of addreſs, did not ſucceed in his miſſion, which was as hoſtile to Ruſſia as Britain.

Bochara, at preſent, is divided into almoſt as many ſovereignties as there are villages, and there is no union among them. It is a country without ſtrength, except ſome enemy were to attack them in ſuch a manner as to oblige them to unite.

The friendſhip of this Tibet Shah may be of conſequence to the Engliſh to cultivate, as the moſt effectual check on the Bocharians, or on thoſe who would paſs through their country to invade India.

The Perſians, diſtracted as their ſtate is, ſtill remember that they have conquered India. Timur entered India in 1398, Nadir Shah in 1738, Abdallah ſeveral times from 1748 to 1765.

3d. Reſpecting PERSIA.

IN 1780, Prince Potemkin framed a project of opening a trade through Perſia to Bender-Buſhier, and India. Count Mark Wainovich ſailed in July 1781, with a ſquadron of four frigates and two armed ſloops from Aſtrakan. He ſtopped and examined the iſlands of Shiloy and Oguzzin, but found them barren ſpots; he proceeded to Aſterabad; the commodiouſneſs of the harbour and the fruitfulneſs of the country, induced him to enter into a negociation with the khan of Aſterabad, who deceived him. The Ruſſians, however, erected, to defend the harbour, a ſmall fort about fifty miles from the city of Aſterabad. The caravans from Bochara, Tibet, and India, paſs through Meſhd. The fleet wintered there, and returning, ſurveyed the bay of Bulkan, and the inlet of Karabogas

The death of the regent (Vakil) Karim Khan, having thrown Perſia into ſuch a diſorderly ſtate, that the prince abandoned

abandoned his project, but there ſtill exiſts a Ruſſian fortreſs at Zinzeli, with a ſmall but ſufficient garriſon to defend it. A conſul reſides there, who is the commandant.

Of a PROJECT, *which the* EMPRESS *of* RUSSIA *had formed to attack the* ENGLISH *in* INDIA.

WHEN the Britiſh fleet was about to ſail for the Baltic, to force the empreſs to make peace, Prince Naſſau, who was then in favour with her imperial majeſty, preſented a project of ſending an army through Bochara to Caſhmir, and thence to Bengal, to drive the Engliſh out of India. This project was conceived and drawn up by a Monſieur de St. Genie (the perſon whoſe agents ſet fire to the Dutch arſenal, &c. and had formed a ſimilar project for deſtroying the Britiſh dock-yards and ſhips, &c.)

By a manifeſto to be publiſhed, the empreſs declared that ſhe ſent the army to re-eſtabliſh the mogul on the throne of India.

Little difficulty was foreſeen in paſſing through Bochara; it was even hoped, ſeeing the object was to re-eſtabliſh on the throne of India a prince of their religion, that they would be friendly to the enterprize: however, were they not, little apprehenſion was entertained of a people ſo diſunited among themſelves, and who tremble at the name of Ruſſia.

St. Genie pretended, that there were paſſes through the mountains, and that he had people who had been in the country, ſent by Mr. de Vergennes. He preſented with his project a map, and a *marche-route* for the army.

The empreſs highly approved the plan: Prince Potemkin turned it into ridicule. Had a war taken place, it is difficult to ſay what the empreſs might not have undertaken, if not effectuated, at that period.

They counted on being joined in the north of India by the diſcontented from all parts.

Reſpecting ſome PROJECTS *of the* RUSSIANS *on* CHINA *and* JAPAN.

1*ſt* PAPER.

CAPTAIN BILLINGS, who was formerly with captain Cook round the world is returned to St. Peterſburg, from the north-eaſt part of Ruſſia, and the continent of America, whither the empreſs ſent him nine years ago.

One of his inſtructions was, to find a port for eſtabliſhing an admiralty; *i. e.* a port for building, putting into dock, and ſtationing ſhips of war and other veſſels.

A captain of the navy was alſo ſent to join him in 1787, and to examine the coaſt as far as the mouth of the river Amur, and to fix on a port. Oud, not far from the mouth of the Amur, was fixed on. Alſo, 200 werſts to the ſouth of Oud, they found a very fine port beyond the Chineſe frontier. At length, it was determined to fix the admiralty on the American coaſt, either at Prince William's Sound, or Comptroller's Bay. They alſo found many other very fine harbours on the American coaſt. The empreſs wrote, in 1787, to theſe captains, and to the commander of the Ruſſian fortreſſes, that ſhe had ſent ſix ſhips from the Baltic to Kamchatka, to co-operate with a powerful army that was to go down the Amur, and take poſſeſſion of its banks to its mouth, and all the country to the left.

A great ſaving would accrue to the Ruſſians by ſending by water proviſions for their ſettlements, which now go by land to Kamchatka, &c. at a great expence, and two thirds of them are often ſpoiled. Beſides, they propoſe to open this way a trade with Japan, China, and India, and to have in thoſe ſeas a naval force ſufficient to make themſelves reſpected.

Two ſmall ſquadrons were fitted out at Cronſtadt, for Kamchatka, but were prevented from ſailing by the Swediſh war. One of them was commanded by captain Trevanion, an Engliſhman, and was to go round Cape Horn; the other by

by captain Malofskoi, who was to go round the Cape of Good Hope.

The empreſs acted in conjunction with the court of Spain, it ſeems, for Malofskoi was to go to the Philippines, and to purchaſe large veſſels from the Spaniards.

The Ruſſians claim the coaſt of America to a conſiderable diſtance ſouth; they have not themſelves determined how far; this probably will be fixed by the utility the claimed country may promiſe to be of.

2d PAPER.

IN Auguſt 1792, Profeſſor Laxman conducted to St. Peterſburg, a Japaneſe maſter of a veſſel, that had ſome years ago been ſhipwrecked on the Ruſſian coaſt; they were in all ſixteen ſailors and the maſter; five of the ſailors only are now alive. It was not thought proper to ſend them back till they had learned enough of the Ruſſian language to communicate what knowledge of their own country they were poſſeſſed of. The maſter is a very intelligent man, but it is only by ſtealth that he can be ſpoken with, as the government is very watchful over him. He has brought with him a chart of the coaſt of Japan, which widely differs from thoſe made in Europe.

3d PAPER.

THE empreſs has appointed the ſon of Profeſſor Laxman to conduct the Japaneſe, in a Ruſſian ſhip, back to their own country, and to reſide there as her chargé d'affaires, if he is received. He has conſiderable preſents with him, and is accompanied by ſeveral engineers.

4th PAPER.

THE chargé d'affaires is returned from Japan, and has obtained leave for the Ruſſians to ſend a veſſel every year, to trade with the natives under the ſame reſtrictions as the Dutch.

The iſlands on which the Ruſſians have poſſeſſions extend within 300 miles of Japan. They think *ſome day or other* they may be maſters of the iſlands of Japan alſo (for Japan is not one, but two large iſlands) as they conceive the force they could bring could not be withſtood by ſuch a people.

With reſpect to China, an attack was much nearer; preparations were actually making for taking poſſeſſion of the Amur at Narſhinſk, where the Ruſſian gold and ſilver mines are; the chief difficulty was want of timber. The death of Prince Potemkin put a ſtop to this expedition:—when it will be reſumed is not known; it is ſuppoſed that 10,000 Ruſſians could march through China *.

A PROJECT *of the late* PRINCE POTEMKIN'S, *of purchaſing from a private proprietor the Iſlands of* LAMPEDOSA *and* LINOSA, *in the Mediterranean, and obtaining the Suzerainity of the Court of* NAPLES.

WHETHER any overture was made to the court of Naples reſpecting this object I do not know. The project was drawn up, ſome time after Minorca was taken by the French, and was much approved of by Prince Potemkin, as well as by the empreſs. The following particulars were extracted from the original paper in his poſſeſſion. It probably was laid aſide when the king of Naples conſented to receive the Ruſſian fleet into his ports in Sicily.

It was propoſed to eſtabliſh an order of knighthood, ſimilar to that of Malta, for Ruſſians and Greeks, but proofs of ancient nobility were not to be required. The particular inſtitution of the order I never ſaw; but the empreſs was to be the grand maſter, and the governor of the iſland for the time being her deputy.

* A particular account of all theſe matters, and a deſcription of the countries here alluded to, from original documents, will ſhortly be publiſhed by Mr. Arrowſmith, with valuable maps, charts, &c.

DESCRIPTION

DESCRIPTION *of the Iſland of* LAMPEDOSA.

THIS iſland is in Africa, in 35 degrees and 30 min. latitude; it is about twelve miles long and five to eight broad; it is flat, exceedingly fertile, and has plenty of water; the ſea on the ſouth ſide is not very deep, and a veſſel may anchor at a conſiderable diſtance from land; to the north it is deep all round, and the ſhore very bold. There is a rock a league from the W. S. W. point, but it is eaſily known, and may be marked: a ſhip may ſail ſafely between it and the land. Three leagues off there is a high great round rock in the ſea, which is a good mark. To the ſouth there is an exceedingly fine bay, where veſſels may anchor in fifteen to eighteen fathoms water, ſhut in from all winds except the ſouth and ſouth-weſt; the bottom is a ſoft ſand. There is a great abundance of fiſh in this bay.

The ſhore may be eaſily defended all round by forts and entrenchments. At the bottom of the bay is a creek, which is capable of being made a very fine harbour, and at a ſmall expence, nature having already done the greateſt part of the work. The entrance is from the S. S. W. There is fifteen fathoms water at its mouth, ten in the middle, which gradually decreaſes to ſix, and at the extremity there is only one fathom. To the left, halfway up the creek, there is a point which projects half acroſs it, behind which ſmall veſſels may anchor with ſafety, when the wind blows ſtrong directly into the harbour, at which time there is a great ſwell in other parts of it. To the left, from the entrance to the part where there is ten fathoms water, there is a ſhallow bay, land-locked, in which there is only three to five feet water, with a ſoft ſandy bottom: this bay may be ſhut up with a temporary wall, and the bay ſunk to any depth, at a ſmall expence, and continued a great way into the iſland, ſo as to form a large port for ſhips of any draught of water, the land being but a little above the ſurface of the water, and of a proper kind to admit of digging. Docks may alſo be formed by

by ſimply excavating the earth. The ſurface of this bay is never ruffled by the moſt violent gales of wind.

The entrance of the creek or port is ninety fathoms broad, and half a mile in length; the right hand ſhore is a rock, and near it is a hill of ſtone with a church on it; this being fortified, would defend the harbour and command the land.

Veſſels may anchor in the bay all the ſummer; and in winter, when too violent a ſtorm comes on from the ſouth or ſouth weſt, they may go to the north, round the iſland, and keep in as cloſe under ſhore as they pleaſe; when the port is fit to receive them, they may ſafely run in; they may alſo bear away for Linoſa, about twenty miles diſtant, and which lies exactly in the direction theſe winds blow. The coaſt of Linoſa is ſo bold, that ſhips may faſten on ſhore; large veſſels are, however, not more expoſed at Lampidoſa than in the road of Leghorn.

There are only ten or fifteen inhabitants on the iſland: they are Malteſe; one of them is a prieſt, and they have a paſſport of protection from France. The Barbary cruizers go often into this port as well as the Malteſe veſſels, and ſhips which come from Turkey with the plague on board, till the ſickneſs has ceaſed, when they return to Turkey, and thus ſave their ſhip and cargo from being burnt, which would be the caſe were they to go into any harbour where there is a quarantine.

The ſituation of Lampidoſa is the moſt advantageous poſſible; it is 100 miles from Suſa in Barbary, from Giorgenti in Sicily, and from the great port of Malta; 600 from Toulon, from Algiers, and the entrance into the Archipelago; from Gibraltar, Alexandria, and Conſtantinople, 950; from Tripoli, Tunis, and the ſouth point of Sicily, 160 miles.

ADVANTAGES *to* RUSSIA, *in poſſeſſing this Iſland.*

IT is the beſt ſituation of any in the Mediterranean; in that reſpect it has all the advantages of Malta for the ſtation of

of a fleet in time of peace or war; Leghorn is quite out of the way; every thing is exceedingly dear there, and the motions of the fleet are almoſt immediately known in Italy and France. It is farther from France than from the Archipelago, and is in the paſſage of all veſſels that go to or come from the Levant.

In time of war, if the iſland ſhould be in danger of an invaſion, and being attacked by a ſuperior fleet, the veſſels ſtationed there may retire to Malta or Sicily, &c. however, a fleet drawn up near the ſhore may be protected by the land batteries.

It is the beſt ſtation for protecting trade. Veſſels coming either from the ſtraits of Gibraltar or from the Levant may be met by frigates, this iſland being in the middleway.

Magazines of naval ſtores may be formed here from the Black Sea, inſtead of purchaſing them at enormous prices in Italy, in war time.

Proviſions will be produced in the iſland, but till that is the caſe, they may be had from Sicily or the coaſt of Barbary, even in time of war, as Malta is ſupplied thence, and more than two thirds of the coſt at Leghorn ſaved.

The Barbary powers will be kept in great awe by its vicinity, and prevented from ever daring to commit hoſtilities againſt Ruſſia: their ports may be kept blocked up. If Malta would cruize *ſeriouſly* againſt theſe ſtates in conjunction with the Ruſſians, the Algerine cruizers could never paſs beyond theſe iſlands, and Tunis and Tripoli may be continually blocked up.

It is alſo the beſt ſituation for an emporium for Ruſſian products brought from the Black Sea, for ſupplying the Mediterranean, and for collecting articles of return.

A lazaretto muſt be built, and thereby the expences of quarantine will be ſaved to Ruſſia.

Maxims of Government to be obſerved.

A colony and a province of the empire are to be governed by oppoſite maxims.

1. The

1. The colony muſt manufacture nothing that can be manufactured in Ruſſia, not even the raw products of the colony.

2. The colony muſt produce only raw articles, which Ruſſia does not produce, or ſuch as Ruſſia is in need of, or its veſſels.

3. The colony muſt take from Ruſſia every thing it wants, if Ruſſia can furniſh them.

4. The colony muſt trade with no other country. Ruſſia muſt receive its products, and either conſume them or ſend them to other nations, and muſt reap the advantage of exportation and navigation.

5. The inhabitants muſt be drawn as much as poſſible from other countries, not to diminiſh the population of the mother country.

6. A colony muſt be diſtant enough from the mother country to become a nurſery for ſeamen, but not ſo far off as that the voyage may injure their health; its climate muſt be healthy, that its advantages may not be counterbalanced by the loſs of thoſe of the mother country who viſit it. It muſt be in a different climate than the mother country, or theſe maxims will be oppreſſive.

Laws for the Colony.

IN eſtabliſhing the government, regard muſt be had to the genius, cuſtoms, and morals of the neighbouring Chriſtian nations.

1. No duty whatever ſhall be paid, neither on importation nor exportation of any kind of merchandize. Duty is to be paid in the Ruſſian ports as now, or with ſuch diminutions as ſhall be judged neceſſary.

2. It is prohibited to make uſe of, or to have any utenſil or inſtrument of iron, braſs, &c. or any cloth, linen, or ſail cloth, not made and imported from Ruſſia, with the exception of ſilks and other merchandize not produced or manufactured in Ruſſia, which may be had from the neighbouring countries, of which a liſt ſhall be made.

3. No

3. No foreign veſſel (except in time of war and by ſtreſs of weather) ſhall be permitted to enter the port, except it be empty of all kind of merchandize, and then it ſhall have no communication with the coloniſts, till after it has been viſited. Veſſels loaded, in need of aſſiſtance, ſhall receive it, but they ſhall be conſidered as in quarantine as long as they ſtay. Paſſengers, after the quarantine has been performed, according to the place they came from, may land with their baggage, but not with merchandize.

4. Foreigners may purchaſe merchandize in the iſland, except the products of the iſlands, and export them in their own veſſels, which arrived empty.

5. Foreigners or Ruſſians may import into Lampidoſa merchandize from Ruſſia or elſewhere, only in Ruſſian veſſels.

6. Only Ruſſian veſſels may export products to Ruſſia. The cargo unloaded in Ruſſia muſt correſpond to the note of the cargo given by the government of the iſland, and they muſt not carry it elſewhere, nor ſell any to pay charges in ports they may by diſtreſs put into, but they may mortgage the produce of the ſale in Ruſſia.

7. The products of the iſland muſt be regiſtered before the harveſt, or the bringing them into warehouſes from the fields.

8. Any perſon, of whatever nation or religion, may become an inhabitant of the iſland, and leave it when he thinks proper; but his reſidence in it ſhall not give him a right to have the Ruſſian flag for a veſſel, large or ſmall.

9. Every individual, who ſhall be poſſeſſed of a houſe, or land cultivated, to the value of five hundred roubles, ſhall be entitled to have the Ruſſian flag for one veſſel of forty tons; if he poſſeſs houſe or land to the value of 1,000 roubles, one of eighty tons; and for larger poſſeſſions, one or more veſſels in the ſame proportion. Who lends his name to others ſhall forfeit the value, and the borrower ſhall forfeit the veſſel. Property, which has given a right to have the flag, ſhall not be ſold before the paſſports of the veſſels have been delivered up to the government, and the veſſels return

to

to the port of the iſland. No proprietor of a veſſel is obliged to go himſelf to ſea with his veſſel.

10. He who ſhall ſend his family to Ruſſia, or another family in its ſtead, conſiſting of a male under thirty-five years of age and a woman under twenty-five, or a man of any age and a woman under thirty years of age and one child, or of thirty-five with two children, or the man and woman of any age with three children, who ſhall become naturalized ſubjects of the empreſs, and ſhall buy in Ruſſia immoveable property for 500 roubles, under the ſame reſtrictions as property in the iſland with reſpect to the ſale, ſuch ſender ſhall have the Ruſſian flag for a veſſel of any ſize under 200 tons, and for a larger veſſel in proportion, or for ſeveral. Neither the perſons ſent to Ruſſia ſhall be anſwerable for the conduct of the ſender, nor the ſender for the conduct of the ſent.

In the year 1779, a project of a peace with the Barbary States, was preſented to the empreſs by Prince Potemkin, who was at that time very ardent in promoting the trade of the Black Sea to the Mediterranean in Ruſſian veſſels. There were no humiliating conditions in this arrangement, as there are in moſt of the treaties of other nations. The empreſs gave for anſwer, that ſhe would never make any arrangement whatever with thoſe powers; that if they took her mercantile veſſels ſhe would know how to force the porte to oblige them to obſerve the ſtipulations of the treaty of peace; and that rather than ſend a negotiator to them, ſhe would ſend a fleet of frigates.

The number of ſailors in the different ports of Italy is much greater than is generally imagined; there are above 10,000 in the two Sicilies. Malta generally furniſhes to Spain 6,000 excellent ſeamen.

From the coaſt of the Adriatic, about Raguſa, Prevaſa, &c. the French have for many years imported a great quantity of the moſt excellent oak timber; there is, indeed, no finer timber any where to be found for the purpoſe of ſhip building, than that which grows in thoſe parts in great abundance.

A PLAN

A PLAN *for attacking the* TURKISH FLEET *in the Port of* CONSTANTINOPLE.

IT will ſerve no good end to publiſh the details of the intended operations of the Ruſſian fleet in the laſt war. The following particulars will ſufficiently ſhow the probability there was of their being crowned with ſucceſs.

The channel of Conſtantinople is of different breadths, from about one to three miles, and runs between high hills, at the foot of which are batteries, from the entrance at the Black Sea to Serrieri (a village near Buyukderé.) The north and north eaſt winds blow down the channel nine or ten months in the year. The ſoutherly winds, which blow up the channel when they reign, ſeldom laſt more than two or three days at a time; the north and north eaſt winds, on the contrary, are generally conſtant for two or three months, ſo that a fleet coming from the Black Sea at the proper ſeaſon is almoſt certain of a fair wind to enter the channel and the port of Conſtantinople.

The current is very ſtrong from the Black Sea, except when the wind has blown two or three days from the ſouth, when there is a current from the ſea of Marmora. The ſtream divides at the point of the ſeraglio; a part of the water runs into the ſea of Marmora, and a part is forced into the port, making, on the Conſtantinople ſide, a tolerably ſtrong current, which runs towards the bottom of the port, and coming out again on the Galata ſide, and by an under current, occaſions an eddy or ſtill water in the middle; hence it is, that ſhips cannot ſail at once from the port, but muſt be towed or warped in the ſtill water cloſe to the ſhore of Tophana, till they are ſo far up the ſtream (that is, to the northward) that they can make ſail without danger of being carried againſt the ſeraglio point (as has ſometimes happened) and where there is a perfect torrent.

From this deſcription it is evident, that a fleet coming from the Black Sea down the channel of Conſtantinople, with the wind and current in its favour, could with eaſe

ſail

ſail ſtraight into the port; that the Turkiſh fleet in the port cannot go out to meet it in the middle of the channel, but by towing ſlowly up the ſhore, while the enemy's fleet coming down will have, within a few fathoms of it, the wind and current in its favour, and will be able to caſt anchor, and form in whatever manner the commander may judge moſt advantageous.

If the Turkiſh fleet is not in the port, but lies in the channel in the ſtream, where it uſually is ſtationed before it ſails in the ſpring for the Archipelago, three or four miles above the port, the Ruſſian fleet may anchor at what diſtance it pleaſes from it, either to attack or not, while the Turkiſh ſhips cannot poſſibly advance againſt the current, not even by warping. In ſuch a ſituation they are expoſed to fire-ſhips, and if any part ſlip their anchors to avoid being burnt, they cannot again get into the line; the reſt muſt follow them if they will preſerve their line.

As to the batteries on the two ſhores, they may be paſſed ſo rapidly, and at ſuch a diſtance, that nothing is to be feared from them; but as the water is deep enough to admit line-of-battle ſhips to lie quite cloſe to them, and the ſhore is perfectly clean, they may be ſoon ſilenced, and particularly as only one or two guns in the flanks can bear on a ſhip before it comes oppoſite to them. The ſtones of which they are built are hard and exceedingly brittle; they are alſo ſo low and ſo expoſed, that a ſhip with grape-ſhot may ſoon drive out the gunners.

In the firſt winter of the laſt war, a Ruſſian ſixty-four gun ſhip was diſmaſted in a violent ſtorm in the Black Sea, and the officers being ignorant of the Turkiſh ports on the coaſt of Anatolia, ſaw no other means of ſaving their lives than by running into the channel of Conſtantinople. The ſhip entered it with a fair wind, but having only jury-maſts, ſhe ſailed very ſlowly, yet the Turkiſh batteries, though they kept up a conſtant fire on her, did her not the leaſt injury; when ſhe had run by all the batteries, ſhe caſt anchor in the bay of Buyukderé, and ſurrendered herſelf. The captain was afterwards blamed for not ſailing by Conſtantinople,

nople, and attempting to run between the forts of the Dardanelles, and get into the Archipelago.

This example puts the matter beyond doubt, as to the poſſibility of a fleet's ſailing by theſe batteries, reputed ſo tremendous.

STATE of the RUSSIAN ARMY, January 1795, according to the Regiſters of the College of War, from the Reports of the different Corps.

Regiments.	Number of Men in pay.
19 of artillery	38,110
11 grenadiers, of 4,075 men each 3 grenadiers, of 1,000 to 3,009 men each	51,048
51 muſketeers, compoſed of 10 companies of muſketeers and 2 companies of grenadiers, each regiment being compoſed of 2,424 men 7 muſketeers without grenadiers 1 muſketeers, of 4 battalions, 4,143 men	139,592
New arquebuſiers, ſo called	5,879
12 battalions of muſqueteers, of 1,019 men 3 battalions of muſqueteers, of 1,475 men	16,653
48 battalions, infantry in garriſon on the frontiers 10 in the country	82,393
9 corps of chaſſeurs (jäger) of 4 battalions of 998 men, each 3,992	35,928
3 battalions of chaſſeurs	2,994
5 cuiraſſiers (of 6 ſquadrons) of 1,106 and 1,125 men	5,490
10 dragoons (of 10 ſquadrons) of 1,882 men 2 with huſſars and grenadiers mounted	23,573
8 carabiniers (of 6 ſquadrons) of 1,106 men 8 carabiniers (of 5 ſquadrons) of 938 men	16,352
	2 huſſars

Regiments.	Number of Men in pay.
2 huſſars of 1,119 men - - -	
3 ſquadron huſſars - - - -	2,722
1 ſquadron huſſars de corps - -	
4 regiments chaſſeurs à cheval, of 1,838 men -	7,352
5 light horſe (of 6 ſquadrons) of 1,047 men -	5,235
6 cavalry of the Ukraine, of 1,047 men - -	6,282
16 regular Coſack cavalry - - -	30,883
Troops to guard the country (marechauſſée)	22,216
In the new provinces acquired from Poland at the firſt partition, viz.	
6 brigades of 1,819 men - - -	
5 brigades light horſe, of 1,098 men - -	23,360
4 of infantry, of 1,447, &c. in all - -	
Invalids in garriſon - - -	3,864
Soldiers ſons at ſchool for ſervice - -	16,816
Troops to aſſiſt the commiſſaries, &c. - -	1,258
Total regular troops - - Men	541,731
Irregular Coſſaks cavalry - - 21,625	
Irregular troops of the Don Coſſaks cavalry, all in actual ſervice - 24,976	46,601
A great number of other irregular troops, all cavalry, as Calmuks, Baſkirs, &c. &c. not enrolled, but ready when called out; they receive no pay; at leaſt - -	100,000
Men -	688,332

Of the regular troops there are about 300,000 men, which may be ſpared for foreign ſervice.

The cavalry is never complete, and particularly thoſe in Poland.

The irregulars are generally over-complete in time of war.

In 1796, there were 150,000 recruits raiſed for the infantry.

A very

A very great part of the empire has not yet contributed in furniſhing troops for the army, ſo that the number of regular troops may be greatly increaſed, whenever a ſtill more formidable military eſtabliſhment may be neceſſary.

LIST of the RUSSIAN FLEET, fitted out at Cronſtadt, to cruize in the Baltic, in 1795.

100 gun ſhips.

Evſevie.
Vladimir.
Saint Nicholai.
Saratov.
Raſteſlav.
Ire Erarkov.

74 gun ſhips.

Makſim Izpovednik.
Siſoi Velikoi.
Conſtantine.
Saint Peter.

74 gun ſhips.

Pobedoſlav.
Prince Guſtaf (Swediſh)
Boris.
Sophia Magdalena (Swediſh)
Vſeſlav.
Jaroſlav.

66 gun ſhips.

Omgeten (Swediſh)
Proxor.
Pobedonocets (hoſpital ſhip)

FRIGATES.

Archangel Gabriel.
Simeon.
Patrick.
Pomoſhnoi.
Raphael.
Venus.

2 cutters, Volkov and Sokole.

A LIST of the AUXILIARY FLEET, which the Empreſs of Ruſſia ſent to England, in 1795.

74 guns.

Pamit Eſtafei.
Kleb.
Peter.
Helena.

66 guns.

No. 82 (ſo called)
Graf Orloff.

66 guns.

Jona.
Philip.
Pimén.
Parmen.
Nikonor.
Reviſan (Swediſh ſhip) of oak.

FRIGATES.

FRIGATES.

The Archangel Michael	The Narva.
The Reval.	The Archipelago.
The Riga.	The Cronſtadt.

CUTTERS.

Mercury.	Letúchie.

STATE of the RUSSIAN FLEET at Sebaſtopolis, in the Spring of 1796, all the old veſſels being condemned.

	Number of guns.
1 ſhip of 90 guns - - - -	90
1 — 80 - - -	80
3 — 74 - - -	222
6 — 64 - - -	384
11 ſhips of the line - - -	776
8 large frigates - - -	362
19	1,138 guns.

Beſides thoſe on the ſtocks, which are now finiſhed.

The flotilla at Odiſſa, or Khogia-bay.

Twenty-five very large and ſixty ſmaller veſſels to tranſport troops.

They are ſixty-four to ſeventy feet long, draw ſix feet water when loaded, and carry one very large gun. They have a latine main ſail and gib, and twenty-four oars; beſides theſe, there are a great number of other tranſports, bomb veſſels, &c.

FINIS.